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Glossary
This glossary is compiled by the lead authors of the report, 
drawing on glossaries and other resources available on 
the websites of the following organizations, networks and 
projects: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 
Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action, United Nations 
Environment, United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change and World Resources Institute.
Afforestation: Planting of new forests on lands that 
historically have not contained forests.
Agroforestry: Farming management practice characterized 
by the deliberate inclusion of woody perennials on farms, 
which usually leads to significant economic and/or 
ecological benefits between woody and non-woody system 
components. In most documented cases of successful 
agroforestry, tree-based systems are more productive, more 
sustainable and more attuned to people’s cultural or material 
needs than treeless alternatives. Agroforestry also provides 
significant mitigation benefits by sequestering carbon from 
the atmosphere in the tree biomass.
Baseline/reference: The state against which change is 
measured. In the context of transformation pathways, the 
term ‘baseline scenarios’ refers to scenarios that are based 
on the assumption that no mitigation policies or measures 
will be implemented beyond those that are already in force 
and/or are legislated or planned to be adopted. Baseline 
scenarios are not intended to be predictions of the future, 
but rather counterfactual constructions that can serve to 
highlight the level of emissions that would occur without 
further policy effort. Typically, baseline scenarios are then 
compared to mitigation scenarios that are constructed 
to meet different goals for greenhouse gas emissions, 
atmospheric concentrations or temperature change. The 
term ‘baseline scenario’ is used interchangeably with 
‘reference scenario’ and ‘no policy scenario’. In much of 
the literature the term is also synonymous with the term 
‘business as usual (BAU) scenario’, although the term has 
fallen out of favour because the idea of ‘business as usual’ in 
century-long socioeconomic projections is hard to fathom. 
Biochar: A solid material obtained from thermochemical 
conversion of biomass in an oxygen-limited environment. 
Bioenergy: Energy derived from any form of biomass such 
as recently living organisms or their metabolic by-products.
Bioenergy and Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage (BECCS): 
The application of Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage (CCS) 
technology to bioenergy conversion processes. 
Black carbon: The substance formed through the incomplete 
combustion of fossil fuels, biofuels, and biomass, which is 
emitted in both anthropogenic and naturally occurring soot. 
It consists of pure carbon in several linked forms. Black carbon 
warms the Earth by absorbing heat in the atmosphere and 
by reducing albedo – the ability to reflect sunlight – when 
deposited on snow and ice.
Bottom-up model: In the context of this assessment, a model 
that represents a system by looking at its detailed underlying 
parts. Compared to so-called top-down models, which focus 
on economic interlinkages, bottom-up models of energy use 
and emissions can provide greater resolution with regards to 
sectors or mitigation technologies. 
Cancun Pledge: During 2010, many countries submitted 
their existing plans for controlling greenhouse gas emissions 
to the Climate Change Secretariat and these proposals 
were formally acknowledged under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 
Developed countries presented their plans in the shape of 
economy-wide targets to reduce emissions, mainly up to 
2020, while developing countries proposed ways to limit 
their growth of emissions in the shape of plans of action. 
Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage (CCS): A process 
in which a relatively pure stream of carbon dioxide from 
industrial, energy-related sources or captured from the 
air is separated (captured), conditioned, compressed, and 
transported to a storage location for long-term isolation 
from the atmosphere.
Carbon dioxide emission budget (or carbon budget): For 
a given temperature rise limit, for example a 1.5°C or 2°C 
long-term limit, the corresponding carbon budget reflects 
the total amount of carbon emissions that can be emitted 
for temperatures to stay below that limit. Stated differently, 
a carbon budget is the area under a carbon dioxide (CO
2
) 
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emission trajectory that satisfies assumptions about limits 
on cumulative emissions estimated to avoid a certain level 
of global mean surface temperature rise. 
Carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e): A way to place emissions 
of various radiative forcing agents on a common footing by 
accounting for their effect on climate. It describes, for a given 
mixture and amount of greenhouse gases, the amount of 
CO
2
 that would have the same global warming ability, when 
measured over a specified time period. For the purpose of 
this report, greenhouse gas emissions (unless otherwise 
specified) are the sum of the basket of greenhouse gases 
listed in Annex A to the Kyoto Protocol, expressed as CO
2
e 
assuming a 100-year global warming potential. 
Carbon intensity: The amount of emissions of CO
2
 released 
per unit of another variable such as gross domestic 
product, output energy use, transport or agricultural/ 
forestry products. 
Carbon offset: See Offset.
Carbon price: The price for avoided or released CO
2
 or 
CO
2
e emissions. This may refer to the rate of a carbon tax 
or the price of emission permits. In many models that are 
used to assess the economic costs of mitigation, carbon 
prices are used as a proxy to represent the level of effort in 
Current policy trajectory: This trajectory is based on 
estimates of 2020 emissions considering projected economic 
trends and current policy approaches including policies at 
least through 2012. Estimates may be based on either official 
data or independent analysis.
Deforestation: Conversion of forest to non-forest.
Double counting: In the context of this assessment, 
double counting refers to a situation in which the same 
emission reductions are counted towards meeting two 
countries’ pledges. 
Economic mitigation potential: The mitigation potential, 
which takes into account social costs and benefits and social 
discount rates, assuming that market efficiency is improved 
by policies and measures and barriers are removed.
Emissions gap: The difference between the greenhouse 
gas emission levels consistent with having a likely chance 
(>66 percent) of limiting the mean global temperature rise 
to below 2°C/1.5°C in 2100 above pre-industrial levels and 
the GHG emission levels consistent with the global effect of 
the INDCs, assuming full implementation from 2020. 
Emission pathway: The trajectory of annual greenhouse gas 
emissions over time. 
Global warming potential: An index representing the 
combined effect of the differing times greenhouse gases 
remain in the atmosphere and their relative effectiveness in 
absorbing outgoing infrared radiation. 
Greenhouse gases: The atmospheric gases responsible for 
causing global warming and climatic change. The major 
greenhouse gases are carbon dioxide (CO
2
), methane 
(CH
4
) and nitrous oxide (N
2
O). Less prevalent, but very 
powerful, greenhouse gases are hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), 
perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF
6
). 
Hydrofluorocarbons (HFC) bank: Quantities of 
hydrofluorocarbons already produced or in use of which a 
portion is likely to eventually be emitted to the atmosphere.
Integrated assessment models: Models that seek to 
combine knowledge from multiple disciplines in the form 
of equations and/or algorithms in order to explore complex 
environmental problems. As such, they describe the full 
chain of climate change, from production of greenhouse 
gases to atmospheric responses. This necessarily includes 
relevant links and feedbacks between socio-economic and 
biophysical processes. 
Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC): 
Submissions by Parties which identify actions each national 
government intends to take under the future UNFCCC 
climate agreement, negotiated in Paris in December 2015. 
INDCs are, in effect, the basis of post-2020 global emission 
reduction commitments that will be included in the future 
climate agreement. 
International cooperative initiatives (ICIs): Initiatives 
outside the UNFCCC aimed at reducing emissions of 
mitigation policies. 
Carbon sequestration: The process of removing carbon from 
the atmosphere and depositing it in a reservoir. 
Carbon stock: The quantity of carbon contained in a carbon 
pool or reservoir. 
Carbon tax: A levy on the carbon content of fossil fuels. 
Because virtually all of the carbon in fossil fuels is ultimately 
emitted as CO
2
, a carbon tax is equivalent to an emission tax 
on CO
2
 emissions. 
Circular carbon economy: An economy or portion of an 
economy in which waste, by-product, or ambient CO
2
 
serves as feedstock and is recycled into products (e.g., fuels, 
chemicals, plastics, carbon composites)
Co-benefits: The positive effects that a policy or measure 
aimed at one objective might have on other objectives, 
without yet evaluating the net effect on overall social 
welfare. Co-benefits are often subject to uncertainty 
and depend on, among others, local circumstances and 
implementation practices. Co-benefits are often referred to 
as ancillary benefits. 
Conditional INDC: INDC proposed by some countries that 
are contingent on a range of possible conditions, such as the 
ability of national legislatures to enact the necessary laws, 
ambitious action from other countries, realization of finance 
and technical support, or other factors. 
Conference of the Parties (COP): The supreme body of the 
Convention. It currently meets once a year to review the 
Convention’s progress. 
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climate forcers by, for example, promoting actions that 
are less greenhouse gas intensive, compared to prevailing 
alternatives. Cooperative initiatives also involve national and 
sub-national partners (they are often referred to as, simply, 
‘cooperative initiatives’). 
Kigali Agreement: The Kigali Amendment to the Montreal 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer aims 
for the phase-down of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) by cutting 
their production and consumption.
Kyoto Protocol: An international agreement, standing on its 
own, and requiring separate ratification by governments, 
but linked to the UNFCCC. The Kyoto Protocol, among other 
things, sets binding targets for the reduction of greenhouse 
gas emissions by industrialized countries. 
Land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF): A 
greenhouse gas inventory sector that covers emissions and 
removals of greenhouse gases resulting from direct human-
induced land use, land use change and forestry activities. 
Likely chance: A likelihood greater than 66 percent chance. 
Used in this assessment to convey the probabilities of 
meeting temperature limits. 
Lock-in: Lock-in occurs when a market is stuck with a 
standard even though participants would be better off with 
an alternative. 
Medium chance: A likelihood of 50–66 percent chance. 
Used in this report to convey the probabilities of meeting 
temperature limits. 
Mitigation: In the context of climate change, a human 
intervention to reduce the sources, or enhance the sinks of 
greenhouse gases. Examples include using fossil fuels more 
efficiently for industrial processes or electricity generation, 
switching to solar energy or wind power, improving the 
insulation of buildings and expanding forests and other ‘sinks’ 
to remove greater amounts of CO
2
 from the atmosphere. 
Monitoring, reporting and verification: A process/concept 
that potentially supports greater transparency in the climate 
change regime. 
Montreal Protocol: The Montreal Protocol on Substances 
that Deplete the Ozone Layer is an international treaty that 
was designed to reduce the production and consumption 
of ozone-depleting substances in order to reduce their 
abundance in the atmosphere, and thereby protect the 
Earth’s ozone layer. 
Nationally determined Contribution: Actions that, by 
ratifying the Paris Agreement, each party to the UNFCCC 
binds itself to pursuing. 
Non-state actor: In the context of climate action, ‘non-state 
actor’ includes companies, cities, subnational regions and 
investors. More broadly, non-state actors have been defined 
as entities that participate or act in international relations. 
They are organizations with sufficient power to influence 
and cause a change even though they do not belong to any 
state institution. 
Offset (in climate policy): A unit of CO
2
e emissions that 
is reduced, avoided, or sequestered to compensate for 
emissions occurring elsewhere.
Party: A state (or regional economic integration organization 
such as the European Union) that agrees to be bound by a 
treaty and for which the treaty has entered into force. 
Pigouvian tax: A tax levied on any market activity that 
generates negative externalities (costs not internalized in 
the market price). 
Pledge case: This case identifies the maximum level of 
greenhouse gas emissions that each country or Party could 
emit in 2020 and still meet its pledge – without considering 
the use of offsets. 
Reforestation: Replanting of forests on lands that have 
previously contained forests but that have been converted 
to some other use.
Scenario: A description of how the future may unfold based 
on ‘if-then’ propositions. Scenarios typically include an initial 
socio-economic situation and a description of the key driving 
forces and future changes in emissions, temperature or 
other climate change-related variables.
Short-lived climate pollutants (SLCPs): Compounds in the 
atmosphere that cause warming and have lifetimes roughly 
below 20 years, including black carbon, ozone, methane, 
and many hydrofluorocarbons.
Source: Any process, activity or mechanism that releases a 
greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse 
gas or aerosol into the atmosphere. 
Shared Socio-Economic Pathways (SSPs): Narratives 
of possible societal futures that include quantitative 
projections of socio-economic factors such as population, 
GDP, urbanization, technologies and regional heterogeneity.
SSP3 (Shared Socio-Economic Pathway – narrative 3):  This 
SSP narrative is characterized by high challenges to mitigation 
and adaptation. It assumes a focus on national and regional 
policies, slow economic growth, lack of collaboration, 
large population remaining in poverty, and low priority for 
environmental policies, leading to strong environmental 
degradation in some regions.
Subcritical coal plant: A subcritical coal fired plant uses coal 
to heat water into high-pressure steam to drive an electrical 
generator, whereas the steam in the boiler does not pass 
the supercritical point of water (as compared to supercritical 
power plants). The resulting efficiency rates are comparably 
low, i.e. below 37 percent.
Sustainable development: Development that meets the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs. 
Technical mitigation potential: Such potential is estimated 
for given scenarios assuming full implementation of best 
available pollutant reduction technology, as it exists today, 
by 2030 independent of their costs but considering technical 
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lifetime of technologies and other key constraints (e.g., 
cultural acceptance) that could limit applicability of certain 
measures in specific regions.
Top-down model: A model that applies macroeconomic 
theory, econometric and/or optimization techniques 
to aggregate economic variables. Using historical data 
on consumption, prices, incomes, and factor costs, top-
down models assess demand and emissions for goods and 
services from main sectors, such as energy conversion, 
transportation, buildings, agriculture and industry. 
Tropospheric ozone: Ozone in the lowest portion of the 
atmosphere extending from the surface to the edge of the 
stratosphere. Ozone in this region is a powerful greenhouse 
gas, especially in the mid to upper troposphere, whereas the 
portion at the surface is damaging to humans and plants.
Uncertainty: A cognitive state of incomplete knowledge that 
can result from a lack of information or from disagreement 
about what is known or even knowable. It may have many 
types of sources, from imprecision in the data to ambiguously 
defined concepts or terminology, or uncertain projections of 
human behaviour. Uncertainty can therefore be represented 
by quantitative measures (for example a probability density 
function) or by qualitative statements (for example reflecting 
the judgement of a team of experts). 
Unconditional INDCs: INDCs proposed by countries without 
conditions attached. 
2020 pledge: See Cancun Pledge. 
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Acronyms
°C Degree Celsius
BAU           Business as usual
CCS Carbon capture and storage
CO2          Carbon dioxide
CO2e         Carbon dioxide equivalent
COP            Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
EJ Exajoule
G20 Group of 20
Gt           Gigatonne
GW Gigawatt
INDC       Intended Nationally Determined Contribution
IPCC        Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
LULUCF  Land use, land-use change and forestry
m2  Square metre
Mt Million tonnes 
NDC Nationally Determined Contribution
OECD      Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
SLCP Short Lived Climate Pollutant
UNFCCC  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
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Political, industrial and civil leaders are strengthening and 
implementing the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. Yet 
current state pledges cover no more than a third of the 
emission reductions needed, creating a dangerous gap, 
which even growing momentum from non-state actors 
cannot close. This report highlights the dangers of that gap, 
the issues behind it and the means at our disposal to close it.
Fossil fuels and cement production still account for about 
70 percent of greenhouses gases. The report shows how a 
shift in technology and investment can reduce emissions, 
while creating huge social, economic and environmental 
opportunities. Even as greenhouse gas emissions continue to 
increase, carbon dioxide emissions from energy and industry 
have remained largely stable since 2014. This is mainly 
thanks to, more renewable energy and energy efficiency, 
and better infrastructure, notably in China and India. For 
example, record levels of renewable energy were added in 
2016, but for 23 percent less investment than in 2015. So, it’s 
little wonder the sector now employs eight million people, 
including more new jobs in China and the United States than 
oil and gas. 
It proves that using policies and financial frameworks to 
grow green technology markets can combat climate change, 
reduce pollution and creates a more sustainable society. 
And it demonstrates why governments, industry and the 
financial community can and must collaborate to provide 
the conditions that foster and fast-track innovative solutions. 
This is the only way to keep the global temperature rise 
below 1.5 degrees and reduce the human and economic 
cost of pollution. Many solutions are already available at 
a reasonable cost and with sound profits. Encouraging a 
faster transition will generate widely-shared benefits and 
momentum for climate action.
To understand the alternative, just look at how Hurricane 
Harvey flooded 50,000 homes in Texas with nearly 20 trillion 
gallons of rain in just five days. Listen to Annie Smith explain 
what it’s like going into labour as the floodwaters rise. 
Even in a such a wealthy nation, her survival was down to a 
human chain of neighbours and firefighters. Or what about 
the 1,200 people in India, Nepal and Bangladesh who were 
less fortunate when the floods hit there? Over 600 Nepalese 
were rescued by elephants, while Red Cross and Red 
Crescent workers struggled to find a scrap of dry land and 
saw farmers left without even drinking water. Such stories 
are a frightening reminder that we simply cannot save every 
victim, one at a time, with nothing but compassion. 
That is why governments, private sector and civil society 
must bridge this catastrophic climate gap. Talking less about 
‘fixing environmental problems’ and more about ‘grasping 
economic and social opportunities’ is crucial. I hope this 
report will nurture that change in mind set, to build a more 
prosperous future for this planet and its people.
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Executive summary
The Paris Agreement adopted in 2015 set the specific goal 
of holding global warming to well below 2 degrees Celsius 
(°C) compared to pre-industrial levels, and of pursuing 
efforts to limit warming to 1.5°C. This report, which is the 
eighth Emissions Gap Report produced by UN Environment, 
focuses on the “gap” between the emissions reductions 
necessary to achieve these agreed targets at lowest cost and 
the likely emissions reductions from full implementation of 
the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) forming 
the foundation of the Paris Agreement. It also explores 
potential for enhanced mitigation efforts in a number of 
key sectors, presenting cost-effective options for enhanced 
action to close the emissions gap.
The report has been prepared by an international team 
of leading scientists, assessing all available information, 
including that reviewed by the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) in its Fifth Assessment Report (AR5), 
as well as more recent scientific studies. The assessment 
production process has been transparent and participatory. 
The assessment methodology and preliminary findings 
were made available to the governments and stakeholders 
concerned during relevant international forums, as 
well as on the UNEP Live website. The governments of 
the countries with specific mention in the report have, 
throughout the process, been invited to comment on the 
specific assessment findings.
1. The overarching conclusions of the 
report are that there is an urgent need 
for accelerated short-term action and 
enhanced longer-term national ambition, 
if the goals of the Paris Agreement are to 
remain achievable — and that practical 
and cost-effective options are available 
to make this possible.
• The successful Paris Agreement has generated and 
incentivized action at scale by both governments 
and the private sector. Nevertheless, it marks only a 
beginning. The NDCs that form the foundation of the 
Paris Agreement cover only approximately one third 
of the emissions reductions needed to be on a least-
cost pathway for the goal of staying well below 2°C. The 
gap between the reductions needed and the national 
pledges made in Paris is alarmingly high.
• Looking beyond 2030, it is clear that if the emissions gap 
is not closed by 2030, it is extremely unlikely that the goal 
of holding global warming to well below 2°C can still be 
reached. Even if the current NDCs are fully implemented, 
the carbon budget for limiting global warming to 
below 2°C will be about 80 percent depleted by 2030. 
Given currently available carbon budget estimates, the 
available global carbon budget for 1.5°C will already be 
well depleted by 2030.
• Action by subnational and non-state actors, including 
regional and local governments and businesses, is key to 
enhancing future ambition. There is still limited evidence 
that non-state action will fill a significant part of the 
emissions gap, although there is significant potential 
for it to do so. Enhanced monitoring and reporting of 
non-state actions and the resulting emissions reductions 
be will be essential to making pledged actions transparent 
and credible.
• More ambitious NDCs will be necessary by 2020 and 
should build on the existing, extensive knowledge 
about the cost-effective policies and measures that can 
be taken. A systematic assessment of sectoral mitigation 
options presented in the report shows that the gap can 
be closed before 2030 by adopting already known and 
cost-effective technologies, often by simply adopting 
or adapting best practice examples already deployed in 
the most innovative country contexts. The assessment 
in Chapter 4 shows that emissions could be reduced 
by up to 30 to 40 GtCO
2
e per annum, with costs below 
US$100/tCO
2
e. It is remarkable that a large part of this 
potential comes from just six relatively standardized 
categories: solar and wind energy, efficient appliances, 
efficient passenger cars, afforestation and stopping 
deforestation. These six present a combined potential of 
up to 22 GtCO
2
e per annum.
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• This eighth Emissions Gap Report assesses in more detail 
some specific options that may contribute to closing the 
gap. These include addressing the possibilities and risks 
associated with technologies and practices to remove 
carbon dioxide from the atmosphere via enhanced 
land-use sinks and advanced storage technologies. 
The land-use related options offer an annual reduction 
potential in 2030 of the order of between 4 and 
12 GtCO
2
e, forming part of the sectoral potential 
mentioned above. It is still too early to judge the potential 
for the emerging technology options.
• The report also covers an assessment of the potential 
contribution from reductions in short-lived climate 
pollutants (SLCPs), although they are not directly 
comparable with reductions in long-lived greenhouse 
gases. Reductions of SLCPs limit the rate of short-term 
warming, and when sustained and combined with CO
2
 
reductions, these reductions also help to limit long-term 
warming, which is the ultimate aim of closing the 
emissions gap.
• Finally, the report presents an assessment of recent 
developments in the coal sector, and discusses how a 
transition away from coal could be incentivized. The 
assessment shows that a transition could take place 
remarkably quickly, if political will and market signals 
provide adequate incentives, but it also shows that a just 
transition requires careful consideration of the social and 
energy system impacts and additional policies to cope 
with such impacts. If these effects are not addressed 
from the beginning of a transition process, they very 
often prevent or hamper the process significantly. 
Government policy is essential not only to incentivize 
innovation, but also to mitigate adverse effects and to 
ensure social and political acceptability. It is essential 
to do everything possible to ensure that the benefits 
stemming from a transition are shared.
2. The Facilitative Dialogue and the 
2020 revision of the NDCs are the 
last opportunity to close the 2030        
emissions gap.
These key messages send a set of strong signals to the 
Facilitative Dialogue process scheduled to take place under 
the aegis of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) during 2018, and suggest that 
ambition should be significantly enhanced in the new and 
updated NDCs that will be submitted in 2020.
 
If the climate targets in the Paris Agreement are to remain 
credible and achievable, all countries will need to contribute 
to significantly enhancing their national ambitions, 
augmenting their national policy efforts in accordance with 
respective capabilities and different circumstances, and 
ensuring full accounting of subnational action. Furthermore, 
a strong commitment to facilitating and stimulating 
widespread, equitable and accountable innovation will be 
needed, to ensure that the best the world can offer in terms 
of cost-effective technology, policy and business models is 
available wherever needed. Non-state actors need to adhere 
to high standards of accountability in this respect.
Missing the 2020 option of revising the NDCs would make 
closing the 2030 emissions gap practically impossible. 
3. Global CO2 emissions from energy and 
industry have remained stable since 2014, 
but overall greenhouse gas emissions 
continue to rise slowly.
Global carbon dioxide (CO
2
) emissions from fossil fuel 
combustion, cement production and other industrial 
processes account for about 70 percent of total global 
greenhouse gas emissions, and were estimated at a total 
of 35.8 GtCO
2
 for 2016, as shown in figure ES.1. There is 
increasing evidence that these emissions have remained 
more or less stable for the past three years, reversing the 
previous tendency of increases each year. This may indicate 
a decoupling of energy- and industry-related CO
2
 emissions 
from economic growth during these years, in which global 
Gross Domestic Product increased by between 2 and 
3 percent annually. The main drivers have been reduced 
growth in coal use since 2011, primarily in China and 
secondarily in the United States, growing renewable power 
capacity and generation, especially in China and India, 
combined with enhanced energy efficiency and structural 
changes in the global economy.
However, the trend is still over a relatively short period, and 
could potentially be reversed if growth in the world economy 
accelerates. Furthermore, continued investment in more 
traditional technologies, especially coal-fired power stations, 
implies significant technological lock-in and long-term 
commitment to continued emissions. The assessment shows 
that between 80 and 90 percent of coal reserves worldwide 
will need to remain in the ground, if climate targets are to be 
reached. This compares with approximately 35 percent for 
oil reserves and 50 percent for gas reserves.
Total global greenhouse gas emissions, including emissions 
from land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF), are 
estimated at about 51.9 GtCO
2
e/year in 2016. The time series 
data for global total CO
2
 and greenhouse gas emissions used 
for the Emissions Gap Reports have been updated since the 
2016 report, with the estimate for global total greenhouse 
gas emissions in 2014 now updated to 51.7 GtCO
2
e, and the 
estimate for global total CO
2
 emissions in 2015 updated to 
35.6 GtCO
2
. Emissions still show a slowdown in growth in 
the past two years, with calculated increases of 0.9 percent, 
0.2 percent and 0.5 percent in 2014, 2015 and 2016 
respectively, as shown in figure ES.1.
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4. Global greenhouse gas emissions in 2020 
are likely to be at the high end of the 
range of the scenarios consistent with the 
2°C and 1.5°C goals respectively, making 
it increasingly difficult to be on track to 
meet the 2030 emission goals.
G20 countries are collectively on track to meet the middle 
range of their Cancun Pledges for 2020, but for some 
countries further action is needed and there are still many 
opportunities to further reduce emissions in the short term, 
as documented in Chapter 4. While praise for meeting a 
target is merited, it should be remembered that it does not 
give any indication of how ambitious the target was.
The assessment shows that according to all available 
estimates, four of the G20 members – China, the EU28, India 
and Japan – are on track to meet their 2020 pledges without 
purchasing offsets. A further three – Australia, Brazil and 
Russia – are on track according to most estimates.
According to both government and independent estimates, 
Canada, Mexico, the Republic of Korea, South Africa and the 
United States are likely to require further action, possibly 
supplemented by purchased offsets, in order to meet their 
2020 pledges. Mexico’s 2020 pledge is conditional on the 
provision of adequate financial and technological support 
from developed countries as part of a global agreement, and 
the fulfilment of this condition has not been assessed.
Independent estimates of the Republic of Korea’s 2020 
emissions are well above the level implied by its pledge. 
The country’s amended Green Growth Basic Act, however, 
replaced the 2020 pledge with the NDC target for 2030, 
implying there no longer is a 2020 target.
Insufficient information is currently available to determine 
whether Indonesia is on track to meet its pledge. 
Independent projections span a wide range, and official 
projections reflecting current policies are unavailable.
Finally, Argentina, Saudi Arabia and Turkey have not 
made greenhouse gas reduction pledges for 2020. All 
three countries submitted post-2020 pledges to the 
UNFCCC as part of their Intended Nationally Determined 
Contributions (INDCs).
The limited collective ambition of the Cancun Pledges means, 
however, that the global greenhouse gas emissions in 2020 
are likely to be at the high end of the range of the scenarios 
consistent with the 2°C and 1.5°C targets respectively. 
This increases the challenge of meeting the necessary 
2030 emission goals. With the limited time to 2020, it will 
be difficult to realize any significant additional emission 
reductions, but many actions can still be initiated that both 
lead to short-term reductions and facilitate pathway changes 
for the next decade.
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Figure ES.1.a: Global greenhouse gas emissions for top six 
emitting countries and regions (excluding land use, land-use 
change and forestry), international transport emissions, and land 
use, land-use change and forestry emissions. 
Figure ES.1.b: Global carbon dioxide emissions per region from 
fossil fuel use, cement production and other processes, and from 
international transport.
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5. A large gap exists between 2030 emission 
levels and those consistent with least-
cost pathways to the 2°C and 1.5°C goals 
respectively. The 2°C emissions gap for 
the full implementation of both the 
conditional and unconditional NDCs for 
2030 is 11 to 13.5 GtCO2e. The gap in  
the case of the 1.5°C target is 16 to  
19 GtCO2e.
The assessed global scenarios show that if least-cost 
trajectories are followed, then emissions of all greenhouse 
gases should not exceed 42 GtCO
2
e in 2030, if the 2°C target 
is to be attained with higher than 66 percent chance. The 
level for 1.5°C has in earlier reports been reported with 
higher than 50 percent probability and is about 5 GtCO
2
e 
lower than the central estimate for the 2°C pathways. New 
studies are, however, becoming available that present least-
cost pathways starting from 2020 that could return global 
warming to below 1.5°C by 2100 with higher than 66 percent 
probability. These studies indicate a much lower required 
level of around 24 GtCO
2
e, which would imply a need for 
significantly faster and deeper reductions than previously 
anticipated. The number of published studies on this topic 
is considered too low to allow for inclusion in the gap 
assessment with a high level of confidence in 2017, but it is 
expected that further analysis of these 1.5°C pathways with 
higher than 66 percent probability will be included in the 
2018 report.
Figure ES.2: Global greenhouse gas emissions under different scenarios and the emissions gap in 2030 (median estimate and 10th to 90th 
percentile range).  
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The emissions gap related to the 2°C goal for the full 
implementation of NDCs for 2030 is 11 to 13.5 GtCO
2
e, 
for conditional and unconditional pledges respectively. 
These estimates are slightly lower than the 12 to 14 GtCO
2
e 
estimates in the 2016 report, due to updated information 
from five global studies with lower emission projections 
resulting from the NDCs. The emissions gap in the case of 
1.5°C with higher than 50 percent probability is found to 
be 16 to 19 GtCO
2
e for conditional and unconditional NDCs 
respectively, which is higher than the 15 to 17 GtCO
2
e 
estimates in the 2016 report, due to new studies on 1.5°C 
pathways and the harmonization of 2010 emission levels 
across scenarios. As indicated above, there are not enough 
studies available to give a reliable estimate for a gap in the 
case of higher than 66 percent probability, but it is clear the 
gap will be larger.
The alarming number and intensity of extreme weather 
events in 2017, such as hurricanes, droughts and floods, 
adds to the urgency of early action. These events underline 
the importance of the Paris Agreement, which seeks to limit 
warming to “well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and 
pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C 
above pre-industrial levels”. The particular class of models 
referred to in this Emissions Gap Report looks at meeting 
the Paris Agreement goals at the lowest possible costs, 
and therefore results do not change even when the risks of 
climate change become more apparent.
Implications for the carbon budget: If the current NDCs 
are fully implemented, the carbon budget for limiting 
global warming to below 2°C with higher than 66 percent 
probability will be about 80 percent depleted by 2030. Given 
currently available carbon budget estimates, the available 
global carbon budget for 1.5°C with at least 50 percent 
probability will already be well depleted by 2030. 
Implications for temperature levels in 2100: Full 
implementation of the unconditional NDCs and comparable 
action afterwards is consistent with a temperature increase 
of about 3.2°C by 2100 relative to pre-industrial levels. Full 
implementation of the conditional NDCs would lower the 
projection by about 0.2°C.
6. Most G20 countries require new policies 
and actions to achieve their NDC pledges.
This 2017 report includes an updated assessment of the 
emissions associated with the NDC pledges and current 
policies of each of the G20 countries, including the EU. 
As these countries collectively generate around three 
quarters of global greenhouse gas emissions, their success 
in implementing (or exceeding) their NDC pledges will 
have a major impact on the achievement of the global 
temperature goals.
The assessment shows that for many countries, implementing 
their NDC would lead to lower emissions than the current 
policies scenario, or in other words that additional policies 
will have to be implemented to meet the NDC target. The 
level of ambition embedded in NDCs varies considerably: 
for some countries the NDC target is actually above current 
projected policy case emissions.
With this caveat, recent studies assessed suggest that 
Brazil, China, India and Russia are likely to – or are roughly 
on track to – achieve their 2030 NDC targets with currently 
implemented policies. Conversely, Argentina, Australia, 
Canada, the European Union, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, 
South Africa, the Republic of Korea and the United States are 
likely to require further action in order to meet their NDCs, 
according to government and independent estimates. 
7. Subnational and non-state action has the 
potential to reduce the emissions gap 
by a few gigatonnes CO2e/year by 2030. 
Improved information about the impact 
of subnational and non-state action is 
urgently required.
Subnational and other non-state actors, such as private 
companies, make a considerable contribution to global 
greenhouse gas emissions. For example, the world’s 100 
largest emitting publicly traded companies account for 
around a quarter of global greenhouse gas emissions. 
State and non-state actions can both overlap and mutually 
reinforce each other, but it is currently unclear how many of 
the actions by non-state actors are included in the national 
pledges. The assessment provided here suggests that the 
aggregated additional impact of the various non-state 
initiatives is of the order of a few GtCO
2
e in 2030, over 
and above current NDCs. This is potentially a significant 
contribution to closing the gap, if the initiatives reach their 
stated goals, and if these reductions do not displace actions 
elsewhere. Coordinated, comparable and transparent 
reporting and verification of actions by all actors is essential 
to clarify effects and possible overlaps. This would also 
help in gaining recognition of ambitious action and would 
facilitate replication.
8. The Kigali Amendment and the ICAO 
Offsetting Scheme provide some 
welcome additional momentum and may 
contribute just under 1 GtCO2e to closing 
the gap in 2030.
The Kigali Amendment, signed in December 2016, aims to 
phase out the use and production of hydrofluorocarbons, 
and the agreement is expected to accelerate this process, 
which some countries have already included in their NDCs. 
The impact compared to a no-action baseline would globally 
be of the order of 0.7 GtCO
2
e/year in 2030. Since some 
countries already include hydrofluorocarbons phase-down 
in their NDCs, the additional impact compared to the NDCs 
will be smaller. UN Environment will in 2018 undertake a 
new specific assessment to shed more light on the impacts 
of implementing the Kigali Amendment.
International aviation emissions are expected to grow 
from 0.5 GtCO
2
e in 2017 to around 1.1 GtCO
2
e in 2030, 
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with increasing traffic demand over the coming decades. 
Domestic aviation is included in many countries’ NDCs 
and related national actions, but international aviation is 
not. The ICAO’s Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme 
for International Aviation (CORSIA) established to reduce 
emissions from international aviation is estimated to have 
an impact of 0 to 0.3 GtCO
2
 per year on global emissions in 
2030. The wide range implies that the result will depend on 
the way the offsetting rules will be set. The long-term impact 
will likely be larger. 
9. The assessment of the emissions gap and 
the mixed progress on implementation 
of both the Cancun Pledges and the NDCs 
show that there is a significant distance 
between the current collective ambitions 
and commitments and what is required to 
meet the temperature goals of the Paris 
Agreement. It is therefore absolutely 
crucial that the Facilitative Dialogue 
in 2018 addresses the need and the 
opportunities for significantly enhanced 
action pre-2030, including by assisting 
and informing countries in urgently 
strengthening their NDCs.
In order to inspire the process of strengthening NDCs, this 
2017 Emissions Gap Report addresses a number of key 
opportunities for closing the 2030 emissions gap, including:
• A systematic review of the mitigation potential of a 
large number of sector actions. The results here are 
unambiguous: technologies and institutional innovations 
are available to bridge the emissions gap, and at 
reasonable cost.
• A detailed assessment of global developments in the 
coal sector that also examines the options and barriers 
for a gradual coal phase-out.
• Opportunities offered by limiting emissions of SLCPs. 
Reducing these pollutants will limit the rate of short-
term warming, and when sustained and combined with 
CO
2
 reductions, help limit long-term warming, which is 
the ultimate aim of closing the emissions gap.
• Options for both biological and technological carbon 
dioxide removal: some of the former come with decades 
of experience, while many of the latter are still in 
their infancy.
10. The emissions reduction potential by 
2030 at costs <US$100/tCO2e, compared 
to the current policy trajectory, is 
sufficient to close the emissions gap in 
2030 under all cases assessed. It could in 
addition provide many benefits for other 
important environmental, social and 
economic goals.
The systematic review presents estimates of the global 
emission reduction potentials that could be achieved in 2030 
in six key sectors: agriculture, forestry, buildings, energy, 
industry and transport. For all sectors, the main categories 
of emissions reduction for 2030 are identified. 
The focus is on the socio-economic potential, meaning 
that the numbers presented refer to the total emissions 
reductions that can be achieved using all technologies 
available in a given future year. The potential is defined by 
all reductions that can be achieved at a cost of no more 
than US$100/tCO
2
e, using social, not private, payback 
times. Most of the potential, however, can be achieved at a 
cost significantly below US$100/tCO
2
e.
There are important uncertainties related to technology 
development assumptions and implementation rates, such 
as how rapidly solar photovoltaic energy production can be 
scaled up, or the rate at which buildings can be retrofitted. 
Most of the underlying analysis introduces some degree of 
‘realism’ to the assessment and its respective assumptions. 
In general, the potentials can be achieved if countries 
around the globe are willing to establish necessary policies 
that enable the available solutions to be implemented and 
barriers to be addressed.
The total of all emission reduction potentials in the 
assessment amounts to 35–41 GtCO
2
e/year in 2030, with 
details shown in table ES.1. However, there are some 
areas where estimates of potentials are fairly new, and it 
is uncertain whether it is indeed feasible to realize them 
by 2030. Leaving out these areas will reduce the emission 
reduction potential to 30–36 GtCO
2
e, which is still more 
than double the 2030 emissions gap for the 2°C goal.
An important question is of course what are the policies, 
measures and costs required to implement a substantial 
part of these emission reduction options? Although 
answering in full is beyond the scope of the current 
assessment, some first comments are made in Chapter 4. 
It is remarkable that a large part of the potential consists 
of just six relatively standardized categories: solar and 
wind energy, efficient appliances, efficient passenger 
cars, afforestation and stopping deforestation. These six 
measures sum up a potential of 15–22 GtCO
2
e, making up 
over 40 percent of the total potential. All these measures 
can be realized at modest or even net-negative incremental 
costs, and in most of the cases there are proven policies 
that can be replicated.
For both current and evolving technologies, the assessment 
reported here are at the global level. Further work will be 
needed to disaggregate by region and design appropriate 
mitigation plans for each country. Countries will need to 
undertake more specific assessment of the key options 
relevant to their own circumstances as part of the 
collective effort to boost the global mitigation ambitions. 
It will be important to ensure that international technical 
and financial support is available to facilitate action in 
developing countries. 
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Table ES.1: Overview of emission reduction potentials in 2030 (GtCO
2
e per year). 
Sector Category Emission reduction potential 
in 2030 (GtCO2e)
Category Sectoral aggregate potential 
(GtCO2e)
Agriculture
Cropland management 0.74
Basic 3 (2.3 - 3.7)
Rice management 0.18
Livestock management 0.23
Grazing land management 0.75
Restoration of degraded 
agricultural land
0.5 - 1.7
Peatland degradation and 
peat fires
1.6
Additional 3.7 (2.6 - 4.8)
Biochar 0.2
Shifting dietary patterns 0.37 - 1.37
Decreasing food loss and 
waste
0.97 - 2
Buildings
New buildings 0.68 - 0.85
Basic
1.9 (1.6 - 2.1)
Existing buildings 0.52 - 0.93
Renewable heat - bio 0.39
Renewable heat - solar 0.21
Lighting 0.67 Basic (indirect emissions) See energy sector 
potential
Appliances 3.3
Energy sector 
Solar energy 3 - 6
Basic 10 (9.3 – 10.6)
Wind energy 2.6 - 4.1
Hydropower 0.32
Nuclear energy 0.87
Bioenergy 0.85
Geothermal 0.73
CCS 0.53
Bioenergy with CCS 0.31 Additional 0.3 (0.2 - 0.4)
Methane from coal 0.41
Basic 2.2 (1.7 - 2.6)
Methane from oil and gas 1.78
Forestry
Restoration of degraded forest 1.6 - 3.4 Basic 5.3 (4.1 - 6.5)
Reducing deforestation 3
Industry
Energy efficiency - indirect 1.9 Basic (indirect emissions) See energy sector 
potential
Energy efficiency - direct 2.2
Basic 5.4 (4.2 - 6.6)
Renewable heat 0.5
Non-CO
2
 greenhouse gases 1.5
CCS 1.22
Transport
Heavy Duty Vehicles potential 
(efficiency, mode shift)
0.88
Basic 4.7 (4.1 - 5.3)
Light Duty Vehicles  potential 
(efficiency, mode shift, electric 
vehicles)
2.0
Shipping efficiency 0.7
Aviation efficiency 0.32 - 0.42
Biofuels 0.63 - 0.81
Other
Landfill gas recovery 0.4 Basic 0.4 (0.3 - 0.5)
Enhanced weathering 
measures
0.73 - 1.22 Additional 1 (0.7 - 1.2)
Total basic emission reduction potential 33 (30 - 36) 
Total emissions reduction potential including additional 
measures
38 (35 - 41)
Note: Although for many emission reduction categories a single point estimate is given, there are always uncertainties, assumed to be ±25 percent. For the categories 
peatland degradation and peat fires, biochar and energy efficiency, the potential in 2030 is more uncertain. Therefore, a higher uncertainty range of 50 percent is 
applied to these categories. In the final column, the categories are aggregated to the sectoral level. The numbers in the third column are not corrected for overlap 
between measures. The numbers in the final column are corrected for overlap, and this is also reflected in the total potential. Therefore, the total is smaller than the 
sum of the individual potentials in the third column. The aggregate potentials for indirect emission reductions in buildings and industry are reflected in the electricity 
sector potential.
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11. Avoiding building new coal-fired power 
plants and phasing out existing ones is 
crucial to closing the emissions gap. This 
will require careful handling of issues 
such as employment impacts, investor 
interests, grid stability and energy access 
to achieve a just transition.
Many of the sectoral mitigation options presented above 
will, if implemented at scale, bring significant changes to 
the global energy sector, especially in growing but quickly 
decarbonizing electricity capacity. For this to happen, it 
will be important to also reduce the fossil-based electricity 
capacity already in place and under construction and avoid 
planning new coal plants. A gradual phase-out of coal is 
needed, recognizing that coal-based power generation will 
remain significant for a number of both developing and 
industrialized countries until at least 2030. 
Today, there are an estimated 6,683 operating coal-fired 
power plants in the world, with a combined installed capacity 
of 1,964 GW. If these plants were operated until the end of 
their lifetime and not retrofitted with carbon capture and 
storage (CCS), the stock of operating power plants would 
emit an accumulated amount of around 190 GtCO
2
.
 
Without additional policy interventions, the number of coal-
fired power plants will continue to increase. As of early 2017, 
across the globe there were additional 273 GW of coal-
fired capacity in construction and 570 GW at the planning 
stage. Ten countries make up approximately 85 percent of 
the entire coal pipeline, with 700 GW being built or planned 
in China, India, Turkey, Indonesia, Vietnam, Japan, Egypt, 
Bangladesh, Pakistan and the Republic of Korea alone. As 
shown in table ES.2, these new plants, if operated until 
the end of their assumed lifetime of 40 years, would lead 
to additional accumulated emissions of approximately 
150 GtCO
2
. In comparison, the total remaining carbon budget 
is approximately 1,000 GtCO
2
 for staying below 2°C and 
less than 600 GtCO
2
 for staying below 1.5°C. On a positive 
note, in 2016 a large number of planned coal-fired power 
plants— particularly in China and India — were shelved 
or cancelled, and globally there was a slower rate of coal 
expansion generally.
Large-scale phase-out of coal will pose very different 
challenges and solutions for individual countries, and with 
respect to existing plants, recently built plants and those in 
the pipeline.
Chapter 5 discusses experiences with possible market and 
non-market-based policy instruments and how these could 
be used to incentivize a transition away from coal. A set of 
country assessments presents the challenges a transition 
would have for the largest coal-using and exporting 
countries. One example, from India, illustrates some of these 
challenges by showing that coal production, transport, usage 
and ash disposal employ almost one million people. Coal 
mining is the second largest employer in India — the largest 
being the railroads, which again has coal transporting as its 
number one product and revenue source.
The country examples show that if a transition is to succeed, 
it will need to be carefully managed, ensuring that impacts 
on workers, coal owners, industry and energy users are, as 
far as possible, addressed up front and that compensation 
measures are developed in consultation with these 
key stakeholders. Failing to address the interests of the 
potential “losers” in any transition process has made many 
societal or industrial transitions fail or created political and 
social unrest. 
Region Announced Pre-permitted Permitted Construction Operating Total
East Asia 12.19 12.34 6.30 30.41 126.41 187.66
South Asia 6.21 9.87 5.89 8.28 27.42 57.67
South-East Asia 7.00 5.78 2.63 5.21 8.95 29.60
European Union 0.60 0.66 0.17 1.14 7.22 9.79
Non-EU Europe 4.86 5.30 1.70 0.44 3.56 15.87
Middle East and Africa 5.83 1.16 1.94 2.14 2.46 13.52
Latin America 0.61 0.17 0.28 0.37 1.74 3.18
Eurasia 1.65 0.00 0.00 0.20 2.69 4.54
North America 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.00 8.85 9.01
Australia and New 
Zealand
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.14 1.14
Total 38.97 35.28 19.08 48.20 190.44 331.97
Note:
• The figures take into account the remaining lifetimes of existing plants.
• A lifetime of 40 years is assumed for newly constructed power plants.
• European Union data refers to the current 28 Member States. North America refers to both Canada and the United States.
• It is assumed that not all permitted, pre-permitted and announced power plants come online.
Source: Edenhofer et al. (2017) and Shearer et al. (2017)
Table ES.2: Committed carbon dioxide emissions for coal-fired power plants, in GtCO
2
, by status and region.
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12. Reductions in SLCP emissions can be an 
important part of global mitigation efforts 
and contribute to the achievement of 
a number of Sustainable Development 
Goals. Significant potential, beyond 
existing commitments, is achievable with 
proven technologies, but dedicated policy 
action to establish legal frameworks 
and institutional capacity is required to   
unlock it. 
SLCPs are agents that have a relatively short lifetime in 
the atmosphere — from a few days to a few decades — 
and a warming influence on climate. The main SLCPs are 
black carbon, methane and tropospheric ozone, and some 
hydrofluorocarbons are also included. Although some SLCPs, 
particularly black carbon, are not greenhouse gases and 
not included under the UNFCCC and its Paris Agreement, 
most SLCPs are considered in evaluations of pathways 
towards the temperature targets. Reducing these pollutants 
will limit the rate of short-term warming and, when 
sustained and combined with CO
2
 reductions, will help limit 
long-term warming, which is the ultimate aim of closing the 
emissions gap.
A complete separation between these pollutants and CO
2
 
reductions is also not possible, as decarbonization strategies 
will lead to reductions in some SLCPs, including black carbon, 
about a third of which originates from fossil fuel sources, 
and energy efficiency improvements can reduce all types of 
emissions. SLCP reductions have the potential to decrease 
the rate and degree of warming in the next few decades, due 
to the rapid effect of their mitigation on temperature.
Studies have estimated that mitigation of SLCPs has the 
potential to avoid up to 0.6°C of warming by mid-century 
and in this way, to reduce impacts that are related to 
cumulative heat uptake, helping ensure a steady and lower 
temperature trajectory towards the temperature goals of 
the Paris Agreement. In addition, there will be a number of 
other benefits associated with a reduced emissions pathway, 
notably improved air quality.
Successful cooperation on the individual building blocks of 
the international climate regime, such as the Climate and 
Clean Air Coalition or the Montreal Protocol, will build the 
trust and confidence required to help accelerate progress on 
some of the bigger elements of the Paris Agreement.
In many NDCs it is usually difficult or impossible to identify 
particular compounds, as targets are given in CO
2
e often 
without specific targets for methane, hydrofluorocarbons 
or black carbon. Instead the NDCs provide a broad list of 
sectors and actions where mitigation action is planned. Four 
countries specifically address black carbon in their NDCs—
Mexico, Chile, Nigeria and Canada—with Mexico specifying 
a target. 
13. Carbon dioxide removal from the 
atmosphere can provide an additional 
mitigation element to conventional 
emission abatement strategies. Biological 
CO2 removal through afforestation, 
reforestation, forest management, 
restoration of degraded lands, soil carbon 
enhancement and biochar application in 
agriculture can play an immediate role, 
and can also significantly contribute 
to achieving several other Sustainable 
Development Goals. 
Carbon dioxide removal refers to a cluster of technologies, 
practices and approaches that remove and sequester carbon 
dioxide from the atmosphere. Despite the common feature 
of removing CO
2
, these technologies and approaches are 
very different. In generic terms, they can be distinguished as 
biological or engineered options. For biological options such 
as afforestation, reforestation or soil carbon management, 
experience has been accumulated over decades. On the 
other hand, engineered options such as bioenergy combined 
with carbon capture and storage, or certainly direct air 
capture, have large potential but are still in the early stages 
of development. 
As indicated in the sectoral mitigation options presented in 
table ES.1, the potential for significant contributions to close 
the gap exists in the agricultural and forestry sectors. Chapter 7 
presents a more detailed assessment of some of these 
options, along with some of the more recent technological 
approaches to capturing and storing CO
2
.
Land-based carbon removal options, including forests, 
wetlands and soils have been managed by humans for 
many years and as such, there is a wealth of knowledge 
that can be readily applied today with confidence. In 
addition, these approaches present opportunities to meet 
other global sustainability goals, such as improved water 
quality, ecosystem restoration, biodiversity preservation and 
improved crop yields. The total annual reduction potential 
is in the order of 4 to 12 GtCO
2
e, with relatively wide ranges 
for the various options; some studies indicate a significantly 
higher potential.
For these land-based options to contribute to carbon removal 
at the gigatonne scale, large land areas and ecosystems may 
need to be engaged in new ways. There are substantial 
uncertainties regarding effective carbon removal rates, 
possible volumes and duration of effective sequestration, 
and implications for ecosystem services and food production 
currently associated with these land areas.
The chapter presents a detailed assessment of one specific 
set of options that has briefly been addressed in previous 
Emissions Gap Reports—bioenergy with carbon capture 
and storage. This option warrants a specific focus, because 
it forms an integral part of the solutions considered within 
many integrated assessment models, and its components are 
already applied at a large scale. Most scenarios that aim to 
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keep global warming below 2°C, and especially those aiming 
for below 1.5°C, include contributions from this option at the 
gigatonne scale. Achieving these reductions, however, would 
entail significant land-use and water-resource requirements 
and substantial investment; the question of whether the 
model assumptions are realistic is therefore a relevant one. 
In addition, while bioenergy and carbon capture and storage 
are relatively mature technologies individually, there is very 
little deployment of them in combination, especially at a 
large scale. Whether the combined option can thus be scaled 
up promptly to help achieve the ambitious climate targets 
remains uncertain. Mitigation action in other sectors should 
therefore not be delayed.
As for engineering options, the chapter provides an 
assessment of emerging options, such as direct air capture 
combined with carbon storage, accelerated weathering of 
materials, ocean alkalinity enhancement and conversion of 
CO
2
 into long-lived products. Most of these options are at 
early piloting stage, so it is hard to judge the technical and 
economic potential in the short term, and the chance of 
these technologies making a real contribution to closing the 
2030 gap seems unrealistic. Beyond 2030, these technologies 
may show additional important reduction potential. When 
global emissions need to move towards net zero by around 
2050, CO
2
 removal may offer some welcome flexibility and, 
as with other technologies, cost and performance will likely 
improve with increased deployment.
Figure ES.3: Major strategies for negative emission technologies.
Note: This figure includes the major strategies that have been discussed in the literature so far (Minx et al., 2017).
NATURAL TECHNOLOGICALCOMBINED
Tree growth takes up CO₂ 
Aﬀorestation/
Reforestation
from the atmosphere
Biochar
Partly burnt biomass is added 
Land management changes 
increase the soil carbon 
removal of  CO₂ from the 
atmosphere
Other Land-Use/Wetlands
high carbon density, anaerobic 
ecosystems
Bioenergy with 
Carbon Capture and 
Storage (BECCS)
Plants turn CO₂ into 
biomass that fuels 
energy systems; CO₂ 
from conversion is 
stored underground
acidiﬁcation
Accelerated Weathering
Natural minerals react with 
CO₂ and bind them in new 
minerals
Direct Air Capture
CO₂ is removed from 
ambient air and stored 
underground
Ocean Alkalinity 
Enhancement
Alkaline materials are 
added to the ocean to 
enhance atmospheric 
drawdown and negate 
CO2 to Durable Carbon
CO₂ is removed from the 
atmosphere and bound in 
long-lived materials
FORESTRY / AGRICULTURE NATURAL + TECHNOLOGICAL ENERGY / INDUSTRY
 Less costly
 Closer to deployment
 More vulnerable to reversal
More costly 
Greater R&D needs 
Less vulnerable to reversal 
to soil absorbing additional CO₂
Soil Carbon Sequestration
content, resulting in a net
Restoration or construction of
xxiv The Emissions Gap Report 2017 – Foreword
1The Emissions Gap Report 2017 – Scoping the Emissions Gap Report 2017
Recognizing this significant gap and the urgent need to 
bridge it, Article 4 of the Paris Agreement specifies that 
“Each Party shall communicate a nationally determined 
contribution every five years” and furthermore that “Each 
Party’s successive nationally determined contribution will 
represent a progression beyond the Party’s then current 
nationally determined contribution and reflect its highest 
possible ambition” (UNFCCC, 2015a:22). The successive 
NDCs are to be informed by the global stocktakes, which 
are specified in Article 14 of the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 
2015). These stocktakes will take place every five years, 
starting from 2023, to assess the collective progress towards 
achieving the objective of the Agreement and its long-
1.1 Moving towards implementation 
of the Paris Agreement: 2018 as a                 
critical juncture
The adoption of the Paris Agreement at the 2015 Conference 
of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) marks a milestone in 
international efforts to establish a universal foundation 
for ambitious climate change action. The Agreement 
builds on national plans and contributions submitted by 
almost all Parties to the Convention during 2015: the 
Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs). 
The Agreement entered into force on November 4, 2016, 
following a very rapid ratification process. As of 15 October 
2017, 168 of the 197 Parties to the Convention have ratified 
the Agreement, thereby turning their Intended Nationally 
Determined Contributions into Nationally Determined 
Contributions (NDCs). This report consequently refers to 
NDCs, unless specifically mentioning a country that has not 
yet ratified the Agreement.
The Paris Agreement’s long-term goal of “holding the 
increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C 
above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the 
temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels” 
(UNFCCC, 2015:22) accentuates the urgency of enhanced 
and immediate mitigation action. In 2015 and 2016, the UN 
Environment Emissions Gap Reports undertook thorough 
assessments of the aggregate effects of the NDCs on global 
greenhouse gas emissions in 2025 and 2030 – the years 
referred to in the NDCs (UNEP, 2015; 2016). The overall 
conclusion of these assessments was that although NDCs 
represent an increase in ambition compared with global 
greenhouse gas emission levels resulting from a projection 
of the impacts from the current policies, these contributions 
are far from the level of ambition required for an emissions 
pathway consistent with staying below a 2°C, let alone a 
1.5°C, temperature increase. Currently, the NDCs cover only 
around one third of the emission reductions needed by 2030.
Lead authors: Anne Olhoff and John Christensen, UNEP DTU Partnership
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term goal.
However, as an important precursor to the global stocktakes, 
a Facilitative Dialogue will take place during 2018. In line 
with the subsequent global stocktakes, the purpose of the 
Facilitative Dialogue is “to take stock of the collective efforts 
of Parties in relation to progress towards the long-term goal 
and to inform the preparation of nationally determined 
contributions” (UNFCCC 2015:4). 
During 2017, there have been extensive consultations with 
Parties on the organization of the Facilitative Dialogue, with 
a view to reporting their findings to the 23rd Conference of 
the Parties (COP23) taking place in November 2017. Initial 
feedback indicates that the dialogue is likely to consist of 
a preparatory and political phase, with the preparatory 
phase starting officially at the intersessionals in Bonn in 
May 2018 and continuing until the 24th Conference of the 
Parties (COP24) in December 2018. The preparatory phase 
will include absorbing the information from the 2018 special 
report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-
industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission 
pathways that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) was invited to produce in the decision to 
adopt the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2015). The political 
phase, which is expected to take place at the 24th Conference 
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of the Parties, will focus in particular on how to strengthen 
the next NDCs (UNFCCC, 2017). 
The year 2018 and the Facilitative Dialogue will be a critical 
juncture for countries to identify and pursue opportunities to 
strengthen their mitigation action and raise the ambition of 
their NDCs by 2020. Indeed, the outcome of the Facilitative 
Dialogue and the 2020 submission of new or updated NDCs 
are likely to determine whether it will be feasible to bridge 
the emissions gap by 2030. 
Time lags between implementing policies and actions and 
the resulting mitigation benefits imply that by delaying the 
strengthening of NDCs until after the global stocktake in 
2023, the opportunity to bridge the emissions gap by 2030 
will be lost. 
1.2 The Emissions Gap Reports and new 
aspects included in 2017
The 2017 Emissions Gap Report is the eighth assessment 
undertaken by UN Environment to provide countries with 
an independent scientific assessment of how actions and 
pledges by countries affect the global greenhouse gas 
emissions trend, and how this compares to emissions 
trajectories consistent with the long-term goal of the Paris 
Agreement. The difference has become known as the 
‘emissions gap’. The reports additionally provide information 
on options to achieve the emissions reductions necessary 
to bridge the gap. Based on requests by countries, UN 
Environment has prepared this eighth Emissions Gap Report 
to inform the political process, as we move towards full 
implementation of the Paris Agreement. 
In line with previous years, the report provides an update 
on the progress of G20 members in achieving their Cancun 
Pledges for 2020 and an overview of global emission trends 
(Chapter 2). This is followed by an update of the estimated 
gap between countries’ mitigation actions and NDCs for 
2030 and the emission levels consistent with pathways that 
are aligned with the long-term temperature goal of the Paris 
Agreement (Chapter 3). New for 2017 are brief assessments 
of the potential implications on the gap of the Kigali 
Amendment to the Montreal Protocol, and the new global 
market-based Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for 
International Aviation (CORSIA) under the auspices of the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).
In addition, and to inspire the process of strengthening the 
NDCs, this 2017 Emissions Gap Report assesses a number of 
the issues that will be central to bridging the 2030 emissions 
gap. Firstly, the report provides a systematic review of 
the sectoral mitigation potential by 2030. The results are 
positive and unambiguous: technologies and institutional 
innovations are available to bridge the emissions gap by 
2030 at reasonable cost (Chapter 4). Secondly, the report 
includes a detailed assessment of global developments in 
the coal sector that also examines the options and barriers 
for a gradual coal phase-out (Chapter 5). Thirdly, the report 
looks into the opportunities offered by limiting emissions 
of short-lived climate pollutants (SLCPs). Reducing these 
pollutants will limit the rate of short-term warming and, 
when sustained and combined with CO
2
 reductions, will help 
limit long-term warming, which is the ultimate aim of closing 
the emissions gap (Chapter 6). Finally, options for land-based 
and technological carbon dioxide removal that will become 
increasingly critical over this century to stay within the Paris 
goals are assessed (Chapter 7). 
As in previous years, the 2017 report is based on an 
assessment approach and has been prepared by a wide range 
of scientists from around the world. This year, 63 scientists 
from 49 institutions in 23 countries have contributed to 
the report.
The assessment builds on all available information, including 
that reviewed by the IPCC in its fifth assessment report, 
as well as more recent scientific studies. The assessment 
production process has been transparent and participatory, 
involving two rounds of external reviews and overseen by 
a steering committee. The governments of the countries 
with specific mention in the report have been invited to 
comment on the specific assessment findings during the 
production process.
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2.1 Introduction
This chapter provides an update, based on the latest 
available scientific literature, on trends in global emissions 
and progress towards the G20 members meeting their 
Cancun Pledges. These trends give key indications of pre-
2020 mitigation progress and action.
In light of the Paris Agreement, enhanced pre-2020 
mitigation action is more urgent than ever: studies indicate 
that holding the increase in global average temperature well 
below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, and pursuing efforts to 
limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial 
levels, requires that global greenhouse gas emissions peak 
before 2020. Moreover, enhancing pre-2020 action would 
facilitate the implementation and strengthening of the 
Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), as well as the 
transition to the stringent long-term emissions reductions 
that are required to reach the temperature target of the 
Paris Agreement.
To assess whether emissions show signs of peaking, section 2.2 
provides an overview of current trends in total global 
emissions of greenhouse gases, and of energy- and industry-
related carbon dioxide (CO
2
) emissions as a major driver of 
total global greenhouse gas emissions. This is followed by an 
update on the extent to which G20 members are on track 
to meet their Cancun Pledges (section 2.3). This update 
is based on an assessment of current policy portfolios of 
the G20 members and plausible assumptions regarding 
macroeconomic trends and offsets. The chapter ends by 
reiterating the urgency of immediately enhancing mitigation 
action to facilitate the transition towards least-cost emission 
reduction trajectories after 2020 that are aligned with the 
2°C and 1.5°C temperature goals. 
2.2. Trends in current global emissions 
Total global greenhouse gas emissions continue to increase, 
although the rate of growth has decreased over the past 
few years. Total global greenhouse gas emissions, including 
emissions from land use, land-use change and forestry 
(LULUCF), were estimated at about 51.9 GtCO
2
e/year in 
2016 (Olivier et al., 2017)1. Often, greenhouse gas emissions 
from LULUCF are accounted for separately, because they 
show large inter-annual variation and are very uncertain 
(see Grassi et al., 2017). Considering total global greenhouse 
gas emissions excluding LULUCF (thus also excluding forest 
fires), reveals a slowdown in growth in the past three years. 
They reached 47.8 billion tonnes of CO
2
-equivalent in 2016 
following increases of 0.9 percent in 2014, 0.2 percent in 
2015, and 0.5 percent in 2016 (Olivier et al., 2017)2. Taking 
into consideration that 2016 was a leap year, and thus 
0.3 percent longer than other years, the growth in total 
global emissions in 2015 and 2016 is the slowest since the 
early 1990s, except for years of global economic recession. 
1 The greenhouse gas emissions estimates in EDGAR 4.3.2 (Olivier et al., 2017) 
for recent years have decreased compared to the earlier greenhouse gas 
emission estimates presented in UNEP (2016; 2015). Apart from revisions 
due to revised statistics (for example, for China), also the use of more detailed 
emission factors (for example, for cement clinker) and sometimes a change in 
data source for other sources than fuel combustion (for example, gas flaring 
and LULUCF emissions including biomass burning emissions), led to a lower 
level of CO
2
 emissions. Likewise, replacing so-called Fast Track estimates for 
CH
4
 and N
2
O emissions by more detailed and recent statistics and improved 
information on emission factors and abatement (for example, CH
4
 in fossil 
fuel production) led to lower calculated emissions. Combined, this leads to 
total greenhouse gas emissions that are about 1 GtCO
2
e lower for recent 
years than presented in recent Emissions Gap Reports.
2 The data presented here have been calculated using the new EDGAR 4.3.2 
dataset (Olivier et al., 2017), which provides emissions per source and 
country for the period 1970–2012 (Janssens-Maenhout et al., 2017). This was 
extended for CO
2
 using international statistics through 2016, and for other 
greenhouse gases using statistics through 2014 (FAO), 2017, 2016 (IEA 2017, 
BP 2017), and other data sources such as CDM projects through 2016 (for 
example, reductions of CH
4
, N
2
O and HFC-23).
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Contributing authors: Jasmin Cantzler (Climate Analytics), Hanna Fekete (NewClimate Institute), Jos Olivier (PBL Netherlands Environmental 
Assessment Agency), Paola Yanguas Parra (Climate Analytics) 
Pre-2020 action: trends and progress
Chapter 2
4 The Emissions Gap Report 2017 –Pre-2020 action: trends and progress
Figure 2.1.a: Global greenhouse gas emissions for top six emitting 
countries and regions (excluding land use, land-use change and 
forestry), international transport emissions, and land use, land-
use change and forestry emissions. 
Figure 2.1.b: Global carbon dioxide emissions per region from 
fossil fuel use, cement production and other processes, and from 
international transport.
Note: Other G20 countries include Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Indonesia, Mexico, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Turkey. The greenhouse 
gas total are expressed in terms of billions of tonnes of global annual CO
2
 equivalent emissions (GtCO
2
e/year). CO
2
 equivalent is calculated using the Global Warming 
Potentials (GWP-100) metric of UNFCCC as reported in the IPCC Second Assessment Report, similar as has been done in the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report.
Source: EDGAR v4.3.2 FT2016 (Olivier et al., 2017).
relatively stable economic growth. Reduced growth in coal 
use since 2011, primarily in China and secondarily in the 
United States, plays a key role in the recent slowdown in 
growth in global CO
2
 emissions (Olivier et al., 2017; Peters 
et al., 2017). Growing renewable power generation has 
also contributed, but has had a less significant impact than 
economic factors and energy efficiency (Peters et al., 2017). 
These findings are in line with other studies on trends in 
global energy-related CO
2
 emissions until 2016 (BP, 2017; 
IEA, 2017; Jackson et al., 2016).
A number of studies provide detailed analysis of key drivers 
for the development in CO
2
 emissions from fossil fuel use and 
cement production at the country level (Olivier et al., 2017; 
Peters et al., 2017). In China, CO
2
 emissions have decreased 
since 2015, following a slowdown in annual growth of 
China’s CO
2
 emissions since 2012. The decrease since 2015 
is mainly caused by reduced coal use, but is also due to 
structural changes in the country’s economy and energy mix. 
The European Union has consistently reduced CO
2
 emissions 
since 1979, mainly driven by continual improvements in 
energy intensity and carbon intensity combined with lower 
economic growth since the global financial crisis. In the 
United States of America, energy-related CO
2
 emissions 
have decreased over the last 10 years. This decrease has 
mainly occurred in the power sector, due to a shift from 
coal to natural gas use in electricity generation, but also 
from increased use of renewables and a somewhat slower 
economic growth. In contrast, India’s emissions have grown 
steadily over the past decade.
Figure 2.1 shows the trends in total global emissions for 
the period 1970–2016. Trends in global greenhouse gas 
emissions are illustrated in Figure 2.1a, while Figure 2.1b 
shows the development in global carbon dioxide (CO
2
) 
emissions from fossil fuel combustion, cement production 
and other processes. It should be noted that the time series 
data for total global greenhouse gas and CO
2
 emissions used 
for the Emissions Gap Reports have been updated since 
the 2016 report. This affects the numbers presented in the 
2016 report, where the updated estimate for total global 
greenhouse gas emissions in 2014 is 51.7 GtCO
2
e, and the 
estimate for global total CO
2
 emissions in 2015 is 35.6 GtCO
2
.
Carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel combustion, 
cement production and other processes3 are the major 
source of total global greenhouse gas emissions. Currently 
they account for about 70 percent of total global greenhouse 
gas emissions and were estimated at a total of 35.8 GtCO
2
 
for 2016 (Olivier et al., 2017)4. Given their share of total 
greenhouse gas emissions, it is relevant to look more closely 
at their trend. As Figure 2.1b indicates, global CO
2
 emissions 
from fossil fuel use and cement production remained stable 
for the second year in a row in 2016, against a backdrop of 
3 Including flaring of waste gas during gas and oil production, feedstock and 
other non-energy uses of fuels, and several other small sources.
4 This is slightly lower than the 2015 emissions estimate of 36.2 GtCO
2
, 
as presented last year, due to regular annual statistical revisions of fuel 
consumption in International Energy Agency and British Petroleum statistics 
as well as revisions and some full updates, including emission factors, for 
several other sources (gas flaring, cement production, solvent use, ammonia 
production, urea and lime application) (Olivier et al., 2017).
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Box 2.1: Greenhouse gas emissions development: how have G20 members                
performed collectively?
G20 members have made more efficient use of energy resources: total greenhouse gas emissions from G20 countries 
grew by 34 percent between 1990 and 2014, while GDP grew by nearly 117 percent during the same period. Per capita 
energy-related CO
2
 emissions seem to have peaked and there are signs of an absolute decoupling of economic growth 
and greenhouse gas emissions. 
Current levels of effort are, however, not enough. Climate Transparency (2017) concludes that current efforts are 
sufficient neither in speed nor in depth to keep global warming to the limit set in the Paris Agreement. One area that 
requires major effort is the power sector, given that the carbon intensity of electricity has not improved for the last 
25 years, because the electricity mix has continued to be dominated by coal and other fossil fuels. 
Figure 2.2 Key indicators on the G20 transition to a low-carbon economy: trends between 1990 and 2014. 
Focusing on emissions and energy and carbon intensities 
of the G20 members, box 2.1 describes the trends of key 
indicators on the transition to a low-carbon economy 
observed between 1990 and 2014 for G20 members (Climate 
Transparency, 2017).  
In summary, global greenhouse gas emissions continue to 
grow, although the slowdown in growth of global greenhouse 
gas emissions and the apparent stabilization of global levels 
of CO
2
 emissions from fossil fuels and industry over the past 
two to three years is very encouraging. However, it is still too 
early to say whether it is likely to be permanent, and both 
the speed and depth of mitigation efforts require significant 
scaling up to enable a transition towards mitigation 
pathways consistent with the long-term temperature goal of 
the Paris Agreement. 
2.3. Progress towards achieving the Cancun 
Pledges: G20 members
In line with last year’s Emissions Gap Report, this section 
provides an update on the progress towards achieving 
the Cancun Pledges, focusing on the G20 members5. 
Thirteen of the members have pledges for 2020 (counting 
the EU members France, Germany, Italy and UK as one 
member) and three do not have pledges. These economies 
collectively generate around three quarters of total global 
greenhouse gas emissions6. Although it is critical that all 
countries advance as far as possible towards achieving their 
Cancun Pledges, the role of the highest-emitting economies 
is particularly critical to achieving the Paris Agreement 
mitigation goals. 
5 The members of the G20 are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, 
France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Republic of Korea, 
Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the UK, the USA, and the EU. In 
our analysis, the EU including all its Member States (regardless of G20 status) 
is considered as a single Party, and EU Member States are not considered 
individually. In general, evaluating the pledges of other countries is limited 
by a lack of data. Aggregate measures for the G20 do not double count EU 
members that are also G20 members as individual countries.
6 In 2012, these parties accounted for 77 percent of global emissions excluding 
LULUCF and 75 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions including LULUCF 
(WRI CAIT, 2017).
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Country 2020 pledge case Current policy trajectory
Official data Official data Independent estimates
Argentina No pledgea Ministry of the Environment and 
Sustainable Development, Argentina 
(2015) 
CAT
Australia Government of Australia (2016) Government of Australia (2016) CAT, PBL, RepuTex (2016)
Brazil Government of Brazil (2010) N/A CAT, PBL
Canada Government of Canada (2016) Government of Canada (2016) CAT, PBL
China N/Ab N/A CAT, PBL, Sha et al. (2017)
EU28 EEA (2014) EEA (2016b) CAT, PBL
India Planning Commission Government of 
India (2011, 2014)
CAT, PBL, Mitra et al. (2017)
Indonesia BAPPENAS (2015) N/A CAT, PBL
Japan Government of Japan (2016) N/A CAT, PBL
Mexico NCCS (2013) (Government of Mexico, 2012b; NCCS, 
2013)
CAT, PBL
Russia Government of Russia (2014) Government of Russia (2015) CAT, PBL
Saudi Arabia No pledgea N/A CAT
South Africa Department of Environmental
Affairs, Republic of South Africa (2011a, 
2011b)
N/A CAT, PBL
Republic of 
Korea
Republic of Korea (2016) N/A CAT, PBL
Turkey No pledgea Republic of Turkey, Ministry of 
Environment and Urbanization (2016)
CAT, PBL
USA US Department of State (2016) US Department of State (2016) CAT, PBL
Note: 
a Argentina, Saudi Arabia and Turkey have not proposed greenhouse gas reduction pledges, and here we assume current policies. 
b  China has no official estimate for the 2020 pledge, and here we assume the 2020 emissions estimate for China’s 2020 pledge based on the average outcome of four 
global studies (PBL, Climate Action Tracker, LSE and University of Melbourne (see Chapter 3).
To assess the progress of G20 members towards their Cancun 
Pledges, this section compares current emissions trajectories 
with the trajectories associated with the achievement of the 
pledges of these members. In line with previous Emissions 
Gap Reports, three cases are considered: a pledge case, 
based on official data; a current policy trajectory case, 
based on official data; and a current policy trajectory case, 
based on independent analysis. These three cases are briefly 
described in box 2.1. 
Box 2.1: Assumptions of the assessment of progress towards the Cancun Pledges
For each G20 member, estimates of 2020 emissions are compared under three cases:
1. Pledge case (official data): Identifies the maximum level of greenhouse gas emissions that each member could emit 
in 2020 and still meet its pledge – without considering the use of offsets. Where available, the 2020 emission level 
described by the member as the pledge level is used; alternatively, these levels are calculated working from official 
base-year or baseline data. The sources of official country data are provided in Table 2.1. 
2. Current policy trajectory case (official data): Identifies most recent, publicly available official estimates of 2020 
emissions, considering projected economic trends and current policy approaches. The sources of official country 
data are provided in Table 2.1.
3. Current policy trajectory case (independent analysis): Identifies estimates of 2020 emissions, considering the best 
current estimates of projected economic trends and current policy approaches, including policies at least through 
2015, based on independent analysis rather than official data. Estimates are drawn from the Climate Action Tracker 
(CAT) (2017g) and PBL (den Elzen et al., 2016a; Kuramochi et al., 2016b; PBL, 2017) for all countries, as well as 
other, country-specific sources where noted. The independent analysis of current policy trajectories supplements 
the official sources described in point two by providing data that targets consistency across countries and 
political independence.
Source: Adapted from UNEP (2015)
Table 2.1: Studies used to estimate the emissions in 2020 under the pledge case and current policy trajectory case for G20 members
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Box 2.2: Assessing progress towards achieving the Cancun pledges: three caveats
1. Pledges do not necessarily demand the same level of effort to achieve. In other words, a country currently on track 
to achieve its pledge has not necessarily made a greater effort to mitigate emissions than a country not yet on track. 
2. Projections are subject to uncertainty associated with macroeconomic trends, such as changes in gross domestic 
product (GDP) and population trends, as well as the impact of each country’s climate policy action. 
3. The potential impact of using offsets to achieve pledges is not quantified for the emission trajectories considered. 
If offsets are traded internationally, and are stemming from actions that are not really additional or if offsets are 
counted twice (towards the pledges of both buying and selling parties), the global impact of the pledges will be 
weakened. Most countries have not clarified their intentions concerning their use of offsets to meet their 2020 
pledges. Australia, Brazil, Canada, the European Union, and the United States have explicitly not excluded the 
possibility; other members have not formally commented (WRI, 2015).
Source: UNEP (2015)
Collectively, G20 countries are on track to achieving the mid-
range of the Cancun Pledges, but several countries will need 
to accelerate action to meet their Cancun Pledge by 2020 
(see Figure 2.4). Seven G20 members (Australia, Brazil, China, 
the EU, India, Japan, and Russia) are on track to meet their 
Cancun Pledges according to most or all available analyses. 
Five members (Canada, Mexico, the Republic of Korea, South 
Africa and the United States) are likely to require further 
action or to have to purchase offsets — or a combination 
of the two — to meet their pledges. (The Republic of Korea 
has not rescinded its pledge communicated to the UNFCCC, 
but has amended the Green Growth Basic Act to replace the 
2020 pledge with the NDC target for 2030.) Better data are 
necessary to adequately track progress in some countries, 
including Indonesia, where there is currently insufficient 
information to assess whether the country is on track to meet 
its pledges. The three remaining G20 members (Argentina, 
Saudi Arabia and Turkey) have no Cancun Pledges. Further 
details are provided in Box 2.2, which highlights the three 
important caveats that should be kept in mind when 
assessing country progress towards the Cancun Pledges.
 
Figure 2.3: Greenhouse gas emissions of G20 members and the group of non-G20 countries (also includes the international bunker 
emissions) for the 2020 pledges and current policies scenario. 
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cumulative emissions over the 2013–2020 period in order to 
assess progress towards its pledge. Australia’s latest official 
projections find that for the budget period (2013–2020), 
Australia is now on track to overachieve its 2020 pledge by 
97 MtCO
2
e (cumulative), excluding a 128 MtCO
2
e carry-over 
from its first commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol 
(Government of Australia, 2016). Independent studies 
consider the year 2020 in isolation, and find a difference 
of about 63 MtCO
2
e between Australia’s projected 2020 
emissions and its pledge level for that year (Kuramochi et al., 
2016b; PBL, 2017; Reputex, 2016), which is higher than the 
37 MtCO
2
e difference of Australia’s latest official projections 
(Government of Australia, 2016). The former do not factor in 
the most recent official projections.
Brazil pledged to reduce its emissions including LULUCF by 
between 36.1 percent and 38.9 percent by 2020, compared 
to a business as usual (BAU) scenario. Independent analysis 
estimates emission projections under current policies at 
well below the 2020 Cancun Pledge (Climate Action Tracker, 
2017b; Kuramochi et al., 2016b; PBL, 2017). 
Russia pledged a 25 percent reduction from 1990 levels, 
excluding LULUCF. According to official data, Russian 
emissions are projected at about 2.4 GtCO
2
e/year for 2020 
(Government of Russia, 2014), which is below the pledge 
level of 2.5 GtCO
2
e/year (Government of Russia, 2015). 
Independent estimates show a similar emission projection. 
G20 members that are likely to require further action or 
purchased offsets
Five countries — Canada, Mexico, the Republic of Korea, 
South Africa and the United States — are likely to require 
further action and/or to have to purchase offsets in order 
to meet their pledges, according to government and 
independent estimates. 
Canada’s Cancun Pledge aims to reduce emissions by 
17 percent below 2005 levels by 2020. However, according 
to official projections, Canada’s emissions are expected to 
reach 731 MtCO
2
e/year in 2020 (Environment and Climate 
Change Canada, 2017), well above the pledged level of 
620 MtCO
2
e/year (Government of Canada, 2016). 
Independent analysis also suggests that Canada is set to miss 
its 2020 pledge by a wide margin (Climate Action Tracker, 
2017g; PBL, 2017). 
Mexico’s Cancun Pledge to reduce its greenhouse gas 
emissions by 30 percent below BAU levels including LULUCF 
is conditional on the provision of adequate financial and 
technological support from developed countries as part of a 
global agreement (UNFCCC, 2011). Under its current policies, 
Mexico is not on track to meet its pledge. This conclusion is 
based on official estimates by the Government of Mexico 
(2012a), adjusted per the National Climate Change Strategy 
(NCCS, 2013), and independent estimates (Climate Action 
Tracker, 2017g; PBL, 2017).
Independent estimates of the Republic of Korea’s 2020 
emissions are well above the level implied by its pledge. 
Although the country has not rescinded its pledge 
communicated to the UNFCCC, it amended the Green 
G20 members that are on track to meet their 
Cancun Pledges
According to all available analyses, four G20 members — 
China, the EU, India, and Japan — are on track to meet 
their pledges with currently implemented policies without 
purchasing offsets. Australia is on track based on the carbon 
budget approach. Two more countries — Brazil and Russia — 
are also on track according to most estimates. 
China, which pledged a reduction of 40–45 percent in CO
2
 
emissions intensity, is projected by several studies to be 
on track to achieve a reduction of at least 42 percent (IEA, 
2015; Sha et al., 2015; den Elzen et al., 2016b; Climate 
Action Tracker, 2017c; Sha et al 2017). China also pledges 
to increase the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy 
consumption to around 15 percent by 2020 and to increase 
forest coverage and forest stock volume. The Climate 
Action Tracker update of May 2017 (Climate Action Tracker, 
2017c) has made a downward revision of economy-wide 
greenhouse gas emissions (excluding LULUCF) under current 
policies for China. Projections are now 11.9-12.2 GtCO
2
e/year 
instead of the 12.2-12.5 GtCO
2
e/year projected in the 2016 
update. This compares to the pledged emission level of 13.2-
13.5 GtCO
2
e/year excluding LULUCF, taking into account 
both CO
2
 intensity and non-fossil fuel targets (Climate Action 
Tracker, 2017c). Some analysts have argued that structural 
shifts in the economy in recent years make much steeper 
reductions in the CO
2
 intensity of GDP likely; Green and Stern 
(2017) include an illustrative pathway where CO
2
 intensity is 
halved from 2005 to 2020. 
Regarding the EU pledge to reduce its greenhouse gas 
emissions by 20 percent from 1990 levels, official data for 
2014 shows that this pledge has already been met and, in 
fact, exceeded (EEA, 2016a).    
India pledged to reduce its emissions intensity of GDP, 
excluding the agriculture sector, by 20–25 percent below 
2005 levels by 2020. Independent studies project that India 
will meet its pledge by a narrow margin through the policies 
that are currently implemented (Climate Action Tracker, 
2017d; Mitra et al., 2017; PBL, 2017). The Climate Action 
Tracker update of May 2017 has made a small downward 
revision of current policies projections for India for economy-
wide greenhouse gas emissions (excluding LULUCF) from 3.6 
to 3.5 GtCO
2
e/year in 2020. Meanwhile Mitra et al. (2017) 
project 2.9 GtCO
2
e/year, considering the impacts of five key 
policies and excluding the agriculture and land-use sectors.
Japan pledges to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 
3.8 percent from 2005 levels by 2020. This pledge assumes 
the same electricity mix as 2012, which was fossil fuel-
dominant following the Fukushima nuclear accident. Recent 
studies (Climate Action Tracker, 2017e; Kuramochi et al., 
2016b) project that Japan will overachieve its 2020 pledge 
due to lower-than-expected end-use energy demand and 
considerable increase of renewable electricity generation 
following the introduction of a feed-in-tariff scheme in 2012. 
Official projections reflecting current policies are unavailable.
In accordance with the Kyoto Protocol accounting rules, 
Australia uses a carbon budget approach that accounts for 
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Growth Basic Act to replace the 2020 pledge with the NDC 
target for 2030 (The Law National Information Center, 2016).
South Africa’s Cancun Pledge includes a reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions, including LULUCF, of 34 percent 
below BAU by 2020. Independent studies translate this 
pledge to a range of 400–600 MtCO
2
e/year in 2020 
(Climate Action Tracker, 2017f; Kuramochi et al., 2016b). An 
independent current policy scenario projection that covers 
LULUCF (Kuramochi et al., 2016b) indicates that South Africa 
is slightly short of reaching the upper end of this range. 
The United States submitted a pledge to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions levels to 17 percent below 2005 levels by 
2020. The most recent official projections, produced before 
the current Administration took office, indicated that the 
United States was on track to achieve its 2020 pledge, 
assuming full implementation of planned measures as of 
mid-2015 (US Department of State, 2016). However, more 
recent independent analysis that takes a range of possible 
policy changes into account raises questions as to whether 
the United States will meet its 2020 pledge (Climate Action 
Tracker, 2017a; Climate Advisers, 2017; Climate Interactive, 
2017; Hafstead, 2017; Rhodium Group, 2017).
Other G20 members
Insufficient information is currently available to determine 
whether Indonesia is on track to meet its pledge. 
Indonesia’s Cancun Pledge includes an unconditional 
26 percent below BAU and a conditional 41 percent 
reduction below BAU by 2020, both including LULUCF. 
There is considerable uncertainty regarding the pledge 
emission level; the unconditional pledge is translated as 2.2 
GtCO
2
e/year when using the BAU projection from the First 
Biennial Update Report, and 1.3 GtCO
2
e/year when using 
the BAU projection consistent with the one reported in 
Indonesia’s NDC (BAPPENAS, 2015). Recent assessments 
(Kuramochi et al., 2016b; WRI, 2016) project greenhouse 
gas emissions, including LULUCF, ranging between 1.65 and 
Three G20 member states — Argentina, Saudi Arabia and 
Turkey — have not proposed greenhouse gas reduction 
pledges for 2020. However, all three countries have submitted 
post-2020 pledges to the UNFCCC as part of their Nationally 
Determined Contributions. In addition, Turkey has submitted 
a Biennial Report which includes its projected emissions 
for 2020 (Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Environment and 
Urbanization, 2016). In all four countries, the emissions 
are projected to increase towards 2020 and beyond under 
current policies (Kuramochi et al., 2016b).
2.4. Amplified urgency of enhanced              
pre-2020 action
As the previous sections have demonstrated, mitigation 
action shows several encouraging signs. However, the 
progress of G20 countries towards decarbonization has been 
slow, as illustrated in Box 2.1. The projected emissions under 
current policies for 2020 are still far from what is required to 
improve the starting point for reaching the emission levels 
in 2030 consistent with pathways aligned with the long-term 
temperature goal of the Paris Agreement (see Chapter 3). 
The 2020 emissions under current policies are estimated 
to be in the mid-range of the Cancun Pledge scenario (see 
section 2.3), and any further delay in strengthened short-
term action will decrease the chance of keeping global 
warming well below 2°C and will make the 1.5°C target 
increasingly unattainable. 
The UNFCCC and its Parties need to seriously consider the 
growing number of science-based policy targets and roadmaps 
that have recently been proposed to strengthen short-
term action to meet the Paris Agreement’s long-term goals 
(Figueres et al., 2017; Kuramochi et al., 2016a; Rockström et 
al., 2017). Box 2.3 presents an action proposal by Figueres et 
al. (2017), which focuses on pre-2020   ambition. As Figueres 
et al. suggest, concerted global effort is required to scale up 
existing solutions rapidly and to encourage optimism.
1.81 GtCO
2
e/year in 2020. 
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Box 2.3: Mission 2020’s six-point plan 
In collaboration with knowledge leaders and several think tanks, the Mission 2020 initiative convened by Christiana 
Figueres, the former Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC, developed a six-point plan to enhance pre-2020 action to 
achieve the Paris Agreement’s long-term goals (Figueres et al., 2017): 
1. Energy
• renewable electricity: increase renewable energy from 23.7 percent of the world’s electricity supply in 2015 to at 
least 30 percent in 2020;
• coal-fired power plants: do not approve any new plants beyond 2020 and retire all existing ones;
2. Infrastructure
• fully decarbonize buildings and infrastructure by 2050 with US$300 billion in annual funding. Cities are already 
upgrading their building stock to zero- or near-zero emission structures at a rate of 3 percent per year;
3. Transport
• electric vehicles: at least 15 percent share in new car sales globally, up from the current less than 1 percent share;
• doubling of mass-transit use in cities;
• heavy duty vehicles: 20 percent increase in fuel efficiency; 
• aviation: 20 percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions per kilometre travelled;
4. Land use
• deforestation and land use change: net zero emissions within the 2020s; 
• enhanced afforestation and reforestation;
5. Industry
• heavy industry: strengthen action in line with halving emissions well before 2050;
6. Finance
• mobilize US$1 trillion per year for climate action, mostly from the private sector through, for example, a tenfold 
increase in green bonds compared with their current level (US$81 billion in 2016).
Figueres et al. also proposes three necessary steps to enable the achievement of the aforementioned sector-
specific goals: (1) use science to guide decisions and set targets, (2) scale up existing solutions rapidly, and 
(3) encourage optimism. 
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The emissions gap and its implications  
Chapter 3
Lead authors: Michel den Elzen (PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency), Niklas Höhne (NewClimate Institute), Kejun Jiang 
(Energy Research Institute, China)
Contributing authors: Jasmin Cantzler (Climate Analytics), Philip Drost (UN Environment), Taryn Fransen (World Resources Institute), 
Hanna Fekete (NewClimate Institute), Takeshi Kuramochi (NewClimate Institute), David Lee (Manchester Metropolitan University), Kelly 
Levin (World Resources Institute), Joeri Rogelj (International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis), Fu Sha (National Center for Climate 
Strategy and International Cooperation), Michiel Schaeffer (Climate Analytics) and Zoi Vrontisi (E3M-Lab) 
3.1 Introduction
The Paris Agreement aims to limit global average temperature 
increase to well below 2°C relative to pre-industrial levels 
and to pursue efforts to further limit it to 1.5°C. In 2015, 
almost all countries submitted national climate action 
plans and commitments for 2025 or 2030: their Intended 
Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs). These form 
the foundation of the Paris Agreement, which entered into 
force on 4 November 2016. For the 168 countries that have 
to date (24 October 2017) ratified this Agreement, the INDCs 
have become Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). 
This chapter provides an update on the mitigation challenge 
associated with the global temperature goal of the Paris 
Agreement, and the estimated global emission levels under 
various assumptions regarding the implementation of 
current policies and NDCs or INDCs (hereafter referred to as 
NDCs, unless specifically mentioned in relation to a country 
that has not ratified the Paris Agreement) (section 3.2 and 
3.3). It also assesses the additional impact of the Kigali 
Amendment and the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) Agreement (section 3.3), before further exploring the 
projected impact up to 2030 of the current policies and NDCs 
on emissions for each G20 member and considering how the 
ambition of NDCs can be compared across countries (section 
3.4). Finally, the chapter provides an update on recent 
estimates of emission reduction potentials by subnational 
and non-state actor action (section 3.5).
3.2 Scenarios considered in the emissions    
gap assessment
3.2.1 Overview of scenarios
In line with the 2016 Emissions Gap Report, the assessment 
of the emissions gap draws on six scenarios (Rogelj et al., 
2016). These comprise: 
• Two reference scenarios: 
- No-policy baseline scenario, which projects global 
greenhouse gas emissions based on the assumption 
that no new climate policies are put into place from 
2005 onwards.
- Current policy scenario, which provides best estimates 
of future global emissions taking all currently adopted 
and implemented policies1 into account, but assuming 
that no additional mitigation action is taken beyond 
these policies.
• Two NDC scenarios2: 
- Unconditional NDC scenario, where Parties with NDCs 
are assumed to implement only the portions of their 
targets that are without conditions, while Parties that 
solely have a conditional target are assumed to follow 
a current policy scenario.
- Conditional NDC scenario, where all Parties with NDCs 
in addition to their unconditional targets are assumed 
to implement their conditional targets, and Parties 
that only have an unconditional target are assumed to 
implement that target. 
• Two scenarios that limit global warming to below 2°C 
and 1.5°C, respectively: 
- 2°C scenario, which is based on global emission 
scenarios that assume limited action until 2020 and 
least-cost emission reduction pathways from 2020, 
and are consistent with a greater than 66 percent 
 
1 These are defined as legislative decisions, executive orders, or 
their equivalent.
2 In both the unconditional and conditional NDC cases, it is assumed that for 
any traded international offsets, each unit is counted towards the NDC of 
a single country only – either the buyer or the seller – to avoid issues of 
double counting.
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chance of limiting global warming in 2100 to below 2°C 
above pre-industrial levels.
- 1.5°C scenario, which is based on global emission 
scenarios that assume limited action until 2020 and 
least-cost emission reduction pathways from 2020, 
and are consistent with a 50-66 percent chance of 
limiting global warming in 2100 to below 1.5°C above 
pre-industrial levels. 
The assessment draws on multiple individual scenarios 
from the published literature. Each scenario is global in 
scope, reflecting possible actions by all countries (for further 
details, see Appendix A, available online). It should be noted 
that the two NDC scenarios assume full implementation of 
the conditional and unconditional NDCs for all countries, 
including the United States of America, as the NDC of the 
United States of America has not yet been officially repealed. 
Section 3.3 discusses the impact of a possible withdrawal of 
the United States of America from the Paris Agreement.
In line with the 2016 Emissions Gap Report (UNEP, 2016) 
and as indicated above, the 2017 assessment mainly draws 
on 1.5°C scenarios that assume least-cost pathways starting 
from 2020 and return global warming to below 1.5°C in 
2100 with a lower (50–66 percent) probability than for 
the 2°C scenarios (greater than 66 percent probability) 
(see box 3.1 for additional information about these 
scenarios). New studies are emerging that provide least-
cost pathways from 2020 consistent with a greater than 
66 percent chance of limiting global warming in 2100 to 
below 1.5°C. The preliminary findings of these new studies 
and their implications for the 2030 global emission levels 
are summarized in section 3.2.3. More studies are under 
way and will be fully integrated into the gap assessment 
next year, as current estimates may still change during the 
review process of the studies. Box 3.1 provides a discussion 
of the extent to which the 1.5°C and 2°C least-cost pathways 
are informed by the growing damages that increasingly are 
being attributed to early impacts of climate change.
Table 3.1 provides an overview of the projected global 
emission estimates under the six scenarios considered for 
the assessment in this report, showing the median global 
emission levels for 2025 and 2030 — the years countries use 
in their NDCs. 
Box 3.1 How are recent extreme events reflected in the 1.5°C and 2°C pathways used in the 
Emissions Gap Report? 
With drought in Africa, floods in South Asia and repeated hurricanes in the Caribbean, 2017 will probably prove to have 
been a record year for the human, social and economic cost of extreme weather events. Although it would be a mistake 
to attribute all extreme weather events to the impact of climate change, there is growing evidence that climate change 
may be contributing to the their increasing frequency and severity.
It would be logical to think that the damage caused by climate change should affect the least-cost pathways that are at 
the core of the analysis in this report: the earlier and more severe the damage, the stronger the case for early action to 
reduce emissions.
Some models, such as the Dynamic Integrated Climate-Economy (DICE) model, do indeed incorporate damage functions 
(Nordhaus, 2017). These are a subset of Integrated Assessment Models that combine physical and economic elements 
and are termed ‘cost-benefit Integrated Assessment Models’. These cost-benefit studies monetize the impacts of climate 
change and then balance the economic implications of mitigation and climate damages to identify the optimal trajectory 
of emissions reductions that will maximize total welfare (see box 6.1 in Clarke et al., 2014). However, since by design 
such scenarios do not achieve a specific climate goal, they are less directly useful as a benchmark to assess pathways 
towards achieving the long-term temperature goal set in Paris.
For this reason, the Emissions Gap Report makes use of a different class of Integrated Assessment Models, termed ‘cost-
effectiveness’ models (see Weyant (2017) for a discussion of all types of Integrated Assessment Models). These models 
distribute the emission reductions across regions, sectors and gases in such a way that the global discounted reduction 
costs are minimized over time, and the climate target is achieved ( Rogelj et al., 2016; Clarke et al., 2014). In practice, the 
Emissions Gap Report selects pathways that aim to limit global mean temperature increase to either 1.5°C or 2°C relative 
to pre-industrial levels, with varying levels of probability. This means that, unless decision makers decide to make the 
global climate target even more ambitious, the benchmark pathways used in the Emissions Gap Report will not change 
in response to the impact of extreme weather events.
It does not follow that decision makers can ignore the impact of extreme weather. The events of 2017 reinforce the case 
for early and sustained action to reduce emissions.
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Box 3.2 The impact of uncertainties  
Additional research is necessary, as the uncertainty ranges overlap for many countries and since the number of studies 
available for the current policy trajectory case and the NDC cases vary significantly. A recent study (Rogelj et al., 2017a) 
explores six dimensions that contribute to uncertainties in the assessment of emissions outcomes of NDCs. These 
comprise (i) variations in overall socioeconomic conditions, such as Gross Domestic Product and population growth, 
(ii) uncertainties in historical emission inventories, (iii) the conditionality of certain NDCs, (iv) the definition of NDC targets 
as ranges instead of single values, (v) the way in which renewable energy targets are expressed, and (vi) the way in which 
traditional biomass use is accounted for, as renewable energy or otherwise. They find that depending on assumptions in 
these six dimensions, NDC estimates can range from 47 to 63 GtCO
2
e/year in 2030, which is a wider range than the 50 
to 56 GtCO
2
e/year combined unconditional and conditional NDC scenario range of this report (table 3.1). Uncertainties 
in socioeconomic developments are the dominant driver, accounting for more than half of the uncertainty, followed 
by uncertainties in the way renewable energy targets are expressed. These uncertainties are not fully accounted for in 
the range of this study, as this is based on the central estimates of all studies that individually make implicit or explicit 
assumptions on the above-mentioned uncertainties. 
Another issue is the accounting of land-use-related mitigation, which has been identified as an important source of 
uncertainty (Forsell et al., 2016; Grassi et al., 2017; Rogelj et al., 2016), but is not explored explicitly in Rogelj et al. 
(2017a). Grassi et al. (2017) find a current ±3 GtCO
2
e/year difference in global LULUCF net emissions between country 
reports (data submitted to UNFCCC, such as greenhouse gas inventories and national communications) and scientific 
studies (as reflected in Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports). Among the many possible reasons 
for these differences, Grassi et al. suggest that a key factor, which deserves further analysis, relates to what is considered 
‘anthropogenic sink’.
Finally, there is some additional uncertainty around the impact of Global Warming Potentials. There is no consistency in 
the historical data and the future projections across the studies in the use of Global Warming Potentials. Some studies 
use the Global Warming Potentials from the IPCC Second Assessment Report (AR2) consistently for all countries, whereas 
others use the Global Warming Potentials from the IPCC Fourth and Fifth Assessment Reports (AR4 and AR5), depending 
on the NDC information. With regard to the magnitude of uncertainty related to the choice of Global Warming Potentials, 
global total greenhouse gas emissions for 2014 are reported to be 3 percent higher when the IPCC Fourth Assessment 
Report (AR4) Global Warming Potentials are used, compared to when the IPCC Second Assessment Report (AR2) Global 
Warming Potentials are used (Gütschow et al., 2017). The difference can be larger at a country level when, for example, 
the share of Methane (CH
4
) emissions in total greenhouse gas emissions of a country is larger than the global average. 
Emissions estimates (GtCO2e/year) (rounded to the nearest gigatonne)
Scenario Global total emissions in 2025 Global total emissions in 2030 Number of scenarios in set
No-policy baseline 61.0 (56.7–64.3) 64.7 (59.5–69.5) 179
Current policy trajectory 55.4 (53.5–56.8) 58.9 (57.6–60.7) 4
Unconditional NDCs 53.8 (50.6–55.3) 55.2 (51.9–56.2) 10
Conditional NDCsa 52.2 (49.3–54.0) 52.8 (49.5–54.2) 10 (6+4)
2°C pathways (more than 66% chance 2°C, 
least-cost from 2020)b 
47.7 (46.2–50.2) 41.8 (30.6–43.5) 10
1.5°C pathways  
(50- 66% chance 1.5°C, least-cost from 
2020)c 
44.5 (43.1–45.5)d 36.5 (32–37.7)d,e 6
Note: 
Ranges are computed as described in Rogelj et al. (2016). In cases where estimates are based on less than 10 scenarios, the minimum-maximum range is provided. The 
row of “Conditional NDCs” is only provided for information, as a direct comparison with the “Unconditional NDCs” ranges is not possible, due to arbitrary model sampling 
differences. The emissions range for 1.5°C is smaller than for 2oC, as fewer studies for 1.5°C are available. Source: adjusted from Rogelj et al. (2016).
a  Assuming full implementation of both unconditional and conditional NDCs. Six studies provided an estimate for the conditional NDC case. The median estimate of 
influence derived from these six studies is used to adjust the unconditional NDC estimate of the four remaining studies that did not include conditional NDC estimates. 
The estimated improvement of moving from the unconditional to the conditional case is in the range of 2.4 (1.2–3.0 GtCO
2
e/year, full range).
b  As in UNEP (2015): greater than 66 percent probability of limiting global average temperature increase to below 2°C in 2100 (probabilities never drop below 60 percent 
during the entire century).
c  As in UNEP (2016): 50 percent to 66 percent probability of limiting global average temperature increase to below 1.5°C in 2100 (allowing median global average 
temperature to temporarily exceed the 1.5°C limit before 2100). 
d These numbers have been harmonized to the same 2010 emissions levels as the 2°C pathways. 
e  Forthcoming peer-reviewed research indicates that this median value is broadly consistent with results for scenarios that assume a middle-of-the-road future socio-
economic development (cf. SSP2 Fricko et al., 2017). At the same time, recent research suggests that the ranges, however, could be extended further at the lower end 
(Rogelj et al., 2017a), that is 32-34 GtCO
2
e/year.
Table 3.1: Global total greenhouse gas emissions in 2025 and 2030 under different scenarios (median and 10th to 90th percentile range). 
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The studies from which the current policy trajectory 
scenario and the NDC scenario are drawn differ in a number 
of respects, such as their treatment of conditional versus 
unconditional NDCs; assumptions regarding non-covered 
sectors and gases; treatment of land use, land-use change 
and forestry (LULUCF) and surplus emission units; different 
bases for calculating Global Warming Potentials. These 
differences are further described in the 2016 Emissions 
Gap Report, which also provides a fuller discussion of the 
six scenarios. The methodological differences between the 
studies cannot be fully harmonized, which leads to some 
uncertainty as indicated in the results presented in section 
3.3, where the implications of the differences between 
studies are also further explored (see also box 3.2).
3.2.2 Updates to the assessment 
The emissions estimates presented in table 3.1 are based on 
the 2016 Emissions Gap Report (UNEP, 2016), but updates 
have been made in a number of cases. 
There are no updates to the no-policy baseline scenario 
compared to the 2016 report. However, the current policies 
projections at the global level have been updated, drawing 
on data from the Climate Action Tracker (CAT, 2017), the 
Joint Research Centre (Kitous et al., 2017), PBL Netherlands 
Environmental Assessment Agency (den Elzen et al., 2016a; 
Kuramochi et al., 2016; PBL, 2017), and the International 
Energy Agency (IEA, 2016). 
The global emissions projections of the two NDC scenarios 
have also been updated with data from the four above-
mentioned modelling studies, and with updated data from 
Climate Interactive (2017). 
The estimates for the 2°C pathways with higher than 
66 percent probability in 2100 remain unchanged since the 
2016 Emissions Gap Report. 
The estimates for the 1.5°C pathways with 50-66 percent 
probability in 2100 have been updated, resulting in 2030 
global emission estimates that are around 3 GtCO
2
e lower 
than those in the 2016 Emissions Gap Report. The update 
is based on: (a) the inclusion of new data that have become 
available from scenarios generated with updated or other 
modelling frameworks, and (b) the harmonization of the 
1.5°C pathways with the same global 2010 emissions as 
for the 2°C pathways. The new data considered lower the 
2030 emission estimates by around 1 GtCO
2
e and have also 
expanded the emissions range. Under the assumption of 
continued historical socioeconomic trends, Rogelj et al. (2017a) 
find emissions in 2030 in the range of 35-37 GtCO
2
e/year, 
whereas when assuming enhanced efforts to limit energy 
demand and a shift towards sustainable consumption 
patterns, cost-optimal emission levels in 2030 are estimated 
at 32-34 GtCO
2
e/year.
The harmonization has been undertaken to resolve a 
discrepancy between the global emissions in 2010 of the 
1.5°C pathways and the 2°C pathways3. More specifically, 
the global emissions in 2010 of the 1.5°C pathways included 
in the 2016 Emissions Gap Report were about 3 GtCO
2
e 
higher than the median 2010 levels of the 2°C pathways. 
This resulted in higher global emissions by 2020 for the 1.5°C 
pathways compared to the 2°C pathways. The harmonization 
brings the 2010 global emission estimates to the same 
level for the assessed 1.5°C pathways and 2°C pathways, 
and leads to comparable 2020 emission levels for the two 
pathways. This harmonization further affects the projected 
global emission levels in 2030, lowering them by around 
a further 2 GtCO
2
e. The estimated global emission level is 
about 5 GtCO
2
e lower than the central estimate for the 2°C 
pathways, as shown in table 3.1. 
 
3.2.3 Emerging studies on pathways with a 
greater than 66 percent chance of limiting 
global warming to below 1.5°C
The strengthened temperature targets of the Paris 
Agreement and the forthcoming 2018 Special Report on 
the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial 
levels and related global greenhouse gas emissions pathways 
by the IPCC have generated substantial interest in scenarios 
that assume least-cost pathways starting from 2020 and that 
have a higher than 66 percent probability of returning global 
warming to 1.5°C in 2100. 
For the 2016 Emissions Gap Report, no such scenarios were 
available. Therefore the report focused on the least-cost 
pathways starting from 2020 that had a lower probability 
(50 percent) of returning global warming to below 1.5°C in 
2100, based on a review by Rogelj et al. (2015) of earlier 
published scenarios (Luderer et al., 2013; Rogelj et al., 
2013a; Rogelj et al., 2013b). 
However, new scenarios are now emerging that assume 
least-cost pathways starting from 2020 that can return 
global warming to below 1.5°C in 2100 with at least 
66 percent probability. These are reported in the ADVANCE 
project’s policy briefs (Luderer et al., 2016; Vrontisi et al., 
2016) and its forthcoming paper (Vrontisi et al., 2017). At 
the ninth meeting of the research dialogue at the Subsidiary 
Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) in Bonn, 
May 2017, Rogelj et al. (2017b) also presented the first draft 
of least-cost 1.5°C pathways starting from 2020 based on a 
multi-model comparison study and the framework of the 
Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (Riahi et al., 2017)4.
These higher probability 1.5°C scenarios have extensive 
implications for 2030 global emission levels. Vrontisi et al. 
(2016) reported scenarios from various models that assume 
least-cost pathways starting from 2020 that can return global 
warming to below 1.5°C in 2100 with at least 66 percent 
probability. Emission levels in 2030 for 1.5°C scenarios are 
estimated at 24 (range: 19–34) GtCO
2
e, which is about 
3 The harmonization is based on the average outcome of adopting the three 
harmonization methods from the literature (Rogelj et al., 2011).
4 These scenarios represent an extension of the set of ‘Representative 
Concentration Pathways’ (RCPs) towards scenarios that limit end-of-century 
forcing to 1.9 W/m2.
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18 GtCO
2
e lower than the central estimate for the 2°C 
pathways (table 3.1).
3.3 The emissions gap in 2030 and urgency   
of action
This section updates the 2030 emissions gap from previous 
reports (section 3.3.1) and examines the implications of the 
estimated emission levels associated with the NDC scenarios 
for peaking of emissions, depletion of the carbon budget 
and global average temperature increase by the end of 
the century (section 3.3.2). It then assesses the potential 
positive effects on the 2030 emissions gap of two important 
agreements outside the UNFCCC: the Kigali Amendment and 
the International Civil Aviation Organization Agreement.
3.3.1 The effect of NDCs on global greenhouse gas 
emissions and the resulting emissions gap
This section presents the emissions gap for 2030, drawing 
on the estimated global total greenhouse gas emission levels 
in 2030 under the six scenarios described in section 3.2 and 
provided in table 3.1. As in previous reports, the emissions 
gap in 2030 is defined as the difference between global total 
greenhouse gas emissions from least-cost scenarios that are 
consistent with the below 2°C and 1.5°C temperature target 
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Figure 3.1: Global greenhouse gas emissions under different scenarios and the emissions gap in 2030 (median estimate and 10th to 90th 
percentile range).  
Note: the emissions range for 1.5°C is smaller than for 2°C, as a smaller 
number of studies for 1.5°C are available. For current policy, the minimum–
maximum across all assessed studies are provided.
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and the expected global total greenhouse gas emissions 
implied if NDCs are fully implemented. Findings regarding 
the aggregate effect of full implementation of the NDCs on 
global total greenhouse gas emissions in 2025 and 2030 are 
also compared to the emissions implied by the no-policy 
baseline scenario and the current policy scenario. 
The results are illustrated in figure 3.1, which shows that the 
emissions gap in 2030, compared with least-cost pathways 
limiting global warming to below 2°C with a greater than 
66 percent chance, ranges from 11-13.5 GtCO
2
e for the full 
implementation of the conditional and the unconditional 
NDCs respectively. These estimates are slightly lower 
than those made in 2016 (12-14 GtCO
2
e), due to updated 
information from five global studies resulting in lower 
emission projections for the NDCs. The emissions gap in 
the case of least-cost pathways limiting global warming to 
below 1.5°C with 50–66 percent chance is 16-19 GtCO
2
e 
for conditional and unconditional NDCs respectively. This is 
higher than the estimates made in 2016 (15-17 GtCO
2
e) due 
to the updated 1.5°C pathways (see section 3.2). As indicated 
by the emerging new studies, the gap would be significantly 
larger if a higher probability (>66 percent) of limiting global 
temperature increase to 1.5°C in 2100 was considered.
It is apparent from figure 3.1 that current policies lead 
to emissions that are markedly lower than the baseline, 
which assumes that no additional climate policies are put 
in place from 2005. This indicates that the baseline will 
become increasingly less useful as a reference case. The 
current policies projections have lowered by about 1 GtCO
2
e 
compared with the estimate made in 2016, mainly due to 
lower current policy projections from China.
Figure 3.1 shows that full implementation of the 
unconditional NDCs will reduce annual global greenhouse 
gas emissions in 2030 by 9 GtCO
2
e5 (range: 8–13) relative to 
the median no-policy baseline, and by 4 GtCO
2
e (range: 2–7) 
relative to the median current policy trajectory. Comparing 
these cost-optimal 2°C and 1.5°C scenarios with the 
unconditional NDC projections shows a large discrepancy. 
More specifically, there is a gap in 2030 of 13.5 GtCO
2
e 
(range: 10–15) between the unconditional NDC scenario 
and the median 2°C scenario. Comparing the unconditional 
NDC scenario with the median global emissions pathway 
consistent with meeting 1.5°C with a 50–66 percent chance 
leads to a gap of 19 GtCO
2
e (range: 15-21), which is 2 GtCO
2
e 
higher than the gap in the 2016 report, due to the lower 
1.5°C emissions pathways. 
In comparison, if countries were to also fully implement 
the conditional NDCs, estimated global greenhouse gas 
emissions would be about 2.4 GtCO
2
e (range: 1.2–3.0) lower 
in 2030 compared with the unconditional NDC scenario 
case. This leaves a gap in 2030 of 11 (range 8–12) GtCO
2
e 
5 The gap numbers and ranges in the text are rounded to the nearest Gt.
between the conditional NDC scenario and the median 
cost-optimal 2°C scenario. Comparing the conditional NDC 
scenario with the median 1.5°C scenarios (50–66 percent 
chance) increases the gap to 16 GtCO
2
e (range: 13–18). 
It should be noted that the two NDC scenarios assume full 
implementation of the conditional and unconditional NDCs 
submitted by all countries. Considering the announcement 
of the United States of America regarding its withdrawal 
from the Paris Agreement and  policy changes in the 
United States of America, section 3.4 also discusses recent 
studies estimating possible effects on the United States of 
America’s emissions.
The gap calculations assume that there is no double counting 
of reductions. In other words, transferred reductions are 
only counted towards the achievement of one country’s 
NDC, not towards both the country buying and selling. The 
Paris Agreement provides for voluntary use of “international 
transferred mitigation outcomes”, such as trading of offset 
credits, on the basis that parties shall avoid double counting. 
If, in a theoretical scenario, all Parties were to freely double 
count (contrary to the provisions of the Paris Agreement), 
this could increase the global emissions by 2030 by 
0.8 GtCO
2
e in the case of both unconditional and 
conditional NDCs6. 
3.3.2 The implications on peaking, carbon budget 
and temperature 
Global total greenhouse gas emissions (covering all sectors 
and gases) are expected to increase and not peak before 
2030 under both the NDC scenarios and the current policy 
scenario. New actions would be necessary to change this. 
In contrast, the 2°C and 1.5°C least-cost pathways assume 
that global total greenhouse gas emissions peak no later 
than in 2020. This stresses the urgency of strengthening 
mitigation action as well as NDCs before 2020, as Chapter 2 
also concludes.
Another indication of the urgency of action concerns the 
implications of projected global total CO
2
 emissions for 
the carbon dioxide (CO
2
) budget. The CO
2
 budget indicates 
the total cumulative CO
2
 emissions that can be emitted for 
temperatures to stay below 2°C and 1.5°C7. If the NDCs are 
fully implemented, they will result in cumulative emissions of 
750-800 GtCO
2
 during the 2011–2030 period, which is about 
80 percent of the remaining CO
2
 budget of 1,000 GtCO
2
 
(range: 750-1,400) for limiting global warming to below 2°C 
with more than 66 percent probability. The available global 
carbon budget for 1.5°C with 50-66 percent probability will 
already be well depleted by 2030. A recently published paper 
(Millar et al., 2017) suggests that the available budget for 1.5°C 
6 Consistent with the earlier analysis of double counting in the UN Environment 
2014 Emissions Gap Report, for the NDC cases it is assumed that international 
emission offsets could account for 33 percent of the difference between 
current policies trajectory and emission levels for the NDC cases by 2030 
for the OECD countries. This is an arbitrary, conservative estimate, as many 
parties have yet to specify any limits on the use of transferable units.
7 Box 2-1 (UNEP, 2014) explains how cumulative CO
2
 emissions are influenced 
by various factors, such as the transient climate response to cumulative 
carbon emissions and non-CO
2
 greenhouse gases.
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(IPCC, 2014a). The carbon budget ranges show the values based on the range of scenarios assessed by Working Group 
III (IPCC, 2014b). The solid horizontal line at 1,000 GtCO
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assessed by Working Group I (IPCC, 2014a). Historical emissions until 2015 are based on Le Quéré et al. (2015).
Figure 3.2: Comparison of projected emissions by 2030 and all-time 1.5°C and 2°C 
carbon budgets.  
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might be bigger. However, criticism on the  study points to 
the fact that using different global average temperature data 
sets in the calculations would not lead to higher budgets8. 
Finally, the urgency of action and enhanced ambition 
becomes unquestionable when the global average 
temperature implications of the NDCs are taken into 
consideration. Estimates of the level of global average 
temperature increase associated with the implementation 
of the NDCs depend on the assumptions made about what 
will happen after 2030, and the probability assigned to the 
global average temperature increase. Previous Emissions 
Gap Reports adopt the approach of Rogelj et al. (2016), 
which assumes that, as a minimum, the level of climate 
mitigation effort implied by the NDCs is continued after 
2030, until the end of the century. As reported in the 2016 
Emissions Gap Report, full implementation of unconditional 
NDCs and comparable action afterwards is consistent with a 
global average temperature increase of about 3.2°C (median, 
range: 2.9–3.4°C) relative to pre-industrial levels with greater 
than 66 percent probability by 2100. Full implementation of 
the conditional NDCs would lower the projection by about 
0.2°C by 2100.
3.3.3 Impact of the Kigali Amendment
The Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol aims to phase 
down production and imports of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), 
thereby reducing hydrofluorocarbon emissions, which is 
in the spirit of the Paris Agreement to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions to net zero. It solidifies the international 
efforts and provides more certainty that national measures 
to reduce these emissions will be implemented. Against a 
no-action baseline, the reductions could be in the order of 
0.7 GtCO
2
e/year in 2030 (Höglund-Isaksson et al., 2017). 
The Kigali Amendment may have a lower additional impact 
against the NDCs, but one that is uncertain as countries are 
not clear about the extent to which such reductions are 
already covered by the NDCs. Most countries set targets 
for all greenhouse gases including the hydrofluorocarbons. 
For them, implementing the commitments of the 
Kigali Amendment will not necessarily lead to lower 
hydrofluorocarbon emissions than implementing the 
NDC. Some, most notably China, have not included these 
emissions in their NDC. For them, the implementation of 
the Kigali Amendment would lead to lower emissions than 
implementing the NDC and would, therefore, narrow the 
emissions gap. 
The long-term impact of the Kigali Amendment is assessed in 
Chapter 6, which shows that it can be substantial. 
8 https://www.carbonbrief.org/factcheck-climate-models-have-not-exag- 
gerated-global-warming ; http://www.realclimate.org/index.php/archives/2017/ 
09/is-there-really-still-a-chance-for-staying-below-1-5-c-global-warming/
3.3.4 Impact of the International Civil Aviation 
Organization Agreement
The International Civil Aviation Organization is the United 
Nations body responsible for international civil aviation 
emissions of CO
2
 under Article 2.2 of the Kyoto Protocol. 
Although international aviation is not explicitly identified 
under the Paris Agreement, it is assumed that the 
International Civil Aviation Organization will continue to take 
responsibility for international emissions.
 
The International Civil Aviation Organization adopted a target 
of ‘Carbon Neutral Growth from 2020’, that is no increase of 
international aviation emissions of CO
2
 from 2020 onwards. 
In order to achieve this, the International Civil Aviation 
Organization agreed a global market-based measure, the 
‘Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International 
Aviation’ (CORSIA) at the 39th International Civil Aviation 
Organization Assembly (Resolution A39-3) in 2016. The 
Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International 
Aviation relies on emissions offsetting and work is currently 
ongoing on agreeing a monitoring, reporting and verification 
system and defining the emissions units and registries to be 
used. In addition, the International Civil Aviation Organization 
is working on implementing technical measures to increase 
efficiency or the use of sustainably sourced low-carbon fuels 
to also contribute to the target of ‘Carbon Neutral Growth 
from 2020’.
As of 2015, total emissions of aviation CO
2
 are estimated 
to be of the order of 0.9 GtCO
2
e (International Energy 
Agency data)9, around 62 percent of which are international. 
Domestic emissions fall under the reporting and reduction 
plans of States. International aviation emissions are 
expected to grow from 0.5 GtCO
2
e in 2017 to around 
1.1 GtCO
2
e in 2030 with increasing traffic demand over 
the coming decades, despite emission reductions from 
operational improvements, aircraft technology and 
utilization of sustainable alternative fuels. If growth after 
2020 is compensated by offsets, emissions of the order of 
0.3 GtCO
2
e/year in 2030 could be saved over the reference 
development. This is consistent with the International Civil 
Aviation Organization’s own estimate10.
 
Given that participation in the first phases of the Carbon 
Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International 
Aviation is voluntary, that certain developing countries 
are permanently exempt, and that its actual effectiveness 
depends on its implementation by States, the impact of the 
Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International 
Aviation is still uncertain. So far, around 70 States have 
declared their commitment to join the Carbon Offsetting 
and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation.
 
9 Here, aviation CO
2
e emissions are effectively CO
2
 emissions alone, the sector 
having no significant emissions of methane, Nitrous Oxide (N
2
O) etc. Aviation 
does have non-CO
2
 impacts, however, from emissions of particles, nitrogen 
oxides (NOx) and water vapour that impact on ozone (O3), reduce methane, 
and affect cloudiness but these are not estimated in CO
2
e since the scientific 
uncertainty of doing so in terms of Global Warming Potential 100 is still 
rather large (Fuglestvedt et al., 2010; Lee et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2010).
10 https://www.icao.int/environmental-protection/Pages/A39_CORSIA_FAQ3.
aspx estimates range from 0.288-0.376 GtCO
2
 per year in 2030.
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Whether the offsetting under the Carbon Offsetting and 
Reduction Scheme for International Aviation reduces the 
emissions gap (between the NDCs and what is needed 
for the Paris Agreement long-term goals) also depends 
on the quality of the offsets that are allowed under the 
Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International 
Aviation regime. The gap (as defined in this report) would 
be narrowed if only offsets that reduce emissions beyond 
the NDC of the country that was selling the offsets were 
allowed. The gap would not be narrowed if credits were 
allowed that were already counted towards meeting the 
countries’ NDCs. This would be the case, for example, for 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects initiated 
several years ago that keep operating regardless of whether 
or not the Clean Development Mechanism credits are sold, 
and whose reductions are included in the current emission 
trajectory of the country selling the offsets (Schneider et al., 
2017). Whether the offsetting under the Carbon Offsetting 
and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation reduces 
the emissions gap also depends on the level of participation. 
Hence, the International Civil Aviation Organization 
Agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from 
aviation may have an impact of between 0 and 0.3 GtCO
2
e 
on closing the emissions gap in 2030.
3.4 Understanding the current emission 
trends of G20 members
3.4.1 A comparison of current emission trends of 
G20 members
This section presents a comparison of country-specific 
findings for the G20 members. To assess these, figure 3.3 
shows the projected impact up to 2030 of the NDCs and 
current policies on greenhouse gas emissions for each G20 
member. As mentioned in Chapter 2, these economies 
collectively generate around three quarters of global 
greenhouse gas emissions. Therefore their success in 
implementing (or exceeding) their NDCs will have a major 
impact on the achievement of global climate goals. 
NDCs are not static or one-off commitments; countries have 
the obligation to strengthen them regularly. The assessment 
conducted in this section is on current NDCs, acknowledging 
that they can be revised in the future. 
For each of the G20 members, median emission projections 
resulting from the current policies and full implementation of 
the NDCs is calculated. As described in box 2.2 in Chapter 2, 
current policies projections from independent analyses 
presented in Chapter 2 cover the main energy and climate 
policies implemented as of a recent cut-off date and do 
not consider prospective policies that are being debated 
or planned.
The calculation is based on the same data as the 2016 
Emissions Gap Report was (UNEP, 2016), but updates have 
been used for: the current policies and the NDC projections 
from the Climate Action Tracker (CAT, 2017); the International 
Energy Agency (IEA, 2016); the Joint Research Centre (Kitous 
et al., 2017); PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment 
Agency (den Elzen et al., 2016a; Kuramochi et al., 2016; PBL, 
2017); updated NDC projections from Climate Interactive 
(2017); and some updated national and official studies 
(Reputex, 2016; Sha et al., 2017) (see Appendix A available 
online). More specifically, the data is sourced from: (i) the 
official estimates included in the NDCs (UNFCCC, 2015a); 
(ii) calculations based on the NDCs and on other documents 
submitted by countries to the UNFCCC (such as national 
greenhouse gas inventories, national communications, 
biennial reports, and biennial update reports); (iii) estimates 
published in country-specific   studies; and (iv) eight 
independent global analyses11. These are described in 
further detail in Appendix A, which is available online.
The results of this assessment are presented for all G20 
members in figure 3.3 (with the 28 European Union members 
represented collectively instead of by the four Member 
States, who are individual G20 members), noting that data 
are not available for all countries for all studies. By comparing 
the current policy scenarios and the NDC scenarios, the 
figure provides an indication of whether or not a country 
needs to implement policies additional to the current policy 
trajectory to meet its NDC target. The figure does not indicate 
the level of ambition of the NDC targets. Box 3.3 considers 
possible principles for assessing and comparing the ambition 
of NDCs across countries. It is also important to note that the 
current policy trajectory scenarios, which attempt to reflect 
the most recent mitigation policies, differ from the baseline 
or ‘business as usual’ (BAU) scenarios employed by some 
countries, which typically assume that no new policies are 
adopted or implemented after a given cut-off year.
11 The UNFCCC synthesis report and the Danish Energy Agency (DEA) study are 
excluded here, as these studies do not provide national estimates. 
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Figure 3.3 shows that for many countries the implementation 
of their NDC would lead to lower emissions than the current 
policies scenario, or in other words that additional policies 
would have to be implemented to meet the NDC target. 
For some countries the NDC is above the current policies 
scenario, indicating that it should be possible to enhance 
ambition quite easily. For eight G20 members, the NDC is 
above 2010 emission levels. 
Recent studies suggest that Brazil, China, India and Russia 
are likely to – or are roughly on track to – (over)achieve 
their (unconditional) 2030 targets through their currently 
implemented policies.
Argentina, Australia, Canada, the European Union, Indonesia, 
Japan, Mexico, South Africa, Republic of Korea and the 
United States of America are likely to require further action 
in order to meet their NDCs, according to government and 
independent estimates. 
From the existing studies, it is not possible to determine 
whether Saudi Arabia and Turkey are on track to meet 
their NDCs.
Figure 3.3 furthermore illustrates that the progress on 
cutting down greenhouse gas emissions varies across the 
G20 countries. For 11 of the 16 G20 members (counting the 
28 European Union members as one), emission projections 
based on current policies are higher than their 2010 emission 
levels. More specifically, for some non-OECD Member States 
(Argentina, China, India and Saudi Arabia) as well as for 
some OECD Member States (Australia, Mexico, Republic of 
Korea and Turkey), currently implemented policies do not 
stop annual emissions from increasing until 2030. Annual 
emissions in other countries are projected to remain stable 
at about 2010 levels (including in Canada, Russia and the 
United States of America), or to decrease further (such as in 
the European Union with a 7–32 percent reduction compared 
to 2010 levels), under current policies. The following section 
provides more detail on each of the G20 members.
2 5 10 - 1 3 6 - - 4 7 8 1 5 9 -
0
8
6
2
10
12
14
16
18
20
China EU-28 India USA*
44 
Emissions (GtCO₂e/year)
Number of studies
1990
2010
Naonal BAU reported in NDC
Current policies (naonal studies)
Current policies (all studies)
Uncondional NDC (all studies)
Condional NDC (all studies)
Figure 3.3: Greenhouse gas emissions (all gases and sectors) of the G20 members by 2030. 
Figure 3.3 a
Note: Greenhouse gas emissions (all gases and sectors) of the G20 members by 2030 for the BAU emissions projection from the NDC submission (third bar), for 
the current policies scenario from official and national studies (fourth bar), from all studies, including official, national and global model studies (fifth bar), for the 
unconditional NDC scenario (sixth bar), and for the conditional NDC scenario (seventh bar). For current-policy and NDC scenarios respectively, the minimum–maximum 
and 10th–90th-percentile range across all assessed studies are provided. The uncertainty ranges are explained in the main text. For reporting reasons, the emissions 
projections for China, European Union, India and United States of America are shown in panel (a), and the other countries in panel (b), with different vertical axis. The 
figure also shows the number of studies underlying the estimate (if available) for the last four bars: current policies (national studies), current policies (all studies) and 
the unconditional NDC and conditional NDC (all studies). 
* For the US, the unconditional NDC is for 2025.
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2
e including LULUCF over the period 2025-2030.
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3.4.2 NDCs and emission trends of individual       
G20 members
China’s NDC includes four major targets: (1) an intention 
to peak CO
2
 emissions around 2030, making best efforts 
to peak earlier, (2) to reduce the carbon intensity of Gross 
Domestic Product by 60–65 percent from 2005 levels by 
2030, (3) to increase the share of non-fossil fuels in primary 
energy consumption to around 20 percent by 2030, and (4) 
to increase the forest stock volume by around 4.5 billion m3 
from 2005 levels by 2030. For the first two targets, the NDC 
does not clarify which sectors are covered (Damassa et al., 
2015). Recent independent studies (Climate Action Tracker, 
2017a; den Elzen et al., 2016b; IEA, 2016; Sha et al., 2015) 
12  www.climatepolicydatabase.org, https://newclimate.org/2015/12/01/good-
practice-policies/
When countries put forward their NDCs for the Paris Agreement, they were asked to explain why these are ambitious. 
These explanations can be used to derive metrics to compare countries’ actions. 
The literature on assessing the ambition of NDCs is growing. It compares different energy and climate indicators 
between countries and analyses what would be necessary in terms of national ambition to be compatible with the Paris 
Agreement (Aldy et al., 2016; Climate Transparency, 2017; Höhne et al., 2017). Höhne et al. (2017) argue that only a 
comprehensive approach that covers all perspectives can be used to assess the ambition of national climate policy. Many 
principles could be used by countries to assess ambition, including (based on Höhne et al. 2017):
• A country’s reduction of emissions since 1990 (or any other base-year): the standard perspective for developed 
countries used since 1992, also used in the Kyoto Protocol – the metric used by the European Union, for example.
• Change in recent trend in emissions: a country would do more than before – the main argument in the proposal by 
the United States of America. This can also be measured as a deviation from a BAU scenario. 
• Time and level of peaking emissions per capita: countries go through different levels of development with first rising, 
then peaking and then declining emissions – the metric chosen by China.
• Comparison with equity-based effort-sharing calculations: There is a long history of scientific studies that use ‘effort-
sharing’ principles to calculate ‘fair’ emission targets for countries. The principles include responsibility (for example 
those who emitted more in the past now have to reduce more) or capability (for example those with higher per capita 
income levels should do more), equality (that is equal emission rights per capita), cost-effectiveness (total abatement 
cost per Gross Domestic Product), as well as combinations.
• Comparison with benchmarks of decarbonization indicators: A number of indicators can be used to describe 
countries’ circumstances and developments, for example at the national level, emissions per Gross Domestic Product, 
emissions per capita, energy use per capita or the energy mix. At the sectoral level it could be emissions per kilometre 
travelled or per tonne of cement or steel produced. Indicators can measure activity (for example vehicle kilometres 
travelled) or intensity (emissions per vehicle kilometre) (see also the data portal of the Climate Action Tracker).
• In line with globally cost-effective model pathways: Modelling exercises can identify the country reductions required 
to minimize the aggregated global costs of emission reductions. As a result, reductions are required in those sectors 
and countries where they are least-cost from a global perspective.
• Comparison with best practice policy package or policy menu: A comparison can be made on the extent to which 
a country has implemented supporting policies, addresses barriers, or has counterproductive policies in place. A 
contribution can be regarded as ambitious if it includes many policies that are considered good practice, while it would 
be less ambitious if the country were not to implement the policies that most of its peers had already successfully 
implemented (see also climate policy database12, Climate Transparency 2017).
Comprehensive studies that evaluate diverse metrics are not yet available. However, their inclusion would be very 
useful in future Emissions Gap Reports, as well as for the further processes under the UNFCCC, including the Facilitative 
Dialogue in 2018 and the global stocktake in 2023.
Box 3.3 Comparing the ambition of countries’ NDCs 
suggest that China’s emissions under currently implemented 
policies would roughly be in line with what the NDC targets 
would mean for overall emissions, but do not provide strong 
indication that CO
2
 emissions would peak before 203013. Total 
greenhouse gas emissions are projected to keep on growing 
up to 2030, albeit at a much lower rate than previously 
observed, which is also concluded in the analysis of Jiang et 
al. (2017). Several studies have revised their projection for 
2030 downward compared to last year’s projection.
 
Driven by air pollution control action policies (State Council, 
2013), China started to control coal use and promote clean 
energy use in 2012. Together with economic structural 
13 Some analysts have argued that structural shifts in the economy in recent 
years make likely much steeper reductions in the CO
2
 intensity of Gross 
Domestic Product. Fergus and Stern (2017) include an illustrative pathway 
wherein intensity is halved from 2005 to 2020, and the result is a peak in CO
2
 
emissions between 2020 and 2025.
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changes, this resulted in a slowdown of most energy-
intensive production, a peak in coal consumption in 2013 in 
physical unit and in 2014 in standard coal equivalents, and 
continued decline from 2014. Coal consumption reduced by 
4.7 percent in 2015, and 3.7 percent in 2016 (China Statistic 
Year Book, 2017). Due to the increase in natural gas and 
petroleum production, the total CO
2
 emissions have started 
to decline after 2014. Based on the energy use data, energy 
related CO
2
 emissions are around 450 MtCO
2
 lower in 2016 
than in 2014, which amounts to 5 percent of total CO
2
 
emissions from energy activities. Despite a small increase in 
emissions from clinker manufacture, CO
2
 emissions in 2016 
are still 430 MtCO
2
/year lower than in 2015 (China Statistic 
Year Book, 2017). 
In the last two years, newly installed capacity on wind power, 
solar power, and hydropower has increased to more than 
120 GW, which together with 11 GW newly installed capacity 
for nuclear has dominated the global newly installed capacity 
for low-carbon power. Low-carbon power accounts for more 
than 40 percent of global newly installed capacity in the last 
two years (CEC, 2017; REN21, 2017). 
Due to structural change in the industry sector, energy 
demand increase is projected to be quite low, with energy 
demand by 2020 much lower than that projected in 
government planning. Based on scenario analysis, the 
increase in energy demand in the near future could be 
provided by renewable energy, nuclear and natural gas. 
Given the recent trends, coal use decline could continue. 
Taking into account these recent developments, CO
2
 
emissions may already have peaked, or may not increase 
in the future (Green and Stern, 2017), a development that 
is not yet included in the studies cited above and may be 
visible in future Emissions Gap Reports.
Meanwhile, the European Union’s NDC contains a 
commitment of a 40 percent reduction in domestic 
emissions by 2030 compared to 1990. Recent independent 
studies (CAT, 2017; Kitous et al., 2016) and the European 
Environment Agency (EEA) Trends report (EEA, 2016) suggest 
that the European Union will fall slightly short of its NDC 
target under existing policies.
India’s NDC commits to, by 2030, reduce its emissions 
intensity of Gross Domestic Product by 33–35 percent below 
2005 levels, increase the share of non-fossil energy in total 
power generation capacity to 40 percent, and create an 
additional cumulative carbon sink of 2.5–3 GtCO
2
e through 
additional forest and tree cover. In figure 3.3, unconditional 
NDCs assume either current policies or only the intensity 
target, while conditional NDCs assume full implementation 
of the NDC, including the non-fossil fuel target. Independent 
studies project that the emission level under the intensity 
target would be overachieved, but it is uncertain what 
emission level would be reached under all three targets 
combined (Climate Action Tracker, 2017a; Mitra et al., 
2017; PBL, 2017). Recent policy developments include the 
Draft Electricity Plan published in December 2016 (Central 
Electricity Authority, 2016). Although this is currently not 
an official policy and is in a draft stage, the analysis in the 
document forecasts that no new coal-fired power capacity 
would be required during the period 2022–2027, in contrast 
to around 50 GW of additional capacity expected for the 
period 2017–2022 (Central Electricity Authority, 2016). As a 
result, the share of renewables in total installed capacity in 
this scenario is projected to increase to around 43 percent 
in 2027 (Central Electricity Authority, 2016). Overall, the 
assessment suggests that the positive development provides 
ample room for India to strengthen its NDC.
The INDC communicated by the United States of America in 
2015 indicated an intent to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
by between 26 and 28 percent below 2005 levels in 2025, 
which translates to 4.6-4.8 GtCO
2
e/year (national estimate, 
in the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) Global Warming 
Potential terms). In June 2017, President Donald Trump 
announced that the United States of America intended 
to withdraw from the Paris Agreement and would cease 
implementation of the NDC. The United States of America 
subsequently communicated its intent to the United Nations 
Secretary-General (The Representative of the United States 
of America to the United Nations, 2017). The earliest that 
United States of America withdrawal can take effect is in 
2020, four years after the Paris Agreement entered into 
force. Seven studies to date estimate that 2025 emissions 
under the new Administration’s policies will range from 
5.7-6.8 GtCO
2
e/year, in contrast to 5.0-6.6 GtCO
2
e/year 
under the previous Administration’s policies (Chai et al., 
2017; Climate Action Tracker, 2017a; Climate Advisers, 2017; 
ClimateInteractive, 2017; Hafstead, 2017; Rhodium Group, 
2017a, b). The impact of current and upcoming action by 
subnational and non-state actors may also be significant 
(Kuramochi et al., 2017).
Argentina presented a revised NDC at the COP 22 in 
November 2016 (Government of Argentina, 2016). This new 
NDC includes an unconditional absolute emissions target 
of 483 MtCO
2
e/year by 2030 and a conditional target of 
369 MtCO
2
e by 2030, both including LULUCF. The revised 
NDC is significantly more ambitious than the previous one in 
terms of absolute emissions (about 190 MtCO
2
e/year lower 
for the unconditional target), which is partially attributable 
to the revised methodology for quantifying the historical 
emissions data. The Climate Action Tracker concludes in its 
latest analysis (Climate Action Tracker, 2017b) that the 2030 
emissions projections, previously assessed to be on track 
to meet the unconditional target (Kuramochi et al., 2016), 
would not reach the revised NDC targets. 
Australia committed to a 26–28 percent reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 below 2005 levels, 
including LULUCF. Government projections indicate that 
emissions are expected to reach 592 MtCO
2
e/year in 2030 
(Government of Australia, 2016), in contrast to the targeted 
range of 429-440 MtCO
2
e/year. Independent analyses 
(Kuramochi et al., 2016; Reputex, 2016) confirm that the 
emissions are set to far exceed its Paris Agreement NDC 
target for 2030. The Emissions Reduction Fund, which 
the Government of Australia considers to be a key policy 
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2017) agree that Mexico will fall short of its unconditional 
NDC target (759 MtCO
2
e/year) by 20–160 MtCO
2
/year under 
its current policies.
The Republic of Korea committed under its NDC to reduce 
its greenhouse gas emissions by 37 percent below BAU by 
2030. Recent independent analyses (CAT, 2017; PBL, 2017) 
indicated that the emissions projections under current 
policies would fall short of the NDC emission level. However, 
it should be noted that the new President Moon Jae-in 
recently announced that the Republic of Korea will reduce 
its dependency on coal-fired and nuclear power generation 
(Cheong Wa Dae, 2017; MOTIE-MOE-MOLIT, 2017), while 
increasing renewable electricity. No official government 
document has been published.
 
Russia’s INDC aims to limit its greenhouse gas emissions 
to 70–75 percent of 1990 levels by 2030. Independent 
estimates on the INDC emission level vary significantly 
(2.4–2.7 GtCO
2
e/year including LULUCF), mainly due to 
different interpretations on the accounting of LULUCF 
emissions (Government of Russia, 2014). The emission 
levels under current policies projected by independent 
analyses are approximately 2.0–2.4 GtCO
2
e/year (including 
LULUCF) in 2030 and reach the lower end of Russia’s INDC 
range (Kuramochi et al., 2016). The latest current policies 
projections for 2030 excluding LULUCF by the Climate Action 
Tracker (Climate Action Tracker, 2017d) have been revised 
downward by 0.2–0.3 GtCO
2
e/year compared to the 2016 
assessment. Our assessment suggests that there is ample 
room for Russia to strengthen its NDC.
Saudi Arabia’s NDC aims to achieve mitigation co-benefits of 
up to 130 MtCO
2
e avoided annually by 2030 through actions 
and plans outlined to contribute to economic diversification 
and adaptation. The country has not yet defined a baseline, 
which the NDC states will be determined based on 
differently weighted combinations of two scenarios, which 
differ in terms of their assumptions on the allocation of 
oil: produced for either domestic consumption or export. 
measure to reduce emissions alongside other measures 
such as the National Energy Productivity Plan and targets for 
the reduction of hydrofluorocarbons (85 percent by 2036), 
does not set Australia on a path to meeting its targets.
Brazil has put forward an absolute emissions reduction 
target, committing to reduce emissions to 1.3 GtCO
2
e/year 
by 2025 and 1.2 GtCO
2
e/year by 2030, which is equivalent 
to 37 percent and 43 percent below 2005 emissions levels 
including LULUCF. Recent independent studies suggest 
current policy projections to be in line with the NDC targets 
(CAT, 2017; Kuramochi et al., 2016; PBL, 2017). Uncertainty 
nevertheless remains about the future of emissions growth; 
for example, the LULUCF emissions reduced by 86 percent 
between 2005 and 2012 (Ministry of Science and Technology 
of Brazil, 2016), but recent data and analyses suggest that 
the decreasing trend on deforestation and the resulting 
emissions reductions have slowed down or even stopped 
(SEEG, 2017). 
Canada’s NDC commits to emissions reductions of 30 percent 
from the 2005 level by 2030. Government projections indicate 
that emissions are expected to reach 742 MtCO
2
e/year 
in 2030, in contrast to the targeted level of 523 MtCO
2
e/year 
(excluding LULUCF) (Environment and Climate Change 
Canada, 2017). Independent studies (Climate Action 
Tracker, 2017h; PBL, 2017) also agree that Canada will miss 
its NDC target under current policies by a large margin 
(610–820 MtCO
2
e/year compared to the NDC target of 
510–580 MtCO
2
e/year in 2030).
Indonesia’s NDC includes an unconditional target of 
29 percent below BAU and a conditional 41 percent 
reduction below BAU with sufficient international support 
by 2030, both including LULUCF. The NDC includes emissions 
due to deforestation and peat land destruction, which are 
the country’s largest sources of greenhouse gas emissions. 
Studies covered in figure 3.3 show that Indonesia is close to 
being on track to achieving its unconditional NDC, which is 
based on new independent analyses (CAT, 2017; Kuramochi 
et al., 2016; PBL, 2017) that show a range of emission 
projections under current policies for 2030, although the 
upper end of the projection range is not expected to achieve 
the unconditional NDC target.
Japan aims to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 
26 percent below 2013 levels by 2030 under its NDC. Recent 
analyses (CAT, 2017; PBL, 2017) show that the target could 
possibly be reached with currently implemented policies, 
although there is still a great deal of uncertainty regarding 
the future role of nuclear and coal power. It is worth noting 
that the government has started the process to formulate a 
new Basic Energy Plan, in which a revised future electricity 
mix target for 2030 and subsequent years would be laid out. 
Mexico aims, in its NDC, to reduce its greenhouse gas 
emissions by between 22 percent (unconditional) and 
36 percent (conditional) from BAU by 2030. Under its current 
policies, Mexico is not on track to meet its NDC target. 
Independent studies (Climate Action Tracker, 2017c; PBL, 
Among independent studies, PBL Netherlands Environmental 
Assessment Agency and the European Commission’s Joint 
Research Centre  project that Saudi Arabia will achieve 
its NDC (Kitous et al., 2017), whereas Climate Action 
Tracker projects it to miss the NDC target (Climate Action 
Tracker, 2017e).
South Africa’s NDC consists of a peak, plateau and decline 
in the greenhouse gas emissions trajectory range, which 
gives a range of 398–614 MtCO
2
e/year between 2025 and 
2030, reaching a peak between 2020 and 2025 and a plateau 
for the following decade, before starting to fall. All studies 
(Climate Action Tracker, 2017f; Kitous et al., 2017; PBL, 2017) 
agree that South Africa will not achieve its NDC range under 
current policies by a margin of 50 MtCO
2
e/year to nearly 
400 MtCO
2
e/year in 2030.  
Turkey’s NDC sets an economy-wide greenhouse gas 
emission reduction target of up to 21 percent below BAU 
in 2030. Among independent studies, PBL Netherlands 
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Figure 3.4: Illustration of the potential impact of international cooperative initiatives in 2030.
Environmental Assessment Agency and the European 
Commission’s Joint Research Centre project that Turkey will 
overachieve its NDC considerably by 370–410 MtCO
2
e/year 
(Kitous et al., 2017; PBL, 2017; van Vuuren et al., 2017; 
Vandyck et al., 2016) while Climate Action Tracker projects it 
to miss the NDC target, based on the government projection 
(Climate Action Tracker, 2017g).
3.5 Subnational and non-state actions to 
narrow the gap
In line with previous Emissions Gap Reports, this report finds 
that subnational and non-state actions could possibly make 
a significant contribution to narrowing the gap (figure 3.4). 
The aggregate impact of the initiatives could be in the order 
of a few GtCO
2
e in 2030 beyond the current NDCs, if the 
initiatives reach their stated goals and if these reductions do 
not displace actions elsewhere. Since the 2016 report, only 
updates on earlier studies (Compact of Mayors 2015; CDP 
and We Mean Business, 2016; The Climate Group, 2016; 
Graichen et al., 2017), but no significantly new aggregation 
reports, have become available.
Analysis of the extent to which individual subnational and 
non-state actors or initiatives meet their stated objectives 
is still scarce. Chan et al. (2016) find that not all initiatives 
deliver on their promises. Graichen et al. (2017) provide a 
preliminary assessment of the actual emission reductions 
of an initiative compared to its potential. Based on such 
analysis, several studies (Graichen et al., 2016; Michaelowa 
and Michaelowa, 2017) have identified criteria for initiatives 
to be effective:
• Permanent funding and secretarial support
•  Inclusion of Non-Govermental Organizations in the 
design and implementation of the initiative
• Definition of mitigation targets including baseline
• Regular monitoring, reporting and verification
The process around and following the COP 21 in Paris in 
2015 has brought about much higher recognition and 
institutionalization of the role of non-state actors in the 
intergovernmental climate change process. This process 
continued at COP 22 in Marrakech in 2016, where the 
Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action was 
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launched14. It provides guidance on how the UNFCCC process 
will catalyse and support climate action by Parties and 
non-Party stakeholders in the period up to 2020, in line with 
the arrangements of the Paris Agreement. It also promotes 
an assessment of the compatibility of commitments with 
regard to the long-term objectives of the Paris Agreement, 
and seeks to increase the coherence with the Sustainable 
Development Goals.
 
A number of new cooperative initiatives involving non-state 
actors were launched at COP 22 in Marrakech. The ‘2050 
Pathways’ platform intends to build a bridge to long-term 
decarbonization scenarios and strategies and brings together 
both state and non-state actors15. The Global South was 
well represented in new initiatives such as the Marrakech 
Investment Committee for Adaptation Fund, the Initiative 
for Renewable Island Energy and the Marrakech Pledge for 
Fostering Green Capital Markets in Africa. A host of other 
initiatives were launched in various areas, including forests, 
water, energy, human settlements, oceans, transport and 
agriculture16. However, there was little information on the 
progress regarding the non-state initiatives launched in Paris.
The number of non-state commitments and actions included 
in the Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action17 platform, 
where the UNFCCC captures and recognizes climate 
commitments from non-state actors, continued to grow 
to over 12,000 (mostly individual) commitments in 2016, 
compared to 10,000 in 2015. The Non-State Actor Zone for 
Climate Action also aims to assess the progress in these 
commitments, but so far there is little data available. UN 
Environment’s Climate Initiatives Platform18, which provides 
the Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action with data on 
important cooperative non-state climate initiatives, has also 
started collecting this information.
14 http://unfccc.int/files/paris_agreement/application/pdf/marrakech_
partnership_for_global_climate_action.pdf
15 http://newsroom.unfccc.int/unfccc-newsroom/high-level-climate-
champions-launch-2050-pathways-platform/
16 http://newsroom.unfccc.int/climate-action/non-state-actors-partner-with-
governments-to-boost-climate-action/ 
17 http://climateaction.unfccc.int/
18 http://climateinitiativesplatform.org/
Actions by subnational and non-state actors have the 
potential to reinforce each other (Andonova et al., 2017) and 
could make the Paris Agreement more robust. Even if Parties 
announce the withdrawal of their support from implementing 
the Paris Agreement, other actors in the same country could 
step in to reaffirm their commitment. For example, following 
the announcement of the Trump Administration to withdraw 
from the Paris Agreement, the United States of America has 
seen a number of new initiatives driven by subnational and 
non-state actors, such as America’s Pledge on Climate19, We 
Are Still In20, Climate Mayors21 and the US Climate Alliance22. 
If backed by action, these initiatives have the potential to 
make up for the withdrawal (Kuramochi et al., 2017).
Jerry Brown, governor of California, announced23 in July 
2017 that the State of California will convene representatives 
from subnational governments, businesses, investors and 
civil society in San Francisco, California, in September 2018 
for a Global Climate Action Summit24. The meeting aims 
to demonstrate the groundswell of innovative, ambitious 
climate action, highlight the economic and environmental 
transition already under way and spur deeper commitment 
from all parties, including national governments.
19 https://www.americaspledgeonclimate.com
20 http://www.wearestillin.com
21 http://www.climatemayors.org
22 https://www.usclimatealliance.org
23 https://www.gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=19866
24 https://globalclimateactionsummit.org/
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4.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores two central questions: Can the 
emissions gap in 2030 be bridged, and what are the most 
promising options to do so? As presented in Chapter 3, 
the estimated emissions gap in 2030 is 11 to 13.5 GtCO
2
e 
for the below 2°C target (>66 percent ‘likely’ chance), and 
16 to 19 GtCO
2
e for the 1.5°C target (50-66 percent ‘medium’ 
chance). Chapter 3 furthermore assessed the difference in 
2030 between emissions under the current policy scenario 
and the emission levels consistent with a likely chance of 
staying below 2°C and a medium chance of staying below 
1.5°C of about 17 and 22.5 GtCO
2
e respectively (table 3.1). To 
be sufficient to bridge the gap, emission reduction potentials 
in 2030 need to be of a comparable magnitude.
The chapter provides a detailed review of greenhouse gas 
emission reduction potentials in 2030 for key economic 
sectors (section 4.2). Sectoral emission reduction potentials, 
also called bottom-up potentials, provide detailed estimates 
of the level of emission reductions that is feasible within a 
certain sector or for a specific emissions category up to a 
certain marginal cost level. When added up, and adjusting 
for any overlaps, these estimates give an indication of the 
total potential for reducing global greenhouse gas emissions 
in 2030. The total potential can then be compared to the 
gap, to determine whether it can be bridged (section 4.3). 
In addition, the estimates provide policy makers with a clear 
and granular view of where important emission reduction 
options exist, that is, how the gap can be bridged. The 
sectoral estimates are then compared to emission reduction 
options provided by integrated assessment models 
(section 4.4). 
Previous Emissions Gap Reports have provided both sectoral 
emission reduction potential estimates and estimates based 
on integrated assessment models (see UNEP, 2014; 2013; 
2012; 2011). However, most of the previous assessments 
provide estimates of emission reduction potentials for 
2020, and the most recent assessments of sectoral emission 
reduction potentials date from more than six years ago. 
These include UNEP (2011) for 2020, IPCC (2007) for 2020 
and 2030, and McKinsey (2010) for 2030. Assessments that 
are more recent include IPCC (2014) and IEA (2017), but 
these do not include a sector-by-sector assessment of the 
full emission reduction potential in 2030.
4.2 Assessment of emission reduction 
potentials by sector in 2030
Drawing on a detailed review of recent studies, this section 
presents estimates of the global emission reduction 
potentials that are technically and economically feasible in 
2030. The focus is on six main sectors: agriculture, buildings, 
energy, forestry, industry, and transport (sections 4.2.1 
to 4.2.6). However, some promising options for emission 
reductions are difficult to allocate under one sector. These 
are considered in section 4.2.7. For all sectors, the main 
categories of emission reductions for 2030 are identified. 
The focus of the analysis is on the socio-economic potential. 
This means that the potentials presented here refer to the 
total of emission reductions that can be achieved using 
all technologies available in a given future year, which are 
economically attractive from a social cost perspective (IPCC, 
2001). This potential is defined as all reductions that can be 
achieved at a marginal cost of no more than US$100/tCO
2
e, 
at current prices, which is the cost level often assumed to 
be necessary by 2030 for achieving ambitious reduction 
pathways (IPCC, 2014; IEA, 2016). There are important 
uncertainties related to assumptions regarding technology 
deployment and implementation rates, including, for 
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example, how rapidly solar photovoltaic energy production 
can be scaled up, and the rate at which buildings can be 
retrofitted. The underlying analysis introduces some degree 
of ‘realism’ in the assessment and its respective assumptions. 
In general, it is assumed that the potentials can be achieved, 
if countries around the globe are willing to set policies that 
enable the implementation of the available solutions. 
The potentials are assessed against a current policy scenario, 
which provides a reference level in 2030 against which the 
greenhouse gas emission reductions could be achieved. The 
current policy scenario emissions projected for 2030 amount 
to 61.1 GtCO
2
e. If emissions from peat degradation and peat 
fires are excluded, projected emissions are 59.2 GtCO
2
e 
which corresponds well with the 58.9 GtCO
2
e current policy 
projection listed in Chapter 3, where peat-related emissions 
are excluded in 3 out of the 4 underlying scenarios. Details 
on the current policy scenario are included in Appendix B, 
available online. The following gases are included in the 
analysis: carbon dioxide (CO
2
), methane (CH
4
), nitrous oxide 
(N
2
O), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) 
and sulfurhexafluoride (SF
6
). Black carbon is not included in 
the assessment (for impacts on global warming of short-lived 
climate pollutants, including black carbon, see Chapter 6). 
The potentials are adjusted to be in line with the current 
policy scenario used for this chapter. Emission factors are 
based on the average global emission intensities for 2030 
from the World Energy Outlook 2016 (IEA, 2016). For the 
electricity sector the average emission intensity of fossil-fuel 
based power plants is used. Finally, interactions between 
mitigation measures (for example, efficient appliances 
versus power sector decarbonisation) are taken into account 
and handled on a case-by-case basis.
4.2.1 Emission reduction options and potential in 
the agriculture sector
Studies of emission reduction potentials for the agriculture 
sector vary widely. Since IPCC AR5, studies that report 
mitigation potentials in the agriculture sector with carbon 
prices up to US$100/tCO
2
 provide annual reductions of 
between 0.26 to 4.6 GtCO
2
e (Smith et al., 2014)1. These 
estimates exclude demand-side options. However, demand 
side mitigation options are included in the assessment 
below. While net carbon emissions from soils are negligible 
in current policy trajectories, Smith et al. (2007) argue 
that around 90 percent of the mitigation potential can be 
attributed to carbon sequestration in soils, like cropland, 
grazing land and the restoration of degraded land. In addition, 
non-CO
2
 greenhouse gases from enteric fermentation and 
rice cultivation can be avoided. Finally, a large share of peat-
related emissions can be avoided.
Regarding cropland management, Smith et al. (2008) cite a 
mitigation potential of 0.74 GtCO
2
e in 2030, with 90 percent 
of the potential coming from CO
2
, while long-term biophysical 
potentials of 2.6 GtCO
2
e/year are reported (Smith, 2016). 
The non-CO
2
 component is more or less in line with the 
1 Lower range figure only concerns non-CO
2
 GHGs and thus excludes soil 
Carbon sequestration where the largest share of the potential lies.
0.04 GtCO
2
e from USEPA (2013), presenting a range of 
options to reduce the emissions originating from crop 
farming. The estimate is established through a combination 
of no-tillage and residue management, agronomy and 
nutrient management, which are all three applied on 
one-third of global croplands. Recently, there has been 
discussion on no-tillage measures, for example in Dimassi 
et al. (2014), who argue that an increase in the soil-carbon 
stock may be the result of a redistribution of carbon 
between soil layers. However, this would not affect the 
potential from Smith et al. (2008), since the area to which 
no-tillage measures are applied can be substituted with 
measures that have a more or less similar potential from 
the other cropland management categories, like agronomy 
and nutrient management (Smith et al., 2008). We therefore 
maintain the estimate potential of 0.74 GtCO
2
e in 2030 for 
cropland management.
Grazing lands are typically managed less intensively than 
croplands, leaving significant potential for enhanced removals 
and emission reduction. Grazing land measures suggested 
by Smith et al. (2008) include: adjusting grazing intensity 
and allowing for more biomass growth, increasing land 
productivity by reducing nutrient deficiencies, using more 
precise nutrient additions resulting in savings in fertilizer, fire 
management (reducing frequency and fire intensity in fire-
prone areas), and species introduction, for example of grass 
species with higher productivity from associated nitrogen 
inputs (Smith et al., 2008). Together, these measures have 
the potential to sequester an additional 0.75 GtCO
2
 in 2030, 
if measures under US$100/tCO
2
 are adopted.
Degraded wetlands, drained for agricultural use, contribute 
disproportionally to global greenhouse gas emissions from 
the land-use sectors, with approximately 25 percent of all 
land-use emissions originating from degraded peatlands 
(Bonn et al., 2014). When peatlands are drained, organic 
matter in soils starts oxidizing and releases significant 
volumes of carbon dioxide emissions, until drainage is 
reversed or all peat is lost (Bonn et al., 2014). Currently, 
global greenhouse gas emissions from peatland degradation 
and peat fires are in the order of 2.2 GtCO
2
e/year and are 
expected to decrease to 1.9 GtCO
2
e/year in 2030. Smith 
et al. (2008) provides 2030 mitigation potentials for the 
restoration of cultivated organic (peaty) soils of 1.3 GtCO
2
e, 
but excludes mitigation from fires. In practice, peat fires can 
only be prevented when an economic value is attributed to 
the peatlands, or when they are rewetted effectively (Joosten 
et al., 2012). Taking the substantial cost of peat fires into 
account and considering measures of up to US$100/tCO
2
, it 
is assumed that emissions from peat fires can be reduced to 
zero for the majority of the peat sites in the world (World 
Bank, 2016; Wichtmann et al., 2016). Remaining emissions 
from peat fires in the current policy scenario are 0.3 GtCO
2
. 
Emission reductions from peatland degradation and peat 
fires combined would therefore amount to 1.6 GtCO
2
 in 2030.
Based on a simulation of alternative rice management 
scenarios using varying management techniques, USEPA 
(2013) estimates an emissions reduction potential of 
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0.18 GtCO
2
e in 2030, a reduction of nearly 25 percent 
compared to emissions under the current policy scenario. 
The scenarios include measures such as adjusting the 
flooding regime, applying no-tillage, and using various 
fertilizer alternatives.
Recently, biochar has gained attention as a potential carbon 
removal option in agricultural lands, mainly cropland. 
Biochar is produced by heating biomass under anaerobic 
conditions, and can under the right conditions enhance soil 
fertility and improve soil’s water retention properties while 
enhancing the soil organic carbon content. Woolf et al. 
estimate that after 15 years, a reduction of about 0.2 GtCO
2
e 
can be realized (Woolf, et al., 2010). 
Although current-policy emissions from enteric fermentation 
and manure management make up a significant part of 
total emissions in agriculture, the mitigation potential from 
livestock management is limited. Based on country-level 
livestock populations from USEPA (2012), and livestock 
production and market price projections from Nelson et 
al. (2010), a global mitigation potential at costs below 
US$100/tCO
2
 in 2030 of 0.23 GtCO
2
e is estimated (8 percent 
of current policy scenario emissions). The mitigation options 
with the highest cost-effective potentials are waste and 
manure digesters, anti-methanogens (vaccines that suppress 
methane production in the rumen), intensive grazing, 
and improved feed conversion and propionate precursors 
(animal feed addition that converts more of the produced 
hydrogen into propionate instead of methane).
Based on a combination of intensive restoration projects on 
agricultural lands (15 million hectares) and farmer-managed 
natural regeneration projects2 (135 million hectares), the 
Global Commission on the Economy and Climate estimates 
that an emission reduction of 1.1 GtCO
2
e/year can be 
achieved by 2030 (GCEM, 2015). These estimates are scaled 
up from case-study results in China and Niger respectively, 
and an uncertainty range of 0.5 to 1.7 GtCO
2
e is applied.
Turning to demand-side mitigation options, efforts can 
be made to lower the carbon footprint of the average 
diet. Stehfest et al. (2013) model the impact of shifting 
food patterns to a diet recommended by the World 
Health Organization, which sets recommendations on the 
consumption of animal products and fat, and compare 
this impact using two different economic models: the 
International Food Policy Research Institute’s (IFPRI) 
International Model for Policy Analysis of Agricultural 
Commodities and Trade (IMPACT) and the so-called LEITAP 
model from the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP). Both 
models were coupled to the integrated assessment model 
IMAGE. As a result of less agricultural demand from less 
land- and resource-intensive diets, total greenhouse gas 
emissions decrease by 0.37 to 1.37 GtCO
2
e/year in 2030 
(Stehfest et al., 2013).
2 A land restoration method using living tree stumps or roots in crop fields, 
grazing pastures, woodlands or forests that have proven to have co-benefits 
in combating poverty and hunger (Haglund et al., 2011).
Stehfest et al. (2013) also studied the effect of reducing 
food waste, utilising the same methods as described in 
the previous paragraph. Within the agricultural supply 
chain, significant losses can be identified when factors 
such as harvesting inefficiency, bad harvesting conditions, 
deterioration during storage, and consumer behaviour are 
considered. Estimates of total losses vary considerably, 
between 30 to 50 percent (Nelleman et al., 2009; Lundqvist, 
2009), and the effect of waste reduction is modelled at a 
15 percent reduction in the amount of food needed to meet 
similar nutrition levels, which requires a 45–75 percent 
reduction in the amount of wasted food. Modelled impacts 
on greenhouse gas emissions are somewhat higher than 
shifting dietary patterns, with IMPACT reporting 2030 
potentials of 0.79 GtCO
2
e/year and LEITAP of 2 GtCO
2
e/year.
Combining the potentials of all the measures discussed leads 
to an emission reduction potential of 3 GtCO
2
e/year in 2030 
(uncertainty range 2.3 – 3.7 GtCO
2
e), if uncertain measures 
like biochar, peat-related emission reductions, and demand-
side measures are excluded. These three measures add up 
to an additional potential of 3.7 GtCO
2
e (uncertainty range 
2.6 – 4.8 GtCO
2
e) in 2030, after correction for overlap with 
other measures. 
4.2.2 Emission reduction options and potential in 
the buildings sector
Under the current policy scenario, buildings account 
for annual energy-related greenhouse gas emissions of 
12.6 GtCO
2
 in 2030. Of these emissions, 29 percent are direct, 
mainly from space heating and hot water production, and 
71 percent are indirect, mainly from electric appliances and 
lighting. Improvements in energy efficiency is an important 
emission reduction option for all energy uses. In addition, 
renewable energy can play a role.
In many countries, policy measures and legislation are 
already addressing the energy efficiency potential of new 
buildings. Concepts like net-zero buildings, insulation, smart 
glazing, and building automation are of increasing interest. 
While developing new buildings with energy-efficient 
technologies is an important step in reducing emissions from 
the sector, retrofitting of existing buildings is also essential. 
Based on the method used by the Climate Action Tracker 
it is estimated that for new buildings between 0.68 and 
0.85 GtCO
2
/year could be avoided in 2030 (Climate Action 
Tracker, 2016). This would require that all new buildings in 
OECD countries are near-zero energy from 2020 onwards, 
and from 2020 to 2025 onwards also in non-OECD countries. 
It is assumed that near-zero energy buildings have 90 percent 
lower emissions than the current standard. This figure is 
consistent with Blok et al. (2015) who based on an analysis of 
several studies estimated a potential from ambitious energy 
efficiency standards for new buildings of 0.7 to 1.3 GtCO
2
/year 
in 2030. This is also consistent with C40 (2014), which reports 
a reduction potential of 0.9 GtCO
2
/year in 2030 for heating 
efficiency in new buildings. 
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For the thermal retrofit of existing buildings, the estimated 
emission reduction potential is 0.52 to 0.93 GtCO
2
/year 
in 2030 using the same method as in the Climate Action 
Tracker (2016). The lower range requires annual renovation 
rates of 3 percent in OECD and non-OECD countries from 
2020 onwards, with 75 percent direct emissions reduction 
per retrofit (GBPN, 2013). The higher range requires annual 
renovation rates from 2020 onwards of 5 percent in OECD 
countries and of 3 percent in non-OECD countries, with 
90 percent direct emissions reduction per retrofit (GBPN, 
2013). This emission reduction potential is consistent 
with C40 (2014), which forecasts a reduction potential of 
0.8 GtCO
2
/year for existing buildings in 2030. 
According to IRENA (2016) and Wagner (2017) heat from 
renewable sources can grow by 5.4 EJ for solid, liquid and 
gaseous biofuels and by 2.9 EJ for solar energy compared 
to the current policy scenario. This equals an emission 
reduction potential of 0.39 GtCO
2
/year in 2030 from biomass 
and 0.21 GtCO
2
/year for solar heat.
For electric appliances (excluding lighting) in households and 
the service sector, an assessment of the emission reduction 
potential is calculated based on Molenbroek et al. (2015), 
leading to an estimate of 3.3 GtCO
2
/year in 2030. This is in 
line with the estimation of adopting the world’s best end-use 
equipment technology by CLASP (2011). For energy efficient 
lighting, a report by UN Environment (UNEP, 2014) estimates 
energy savings of 4.4 EJ, equivalent to 0.92 GtCO
2
/year in 
2030. Molenbroek et al. (2015) reports emission reductions 
from lighting of 0.67 GtCO
2
/year in 2030. We will use this 
figure, which is slightly lower than the older estimate in 
CLASP (2011). 
The total emission reduction potential for direct 
emissions from buildings is 1.9 GtCO
2
/year (uncertainty 
range 1.6 – 2.1 GtCO
2
) in 2030 after correction for overlap 
between energy efficiency and renewable energy measures. 
The reduction potential for indirect emissions is included in 
the energy sector potential.
4.2.3 Emission reduction options and potential in 
the energy sector
In the current policy scenario, energy sector emissions 
amount to 21.3 GtCO
2
 in 2030, of which 16.3 GtCO
2
 comes 
from power generation (IEA, 2016, USEPA, 2012). Main 
options for reducing emissions in the energy sector are wind 
and solar energy. In addition, hydro, nuclear, carbon capture 
and storage and bioenergy combined with carbon capture 
and storage can contribute. Emission reductions from the oil 
and gas sector and coal mining are also discussed.
The installed global wind capacity was 487 GW by the end 
of 2016 (REN21, 2017). Wind energy capacity can grow to 
between 2,110 and 3,064 GW in 2030 (GWEC, 2016; Teske 
et al., 2015), compared to 940 GW in the current policy 
scenario. This represents an emission reduction of between 
2.6 and 4.1 GtCO
2
 in 2030. Reaching these potentials 
would require an annual growth of installed capacity of 
11 to 15 percent per year. For comparison, the growth in the 
past decade amounted to 21 percent per year. 
Solar power capacity can reach 3,725 GW in 2030 (Teske 
et al., 2015), compared to 708 GW in the current policy 
scenario, which represents an emissions reduction of 
3.0 GtCO
2
/year in 2030. The installed global solar capacity 
by the end of 2016 amounted to 303 GW (REN21, 2016). 
Reaching these potentials would require an annual growth 
of installed capacity of 14 to 20 percent per year (Teske et 
al., 2015). For comparison, the growth in the past decade 
amounted to 48 percent per year. Creutzig et al. (2017) 
find that many models have consistently underestimated 
deployment of solar photovoltaics. However, some newer 
studies provide higher potentials. A recent analysis by 
Breyer et al. (2017) estimate a potential of 7,100 – 9,100 GW. 
This potential would require a growth of the installed solar 
photovoltaics capacity of 26 to 29 percent per year and 
would lead to avoided emissions of 5.5 to 7.2 GtCO
2
/year3. 
For a more electrified energy system, Breyer et al. report 
a potential of 12,000 GW. An Ecofys study done for Sitra, 
showed that, by scaling up the solar photovoltaics energy 
strategy of Germany to the whole world, the potential global 
increase in solar photovoltaics could be in the range of 
3,885 to 8,722 GW in 2030. This is equivalent to a potential 
emission reduction of 2.49 to 6.17 GtCO
2
e/year in 2030 
(SITRA, 2015; Afanador et al., 2015)4. Based on the large 
variation of numbers presented here, and leaving out the 
highest ones, we come to a potential of 3 to 6 GtCO
2
/year 
avoided through solar photovoltaics.
Other electricity production options also have potential to 
reduce emissions in the energy sector in 2030. Compared 
to emission levels under the current policy scenario, 
biomass has a potential of 0.85 GtCO
2
/year and geothermal 
has a potential of 0.73 GtCO
2
/year (Teske et al., 2015). 
For hydro power and nuclear energy, the IEA (2016) in its 
450 scenario indicates a potential increase of 147 GW 
and 154 GW compared to the current policy scenario. The 
emission reduction potentials are estimated at 0.32 and 
0.87 GtCO
2
 /year in 2030, respectively.
The total emission reduction potential for carbon capture and 
storage (CCS) is estimated by IEA (2017) at 2.03 GtCO
2
/year 
in 2030, which is slightly lower than the estimation of Mac 
Dowell and Fajardy (2017) of 2.5 GtCO
2
, based on an earlier 
IEA study. This includes a reduction of 0.8 GtCO
2
/year in 2030 
for CO
2
 for enhanced oil recovery and 0.1 GtCO
2
/year in 2030 
for carbon capture and utilisation in 2030. This reduction 
potential can be allocated either to the energy sector or to 
the industry sector. Based on the allocation in IEA (2016), 
67 percent is allocated to the industry sector and 33 percent 
to the energy sector. The amount of carbon dioxide avoided 
is smaller than the amount of carbon dioxide captured, 
3 Given the high penetration of solar photovoltaics, we use average emission 
factors here instead of marginal emission factors.
4 According to the study, the level of uncertainty of the estimation is about 
20 percent, due to data limitations at the country level. The study scales up 
the solar photovoltaics case of Germany in each individual country and then 
aggregates them to a global potential. In cases where country data was not 
available, the authors used regional data.
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because it consumes energy to operate CCS. This ratio is 70 
to 90 percent (Herzog et al., 2005). Therefore, a 20 percent 
discount is applied to correct for the stored CO
2
 that is 
reported. In the industrial sector, a correction of 10 percent 
is applied since the CO
2
 in these sectors is often emitted 
at higher purity. The above leads to a reduction potential 
of 0.53 GtCO
2
/year in 2030 for the energy sector and 
1.22 GtCO
2
/year in 2030 for the industry sector5. 
Bioenergy with CCS has a reduction potential of 
0.31 GtCO
2
/year in 2030 (IEA, 2017). There is uncertainty 
about whether bioenergy with CCS exceeds the costs of 
US$100/tCO
2
. Several studies provide cost estimations 
ranging from above to under the US$100/tCO
2
. Arasto et al. 
(2014) estimate costs at US$100-200/tCO
2
, while McGlashan 
et al. (2012) estimate the average costs for bioenergy 
with CCS to be US$80-90/tCO
2
, and Johnsen et al. (2014) 
estimates that bioenergy with CCS applied on biofuels 
production in 2030 will cost €25 – 175/tCO
2
. Since there are 
studies with estimations under and above US$100/tCO
2
, the 
potential for bioenergy with CCS is allocated to the energy 
sector category as an additional option.
This chapter does not include the shift from coal to gas, 
since natural gas declines in the World Energy Outlook 
450 scenario compared to the current policy scenario (IEA, 
2016). However, within certain regions the shift from coal 
to gas can play a role in the reduction of emissions from the 
energy sector. In the World Energy Outlook 450 scenario, 
only a small increase is visible in India (0.3 EJ) and South 
Africa (0.04 EJ) (IEA, 2016). Given the small size, this is not 
included in the potentials. 
The total emission reduction potential in the power sector 
is large. It makes up about 70 percent of the power sector 
emissions in the current policy scenario, without considering 
overlaps. Adding electricity savings from the buildings and 
industry sector implies that power sector emissions in 2030 
could be reduced by more than 100 percent compared 
with the current policy scenario, which is obviously not 
possible unless bioenergy with CCS is applied on a large 
scale. However, there will be increasing interaction between 
the different emission reduction options long before the 
100 percent is reached, making the total potential smaller 
than the sum of the individual options. In the assessment, 
it is assumed that total emissions in the power sector are 
reduced by a maximum of 57 to 65 percent, which are the 
largest percentages found in the literature (Deng et al., 
2012; Teske et al., 2015)6. This will lead to total emission 
reductions of 9.3 to 10.6 GtCO
2
/year in 2030, which indicates 
the ‘basic’ potential. However, given the large potentials for 
the individual categories, power sector decarbonization 
may develop faster (see, for example, Breyer et al., 2017). 
Implementing large shares of intermittent renewable 
sources would require the use of flexibility options such as 
5 Compared with Chapter 7, this chapter considers different groupings of 
emission reduction options, timeframes and cost levels. For this reason, 
estimates are not directly comparable across chapters.
6 For comparison, the recent Energy Technology Perspective reports (IEA, 
2016; IEA, 2017), give reductions of 35 percent and 48 percent compared to 
the current policy scenario.
demand response, flexibility of supply, network optimization 
and expansion, and storage to match supply and demand. 
For an overview of flexibility options, see Papaefthymiou et 
al. (2014). 
Outside the power sector, methane emissions from the 
distribution of gas and the production and transmission 
of oil and gas can be reduced by 1.78 GtCO
2
/year in 2030 
(Klimont and Höglund-Isaksson, 2017). This is 75 percent 
of the current policy scenario emissions from the oil and 
gas industry. These reductions can mainly be achieved by 
implementing measures for the recovery and utilization of 
vented gas and the reduction of leakages.
Methane emissions from coal mining can be reduced by 
0.41 GtCO
2
e/year in 2030, which is a reduction of 56 percent 
compared to the current policy scenario (Klimont and 
Höglund-Isaksson, 2017). Measures implemented in this 
scenario include pre-mining degasification measures and 
the installation of ventilation air oxidizers.
Combining the potentials of all the electricity- 
related measures discussed, also in buildings and industry, 
leads to a potential of 10.0 GtCO
2
e (uncertainty range  9.3– 
10.6 GtCO
2
e/year) in 2030. Bioenergy with CCS could provide 
an additional potential of 0.3 GtCO
2
e in 2030 (uncertainty 
range 0.2 – 0.4 GtCO
2
e). Emission reductions from the oil and 
gas sector and coal mining are 2.2 GtCO
2
e/year (uncertainty 
range 1.7 – 2.6 GtCO
2
e).
4.2.4 Emission reduction options and potential in 
the forestry sector 
Since IPCC AR5, studies of mitigation potentials in the forestry 
sector with carbon prices up to US$100/tCO
2
 report values 
between 0.2—13.8 GtCO
2
e/year, largely depending on the 
types of models used (Smith et al., 2014). There are two 
main options for reducing emissions in this sector: halting 
deforestation, and restoration of degraded forest land.
Emission reduction potentials from halting deforestation 
come with great uncertainty. These uncertainties relate, for 
example, to the degree to which decreased deforestation 
leads to lowered degradation and associated carbon 
emissions, but also depend on the baseline used (GCEM, 
2015). We assume a global potential in 2030 of 3 GtCO
2
e 
(based on Clarke et al., 2014). This central estimate assumes 
that the current policy scenario emissions remain stable 
from current levels.
Global commitments on restoration of degraded forests, 
such as commitments to the Bonn Challenge and the New 
York Declaration on Forests, aim to bring a total of 350 million 
hectares of degraded and deforested land under restoration 
(Messinger and DeWitt, 2015). Reaching this target by 
2030 would yield emission reductions in the order of 1.6– 
3.4 GtCO
2
/year, with a central estimate of 2.3 GtCO
2
/year 
in 2030 (Verdone et al., 2015).
32 The Emissions Gap Report 2017 – Bridging the gap - sectoral greenhouse gas emission reduction potentials in 2030
Combining the potentials of the measures discussed 
leads to a total contribution from the forestry sector of 
5.3 GtCO
2
e/year (with an uncertainty range of 4.1 – 6.5 GtCO
2
e). 
4.2.5 Emission reduction options and potential in 
the industry sector
Industry sector greenhouse gas emissions are 19.3 GtCO
2
e 
in 2030 under the current policy scenario. The two main 
sources of industrial greenhouse gas emissions are direct 
and indirect (via electricity consumption) use of fossil fuels. 
There are also smaller sources of greenhouse gas emissions, 
including ‘non-energy’ use of fossil fuels (for example, fossil 
fuels as feedstock for chemical processes) and emissions 
from industrial processes (for example, carbonization 
in the cement process and several sources of non-CO
2
 
greenhouse gases). By applying a broad set of mitigation 
options (Fischedick, 2014), the industry sector can achieve 
substantial emission reductions by 2030, mainly from 
energy efficiency, non-CO
2
 measures and CCS, with a smaller 
contribution from renewable heat.
For energy efficiency, the emission reduction potential 
for 2030 is estimated at 4.1 GtCO
2
/year compared to the 
current policy scenario. This estimate is based on data from 
ClimateWorks Foundation and the World Bank (Akbar et al., 
2014), scaled up from six major regions to the entire world 
and correcting for measures other than energy efficiency. 
The emission reduction implies a nearly 30 percent reduction 
compared to the current policy scenario. This is compatible 
with the estimate by Worrell and Carreon (2017) (see 
also Saygin et al. (2011), who estimated a static potential of 
27 ± 9 percent). It should be noted that the potentials 
vary by sector and by region. For example, it is estimated 
at 9 -  30 percent for iron and steel, 4-7 percent for primary 
aluminium, for cement the estimate is 20-25 percent, for 
petrochemicals 23-7 percent, and for ammonia production 
11-25 percent (Worrell and Carreon, 2017). Based on the 
share in current policy emissions, a 2.2 GtCO
2
/year emission 
reduction is allocated to direct emissions and a 1.9 GtCO
2
/year 
is allocated to indirect emissions.
Renewable energy use in the form of solid, liquid and gaseous 
biofuels, solar thermal energy and geothermal can generate 
9.7 EJ (IRENA 2016), which is an additional 7.8 EJ compared 
to the current policy scenario. This will reduce emissions by 
0.5 GtCO
2
/year in 2030.
Carbon capture and storage in the manufacturing industry 
is associated with an emission reduction potential of 
1.22 GtCO
2
/year in 2030 (see the discussion of the option in 
the section on the energy sector).
For non-CO
2
 greenhouse gases, the largest reduction is 
from HFCs, which can be reduced by 1.5 GtCO
2
e/year in 
2030 (Purohit and Höglund-Isaksson, 2017)7. USEPA (2013) 
estimates an additional reduction potential for non-CO
2
 
7 Note that these estimates do not consider the emission reduction impacts 
associated with implementing the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal 
Protocol. Taking these impacts into account would lower the estimate (see 
Chapters 3 and 6).
greenhouse gas emissions of 0.2 GtCO
2
e/year in 2030, where 
0.12 GtCO
2
e comes from nitric and adipic acid production 
and the rest from perfluorocarbons from primary aluminium 
production and sulphur hexafluoride from electric power 
systems and magnesium production. 
Based on the above, the emission reduction potential for 
industry for direct emissions is 5.4 GtCO
2
e/year in 2030 
(uncertainty range 4.2 – 6.6 GtCO
2
e). No correction for 
overlap is needed, as many industrial plants are so large 
that energy efficiency measures can be combined with CCS 
or renewable energy. The reduction potential of indirect 
emissions is already accounted for in the potential for the 
energy supply sector.
4.2.6 Emission reduction options and potential in 
the transport sector
In the current policy scenario, total emissions for transport 
are 9.7 GtCO
2
 in 2030, of which 9.42 GtCO
2
 are direct 
emissions and 0.28 GtCO
2
 indirect emissions for electricity 
use. The emission reduction potential differs per mode of 
transport, but is most significant for light-duty vehicles and 
heavy-duty vehicles, with other contributions coming from 
shipping, aviation and biofuels.
In the automobile sector, fuel efficiency measures could 
potentially reduce emissions by 0.88 GtCO
2
/year (heavy 
duty vehicles) and by 2.0 GtCO
2
/year (light duty vehicles) 
by 2030 (ICCT, 2012). These numbers include modal shifts. 
A shift to more electric vehicles is also included. ICCT (2012) 
assumes that electric-drive vehicles will form a small, but 
not insignificant, share (up to 9 percent) of new-vehicle sales 
by 2030. This is in line with the estimations of IRENA (2016) 
(10 percent) and Bloomberg New Energy Finance (2017) 
(7 percent). Note that substantial emission reductions due 
to fuel economy standards for passenger cars are already 
included in the current policy scenario. 
Aviation can reduce emissions with up to 0.32 (ICCT 
2012) or up to 0.42 (ICAO 2013) GtCO
2
/year in 2030 by 
using alternative fuels, improved infrastructure use and 
technical improvements.
 
Several studies indicate an emission reduction for shipping 
(Alvik et al., 2010; Faber et al., 2011; Eide et al., 2011; 
Hoffmann et al., 2012) ranging from 0.39 to 0.99 GtCO
2
. The 
studies contain several measures focused on fuel efficiency. 
The most recent study, from Bouman et al. (2017), reports 
an emission reduction potential of 0.70 GtCO
2
/year in 2030. 
The numbers for aviation and shipping are in the same order 
as those in the study from New Climate Economy (GCEM, 
2015), which shows a reduction potential between 0.60 and 
0.90 GtCO
2
 per year.
Biofuels is another measure that is relevant for the transport 
sector. ICCT (2012) provides no potential for biofuels in 2030 
due to the high uncertainty. IRENA (2016) does provide an 
estimate for biofuels to cover 10 percent of the sector’s total 
fuel use in 2030. Taking into account that greenhouse gas 
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emissions from biofuels are 70 percent to 90 percent lower 
than those of conventional fuels (BLE, 2016; Ecofys, 2017 
forthcoming) an emission reduction potential of 0.63 to 
0.81 GtCO
2
e/year in 2030 can be calculated.
Based on the above, the total emission reduction potential 
for the transport sector is 4.7 GtCO
2
/year in 2030 (with an 
uncertainty of 4.1 – 5.3 GtCO
2
). No overlap correction is 
needed, as biofuels can be used as drop-in fuels.
4.2.7 Other promising emission reduction options 
and potential
Some options for emission reduction are difficult to allocate 
to one of the sectors assessed in the previous sections. This 
may be because it is still unknown in which sector it can best 
be implemented, or because the option can be applied to 
multiple sectors. Some promising mitigation measures are 
described below.
Methane constitutes some 90 percent of greenhouse gas 
emissions from the waste sector. Landfill gas recovery and 
utilization is one option for reducing methane emissions. 
USEPA (2013) estimates that landfill gas recovery can reduce 
emissions by 0.4 GtCO
2
e/year in 2030, which represents 
42 percent of the emissions in the current policy scenario. 
Enhanced weathering measures aim to draw carbon from 
the atmosphere via, among others, the natural chemical 
weathering process of silicates (other processes elaborated 
in Chapter 7). Preliminary global estimates using waste 
material only, for example from cement and iron and steel 
manufacturing, arrive at 0.73—1.22 GtCO
2
/year in 2030, 
excluding stockpiled waste (Renforth et al., 2012).
There are other measures that are not included in this 
chapter. In April 2017 the book, Drawdown, was published 
containing the 100 most substantive solutions to reverse 
global warming (Hawken, 2017). Comparing the top 20 of 
Drawdown with this analysis, two high-ranked measures are 
missing in this chapter: educating girls and family planning. 
It is expected that the quantitative impact of such measures 
is mostly beyond 2030.
4.3 Can the gap be bridged: total emission 
reduction potential in 2030
An overview of the estimated total emission reduction 
potentials in 2030 assessed in the previous sections is 
provided in table 4.1. The table shows that estimates 
based on proven technologies and relatively precautionary 
assumptions regarding potentials in 2030 (the ‘basic’ 
potential in table 4.1), leads to a total emission reduction 
potential in 2030 of 33 GtCO
2
e/year (uncertainty 30 – 
36 GtCO
2
e). The basic emission reduction potential in 2030 
is also shown in figure 4.1. If, in addition, areas where 
estimates of potentials are relatively new, and the feasibility 
of realizing these in 2030 is more uncertain, are considered 
(the ‘additional’ potential in table 4.1), the potential is 
38 GtCO
2
e/year (uncertainty range 35 – 41 GtCO
2
e).
Importantly, even if only the basic emission reduction 
potential for 2030 is considered, the estimated total 
potential listed here is sufficient to bridge the emissions 
gap in 2030 for 2°C (>66 percent chance) and 1.5°C (50 to 
66 percent chance). It exceeds the estimated difference in 
2030 between emissions under the current policy scenario 
and the emission levels consistent with a likely chance of 
staying below 2°C and a medium chance of staying below 
Figure 4.1: Total emission reduction basic potentials compared to the current policy scenario in 2030.
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1.5°C of about 17 and 22.5 GtCO
2
e respectively, as indicated 
in the introduction to this chapter.
An important question is what the efforts and costs of 
realizing these emission reductions are. Although it is beyond 
the scope of the current chapter to answer this question in 
full, a number of observations can be made. It is remarkable 
that a large part of the potential consists of just six categories, 
that is, solar and wind energy, efficient appliances, efficient 
passenger cars, afforestation and stopping deforestation. 
These six categories sum up a potential of 18.5 GtCO
2
e in 
2030 (range: 15-22 GtCO
2
e), making up more than half of the 
basic potential. Equally important, all these measures can be 
realized at modest cost, and are predominantly achievable 
through proven policies:
• Solar photovoltaics and wind energy. Many countries 
around the world have targets for renewable energy and 
have policies in place to stimulate its adoption. The most 
dominant policy instruments are feed-in tariffs or feed-in 
premiums, which have been implemented in 75 countries 
and 29 states or provinces in the world, providing 
long-term power purchase agreements with a specified 
price or premium price per kWh for a renewable energy 
technology (REN21, 2017). An instrument with increasing 
popularity is competitive bidding or auctioning, especially 
for large scale developments, where the renewable 
energy market is mature and governments have already 
achieved a degree of success with renewable installation 
through feed-in-tariffs (REN21, 2017). Costs of electricity 
from solar and wind electricity have already declined 
to levels comparable with fossil-fuel based electricity 
(Lazard, 2016), and auctions have accelerated this trend 
(IRENA, 2017). Continuation of feed-in policies and/
or a shift to auctions are a straightforward and cheap 
approach to rapid decarbonization of the power sector. 
• Energy efficient appliances and cars. A combination of 
labelling and minimum energy performance standards 
are the dominant policies to stimulate the uptake of 
efficient appliances. Over 60 countries have adopted or 
pledged to adopt policies to shift to more energy-efficient 
lighting (UNEP, 2014). Under the United for Efficiency 
(U4E) public-private-partnership, UN Environment 
is supporting developing countries and emerging 
economies to move their markets to energy-efficient 
appliances and equipment (UNEP, 2017). In terms of 
performance standards for cars, several countries have 
opted to implement fuel economy standards in miles per 
gallon or CO
2
 emission standards in gCO
2
 per km; these 
standards exist in Brazil, the EU, India, Japan, Mexico 
and the USA (ICCT, 2017). Typically, energy efficiency 
standards are implemented in such a way that life-cycle 
costs are minimized, hence leading to net negative costs 
for the consumer. Similar policies are in place in many 
countries for new building construction (UNEP, 2016). 
Further continuation of these policies, scaling them 
up to more countries while raising ambitions is a way 
forward to limit the growth of energy use and hence 
reducing emissions.
• Stopping deforestation and restoration of degraded 
forests. There are several examples of policies 
successfully stopping deforestation, the most large-
scale being the Brazilian ‘Action Plan for Prevention and 
Control of Deforestation in the Amazon’, consisting of 
(1) territorial and land-use planning, (2) environmental 
control and monitoring, and (3) fostering sustainable 
production activities. The programme led to a reduction 
of the rate of deforestation by more than 80 percent. 
Costs are found to be US$13/tCO
2
e on average (Afanador 
et al., 2015; Sitra, 2015). For reforestation of degraded 
forests, the scale of operations is not of that size, but 
promising examples are available for China (Chen et al., 
2016), Costa Rica (Afanador et. al 2015), and the Republic 
of Korea (Kim and Zsuffa, 1994). Costs are comparable 
with the costs of stopping deforestation.
These are examples of a few of the options that can be 
implemented at relatively low cost and based on significant 
existing experience. Together they represent more than 
half of the basic potential identified. Previous Emissions 
Gap Reports provide many more examples of scaling up 
of existing policies and programmes, as do other studies, 
including the study Green to Scale (Sitra, 2015). 
Although the available studies prevent an explicit, economic 
assessment of all emission reduction options, there is a 
relatively high degree of confidence that all options included 
in table 4.1 have costs below US$100/tCO
2
e avoided. In 
many cases, this is explicit in the source documents. For 
some, however, it is not clear whether the costs will be 
below US$100/tCO
2
e. For example, some electricity sources 
may show costs above US$100/tCO
2
e, as there are large 
variations in costs (Lazard, 2016). However, given that there 
are abundant options in the electricity sector, leaving out 
these options will not affect the total potential. 
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Table 4.1: Overview of emission reduction potentials. 
Sector Category Emission reduction potential 
in 2030 (GtCO2e)
Category Sectoral aggregate potential 
(GtCO2e)
Agriculture
Cropland management 0.74
Basic 3 (2.3 - 3.7)
Rice management 0.18
Livestock management 0.23
Grazing land management 0.75
Restoration of degraded 
agricultural land
0.5 - 1.7
Peatland degradation and 
peat fires
1.6
Additional 3.7 (2.6 - 4.8)
Biochar 0.2
Shifting dietary patterns 0.37 - 1.37
Decreasing food loss and 
waste
0.97 - 2
Buildings
New buildings 0.68 - 0.85
Basic 1.9 (1.6 - 2.1)
Existing buildings 0.52 - 0.93
Renewable heat - bio 0.39
Renewable heat - solar 0.21
Lighting 0.67 Basic (indirect emissions) See energy sector 
potential
Appliances 3.3
Energy sector 
Solar energy 3 - 6
Basic 10 .0 (9.3 – 10.6)
Wind energy 2.6 - 4.1
Hydropower 0.32
Nuclear energy 0.87
Bioenergy 0.85
Geothermal 0.73
CCS 0.53
Bioenergy with CCS 0.31 Additional 0.3 (0.2 - 0.4)
Methane from coal 0.41
Basic 2.2 (1.7 - 2.6)
Methane from oil and gas 1.78
Forestry
Restoration of degraded forest 1.6 - 3.4 Basic
5.3 (4.1 - 6.5)
Reducing deforestation 3
Industry
Energy efficiency - indirect 1.9 Basic (indirect emissions) See energy sector 
potential
Energy efficiency - direct 2.2
Basic 5.4 (4.2 - 6.6)
Renewable heat 0.5
Non-CO
2
 greenhouse gases 1.5
CCS 1.22
Transport
Heavy Duty Vehicles potential 
(efficiency, mode shift)
0.88
Basic 4.7 (4.1 - 5.3)
Light Duty Vehicles potential 
(efficiency, mode shift, electric 
vehicles)
2.0
Shipping efficiency 0.7
Aviation efficiency 0.32 - 0.42
Biofuels 0.63 - 0.81
Other
Landfill gas recovery 0.4 Basic 0.4 (0.3 - 0.5)
Enhanced weathering 
measures
0.73 - 1.22 Additional 1 (0.7 - 1.2)
Total basic emission reduction potential 33 (30 - 36) 
Total emissions reduction potential including                 
additional measures
38 (35 - 41)
Note: Although for many emission reduction categories a single point estimate is given, there are always uncertainties, assumed to be ±25 percent. For the categories 
peatland degradation and peat fires, biochar and energy efficiency, the potential in 2030 is more uncertain. Therefore, a higher uncertainty range of 50 percent is 
applied to these categories. In the final column, the categories are aggregated to the sectoral level. The numbers in the third column are not corrected for overlap 
between measures. The numbers in the final column are corrected for overlap, and this is also reflected in the total potential. Therefore, the total is smaller than the 
sum of the individual potentials in the third column. The aggregate potentials for indirect emission reductions in buildings and industry are reflected in the electricity 
sector potential.
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4.4 Comparison with results from Integrated 
Assessment Models
In this section, the results of the bottom-up sector-by-sector 
assessment is compared with the sectoral emissions as 
reported by a range of state-of-the-art integrated assessment 
models. This is relevant because integrated assessment 
models provide information on how a given climate target 
can be achieved in a “least-cost” way through a full cost-
comparison across all sectors, and by taking account of the 
interactions between the different reduction options and the 
interactions with the wider economy. Since the scenarios by 
definition stay within the 2°C or 1.5°C target, they bridge the 
emissions gap in 2030 and the difference between emissions 
levels associated with the current policy scenario and the 
emissions in line with the 2°C and 1.5°C target. Hence, the 
package of mitigation measures identified in the scenarios 
can be viewed as successful examples of how to close the 
gap. Moreover, the scenarios of the integrated assessment 
models also provide the foundation for the gap analysis in 
other chapters of the Emissions Gap Report. Details regarding 
the baseline scenarios for the integrated assessment models 
used are provided in Appendix B, available online. 
Figure 4.2 compares the emission reduction potentials of 
the sector-by-sector technology-based analysis with the 
mitigation activities in the integrated assessment model set 
for the 2°C scenario, noting that the integrated assessment 
models assume a slightly higher total 2030 emission level 
as described in Appendix B, available online. The average 
total mitigation in 2030 in the integrated assessment model 
scenarios is 23 GtCO
2
e, with a full range of 5 - 42 GtCO
2
e. The 
wide range across the integrated assessment models is caused 
by different reduction strategies over time and different 
baseline assumptions. Overall, the integrated assessment 
model range of reductions are lower than the total emission 
reduction potential found in the sector-by-sector analysis, 
which supports the technical feasibility of the integrated 
assessment model scenarios. The sectoral breakdown 
shows that in the electricity sector, emission reductions are 
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Figure 4.2: Comparison of mitigation in the integrated assessment models under a 2°C pathway with the emission reduction potentials 
found in the sector-by-sector analysis. 
Note: The integrated assessment model results show the results of six models, in terms of the mean and the range (15-85th range, thus each time exlcuding the two 
most extreme models). The red dots indicate the reduction in the integrated assessment model IMAGE for both 2 °C and 1.5 °C (in some cases the IMAGE numbers are 
outside the indicated range of IAM model results.)
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comparable, although the integrated assessment models 
show a very wide range for this sector. This is also true for the 
underlying contribution of increased use of renewable and 
nuclear power, fossil fuel and CCS, fuel switch and bioenergy 
and CCS. Typically, however, integrated assessment models 
show a relatively high contribution of bio-energy and fossil 
fuel CCS technology, certainly also for the long-term. This 
highlights the importance of research and development 
with respect to negative emission options, even though 
their role might still be limited in the short-term. Chapter 7 
further discusses this. For the various end-use sectors, the 
integrated assessment models show considerably lower 
emission reductions than the sector-by-sector estimates. 
In the literature, this is explained by 1) the relatively large 
implementation barriers complicating emission reductions 
in these sectors, and 2) the possible predominant focus 
of integrated assessment models on energy supply. While 
the sectoral, bottom up assessment finds energy efficiency 
improvements much more important than fuel switching in 
the end-use sections, integrated assessment models results 
show both measures to be equally important. The emission 
reduction potential of biological carbon removal by means 
of reforestation and increasing carbon in agricultural soil is 
also less in integrated assessment models than in the sector-
by-sector assessment. It should be noted, however, that in 
general integrated assessment models do not consider the 
option of increasing carbon in agricultural soils. Finally, for 
non-CO
2
 greenhouse gases, a similar picture emerges: the 
emission reduction in the integrated assessment model 2°C 
scenarios is smaller than the total potential of the sector-by-
sector analysis.
It is not possible to compare the sector-by-sector analysis 
with the integrated assessment models for 1.5°C, because 
most of these integrated assessment model scenarios are 
yet to be published (see Chapter 3). However, focusing on 
the results of one integrated assessment model, the IMAGE 
model, figure 4.2 shows the IMAGE results for both 2°C and 
1.5°C. The figure shows that moving to the more ambitious 
target requires scaling up emission reductions in several 
sectors, including the electricity sector and most end- 
use sectors. 
In conclusion, the emission reductions of the integrated 
assessment model 2°C scenarios as well as the IMAGE 1.5°C 
are typically within the overall sector specific potential 
of the bottom up assessment. The electricity sector is an 
exception – but here it should be noted that the current 
policy emissions in the bottom up assessment were lower 
than for the integrated assessment models. The analysis also 
suggests that predominantly further emission reductions 
in the integrated assessment model scenarios could be 
achieved via energy efficiency and biological carbon 
removal options. 
 
4.5 Conclusions
The assessment presented confirms that the total emission 
reduction potential is more than sufficient to bridge the 
emissions gap in 2030, with measures that are technically 
and economically feasible, and at a marginal cost of no 
more than US$100/tCO
2
e. The total potential exceeds 
the difference between the current policy trajectory in 
2030 and the emission levels consistent with a 2°C (>66 
percent chance) and a 1.5°C (50 to 66 percent chance) 
temperature target. 
All sectors present substantial emission reduction potentials 
that add up to a total of 33 GtCO
2
e/year in 2030 (range: 
30 – 36). This does not include emission reduction potentials 
of fairly new measures (such as direct capture of atmospheric 
CO
2
, decreasing food loss and waste, and biochar) because it 
is uncertain whether these emission reductions potentials 
could be realized by 2030.
Notably, six specific categories of measures have the 
potential to reduce emissions between 15 to 22 GtCO
2
e/year 
in 2030, which is more than half of the total emission 
reduction potential. This is comparable to the estimated 
difference in 2030 between the current policy trajectory 
and the emissions consistent with the 2°C and 1.5°C target. 
These six categories include solar and wind energy, efficient 
appliances, efficient passenger cars, afforestation and 
stopping deforestation. All these measures can be realized 
at modest costs, and countries around the world have 
already established policies to implement many of them. By 
scaling up these measures that are relatively cheap and easy 
to implement, the world could collectively get on track to 
bridge the emissions gap by 2030.
To realize the full emission reduction potential, countries need 
to implement ambitious policies immediately, to enable and 
accelerate the implementation of the full socio-economic 
potential of available measures and technologies. Most of 
the studies used for the bottom-up assessment of sectoral 
emission reduction potentials assume that implementation 
of measures start immediately, underscoring the urgency of 
pre-2020 mitigation action (see also Chapter 2). 
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5.1 Introduction
If the temperature increase is to be kept well below 
2°C by 2100, the global economy must undergo rapid 
decarbonization. The power sector holds a critical role, given 
the widely available and relatively cheap decarbonization 
options in the sector (Kriegler et al. 2014; Luderer et al. 
2017; Sachs et al. 2014; Williams et al. 2012). In most of 
the scenarios consistent with limiting warming to below 2°C 
in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPPC) 
Fifth Assessment Report (Clarke et al. 2014), unabated coal-
fired power not equipped with carbon dioxide capture and 
storage (CCS)1 declines rapidly, and is almost completely 
phased out by mid-century2 (Audoly, Vogt-Schilb, and 
Guivarch 2014; Kriegler et al. 2014; Luderer et al. 2017; 
Rogelj et al. 2015; Williams et al. 2012) (Chapter 3). In the 
scenarios consistent with a 1.5°C increase in global mean 
temperature by 2100, the decline of the power sector’s 
carbon emissions has to be even faster (Rogelj et al. 2015), 
leading to a faster phase-out of power production from 
1 Carbon capture, (transport) and storage (CCS) consists of three stages, 
beginning with capturing CO
2
 from large stationary emitters, such as coal 
power plants or industrial facilities, then transporting it to an underground 
storage site, before compressing it in suitable geological formations. 
Scenarios by the IPCC (2014) projected large-scale CCS utilization, particularly 
given its potential to provide negative emissions when used in combination 
with biomass plants (see also Chapter 6).
2 Coal is the most carbon-intensive fossil fuel, responsible for about 
46 percent of global carbon emissions from fossil fuels (Olivier et al. 2016). It 
is commonly categorized as steam coal (5,811 Mt; 75 percent market share), 
metallurgical or coking coal (1,090 Mt; 15 percent market share) and lignite 
(807 Mt; 10 percent market share), based on its material properties and end 
use (IEA/OECD 2016). This chapter and most policies focus on steam coal and 
lignite, which are primarily used for generating electricity.
coal3. The longer the world continues to use coal, the greater 
the need for negative emissions technologies in the second 
half of the century (Luderer et al. 2013; Riahi et al. 2015)4.
There are currently an estimated 6,683 coal-fired power 
plants in operation worldwide, with a combined installed 
capacity of 1,964 GW. Emissions from coal alone were 
responsible for a major share of past emissions. If run until 
the end of their lifetime, and not retrofitted with CCS5, 
the stock of operating power plants would emit around 
190 GtCO
2
. Furthermore, they would use a large share of the 
available carbon budget for internationally agreed climate 
targets figure 5.1 and table 5.1).
Coal-based power generation is the single most important 
cause of carbon lock-in (Bertram, Johnson, et al. 2015; 
Davis, Caldeira, and Matthews 2010)6. Without additional 
policy interventions, the number of coal-fired power plants 
would likely continue to increase. In early 2017, across 
3 Without large-scale deployment of CCS, achieving climate targets would also 
involve a large transformation of the upstream coal sector (Meinshausen 
et al. 2009; Bauer et al. 2016). Between 82 percent and 88 percent 
of current coal reserves are considered ‘unburnable’, compared with 
33 percent–35 percent of oil and 49 percent–52 percent of gas reserves 
(McGlade and Ekins 2015, see also box 5.1).
4 See also Chapter 7 of this report for a detailed discussion.
5 Today, there are 17 large-scale CCS projects operating worldwide, mostly 
in combination with enhanced-oil recovery (EOR), which inject a total of 
22 MtCO
2
/y. Two of the 17 large-scale CCS projects operating worldwide are 
coal power retrofits: Boundary Dam in Saskatchewan and Petra Nova in Texas. 
Each of these projects captures and stores >1M tonnes/year, and effectively 
decarbonizes a unit by 90 percent. The Petra Nova project costs (‘all in’) are 
roughly US$100/tonne, with analysts anticipating second and fourth project 
costs for the same technology at US$80/tonne and US$60/tonne respectively. 
Although some countries have very little CO
2
 storage resources, overall there 
does not appear to be a shortage of such resources (GCCSI 2017).
6 Coal power plants have a long economic lifetime, often over forty years, 
meaning that every new coal-fired power commits a large amount of CO
2
 
emissions if run over its economic lifetime (Davis and Socolow 2014).
Bridging the gap – Phasing out coal
Chapter 5
39The Emissions Gap Report 2017 – Bridging the gap – Phasing out coal
the globe there were an additional 273 GW of coal-fired 
capacity in construction, and 570 GW in pre-construction 
(Shearer et al. 2017). Ten countries make up approximately 
85 percent of the entire coal pipeline, with 700 GW being 
built or planned in China, India, Turkey, Indonesia, Vietnam, 
Japan, Egypt, Bangladesh, Pakistan and the Republic of 
Korea alone (Shearer et al. 2017). While a large amount of 
planned power plants were shelved or cancelled in 2016 — 
particularly in China and India (with reductions of 54 percent 
and 52 percent, respectively, compared to 20157) — other 
countries, such as Indonesia, Japan, Egypt, Bangladesh 
and Pakistan, announced new investments in 2016 (with 
increases of 40, 60, 784, 40 and 100 percent, respectively, 
compared to 2015) (Edenhofer et al. 2017). If run until the 
end of their assumed lifetime of 40 years, the plants currently 
under construction (273 GW) and those planned (570 GW) 
would lead to emissions of approximately 150 GtCO
2
, of 
which 50 GtCO
2
 can be attributed to those currently under 
construction (figure 5.1 and table 5.1).
7 The slowdown of China and India is significant because together the two 
countries accounted for 86 percent of all new capacity between 2006 and 
2016. Both countries face a marked slowdown in the anticipated domestic 
demand for new coal power, due to overcapacity in China and a downturn in 
solar prices in India (Shearer et al. 2017, see also section 5.3).
To meet international emissions targets, further lock-ins 
should be avoided (box 5.1). Nonetheless, this would 
not suffice, as existing stocks and plants currently under 
construction would still commit approximately 240 GtCO
2
 
over their lifetime. Closing the emissions gap requires that 
these plants run with lower capacity rates, and are phased 
out before the end of their lifetime, and/or retrofitted with 
CCS facilities.
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Figure 5.1: Committed emissions to the atmosphere from coal-fired power plants (existing, under construction and planned) and other 
economic sectors, by region.
Note:
• Regional breakdowns are consistent with Representative Concentration Pathways, as defined in IPCC (2014).
•  Uncertainty ranges indicate differing lifetimes (between 30 years and 50 years), and coal-fired power plants’ capacity factors (between 37 percent and 80 percent as 
per IEA (2016).
• Emission factors are specific to the power plants.
• For the calculation of “all sectors”, medium lifetimes of infrastructure are as reported by Davis and Socolow (2014).
Source: Figure based on Edenhofer et al. (2017). Data from: Davis and Socolow (2014) and Shearer et al. (2017).
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Phasing out coal can have important societal benefits, going 
beyond climate change mitigation. Key among these are 
improved air quality, especially reduced particulate matter 
and reduced emissions of sulphur dioxide and nitrogen 
oxides (IEA/OECD 2016 and West et al. 2013) (Chapter 6), 
and increased water availability (Zhou et al. 2016). However, 
a transition away from coal can be expected to be politically 
difficult (Vogt-Schilb and Hallegatte 2017). Meanwhile, co-
benefits and rapidly decreasing costs of alternatives8 might 
not suffice to achieve a transformation of the scale, and at 
the speed, that is required to meet international climate 
targets. Investment into coal can also be attractive, as it can 
support other societal goals, such as cheap energy supply, 
energy security or energy access (Jakob and Steckel 2016). 
There is also limited evidence that long-term climate targets 
alone are impacting current investment decisions. Climate 
policy may not be viewed as credible by fossil fuel investors, 
for whom returns on continued investment may be assured
8 In particular, the costs of renewable energy have fallen significantly and faster 
than previously expected (Creutzig et al. 2017). In some places, the costs of 
renewable energy (on a levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) basis) are now 
lower than those of their fossil alternatives (depending on geography and 
available finance).
by (i) lobbying (Dolphin, Pollitt, and Newbery 2016; Kim, 
Urpelainen, and Yang 2016), (ii) market design, or (iii) limited 
implementation of domestic policies to meet emission 
reduction targets (Nemet et al. 2017). Without credible 
additional policies, coal will likely remain attractive in many 
countries, due to its technological maturity, wide availability 
and relatively low price (ignoring externalities) (Edenhofer et 
al. 2017; Steckel, Edenhofer, and Jakob 2015). 
If climate policies are to be implemented, they will need to 
be supported to ease the social and economic burden of 
adjustment (Trebilcock 2014). For example, distributional 
effects that might result from such policies, be it by increasing 
energy prices (Sterner 2012) or potential job losses in the 
industry (Arent et al. 2017), can be a major stumbling block 
for a transition away from coal. 
Table 5.1: Committed carbon dioxide emissions for coal-fired power plants, in GtCO
2
, by status and region
Scenario Announced Pre-permitted Permitted Construction Operating Total
East Asia 12.19 12.34 6.30 30.41 126.41 187.66
South Asia 6.21 9.87 5.89 8.28 27.42 57.67
South-East Asia 7.00 5.78 2.63 5.21 8.95 29.60
European Union 0.60 0.66 0.17 1.14 7.22 9.79
Non-EU Europe 4.86 5.30 1.70 0.44 3.56 15.87
Middle East and Africa 5.83 1.16 1.94 2.14 2.46 13.52
Latin America 0.61 0.17 0.28 0.37 1.74 3.18
Eurasia 1.65 0.00 0.00 0.20 2.69 4.54
North America 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.00 8.85 9.01
Australia and New Zealand 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.14 1.14
Total 38.97 35.28 19.08 48.20 190.44 331.97
Note:
• The figures take into account the remaining lifetimes of existing plants.
• A lifetime of 40 years is assumed for newly constructed power plants.
• European Union data refers to the current 28 Member States. North America refers to both Canada and the United States.
• It is assumed that not all permitted, pre-permitted and announced power plants come online.
Source: Edenhofer et al. (2017) and Shearer et al. (2017).
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5.2  Incentivizing and managing                          
a smooth transition
Policy instruments will be needed to incentivize the transition, 
both with respect to avoiding lock-ins, and facilitating the 
phase-out of existing stocks, including retrofitting them with 
CCS where feasible9.
5.2.1 Policy instruments
Global climate policies in general can be organized along 
different metrics: market-based economic instruments 
(notably taxes and subsidies, tradable allowances or credits, 
and border tax adjustments) (Kolstad et al. 2014), regulatory 
non-market-based approaches (such as standards, and 
non-compliance penalties), and complementary policy 
instruments (notably government provision of goods and 
services) (Oei and Mendelevitch 2016). It is increasingly 
acknowledged that a transition to a low-carbon economy will 
require adjustment to a variety of fiscal and normative rules 
that have an impact on investment decisions (OECD 2017). 
This section assesses possible policy interventions, and how 
their introduction can be managed in a socially balanced 
way. Coal phase-out would have different requirements in 
different geographies for existing coal plants, recently built 
coal plants, and those in the pipeline. Therefore, a different 
combination of these instruments might be necessary.
9 Note that application of CCS in the coal sector might result in a prolonged 
usage of coal and therefore allow for a longer transition period.
Market-based instruments
The economically efficient approach to cutting global coal 
use (without CCS), as part of an overall drive to reduce 
carbon emissions, would have governments remove coal 
subsidies, enforce Pigouvian taxes on local air pollution, 
and use a carbon price to internalize the global warming 
impacts of burning coal. A carbon price creates incentives 
for markets to use all available levers to reduce emissions, 
and should theoretically result in a broadly cost-effective 
overall emissions reductions outcome (Cramton et al. 2017; 
Nordhaus 1991; Pearce 1991; Pigou 1920). Pricing carbon 
strongly disincentivizes the use of coal, as it is the most 
emissions-intensive fossil fuel.
Many countries have emissions trading and other forms 
of carbon pricing schemes in place that, in 2016, covered 
13 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions (World Bank 
and Ecofys 2016). However, the resulting carbon prices are 
typically much lower than the social cost of carbon (the 
estimated monetized negative impact of climate change 
caused by greenhouse gas emissions) and lower than the 
rates required to achieve significant reductions in coal use.
Instead of being taxed, in many countries fossil fuel 
consumption and production are subsidized, with fiscal 
subsidies to fossil fuel production and use being estimated 
to be over US$300 billion, or around 0.4 percent of global 
Box 5.1: Stranded assets 
The term ‘stranded assets’ is used to describe various situations (Caldecott 2017):
• Assets that are lost because of the impact of climate change itself.
•  Man-made capital that has to be retired prematurely or is underutilized, because of direct or indirect climate policies 
(such as coal power plants that become unprofitable after a carbon price is implemented) (Guivarch and Hood 2011; 
Wynn 2016), or which can simply no longer compete against the falling costs of alternative technologies (BNEF 2017; 
IEA-RETD 2016).
•  Fossil fuel resources that cannot be burned if a given climate target is to be reached, also called ‘unburnable carbon’ 
(McGlade and Ekins 2015).
A number of studies have shown that the 2°C target requires early retirement of coal power plants (Guivarch and Hood 
2011; Pfeiffer et al. 2016; Rogelj et al. 2013), and that the longer ambitious mitigation action is delayed, the more the 
rate of retirement increases (Bertram, Johnson, et al. 2015; Johnson et al. 2015; Luderer et al. 2017). Iyer et al. (2015) 
estimate that catching up with 2°C-consistent pathways would involve stranding about 1,500 GW of coal and gas power 
plants worldwide after 2030, while Johnson et al. (2015) estimate that a carbon price consistent with the 2°C target 
would strand at least US$165 billion worth of coal plants worldwide. 
Furthermore, stringent emission reductions translate into substantial upstream unburnable carbon assets, where the 
emissions embodied in fossil fuel reserves already exceed extraction budgets consistent with 1.5°C or 2°C (McGlade 
and Ekins 2015), while OCI (2016) have calculated that developed coal reserves (that is, current mining areas) already 
exceed the budget for the 1.5°C target. The lower capital intensity of coal (compared to oil and gas) means lower 
costs of stranding, but does point to both loss of value invested in coal producers (about US$800 billion according to 
IRENA (2017b), and potential wasted capex in mining (worth US$177 billion) if climate policies are later implemented 
successfully (Carbon Tracker Initiative 2015). Investor-owned firms hold lower reserves than state-owned companies 
and nation states, thus state-owned companies and nations may pose a greater risk to exceeding the carbon budget 
(Heede 2014; Heede and Oreskes 2016), equity considerations notwithstanding (see also section 2.2). 
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gross domestic product in 2015 (Coady et al. 2016)10. 
Most of these fiscal subsidies were for oil and gas, with 
only a relatively small amount for coal. The picture 
changes dramatically once the lack of taxation of negative 
externalities of fossil fuel use is accounted for. Comparing 
actual taxes on coal with the estimated damage to society 
from air pollution reveals an implicit global subsidy to coal 
of US$2,400 billion in 2015, or US$3,100 billion (half of 
total implicit to all fossil fuels) if the damage to climate is 
accounted for (Coady et al. 2016).
In the absence of full implementation of carbon prices, coal 
taxes could potentially reduce carbon leakage (Collier and 
Venables 2014), provide credible long-term price signals, and 
reduce (or even avoid) carbon lock-ins (Lazarus, Erickson, 
and Tempest 2015). When coordinated among major coal-
producing countries, they could raise global coal prices and 
lower global coal consumption, and hence reduce emissions 
(Mendelevitch, Richter, and Jotzo 2015).
Non-market-based instruments
Implementing carbon prices that are sufficiently high might 
not be politically feasible (section 2.2). Hence, complementing 
a carbon price — or even temporarily substituting it — 
with alternative policy instruments such as performance 
standards, feebates, or targeted financial instruments 
(such as subsidized loans) that apply only to new, clean 
power plants can avoid early retirement of existing plants, 
thus preserving vested interests, and ease the phase-out 
(Bertram, Johnson, et al. 2015; Rozenberg, Vogt-Schilb, and 
Hallegatte 2017). Preventing the construction of new assets 
is especially vital in countries that currently invest in coal 
(figure 5.1 and table 5.1). In contrast to a high carbon price, 
standards, mandates or feebates on new power plants do 
not prompt current producers to underutilize existing coal 
plants. While they would avoid stranded assets (box 5.1), 
they would likely redirect new investments towards greener 
options. Stated differently, the stock of coal power plants 
would stop increasing, and instead decrease progressively as 
plants aged and were retired (Rozenberg, Vogt-Schilb, and 
Hallegatte 2017). 
Another policy option in this direction is to enact a 
moratorium (a ban) on new coal power plants or coal mines 
beyond a specific timeline (Bertram et al. 2015; Pfeiffer et al. 
2016; Rozenberg, Vogt-Schilb, and Hallegatte 2017). Those 
approaches can have advantages in political economy terms, 
in that they impact owners of existing coal power plants 
and mines less, and hence reduce resistance to change 
(Rozenberg, Vogt-Schilb, and Hallegatte 2017). When a high 
carbon price is not feasible, typically due to political economy 
considerations, a low price coupled with a moratorium and 
other complementary policy instruments, such as support 
for low-carbon electricity generation capacities, could 
indeed help make progress towards the 2°C target, while 
drastically limiting stranded assets (Bertram et al. 2015).
10 We added together ‘pre-tax subsidies’ and ‘foregone consumption tax 
revenue’ from IMF figures to calculate this total, which we call ‘fiscal subsidy’. 
The IMF adds the failure to internalize externalities related to fuel usage to 
arrive at its headline ‘fossil fuel subsidy’ figure.
Complementary instruments
Even if complemented with non-market-based instruments, 
carbon prices alone would fail to overcome other market 
failures, notably network externalities or imperfections in 
the capital market. While usually assumed to play a key role 
in future electricity supply, renewable energy technologies, 
such as wind or solar power, require additional infrastructure 
to provide a reliable electricity supply (IPCC 2014)11. To 
support their increased deployment, governments can 
invest in improved grid infrastructure and storage facilities to 
address variable availability (Hirth, Ueckerdt, and Edenhofer, 
2015). Smart grids, including bidirectional power flows and 
metering at the individual level, could further enhance 
system efficiency, in turn increasing the market share of 
clean technologies (Iqtiyanillham, Hasanuzzaman, and 
Hosenuzzaman 2017; Meadowcroft et al. 2017; Rifkin 2011). 
Being more capital-intensive than coal, low-carbon 
technologies are sensitive to perceived investor risks, both 
political and financial, and to other capital market constraints. 
For example, regional differences in the weighted average 
costs of capital play a more important role in evaluating 
investments in renewable energy technologies than differing 
natural conditions, such as differences in solar irradiation or 
wind potentials (Ondraczek, Komendantova, and Patt 2015, 
for photovoltaic technologies). These differences can lead to 
carbon prices alone being unable to trigger a transition away 
from coal (Hirth and Steckel 2016).
To address the existing investor risks, and improve the 
attractiveness of alternatives to new coal investments, 
instruments for de-risking clean investment are suggested 
for all financial institutions and governments across the 
world. These include, for example, support for policy 
design, identification and removal of regulatory hurdles, 
improvement of institutional capacity, and provision of 
bridging investment subsidies. Such financial de-risking 
instruments can transfer risk from private investors to public 
actors. A range of ‘private sector instruments’, such as 
guarantees, subordinated debt or equity, is already available 
(Torvanger et al. 2016). National or multilateral development 
banks could employ public financing to mobilize private 
investments, which contribute to a declared development 
target. Concessionary climate finance can also be used 
to de-risk low-carbon investments (Steckel et al. 2017), 
while coal investment could also be made less attractive. 
In 2016, public finance by G20 countries for coal projects 
outstripped financing for renewable projects by four to one 
internationally (Chen 2017).
11 Additional infrastructure investments would also be necessary for increasing 
the deployment and use of CCS. Recent trends suggest that a large-scale 
utilization of CCS as decarbonization technology for the electricity sector is 
unlikely, as the combination of renewables with storage and demand-side 
technologies provides the cheaper alternative (Breyer et al. 2017; Löffler et 
al. 2017). Nevertheless, large-scale power storage technologies to match 
demand–supply mismatches is still a technological challenge and requires 
additional research (Annaluru and Garg 2017; Park and Lappas 2017). 
Critically, the ministers of 26 countries agree that without overt policy 
support (as has been provided in the past to renewable, nuclear, and power 
storage technology), CCS will encounter challenges entering the market and 
achieving emissions reductions.
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5.2.2 Managing the transition
Some of the stakeholders negatively impacted by the 
transition away from coal, including workers, coal owners, 
and energy users relying on low prices, may have the power 
to veto proposed reforms (Arent et al. 2017; Kern and 
Rogge 2016; Sovacool et al. 2016; Trebilcock 2014). As one 
example, governments that have tried to pass fossil fuel 
subsidy reforms on the grounds of technical soundness and 
administrative feasibility, without taking into account the 
political economy of reforms, have often failed (Bazilian and 
Onyeji 2012; Rentschler and Bazilian 2016; Sdralevich, Sab, 
and Zouhar 2014). 
A review of previous experience with reforms in the energy 
sector provides guidance on measures to navigate the 
political economy of phasing out coal (Fay et al. 2015; Louie 
and Pearce 2016; Sovacool et al. 2016; Vogt-Schilb and 
Hallegatte 2017)12. These include managing the impact on 
workers, coal owners, industry and energy users, as well as 
the role of communication.
Managing impacts on workers
A transition away from coal affects many different groups of 
workers. Historically, transitions away from coal have often 
left workers and communities to bear the brunt of job losses 
and deindustrialization (Caldecott, Sartor, and Spencer 
2017; Trebilcock 1981). While macroeconomic analyses of 
the employment impact of switching to more renewable 
energy usually find net job creation (Cameron and van der 
Zwaan 2015; Perrier and Quirion 2016; Ragwitz et al. 2009; 
Wei, Patadia, and Kammen 2010), they may mask job losses 
in other locations, and might hence be a poor indicator for 
a just transition13. Indeed, case-by-case analyses are often 
needed to assess the kinds of jobs created, their wages and 
conditions, the skills required by these jobs, and whether 
they can be accessed by roughly the same population 
group affected by a coal phase-out (Miller, Richter, and 
O’Leary 2015).
Support, such as wage subsidies (to encourage hiring 
in expanding sectors) and unemployment insurance for 
displaced workers, can help effectively mitigate most of the 
losses at generally modest costs (Louie and Pearce 2016; 
Porto 2012). More generally, research on past transitions 
shows that social dialogue, social protection and economic 
diversification are instrumental in ensuring just transitions 
(Caldecott, Sartor, and Spencer 2017; Galgóczi 2014; 
Healy and Barry 2017). This can be expected to be more 
challenging in developing countries, where resources and 
institutional capacities are scarcer and the mining workforce 
is semi- or unskilled.
Managing impacts on coal owners and industry
A coal phase-out would lead to a devaluation of existing 
coal assets (section 5.1 and box 5.1). In a situation in which 
12 Including energy taxation, energy subsidy removal, and carbon taxes, as well 
as adjustment packages for, and re-training of, energy sector workers.
13 The International Labour Organization has produced the Guidelines for a Just 
Transition Towards Environmentally Sustainable Economies and Societies for 
All (International Labour Organization 2015), which are explicitly recognized 
in the Paris Agreement (United Nations 2015).
the competitiveness of other industries was reduced, for 
example following a potential increase in energy prices 
associated with a coal phase-out process (Branger and 
Quirion 2014), the prospects of successfully completing a 
coal phase-out process would be compromised14. Model 
analyses find that losses incurred by coal owners could 
be compensated by governments redistributing a fraction 
of the carbon rent15 (Arent et al. 2017; Bauer et al. 2016; 
Goulder and Schein 2013; Kalkuhl and Brecha 2013). Several 
countries or regions, such as Alberta in Canada, have coal 
phase-out agreements, to ensure an efficient, progressive, 
and politically acceptable reduction in coal power 
generation (Jordaan et al. 2017)16. In the United Kingdom, 
compensatory subsidies were given to support the industry 
in its efforts to compete in the reformed electricity market 
(Oosterhuis and Brink 2014).
Managing impacts on energy users
The negative impacts of a coal phase-out on poor and 
middle-class energy users, notably through increased 
electricity prices, can also challenge the political feasibility 
of reforms, regardless of the progressivity or regressivity 
of increased coal prices on consumers (Lindebjerg, Peng, 
and Yeboah 2015; Arze del Granado, Coady, and Gillingham 
2012). Compensatory redistributive policies can mitigate 
the distributional impacts to a large extent, especially if a 
fraction of revenues is recycled into transfers to poor and 
middle-class households (Brenner, Riddle, and Boyce 2007; 
Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 2009; Callan et al. 2009; Coady, 
Parry, and Shang 2017; Gonzalez 2012; Liang and Wei 2012; 
Rausch, Metcalf, and Reilly 2011; Symons, Proops, and Gay 
1994). This can be done through different instruments that 
specifically target the subset of the population that is directly 
affected. For example, direct cash transfers can be used as 
compensatory measures, where appropriate systems exist 
(Rentschler 2015; Robles, Rubio, and Stampini 2015; World 
Bank 2015). Alternatively, compensation can be offered 
through in-kind measures, such as electrification in poor 
and rural areas, distributing efficient light-bulbs, improving 
public transport, or eliminating fees at government-run 
schools (Coady, Parry, and Shang 2017; Fay et al. 2015; Garg 
et al. 2017).
Redirecting resources, from coal use to the provision of 
public goods, helps governments garner support for coal 
phase-out plans (Stiglitz and Stern 2017). For instance, 
governments can use revenues from taxation or savings from 
avoided fossil fuel subsidies to invest in public infrastructure 
(Jakob et al. 2016, 2015), energy infrastructure17, or social 
assistance (Hallegatte et al. 2016). Governments can also 
14 These kinds of dislocations played a role in the 2016 US elections, where 
loss of coal jobs over the past 20–30 years affected entire communities and 
states, leading to massive shifts in voting behaviour.
15 The ‘carbon rent’ describes the economic value of being allowed to emit, 
which would be captured by governments implementing a carbon price, that 
is a tax or an emissions trading scheme.
16 To do so, the government of Alberta committed to “provide transition 
payments to the companies which were originally slated to operate their 
coal-fired units beyond 2030”. These payments “represent the approximate 
economic disruption to their capital investments” (Government of 
Alberta 2015).
17 See, for example, the case study on India, in Section 5.3.
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use those savings to reduce income taxes and payroll taxes, 
to correct impacts on those consumers who do pay taxes 
(Metcalf 1999).
Cash transfers (to directly affected communities) and tax 
reductions (benefiting all citizens) are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive (Parry and Williams 2010). Indeed, a 
combination of transfers and a reduction of distortive taxes 
funded by energy taxes could foster more progressive income 
distribution patterns, and drive a reduction in low-cost coal 
usage (Bach et al. 2002).
Communicating policy packages
Communicating potential benefits and involving stakeholders 
is an essential precondition for a successful transition away 
from coal (Healy and Barry 2017). Coady et al. (2017), 
comparing 32 energy pricing reforms, found that the 
absence of an effective communication strategy was decisive 
in unsuccessful past reforms.
5.3 Country studies
This section presents policies, measures and instruments 
being used by major coal users and producers around 
the world, to highlight the challenges and opportunities 
associated with coal phase-out. Success rates differ and 
major gaps need to be bridged for a quicker phase-out. 
However, the breadth of positive experiences is enough to 
offer a buoyant outlook on the overall direction.
5.3.1. Australia: coal exports and policy challenges
In Australia, which has relied heavily on its abundant coal 
reserves for domestic electricity production, transitioning 
away from coal is likely to pose significant policy challenges. 
It is widely anticipated that the number of coal-fired power 
plants will continue to decline, as plants come towards the 
end of their planned lifetimes. A number of older coal-fired 
power plants have been shut down, and new coal-fired 
capacity is now widely seen as ‘uninvestable’ by the private 
sector, due to carbon risks and because renewable energy is 
rapidly gaining a cost advantage (Morgan 2017).
Being the world’s second largest coal exporter18, the even 
bigger question is the future of coal exports. Thermal coal 
exports, which are directly dependent on other countries’ 
climate change policies, currently stand at around 
200 million tonnes per year (Australian Government 2017), 
almost double the volume from a decade ago. Large-scale 
expansion of coal mining for export from inland areas of 
north-eastern Australia is under discussion.
There is currently no policy to accelerate the phase-out 
of coal in domestic use, and no systematic framework to 
ease the transition away from coal in regions where large 
coal-based infrastructure exists, or where coal is mined. 
Australia’s experience with climate policy has been a 
difficult one, with the issue heavily politicized, and emission 
reduction policy instruments the subject of political contest. 
18 Note that Australia is the largest exporter of coal when also accounting for 
metallurgical coal.
Australia is the only country that introduced a full-scale 
carbon pricing scheme (in 2012) and then abolished it (in 
2014). Policy uncertainty is deep-seated in the energy sector, 
stifling investment (Jotzo, Jordan, and Fabian 2012).
5.3.2 China: slowly turning the wheel
Being the world’s largest consumer of coal (BP, 2017), and 
relying largely on coal in its energy supply, China has (in its 
Nationally Determined Contribution) committed to achieve 
a peak in coal emissions by 2030, and eventually diversify its 
energy supply. Since 2013, coal consumption seems to have 
stalled, with some claiming that the period of major growth 
in China’s coal consumption is already over (IEA 2016) or that 
China’s coal consumption has already peaked (Green and 
Stern 2017; IEA 2016).
While it is too early to interpret current developments, 
China is adopting a wide range of cross-sectoral policies and 
measures to reduce its coal production and consumption, 
largely motivated by the need to tackle local air pollution 
(Chong et al. 2015; Hao et al. 2016). Specific policies include 
phasing out coal in key cities and regions to improve air 
quality, improving the efficiency of coal-fired power plants 
and industrial boilers and furnaces, mandatory closure of old 
and inefficient coal mines, as well as coal-fired power plants, 
and industrial facilities. For instance, during the 2011–2014 
period, 24 GW of coal-fired power plants and 473 million 
tonnes of coal production capacity were closed (Hart, 
Bassett, and Johnson 2017; NDRC 2016). The Government 
also promotes the development of low-carbon energy 
sources, for example by feed-in tariffs for renewable energy 
and granted grid access. The newly introduced carbon 
dioxide emissions trading scheme can also be expected 
to make coal consumption relatively unattractive (Swartz 
2016). In addition, to address the overcapacity of industries 
and power generation, the Government has also halted 
the approval of new capacity19, although it remains to be 
seen how many of these projects will be cancelled or just 
postponed until after 2020. To soften the social side effects of 
closing insolvent, polluting and inefficient state-owned coal 
mines, an Industry Adjustment Fund has provided Chinese 
Yuan100 billion (approximately US$15 billion) to manage 
unemployment in the steel and coal sectors (NDRC 2016).
Despite those developments, China still added 14 GW of 
new coal-fired power generation capacity during the first 
half of 2017. Even though this increase is 52 percent smaller 
than that during the same period in 2016 (CEC 2017), at the 
beginning of 2017 there were still 280 GW in the pipeline, 
of which 145 GW were under construction (Shearer et al. 
2017). Facing a marked slowdown in new coal capacity 
in the country, the central government has encouraged 
Chinese coal enterprises to seek opportunities outside the 
country (Bal Kishan Sharma 2016). In recent years, China 
has become a major player in developing coal-fired power 
plants abroad, including providing the funding, equipment 
and labour. By the end of 2016, China had been involved in 
the construction of a total capacity of 250 GW of coal-fired 
19 In the second half of 2016, 120 GW acronym of power plant capacity under 
construction and planned were halted (Zhang 2017).
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capacity at different stages (that is, from the planning phase 
to plants that were operational in 2016) across the globe 
(Ren, Liu, and Zhang 2017).
5.3.3. Europe: Learning from past experiences
In terms of managing a coal phase-out, trends in European 
countries are diverging, roughly along an east/west divide. 
Most Western European countries have either already 
phased out coal (Belgium, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, and 
the Baltic countries), agreed on a phase-out path within 
the next 10 years (Portugal, Finland, the United Kingdom, 
Denmark and Austria), or are currently discussing pathways 
with declining coal demand in the medium term (Germany, 
France, Spain, Italy and the Netherlands) (Graichen, Kleiner, 
and Buck 2016). Lessons from these experiences can be 
drawn to design future coal phase-out pathways. The closure 
of most steam coal mines in Western Europe (located mainly 
in the United Kingdom and Germany) at the end of the 
address a transformation might also negatively impact future 
approaches to European Union climate policy (Marcinkiewicz 
and Tosun 2015).
5.3.4. India: balancing multiple objectives
India’s starting point is the urgent need for poverty alleviation 
and more energy for development: in 2016, 21.9 percent of 
Indians lived below the national poverty line, while more 
than 240 million people lacked access to electricity (ADB 
2017; IEA 2016). The country, in line with many others, faces 
a dilemma in addressing its developmental goals: it needs to 
respond to demands in poverty reduction, energy access and 
urbanization, while reconstructing its development pathway 
towards a cleaner energy system that has been coupled 
historically with fossil fuel use (Arent et al. 2017).
Coal has remained the mainstay of India’s electricity 
generation, contributing 61 percent of total national 
generation capacity (Central Electricity Authority 
Government of India 2016). With the goal of providing 
power more efficiently to more people, India is investing in 
modernizing its power plant fleet. Since 2006 the country has 
added 151 GW of new coal power, making a total of 218 GW 
as of June 2017, with about 75 percent of this capacity being 
subcritical (Shearer et al. 2017). Coal-based power plants 
closed or declared non-functional due to their inefficiency 
and pollution amounted to 18.5 GW in 2013–2014, 23 GW 
in 2014–2015, 26.8 GW in 2015–2016, and 30.5 GW in 
2016–2017) (Ministry of Power, Government of India, n.d.). 
There are plans to shut down about 37 GW of antiquated, 
heavily polluting subcritical coal plants in the near future 
(Singh 2016).
Coal use in India is subject to a form of carbon tax. Total 
collections of around US$ 9 billion until June 2017 are mainly 
used to support renewable energy programmes. India 
plans to install 175 GW of renewable power by 2030, which 
includes 100 GW of solar photovoltaic power (GoI 2015). 
4 GW of solar-powered capacity was added to the grid 
in 2016, that is double the addition of the previous year 
(IEA 2017). 
Energy security concerns are often presented as a major 
barrier for India to quickly and decisively turn away from 
domestic coal (Garg and Shukla 2009). In addition, coal 
production, transport and usage and ash disposal employ 
almost one million people20. Income from coal royalties 
constitutes almost 50 percent of total earning of states 
such as Chhatisgarh, Jharkhand and Odisha (Mondal 2017), 
which are some of the least developed large Indian states. 
Therefore, and perhaps more so than in other countries, coal 
use policies have strong socio-economic and sociopolitical 
linkages. A successful energy transition in India hence 
requires a broader perspective that includes economic 
development and measures that balance the associated 
social transformation, notably protecting displaced workers 
(Khosla et al. 2015; Reddy 2016).
20 Coal mining is the second largest employer in India (the largest is the railroads, 
which ship coal as their number one product and revenue source).
20th century was based on economic reasoning. Public 
subsidies were granted with the aim of securing supply 
and easing the social impact of reduced coal production 
(Fothergill 2017; Galgóczi 2014; Matthes et al. 2015). Local 
supplies were at first replaced by steam coal imports, and 
eventually also by natural gas. The latter was supported 
by European Union policies, in combination with national 
measures such as the introduction of a carbon dioxide price 
floor and emission performance standards in the United 
Kingdom (Fothergill 2017; Matthes et al. 2015).
Public financial support in Western Europe has been shifting 
from conventional technologies such as coal (or nuclear) 
towards renewables. Energy transitions, as seen in countries 
such as Denmark (Danish Energy Agency 2017; Gerdes 2016) 
and Germany (Matthes 2017; Renn and Marshall 2016), have 
been facilitated by cooperation between unions, employers, 
governments and research institutions, in a continuous 
process spanning several decades (Sovacool 2017).
In Eastern Europe, countries (most notably Poland) continue 
to support coal-fired electricity with the aim of backing 
up their domestic coal production. Energy security and 
energy prices are major political concerns, while European 
Union climate policy and the German “transition towards 
sustainable energy” are regarded rather critically across 
political parties (Bouzarovski and Tirado Herrero 2017; 
Marcinkiewicz and Tosun 2015; Szulecki et al. 2016). As 
a consequence, coal mining companies, under economic 
pressure due to the plummeted global coal prices, are 
given (indirect) state subsidies or are renationalized (Jonek 
Kowalska 2015; Widera, Kasztelewicz, and Ptak 2016). 
Debates on potential coal phase-out scenarios are met with 
great scepticism, due to previous negative experiences with 
(coal sector) restructuring programmes having resulted in 
high unemployment, as they failed to create jobs in other 
sectors (Suwala 2010; Szpor 2017). However, missing the 
opportunity to start the necessary structured phase-out 
process might result in difficulties to transform the industry 
in a socially balanced way, risking much bigger complications 
in the future for the regions involved. In turn, in some 
countries, ongoing lock-ins and related unwillingness to 
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5.3.5. Indonesia: covering increasing demand with 
domestic resources
In 2015, Indonesia was the world’s fifth largest coal producer 
and the largest steam coal exporter in the world, exporting 
mainly to neighbouring countries, such as China, India, Japan, 
the Republic of Korea, and the Philippines (IEA/OECD 2016). 
In the last two decades, coal production has accelerated 
sharply, but the most recent years have seen a decrease 
in both production and exports, particularly to China and 
Japan. Coal contributes to 2.4 percent of Indonesia’s gross 
domestic product (GDP), and in 2014 led to US$22 billion in 
exports (PWC Indonesia and ICMA 2016).
With Indonesia increasingly using its coal for domestic 
purposes, it is now also the world’s eighth largest coal 
consumer. About 27 GW of coal capacity provide more than 
half of the electricity generated in the country (MEMR 2016). 
Existing power plants are comparably inefficient and have 
low environmental standards, leading to high emissions of 
nitrogen oxides, sulphur dioxide, and particulate matter 
(Centre for Science and Environment 2017).
Indonesia’s electricity demand is expected to increase 
rapidly, as millions will gain access to electricity (Enerdata 
2015). The country aims to provide an increasing share of 
energy by domestic sources, including coal, although due 
to lower-than-expected economic growth rates, 7 GW of 
planned coal-fired power plants were recently deferred in 
Sumatra and Java. The state-owned utility (PLN) nevertheless 
estimates that, in the next decade, 77 GW of additional 
capacity will be needed, of which 32 GW are planned to be 
covered by coal plants (MEMR 2017). Building those would 
cause coal use for electricity generation to triple by 2025. To 
secure domestic supply, the country has announced in its 
National Energy Plan that it will regulate exports.
Indonesia is also rich in other energy sources. The country 
is a large producer and exporter of natural gas, and has 
large potential for renewable energy, not only in solar, 
wind and biomass, but also hydropower and geothermal 
power, the latter of which could, in some cases, produce 
power at a relatively low cost (IRENA 2017a). There are 
plans for exploration and possible significant expansion of 
hydropower and geothermal power, but implementation 
tends to face significant practical hurdles.
5.3.6. South Africa: political lock-in
The lock-in of interests, institutions, and infrastructure may 
slow down the process of coal phase-out in South Africa, 
despite economics favouring low-carbon alternatives. 
South Africa is a good example of how the politics of a 
country may make incentivizing a transition away from 
coal substantially more difficult. The country depends on 
coal for the production of 90 percent of its electricity, in a 
sector dominated by the state-owned, vertically integrated 
monopoly Eskom (Eskom 2017).
In scenarios compatible with the 2°C target, coal-fired 
electricity is phased out before 2050 (Burton et al. 2016). 
Nonetheless, independent power producers are planning, 
and Eskom is building, new coal-fired capacity at costs that 
are approximately 40–50 percent higher than the prices 
achieved for wind and solar photovoltaic in recent renewable 
energy auctions (CSIR 2016). Independent power producers 
will receive 30-year power purchase agreements and 
guaranteed minimum off-take (Baker and Burton, in press). 
A regulated electricity price, state subsidies, and guarantees 
on Eskom’s debt have offset the large cost and time overruns 
at plants under construction. Stated differently, although 
new coal-fired capacity is no longer competitive, as the 
state-owned monopoly Eskom is not subject to competitive 
electricity markets, investors in new coal plants are 
essentially guaranteed returns on their investments through 
the institutional arrangements in the electricity sector. 
Furthermore, the grid operator Eskom is able to limit a rapid 
transition, as it compares long-term prices for new capacity 
against the fuel costs of depreciated coal plants, without a 
clear differentiation in the market between overall system 
efficiency and Eskom’s financial interests.
5.3.7. United States of America: cheap alternatives
A dramatic reduction in coal use by United States power 
utilities was facilitated by several factors. First and foremost 
was the availability of abundant low-cost natural gas, and 
some expectation that costs would remain low indefinitely. 
Two major studies (DoE 2017b; Houser, Bordoff, and 
Marsters 2017) support this view, stating that low-cost gas 
drove the majority of coal-to-gas fuel changes. Additional 
factors included conventional pollution controls (such as 
regulations to reduce mercury emissions), concern over 
carbon liability (notably through the Clean Power Plan, 
but also through shareholder votes), and the age of many 
shuttered plants (some over 60 years old). This suggests 
that access to sustained low-cost gas can accelerate a coal-
to-gas transition. Similarly, in regions where gas is scarce or 
expensive, that transition would be slower (Citi GPS 2015). 
It should be noted that further closures will continue, but 
will likely plateau as the oldest, dirtiest, and least efficient 
plants close.
Recently, a number of policy proposals have emerged 
to incentivize the deployment of CCS. One of the more 
promising approaches concerns a production tax credit 
for CCS, which pays operators for tonnes stored or used 
(the FUTURE Act (US Senate 2017)). By guaranteeing a 
fully refundable tax credit for 12 years of US$50 for saline 
formation and US$30 for carbon dioxide use (including 
Enhanced Oil Recovery), its goal is to create markets for 
CCS technology and projects such that project financing is 
possible. Additional proposed policies include a combination 
of production and investment tax credits (White House 2016, 
2015), changing renewable portfolio standards to clean 
energy portfolio standards  (Great Plains Institute 2016), 
building CCS pipeline infrastructure (DoE 2017a), providing 
access to master limited partnerships (Coons 2015), and tax-
exempt debt financing (Portman 2017).
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5.4. Synthesis and policy discussions 
Phasing out coal consumption in the power sector (without 
CCS) is an indispensable condition for achieving international 
climate change targets, but one that is at odds with recent 
developments. At the global scale, the stock of coal-fired 
power plants is increasing, as are emissions related to coal. 
The existing stocks, in combination with what is currently 
planned and built (assuming standard lifetimes and usage 
rates), will account for a significant share of the available 
carbon budget for a 2°C target, and would make a 1.5°C target 
probably infeasible. Avoiding further lock-ins is therefore a 
major and urgent requirement, as is phasing out existing coal 
use gradually.
Coal is mainly used in the power sector, where cleaner and 
mature technological alternatives are available at increasingly 
lower costs. However, the low price (ignoring externalities) 
of coal, wide domestic availability, and path dependencies 
under a business-as-usual scenario could make coal an 
ongoing large investment. Its negative externalities, such 
as air pollution, land degradation and airborne emissions, 
are regularly not priced in, leading to economic incentive 
structures that favour the extraction and use of coal over 
clean alternatives. Particularly where energy demand is 
increasing rapidly, investments in coal are still attractive. 
While case studies suggest that new coal plants are being 
considered increasingly risky and new investment growth is 
slowing down, stronger policy interventions are needed to 
turn the tide.
With regard to a transition away from coal, it is hence 
pivotal to price in the negative side effects of coal through 
appropriate mechanisms. Increasing prices would affect 
the current stock as well as future investments, by making 
current plants as well as future investments less attractive 
than other alternatives. Subsidies for coal, where they 
apply, should be phased out immediately. On the other 
hand, a carbon price, or pricing coal directly (for example 
in coal-producing countries) needs to be phased in very 
soon. This would generate revenues that in turn could 
help ease the transition, for example by financing public 
infrastructure, social security systems or investments in clean 
transformations include introducing phase-out agreements 
between important stakeholders in a country, phasing out 
inefficient plants first, reducing coal subsidies and promoting 
renewable energy.
Scenarios that achieve temperature stabilization well below 
2°C do not envisage any further room for new investments 
into coal. Given the difficulty of retiring or phasing out coal 
once plants are built, it is even more important to ensure 
that no new coal-fired power plants are constructed, and 
that carbon lock-in from coal is reduced to a minimum. 
Financial institutions worldwide should realize that financing 
coal is quickly becoming riskier, as these investments 
would become stranded. Energy investments are, however, 
required to tackle energy poverty in many developing 
countries, and to upgrade energy infrastructure even in 
many developed countries, which will need to move towards 
alternatives. Countries should ensure that alternatives 
can enter the market easily. This requires investments in 
the smart grid infrastructure and storage capacities that 
facilitate the integration of variable, low-carbon alternatives. 
Additionally, investments in alternatives to coal (such as 
renewable sources of energy) should be supported, for 
example by de-risking investments for investors.
Considering the very recent developments of the coal 
pipeline (that is, power plants that are planned or under 
construction) gives some reason for hope. The pipeline 
decreased significantly in 2016 (compared with 2015) and 
many power plants that were planned have been shelved 
or even cancelled. Important emerging economies that are 
largely dependent on coal, such as China and India, have 
announced policies that address coal consumption from 
various angles, including price mechanisms and policies that 
can socially support a transformation.
However, despite the coal pipeline shrinking, there are still 
large investments in new coal capacities. Some countries 
have recently announced that they will invest more heavily 
in coal (often alongside large investments in renewable 
energy), primarily to cover their increasing energy demands. 
A transition away from coal will only be successful if poor, 
fast-growing countries seek low-carbon alternatives to 
cover their rapidly increasing energy demand. Making 
those alternatives viable will require strong policies around 
the globe. Developing and newly industrializing countries 
will likely need support from the international community 
to design and implement the policies that are needed 
to achieve multiple societal objectives, including energy 
provision and achieving climate change mitigation targets.
energy infrastructure.
Even though getting the prices right is highly important, a 
transformation will likely need to be backed by a set of 
complementary policy instruments. Their implementation 
can be expected to be politically challenging. Even though 
they increase global welfare, policies necessary to phase 
out coal will negatively affect a society’s important interest 
groups; not only producers and owners of coal, but also 
workers that are employed in the industry, and households 
or energy-intensive industry that benefit from current 
low energy prices. These groups might have the power to 
veto measures necessary to trigger the transformation. 
Therefore, for a transformation to be successful, their 
interests need to be taken into account and addressed by 
additional measures, be it compensation for higher prices or 
lost business models, training for workers or the provision 
of alternative employment options. Examples for successful 
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6.1 The contribution of SLCPs to climate 
change – Introduction and framing
This chapter outlines the opportunities to reduce the 
emissions gap afforded by limiting emissions of short-lived 
climate pollutants (SLCPs). This is a topic that has not been 
included in previous Emissions Gap Reports.
Greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction policies 
contribute to varying degrees to reducing emissions of SLCPs: 
while methane sources are covered, black carbon sources 
are only partially covered (for example, through policies 
to regulate emissions from diesel engines). In light of this, 
and given that SLCPs have a relatively short residence time 
in the atmosphere, implementing targeted SLCP reduction 
measures can provide rapid reductions in global warming. 
For this reason, this chapter focuses on measures that are 
specific to SLCPs.
Anthropogenic climate change is largely driven by human-
induced changes in the composition of the atmosphere, 
including long-lived GHGs (that have lifetimes of 
approximately eight years or more) and short-lived climate 
pollutants (that have lifetimes of approximately 20 years 
or less) (Myhre et al., 2013)1. The most recent assessment 
report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) found that increases in carbon dioxide (CO
2
) were the 
largest single contributor to climate change. However, other 
compounds also play large roles and, for this reason, it is 
standard practice to include all climate drivers in analyses 
of historical and projected trends2. In sum, although some 
SLCPs — particularly black carbon — are not explicitly part 
1 These groupings of pollutants by lifetime are consistent with the IPCCs Fifth 
Assessment Report (AR5), and methane is included within both groups.
2 This extends to allowable carbon budgets, for which the IPPC’s Fifth 
Assessment Report presented analyses for both CO₂ alone and all 
climate drivers.
of the Paris Agreement, which targets long-lived GHGs 
only, SLCPs are routinely included in analyses aimed to 
identify emission trajectories that are consistent with 
temperature targets.
This report defines the ‘emissions gap’ as the difference 
between the emission trajectories resulting from 
implementation of Nationally Determined Contributions 
(NDCs), and the trajectories associated with emission 
scenarios that are consistent with temperature targets, such 
as the 2°C target. For some SLCPs, however, such a definition 
is problematic. For example, emissions of black carbon can 
increase relative to current policies under a 2°C pathway, 
due to a greater reliance on biofuels, or growing numbers of 
diesel vehicles without particulate filters and/or stringent fuel 
quality standards. In light of this, the definition of ‘emissions 
gap’ that applies to this chapter is “the difference between 
emission levels that are consistent with emission trajectories 
resulting from NDC implementation, and the lowest emission 
levels achievable using current mitigation technologies and 
policies”. For methane and hydrofluorocarbons, results 
are presented in CO
2
 equivalents (CO
2
e). Additionally, the 
temperature response associated with mitigation measures 
covering all SLCPs is presented3.
Strategies to reduce SLCPs will typically target methane, 
tropospheric ozone, black carbon and hydrofluorocarbons. 
Other short-lived climate forcers, such as sulphur dioxide 
and organic carbon, lead to cooling and are therefore not 
targeted. These SLCP reduction strategies will sometimes 
affect only a single pollutant, for example intermittent 
rice irrigation affects methane alone. Nonetheless, most 
strategies to reduce SLCPs will affect multiple pollutants. 
It follows that an evaluation of mitigation measures must 
3 The analysis presented in this chapter cannot assess the emissions gap in 
terms of national pledges, as most countries pledged reductions in CO₂e.
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examine emissions of both long-lived GHGs and all SLCPs, to 
assess the net impact on warming.
Sustained SLCP reduction strategies can help limit long-term 
warming, especially when combined with CO
2
 reduction, and 
therefore contribute to closing the emissions gap. A complete 
separation between SLCP and CO
2
 reductions is not possible 
for two reasons. Firstly, decarbonization strategies will 
lead to a reduction of some SLCPs, including black carbon, 
about one third of which originates from fossil fuel sources 
(Bond et al., 2013; Klimont et al., 2017). Secondly, efficiency 
increases can reduce all types of emissions, but many SLCP 
mitigation strategies are distinct from strategies to reduce 
CO
2
, especially in the near term, as many decarbonization 
measures require lengthy structural changes. 
Reductions in SLCPs have the potential to decrease the rate 
and degree of warming in the next few decades, with SLCP 
mitigation having a rapid effect on temperature. In contrast, 
reducing CO
2
 (and associated emissions, which often include 
cooling agents such as sulphur dioxide or nitrogen oxides) 
tends to reduce warming more slowly. Hence, the climate 
impact of mitigating SLCPs is not equivalent to reducing CO
2
, 
which is a much longer-lived GHG, owing to the differing 
temporal evolution of the radiative forcing response to 
these emissions (Myhre et al., 2013). It has been estimated 
that SLCP mitigation has the potential to avoid up to 0.6°C 
of warming by mid-century (for example Hu et al., 2013; 
Rogelj et al., 2014; Shindell et al., 2012), while aggressive 
CO
2
mitigation in a comparable scenario leads to less than half 
as much near-term reduction in warming (Hu et al., 2013). 
SLCPs will also affect long-term global mean temperatures. 
In that context, the impact of sustained emissions changes 
of SLCPs can be usefully compared with pulse emission 
changes of long-lived GHGs (Allen et al., 2016). Furthermore, 
existing air quality and CO
2
 mitigation policies will reduce 
emissions of sulphate and nitrogen oxides, which will drive 
up warming in the near term (despite improving air quality). 
Enhancing SLCP mitigation measures can help counteract 
this unmasked warming.
When considering opportunities to reduce the emissions 
gap, it is also important to consider how the measures and 
strategies adopted to cover the temperature gap will affect 
societies, human well-being and health, as well as ecosystems. 
The text of the Paris Agreement commits the world to 
an ambitious long-term temperature target (Article 2a 
and 4.1), but places this ambition within the context of 
“sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty.” 
Through the lens of sustainable development, the path that 
the world choses to reach the long-term climate target is 
as important as achieving the target itself, particularly for 
those that are already suffering from the impacts of climate 
change (Shindell et al., 2017a). 
In this context, near-term mitigation of SLCPs is perhaps 
even more important. In addition to the fast temperature 
response, reductions of SLCPs would contribute to reducing 
climate change impacts that are based on cumulative heat 
uptake (for example, sea-level rise, and glacier and ice 
sheet melting). They would also help reduce the likelihood 
of passing irreversible thresholds and triggering large 
positive feedbacks. In doing so, they would strengthen other 
climate change mitigation efforts (Shindell et al., 2017a; Xu 
and Ramanathan, 2017). SLCP reductions also improve air 
quality, with benefits for human health, agricultural yields, 
rainfall stability and other environmental and social policy 
goals (section 6.5).
 
Finally, cutting levels of black carbon and other SLCPs 
delivers short-term benefits, which may help governments 
to increasingly view collective action on climate change as 
feasible (Victor et al., 2015). Capitalizing on efforts such as 
the Climate and Clean Air Coalition or the Montreal Protocol 
on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer can increase 
the momentum for climate change mitigation (Sabel and 
Victor, 2015).
6.2 Recent SLCP emissions trends and 
outlook towards 2030
Efforts to estimate emissions of SLCPs and their future 
trends have intensified, following a global assessment of 
emission trends for black carbon and tropospheric ozone 
precursors (UNEP/WMO, 2011). Many recent studies have 
focused on improving the understanding about emissions 
from poorly quantified sources4, with a secondary focus on 
large emitting regions5.
6.2.1. Historical estimates
Recent work has led to revised global estimates of SLCP 
emissions (Crippa et al., 2016; Höglund-Isaksson, 2017; 
Höglund-Isaksson et al., 2017; Klimont et al., 2017; Purohit 
and Höglund-Isaksson, 2017; Wang et al., 2014), and to the 
re-estimation of historical emissions of SLCPs that were 
used to develop the Representative Concentration Pathways 
(Lamarque et al., 2010) and Shared Socio-Economic 
Pathways (Rao et al., 2017)6. While estimates of SLCP 
emissions remain uncertain, the revised historical estimates 
are higher than previously assumed (Hoesly et al., 2017; 
Klimont et al., 2017). This is especially important with regard 
to black carbon, where the inclusion of emissions from 
kerosene lamps, open burning of waste, gas flaring, and 
regional data on coal use in China results in emission levels 
that are over a million tonnes (over 15 percent) higher in 
2010 than in the integrated assessment models used in the 
4 These include black carbon from kerosene lamps (Jacobson et al., 2013; 
Lam et al., 2012), gas flaring (Conrad and Johnson, 2017; Stohl et al., 2013; 
Weyant et al., 2016), brick manufacturing (Cardenas et al., 2012; Maithel et 
al., 2012; Weyant et al., 2014), open burning of residential waste (Christian 
et al., 2010; Wiedinmyer et al., 2014), open burning of agricultural residues 
(Stockwell et al. (2016), and methane from the oil and gas industry (Höglund-
Isaksson, 2017).
5 Notably China, India, Russia and the Arctic (Evans et al., 2017, 2015; Huang et 
al., 2015; Kholod et al., 2016; Kondo et al., 2011; Kurokawa et al., 2013; Lu et 
al., 2011; Shen et al., 2012; Winiger et al., 2017).
6 See Hoesly et al. (2017) for additional details concerning past trends on 
anthropogenic emissions of reactive gases and aerosols.
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Representative Concentration Pathways and Shared Socio-
Economic Pathways scenarios7. 
Asia’s role in emissions of black carbon and methane is 
ever-increasing, while North America and Europe (including 
Russia) combined represented nearly one third of global 
methane emissions in 2010, primarily via emissions from the 
oil and gas sector. Although sectoral structures of emissions 
vary greatly across pollutants, a few sectors tend to 
dominate. For black carbon, residential combustion (cooking 
and heating in solid fuel stoves) has been a key source of 
emissions, with transport and industry gaining importance 
in recent years (Hoesly et al., 2017).
6.2.2. Projected emissions (including NDCs)
Within Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), 
identifying particular compounds is usually difficult or 
impossible. This is because emissions reduction targets 
are expressed in CO
2
e, often without specific targets for 
methane, hydrofluorocarbons or black carbon, but rather 
providing a list of target sectors. Only Mexico, Chile, 
Nigeria and Canada name SLCPs (black carbon) in their 
NDCs (and only Mexico specifies a target)8. It follows that 
NDCs are unsuited to analyses of SLCP projections. For this 
reason, the assessment below relies upon air pollutant 
and GHG emissions modelling that provides pollutant- 
specific estimates.
Recent projections of black carbon emissions indicate a 
change in trends (figure 6.1), driven by legislation developed 
to address primarily the health impacts of particulate matter9. 
Following the introduction of diesel particulate filters, black 
carbon emissions from diesel engines in OECD countries 
have continued to decline since about 2005. A similar impact 
is expected in developing countries, where comparable 
legislation has been recently introduced (DieselNet, 2015; 
GOI, 2014; MoRTH, 2016) in addition to measures to reduce 
smoke exposure among rural populations cooking with 
biomass and using kerosene for lighting (Venkataraman 
et al., 2010). Finally, China’s policy to reduce coal use in 
households and small industries is likely to play an important 
role in near-future emissions of black carbon.
Recent scenarios reflect these policies to curb emissions 
of black carbon. figure 6.1 shows how projected emissions 
of black carbon (and methane and hydrofluorocarbons) 
7 A recent study by Höglund-Isaksson (2017) reports a considerably higher 
release of methane and ethane from global oil and gas systems for the period 
1980 to 2012, with oil production emerging as a much larger contributor 
than natural gas production. The results of this study show much closer 
consistency between bottom-up and top-down estimates of global ethane 
emissions from fossil sources than existing bottom-up inventories (EC-JRC/
PBL, 2013; US EPA, 2012).
8 By 2030, Mexico aims to achieve a 51 percent reduction in emissions of 
black carbon, compared to the country’s emissions levels in 2013. This 
is an ambitious goal, requiring significant reductions in transport (over 
70 percent), residential combustion (nearly 60 percent), and industry 
(50 percent), and the enforcement of a ban on open burning of residues 
(INDC-Mexico, 2015). Beyond developing the strategy, the government 
issued new legislation regarding the transport sector requiring improved 
efficiency and emission standards.
9 Reductions in emissions of black carbon is an ancillary benefit of policies 
aimed to curb particulate matter emissions.
compare with Shared Socio Economic Pathways scenarios10. 
In addition to the three Shared Socio-Economic Pathways 
scenario ranges, an ‘updated policy’ pathway is shown, 
reflecting the latest policy assessments11. In the period prior 
to 2030, this pathway is consistent with all the Shared Socio-
Economic Pathways trajectories associated with a radiative 
forcing of 2.6 Watts/m2 (which corresponds to a 2°C increase 
in global mean temperature at the end of this century). 
After 2030, the ‘updated policy’ pathway is consistent with 
Shared Socio-Economic Pathway – narrative 3 trajectories 
associated with a radiative forcing of 3.4 Watts/m2. Unlike 
recent estimates, the Shared Socio-Economic Pathway – 
narrative 3 (reference - no mitigation) scenario does not 
include the most recent policies in the transport sector. 
Considering the latest developments with respect to diesel 
engines (notably stricter standards, bans in cities, and 
the development of alternative propulsion systems), the 
projected decline in emissions from diesel engines over the 
next decades appears plausible. Finally, it is worth noting 
that the estimated near-term baseline developments do not 
consider some of the ongoing discussion that could bring 
further commitments to reduce SLCP emissions12. 
10 The figure shows projected emission ranges for three Shared Socio-Economic 
Pathways scenario groups. Shared Socio-Economic Pathway – narrative 3 
(reference - no mitigation) assumes a focus on national and regional policies, 
slow economic growth, lack of collaboration, large population remaining 
in poverty, and low priority for environmental policies, leading to strong 
environmental degradation in some regions. Shared Socio-Economic Pathway 
– narrative 3 (3.4 Watts/m2) assumes the same socio-economic pathways, 
except that they include aggressive policies to curb climate change. Shared 
Socio-Economic Pathways 1-5 (2.6 Watts/m2) trajectories are consistent with 
the 2°C target that is achieved for all Shared Socio-Economic Pathways except 
Shared Socio-Economic Pathway – narrative 3 (reference – no mitigation) 
(Rao et al. 2017; Riahi et al. 2017).
11 Updates include recent emission legislation (as of 2015) and updated energy 
projections, as described in IEA (2016).
12 Four commitments are especially significant:
 •  The member states of the Arctic Council have pledged to reduce black 
carbon emissions by between 25 percent and 33 percent of 2013 levels 
by 2025.
 •  Black carbon is covered by the Gothenburg Protocol to the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe’s Convention on Long-Range 
Transboundary Air Pollution. While no specific target is set, the Convention 
requires parties to prioritize important sources of black carbon emissions in 
their strategies to reduce emissions of particulate matter.
 •  The International Maritime Organization is considering options to reduce 
emissions of black carbon from the maritime industry.
 •  Thirty-eight partner countries to the Climate and Clean Air Coalition have 
pledged to develop or refine inventories of black carbon (55 countries are 
now partners in the coalition, which targets SLCPs, including black carbon). 
Other non-state actors have also made commitments, with the state of 
California in the United States adopting specific legal targets for reductions 
of each of the major SLCPs.
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For methane and hydrofluorocarbons, the baseline 
trajectories (labelled ‘current policy’ in figure 6.1) relying 
on near-term energy projections (IEA, 2016; Purohit and 
Höglund-Isaksson, 2017) appear similar to the Shared Socio-
Economic Pathway – narrative 3 trajectories. Numerous 
parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (including the top three global consumers of 
hydrofluorocarbons, China, the United States and European 
Union) are already taking action to reduce emissions through 
national policies and legislation. In their Intended Nationally 
Determined Contributions INDCs/NDCs, 99 countries 
pledged to reduce emissions of hydrofluorocarbons13.
 
6.2.3. Impact of the Kigali Amendment
A 2015 study found that phasing down hydrofluorocarbons 
could avoid between 4.0 GtCO
2
e and 5.3 GtCO
2
e per 
year by 2050, compared to a reference scenario (Velders 
et al., 2015). A related study from 2017, which uses 
13 Three sets of initiatives are worth noting:
• In May 2014, as part of an action plan to implement the energy conservation 
and emission reduction targets of its 12th five-year plan, the State Council of 
China announced that it would strengthen emission reduction requirements 
for hydrofluorocarbons, and accelerate their phase-out and replacement. 
In its INDC/NDC, China has stated that it will completely phase out 
hydrofluorocarbon-123.
• The European Union’s regulation 842/2006 on fluorinated greenhouse 
gases, which entered into effect on 1 January 2015, envisages that, by 2030, 
hydrofluorocarbon levels will have reduced by 79 percent of the levels 
registered in the period between 2009 and 2012.
• The United States considered federal-level measures to reduce the 
manufacture and use of hydrofluorocarbons. In August 2017, a court struck 
down part of a 2016 decision by the country’s Environmental Protection 
Agency, which sought to revoke approval for several of the most potent 
hydrofluorocarbons. However, it is unclear how much impact this ruling will 
have, as it returned the decision to the Agency, for further justification. In 
parallel, several state administrations in the United States are regulating 
hydrofluorocarbons. For example, California has set a new emissions 
reductions target for hydrofluorocarbons (a 40 percent reduction to 2013 
levels by 2030).
more up-to-date assumptions about emission reduction 
policies and a revised reference scenario, found that full 
compliance with the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal 
Protocol could reduce global hydrofluorocarbon emissions by 
0.7 Gt CO
2
e per year by 2030, and up to 2.7 Gt CO
2
e per year 
by 2050 (Höglund-Isaksson et al., 2017). This would avoid 
cumulative emissions of 39 GtCO
2
e between 2018 and 2050 
(figure 6.1)14. Strengthening phase-down efforts (that is, 
pursuing a reduction in emissions that goes beyond that 
afforded by the implementation of the Kigali Amendment 
and that seeks to reach the maximum potential) could 
provide about 30 percent greater cumulative benefits 
(figure 6.1), while avoiding additional future emissions by 
precluding a build-up of storage hydrofluorocarbon banks 
(Velders et al., 2014).
In addition to efforts to avoid direct emissions of 
hydrofluorocarbons, additional indirect CO
2
e mitigation 
is likely through parallel improvements in the energy 
efficiency of refrigeration and air-conditioning appliances 
and equipment. Past phase-outs under the Montreal 
Protocol have catalysed significant improvements in the 
energy efficiency of appliances — up to 30 percent in some 
subsectors (US EPA, 2002). Höglund-Isaksson et al. (2017) 
found that full compliance with the Kigali Amendment 
could reduce global electricity consumption by between 
14 These estimates are based on a 100-year global warming potential.
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Figure 6.1: Global annual emissions of methane, black carbon (including forest and savannah fires) and hydrofluorocarbons.
Note: For black carbon, values are shown in million tonnes and also based upon conversion to CO
2
e using 20-year global warming potentials (Bond et al., 2013). For 
methane and hydrofluorocarbons, the values shown are based upon conversion to CO
2
e using both 100-year (left axis) and 20-year (right axis) global warming potentials, 
to highlight the dependence of comparisons between SLCPs and CO
2
 on the choice of metric. Note that a 100-year global warming potential of 21 is used for methane, 
for consistency with prior issues of the ‘emissions gap report’, even though current studies and IPCC assessments use values more than 60 percent higher (Gasser et al., 
2017; Myhre et al., 2013).
Source: The figures were developed using data from Shared Socio Economic Pathways database (https://tntcat.iiasa.ac.at/SspDb/dsd), Riahi et al. (2017) and data 
for policy and mitigation scenarios from the GAINS model (http://gains.iiasa.ac.at) documented in Klimont et al. (2017); Stohl et al. (2015), and Purohit and Höglund-
Isaksson (2017).
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0.2 percent and 0.7 percent over the period 2018 to 2050, due 
to the adoption of more energy-efficient technologies15,16.
6.3 SLCP mitigation potential
Some of the reduction potential for black carbon identified 
in early studies (Shindell et al., 2012; UNEP/WMO, 2011) is 
expected to be realized in the updated baselines (Section 6.2). 
Nonetheless, significant additional opportunities exist, 
which could reduce black carbon emissions by about 
70 percent by 2030 (and more, in the longer term) 
(figure 6.1). Provided that strong targeted SLPC policies are 
introduced, these reductions in emissions could be achieved 
quickly17. While the illustrated potential was estimated for 
an energy scenario with CO
2
 emission levels similar to the 
Shared Socio-Economic Pathway – narrative 3 trajectory, the 
shown potential appears comparable with, or even larger 
than, the strict climate mitigation strategies that assume 
significant structural changes in the energy system. However, 
these strict climate policy scenarios are not compatible 
with the socio-economic developments associated with 
Shared Socio-Economic Pathway – narrative 3. Therefore, 
the intermediate climate target scenario results (reaching a 
3.4 Watts/m2 forcing level, or approximately a concentration 
of 550 ppm of CO
2
) were added. These results illustrate the 
co-benefits of climate policies on black carbon emissions. 
Indeed, under this scenario emissions are reduced by about 
30 percent by 2050, compared to the Shared Socio-Economic 
Pathway – narrative 3 trajectory.
Any further mitigation of black carbon emissions would 
require either tightened air quality standards, and/or 
strengthened development policy. These are included in 
the SLCP mitigation case, and in the strict climate policies 
case (as shown in the 2.6 Watts/m2 scenarios). By 2030, very 
limited reduction is demonstrated in this scenario, contrary 
to the SLCP mitigation case, where effective technological 
solutions and tested policy approaches afford much larger 
emission reduction potentials. In general, the new global 
set of scenarios (Shared Socio Economic Pathways) shows a 
fairly large span of emissions, even within the same Shared 
Socio Economic Pathways (Rao et al., 2017). This differs from 
the Representative Concentration Pathways data set, where 
assumptions that economic growth automatically leads to 
decreases in pollution were uniformly used across all the 
models for projecting changes in emissions of air pollutants, 
including SLCPs (Amann et al., 2013).
15 This would result in a cumulative reduction of about 5.5 GtCO₂e due to 
electricity savings when using country-specific emission factors that take into 
account country-specific transformation and distribution losses (Brander et 
al., 2011).
16 A 2015 study suggested that, in the air conditioning sector alone, improving 
the energy efficiency of equipment by 30 percent, while simultaneously 
transitioning to alternatives with low global warming potential, could provide 
cumulative mitigation of nearly 100 GtCO₂e by 2050 (Shah et al., 2015).
17 Past experience on a regional and local scale exists, demonstrating fast 
and effective implementation, provided that appropriate enforcement 
mechanisms are set in place along the regulation; several examples are 
provided in, for example, Coaen (2012); Klimont et al. (2017); Kodjak (2015); 
Saikawa (2013); Shindell et al. (2012).
In the Shared Socio-Economic Pathway – narrative 3 
scenarios, the global technical mitigation potential for 
methane is estimated at about 45 percent by 2030, provided 
that an appropriate policy environment is introduced18. 
Most of the emission reduction opportunities are in the 
exploration and distribution of coal, oil and gas, and in the 
waste sector19. The reductions available are comparable with 
those in the deep climate mitigation scenarios (figure 6.1). In 
general, policies to reduce emissions of CO
2
 will effectively 
cover a large portion of methane emissions.
Technical measures could bring about fast and significant 
reductions in emissions of black carbon and methane (for 
example Amann et al., 2013; Höglund-Isaksson, 2012; 
Klimont et al., 2017)20. However, introducing such measures 
has proven problematic in some instances. For example, 
programmes that focus on substituting cooking stoves with 
clean alternatives have often had disappointing results, 
with declining penetration rates over time (Aggarwal 
and Chandel, 2004; Pine et al., 2011; Ruiz-Mercado et al., 
2011; Venkataraman et al., 2010; Wickramasinghe, 2011)21.
Nevertheless, some other types of programmes have 
been successful, including emissions reduction strategies 
for motor vehicles, such as those focused on diesel 
particulate filters or emissions standards (CAI-Asia, 2011; 
Chambliss et al., 2013; Coan, 2012; Kodjak, 2015; Saikawa, 
2013; US EPA, 2017).
This chapter presents estimates of technical mitigation 
potentials, since they are more widely used, and therefore 
more abundant, than estimates of economic mitigation 
potentials. Notwithstanding, it is acknowledged that 
economic potentials may be more relevant with regard to 
understanding the political feasibility of mitigation actions22.
18 In figure 6.1 this is coded ‘maximum reduction’, and represented by the 
following symbol: .
19 The emissions reduction potential associated with rice and anaerobic 
digestion is only significant in certain regions.
20 Emission reduction rates would be faster than those brought about by 
transformational changes associated with low CO₂ strategies.
21 Nonetheless, locally tailored projects, often embedded in a larger scale policy 
process, and coupled with awareness-raising efforts, have proven successful 
(GACC, 2015; Sinton et al., 2004; Thomas et al., 2015). Political feasibility 
depends strongly on the design of the programme, its local sustainability, the 
strong involvement of local stakeholders, and on the incentives for national 
governments to act.
22 The economic potential of SLCP mitigation differs substantially from the 
technical potential of CO₂ mitigation for two main reasons: (i) the total 
benefits of SLCP mitigation are typically larger, because they include non-
climate benefits; and (ii) with SLCP mitigation, a large share of the benefits is 
nationally appropriable, in particular for black carbon. Shindell et al. (2017b) 
estimate that the social cost of methane (that is, the monetized societal 
damages resulting from a tonne of emissions incorporating climate and air 
quality related impacts) is 50 to 100 times greater than the corresponding 
social cost of CO₂. Estimates of the net benefits that are nationally 
appropriable are not yet available in the literature. Research programmes are 
ongoing to bridge this research gap.
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6.3.1 Methane
The technical mitigation potential identified through the 
integrated assessment models used to develop Shared Socio-
Economic Pathways scenarios draws primarily on the work 
of United States Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA, 
2013). The estimates for methane have been further updated 
(Höglund-Isaksson, 2012; UNEP/WMO, 2011) to include 
explicit consideration of unconventional gas production, 
new regional characteristics for oil and gas production 
(Höglund-Isaksson, 2017), and waste management. For coal 
production, a structural update was made, to allow for the 
separate estimation of emissions and mitigation potentials 
from pre-mining operations (de-gasification), mining 
operations (ventilation air methane oxidation), and post-
mining activities. Finally, current model implementation 
includes impacts of animal feed and manure management 
options as described in FAO (2013), but does not include 
changes in consumer preferences or behaviour, which could 
add mitigation potentials in the agricultural sector through 
reduced consumption of meat (especially beef) and reduced 
food waste generation (Stehfest et al. (2009) (Chapter 4). 
Figure 6.2 shows regional estimates of ‘Current policy’ 
emission trajectories and reduction potentials in the coming 
decades. These estimates are consistent with International 
Energy Agency projections of energy use (IEA, 2012), and 
integrate the refinements highlighted above23.
Mitigation potentials vary across regions, and are often 
characterized by a dominating source sector24. Nonetheless, 
solid waste separation and treatment offers opportunities 
across all regions. In Europe and Brazil, reduction 
potentials are smaller, as agriculture is the dominating 
methane source, and there are relatively limited technical 
mitigation opportunities. The comparison with the ‘Climate 
policy’ scenario (based on the IEA (2012) 450 ppm CO
2
 
mitigation strategy) shows that most of the near-term 
emissions reduction potential appears to require dedicated 
SLCP measures.
23 In terms of CO₂ emission levels, the International Energy Agency’s scenario is 
comparable to Shared Socio-Economic Pathway – narrative 3 (reference - no 
mitigation) and ‘Current policy’, shown in figure 6.1.
24 For example, capturing ventilation air methane from coal mines represents 
the key mitigation opportunity in China.
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6.3.2 Black carbon
Figure 6.2 gives estimates of mitigation potentials for 
black carbon in a number of world regions. The estimates 
reflect updates referred to above (Klimont et al., 2017; 
Stohl et al., 2015). With regard to black carbon, key updates 
include improved characterisations of the gas flaring 
sector, kerosene lighting, diesel generators, and the brick-
manufacturing sector.
The ‘Current policy’ trajectory varies greatly between 
regions, depending on the structure of emissions and current 
policies. Consequently, the mitigation potential varies too. 
For the European Union and the United States, a strong 
decline is observed (owing to strict transport legislation), 
which explains the limited mitigation potential that remains. 
In China, the transformation in the coke sector, ever-more 
stringent policies in transport, and reductions of coal use in 
the residential sector lead to significant reductions relative to 
the reference scenario emission levels. Therefore, mitigation 
potential is larger in China than in the European Union and 
the United States. In some of the other regions with a large 
share of emissions from biomass cooking (notably India), 
significant opportunities exist.
While the overall global potential by 2030 was estimated 
at over 70 percent (figure 6.1), the regional potentials 
vary from about 40 percent to over 80 percent. In regions 
where solid fuel cooking and heating dominates emissions 
of black carbon, the emissions reduction potential increases 
significantly beyond 2030 (not shown)25.
6.3.3 Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs)
Full compliance with the Kigali Amendment would achieve a 
61 percent decrease in hydrofluorocarbon emissions in the 
period between 2018 and 2050, compared to the emission 
levels in a reference scenario (Höglund-Isaksson et al., 2017). 
Transitioning to available low global warming potential 
alternatives faster and more thoroughly than contemplated 
25 This is due to the assumptions made about the effectiveness of cooking 
stove programmes, and the large increases in diesel vehicle emissions in 
some regions.
by the Kigali Amendment represents a major opportunity to 
reduce emissions of hydrofluorocarbons. Such accelerated 
transition is feasible. In countries with high ambient air 
temperatures, almost 70 percent of sectors currently 
using hydrochlorofluorocarbons can leapfrog past high 
global warming potential hydrofluorocarbon refrigerants, 
directly to low global warming potential alternatives with 
equal or better energy efficiency (Zeiger et al., 2014). The 
same study notes that other low global warming potential 
alternatives are in development, and expected to be ready 
to replace the remaining uses by 2025. Höglund-Isaksson 
and colleagues (2017) report that the maximum technical 
abatement potential, relying on existing technologies, 
is 85 percent below the reference scenario emission 
levels (in the period between 2018 and 2050) (figure 6.1). 
They further note that, towards the end of the period, 
the mitigation potential could represent as much as 
98 percent of the annual reference scenario emission 
levels. Interestingly, most of the model realizations of the 
Shared Socio-Economic Pathways scenarios consistent 
with the 2.6 W/m2 trajectories assume even faster and 
steeper reductions than the Kigali Amendment (figure 6.1).
6.4 Implications for the emissions gap
Compared to the Shared Socio-Economic Pathway – 
narrative 3 trajectories, assessments of the impact of 
updated policies show weaker growth or, depending on the 
pollutant, greater decreases in emissions of methane, black 
carbon, organic carbon, and sulphur dioxide (and CO
2
). These 
trends can be translated into likely changes in temperature26. 
Recent policies lead to roughly 0.09 ± 0.04°C less warming 
due to methane, 0.04 ± 0.02°C less warming due to CO
2
, and 
0.17 ± 0.11°C less cooling due to sulphate in 203027. These 
results evidence that, in the near term, the net warming due 
to reductions in CO
2
 and co-emissions (primarily sulphur 
dioxide) is roughly offset by reductions in SLCP, primarily 
methane. Modelling results highlight that SLCP holds a 
substantial additional emission reductions potential, as 
described in section 6.3.
26 To do so, we used the complementary analyses described in Shindell et al. 
(2017b) that included:
• a simple energy-balance calculation, incorporating climate response 
functions based on the CMIP5 models (Geoffroy et al., 2013);
• estimate of the impact of emissions on the carbon cycle (Gasser et al., 2017);
• updated radiative forcing for methane, including shortwave absorption 
(Etminan et al., 2016).
27 Smaller changes due to other pollutants are not reported here.
Table 6.1: Warming mitigation resulting from SLCP emission reductions
Additional SLCP mitigation                              Change in temperature (°C)
2030 2050
All SLCPs (HFCs following the Kigali Amendment) 0.22 ± 0.11 0.59 ± 0.27
Methane 0.09 ± 0.03 0.30 ± 0.12
HFCs following Kigali Amendment 0.005 ± 0.002 0.07 ± 0.02
HFCs Maximum Feasible Reduction 0.02 ± 0.01 0.10 ± 0.03
Black carbon-rich sources 0.1 ± 0.1 0.2 ± 0.2
Note: The estimates in the table represent departures from the estimates associated with the International Energy Agency’s ‘current policies’ scenario (see the main
text for details). HFCs stands for hydrofluorocarbons. HFCs Maximum Feasible Reduction includes Kigali Amendment.
Source: Own elaboration.
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Additional SLCP mitigation could avert a large fraction of 
projected warming over the near term (figure 6.3 and table 
6.1). By 2050, methane reductions contribute the largest 
share (table 6.1). Realizing the maximum emission reduction 
potentials for emissions of hydrofluorocarbons, thus going 
beyond what is envisaged in the Kigali Amendment to 
the Montreal Protocol, would lead to fourfold additional 
savings by 2030 (figure 6.1)28. The remaining half to 
one third of the benefits stem from the net impact 
of the measures targeting black carbon-rich sources.
Figure 6.1 illustrates the near-term mitigation potential for 
black carbon using 20-year global warming potentials. By 
2030, such near-term mitigation potential is roughly three 
quarters that of methane. As noted, however, understanding 
the full impact of measures to mitigate black carbon 
requires an assessment of the impact of all pollutants 
affected. Compared to methane, changes in emissions 
of black carbon lead to faster changes in concentrations 
of black carbon. When the effects of organic carbon and 
carbon monoxide from black carbon-rich sectors are taken 
into account, the net impact on 2030 temperatures is 
also about three quarters that of methane. This fraction 
decreases over time, as methane concentrations adjust 
more fully to emissions changes. By 2050, the black carbon 
mitigation potential is approximately two thirds that 
of methane, but the temperature response is just over 
50 percent (again, including co-emissions of black carbon). 
This shows that mitigation potentials using 20-year global 
warming potentials can be a useful, but only rough, guide 
to near-term temperature impacts. For the longer term, 
the 2030 additional mitigation potential for methane is 
about 3 GtCO₂e per year (using a 100-year global warming 
28 With hydrofluorocarbons, emissions reductions are phased in early: in 2050, 
additional gains would reach about 30 percent, which represents a much 
more moderate rate in reductions, compared to those achievable by 2030.
potentials of 21), and roughly 5 GtCO
2
e per year (using 
updated 100-year global warming potentials of 34)29. 
The relatively large near-term warming mitigation potentials 
presented above are similar to those in several prior studies. 
Excluding hydrofluorocarbons, they are similar to the 
results presented in (UNEP/WMO, 2011) and Shindell et 
al. (2012). Warming mitigation values are slightly larger in 
2050, consistent with the inclusion of additional mitigation 
measures in this analysis, along with the extension of 
SLCP mitigation through 2050, which offset the decrease 
in benefits associated with the later start in mitigation. 
Including hydrofluorocarbons, values for 2050 are similar to 
those reported elsewhere (Xu et al., 2013)30.
29 A reduction of that magnitude, sustained for 100 years, would be equivalent 
to reducing CO₂ emissions by 170 GtCO₂ in one year (Allen et al., 2016).
30 Other research found smaller warming mitigation from SLCPs, although 
compared to reference cases with reduced SLCP emissions. For example, 
Smith and Mizrahi (2013) used a model that assumed that (i) all control 
measures with a negative cost automatically happen based on ‘rational 
economic behaviour’, and (ii) projected increases in wealth worldwide lead 
to automatic adoption of strict emission control standards. Therefore, in 
essence this study calculated benefits of additional efforts to remove SLCPs 
after many of the available emissions control had already happened. Another 
study explored many possible reference cases, unsurprisingly reporting 
smaller SLCP-related benefits in comparison to reference cases with relatively 
low SLCP emissions, and similar values in comparison with high-SLCP emission 
reference cases akin to those seen in the detailed modelling presented 
above (Section 6.2) (Rogelj et al., 2014). In comparison with reference cases 
incorporating stringent climate mitigation policies focused on CO₂, that 
study found a substantial decrease in the mitigation potential for SLCPs. This 
reflects the overlap mentioned previously between stringent CO₂ controls 
that transition away from fossil fuel use (covering energy-related methane 
emissions and diesel-related black carbon emissions). Those results are 
consistent with the drop in black carbon emissions under the Shared Socio-
Economic Pathway – narrative 3 3.4 W/m2 scenario relative to the Shared 
Socio-Economic Pathway – narrative 3 reference scenario shown in figure 6.1, 
although such scenarios also include structural changes (for example, with 
regard to renewable sources of energy, energy access or electric vehicles), 
and increased energy access for the poor, which may be more difficult to 
realize than technical SLCP control measures, and would likely take longer 
to materialize.
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Given the potential for enhanced SLCP reductions to reduce 
warming substantially in the near term, relative to current 
policies, such reductions could clearly help to close the 
emissions gap defined by long-term global mean annual 
average temperature. They could also help offset near-term 
warming caused by CO₂ mitigation strategies. Near-term 
SLCP mitigation is also a critical lever for slowing the rate 
of change in the next few decades, which is particularly 
important for reducing cumulative climate impacts, such as 
sea-level rise. Hu et al. (2013) found that curbing emissions 
of SLCPs immediately can reduce the rate of sea-level rise 
by approximately 18 percent by 2050, while immediate 
reductions in CO
2
 would yield minimal benefits with regard 
to sea-level rise. Delaying SLCP mitigation by 25 years 
could decrease the impact of both CO
2
 and SLCP mitigation 
on sea-level rise by approximately 30 percent. Not least, 
reducing near-term warming can also decrease risks of low-
probability, high-impact climate change effects (Xu and 
Ramanathan, 2017).
6.5 Implications for the Sustainable 
Development Goals and other policy goals 
This chapter assesses the role of SLCPs, including black 
carbon (a component of particulate matter) and methane, in 
bridging the emissions gap. In addition to the climate change 
mitigation benefits associated with curbing emissions of 
SLCPs, a reduction in emissions of these pollutants would 
contribute significantly to the achievement of several of the 
United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)31. 
The SDGs capture key human and planetary needs and 
challenges, and achieving them by 2030 requires coordinated 
actions on diverse fronts. Implementing SLCP mitigation 
measures can clearly contribute to the achievement of 
multiple SDGs, because of the impact of SLCPs on climate 
change and air pollution32. 
Residential combustion of solid fuels in traditional cooking 
stoves and the use of kerosene for lighting in the Asia-
Pacific and African regions results in very high levels of 
indoor air pollution (Karekezi et al., 2006). The World Health 
Organization has estimated that indoor and ambient air 
pollution cause 6.5 million premature deaths, recognizing 
it as “the single most important environmental health risk 
factor worldwide”, and noting that it is driving a global health 
emergency (WHO, 2016). The provision of modern and 
clean energy forms for meeting these basic requirements, 
particularly those of rural households, would not only help 
reduce the emissions gap, but would also help achieve SDG 3 
on ensuring healthy lives and promoting well-being, SDG 4 
31 The majority of black carbon emissions are accounted for by the Asia-
Pacific region (including China), followed by Africa. Emissions come largely 
from residential combustion of fuels and diesel burning in the transport 
sector. Sources of black carbon also emit a large proportion of precursors of 
tropospheric ozone globally. Methane is another significant precursor of the 
increasing background levels of ozone.
32 SLCP mitigation is also complementary to CO₂ mitigation: many SLCP 
mitigation strategies can yield CO₂ mitigation co-benefits, and vice versa 
(Haines and et al., under review).
on ensuring inclusive education, SDG 5 on empowering women 
and girls, and SDG 15 on sustainable forests (Griggs et al., 2014).
Tropospheric ozone is also harmful to human health. Recent 
estimates show that the significance of this pollutant as a 
cause of premature mortality is higher than had previously 
been estimated (Malley et al., 2017). In addition, tropospheric 
ozone is the pollutant that causes the most significant crop 
yield losses. Therefore, early action on sources of SLCPs could 
lead to a rapid reduction in these adverse impacts.
Another key area of global concern is the increasing levels of 
pollution in urban areas. Urbanization is a global megatrend, 
and it is expected that nearly 70 percent of the world’s 
population will be living in urban areas by 2050 (compared 
with 54 percent in 2014). The major causes of urban air 
pollution, namely transportation and industrial activity, are 
also major contributors to SLCP emissions. Improving fuel 
and technology choices in the transport sector, banning 
the open burning of biomass and waste in urban areas, and 
improving energy efficiencies, all contribute to reducing 
SLCPs. In doing so, these initiatives would also contribute to 
achieving several SDGs (Cherian, 2015): SDG 2 on sustainable 
agriculture, SDG 3 on health, SDG 7 on energy, SDG 11 on 
inclusive and sustainable cities, and SDG 12 on sustainable 
production and consumption. 
Actions to reduce SLCP emissions can be synergistic with 
efforts to improve energy efficiency. For example, when 
coupled with energy efficiency policies, measures to 
phase out hydrofluorocarbon-based refrigerants can save 
between 340 GW  and 790 GW of peak power load globally, 
while also avoiding about 98 Gt of CO₂ emissions by 2050 
(Shah et al., 2015).
Despite widespread efforts to reduce emissions of several air 
pollutants, especially sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and 
particulate matter, in several regions air pollution will not 
improve enough to reduce the burden on human health (IEA, 
2016). On the contrary, regional demographics, rising energy 
use and urbanization may lead to growth in the number of 
premature deaths due to outdoor air pollution, especially in 
Asia. However, introducing efficient reduction measures in 
the power sector, industry, and transport, and accelerating 
access to clean energy for cooking — measures that are 
compatible with an SLCP mitigation strategy — could reduce 
the number of premature deaths significantly (IEA, 2016). 
These results are consistent with those of Schmale et al. 
(2014), who estimated that, by halving the concentrations of 
SLCPs in the atmosphere, more than 40 million deaths from 
respiratory and cardiovascular diseases could be avoided 
by 2030.
Compared to introducing policies to mitigate SLCPs, 
introducing policies to implement the SDGs is often more 
feasible politically. For this reason, the latter can be used to 
exploit the opportunity of reducing emissions of SLCPs.
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Reductions in emissions of SLCPs offer significant potential 
to slow the rate of near-term warming, contribute to the 
achievement of the long-term Paris Agreement temperature 
targets, improve well-being via improved air quality, and 
facilitate the achievement of several SDGs. Although 
technical control measures already exist and have been 
demonstrated, scaling up those measures to their full 
potential would require dedicated policy efforts beyond 
those embodied in either current policies or low-carbon 
policies. Ideally, by aggressively reducing both SLCPs and 
CO₂, policies would optimize the societal welfare associated 
with efforts to curb climate change, improve air quality and 
achieve sustainable development.
6.6 Key messages
Large reductions in emissions of short-lived climate pollutants 
(SLCPs) are an important part of mitigation efforts in virtually 
all scenarios that meet the 2ᵒC target, and especially those 
that meet the 1.5ᵒC target.
Reductions in SLCP emissions cannot be considered 
equivalent to reductions in long-lived greenhouse gases, as 
many impacts are not directly proportional to global mean 
temperature change at a given point in time. For this reason, 
climate change mitigation policies need to consider these 
two classes of emissions separately.
Early reductions in SLCP emissions would provide substantial 
health benefits, limit the short-term rate of climate change, 
slow self-amplifying feedbacks, and facilitate the achievement 
of the Paris Agreement’s long-term temperature target.
Significant SLCP mitigation potential, beyond existing 
commitments, is available via proven technologies. However, 
to unlock that potential requires dedicated policy action to 
strengthen legal frameworks and institutional capacities. 
This is because many SLCP mitigation strategies are distinct 
from strategies to reduce CO
2
 emissions.
Over the period 2018–2050, stringent SLCP reductions 
based on existing, demonstrated technical measures could 
reduce warming by between 0.3ᵒC and 0.9ᵒC relative to 
current emissions projections. Roughly half of the mitigation 
potential is associated with methane, one third with black 
carbon, and the remainder with hydrofluorocarbons. As 
some policies that reduce CO
2
 emissions also reduce SLCP 
emissions, a substantial portion of SLCP reductions could 
be achieved through CO
2
 mitigation efforts. However, 
compared with policies specifically targeting SLCP controls, 
the reductions in SLCP emission resulting from CO
2
 mitigation 
efforts would be slower.
Reduction of SLCP emissions, specifically black carbon, might 
play an important role in mitigating the regional impacts of 
climate change.
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7.1 Introduction
Carbon dioxide removal (sometimes called carbon removal 
or CDR) refers to a cluster of technologies, practices and 
approaches that remove and sequester carbon dioxide 
Bridging the Gap – Carbon  
dioxide removal
Chapter 7
from the atmosphere. Despite the common denominator 
of removing carbon dioxide, these technologies can be 
very different. To put it simply, one can distinguish between 
biological and engineered options. For some of the 
Figure 7.1: Major strategies for negative emission technologies.
Note: This figure includes the major strategies that have been discussed in the literature so far (Minx et al., 2017).
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former (such as afforestation, reforestation or soil carbon 
management), experience has been accumulated over 
decades. Conversely, experience is limited with regard to 
the latter (notably direct air capture, or bioenergy combined 
with carbon dioxide capture and storage). Some approaches 
would be more difficult to implement than others, for 
example, using the ocean as a common-pool resource, 
which would require coordination on an international scale. 
The leading technologies and approaches considered here 
are shown in figure 7.1.
Importantly, carbon dioxide removal is not the same as solar 
radiation management (Royal Society, 2009). This distinction 
is critical and was emphasized by the United States National 
Academy of Sciences, which has reviewed approaches to 
solar radiation management (USNAS, 2015a) and to carbon 
dioxide removal (USNAS, 2015b). While solar radiation 
management may prove important for mitigating climate 
change in the future (Keith et al., 2017), it is not the subject 
of this chapter. Instead, this chapter focuses on reducing 
carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere through 
active management.
Carbon dioxide removal options have become a common 
feature in climate change mitigation scenarios that are 
consistent with the goals of the Paris Agreement (Clarke et 
al., 2014; van Vuuren et al., 2013; Fuss et al., 2014). Given 
that carbon budgets are tight and rapidly being depleted 
(Rogelj et al., 2016; IPCC, 2014), carbon dioxide removal 
options are more widely used to compensate for temporary 
budget overshoot. 
Carbon dioxide removal and the deployment of negative 
emissions approaches must be employed in addition to other 
mitigation options (such as those discussed in Chapter 4). 
Stated differently, carbon dioxide removal is concerned 
with the management of overshoot, even in the event that 
all mitigation options are pursued. For example, limiting 
deforestation and improving forest management are key 
undertakings to reduce current emissions and avoid future 
emissions. However, necessary as they are, these practices 
are quite different to afforestation, which is the practice of 
adding forests to areas where there are none today.
In many scenarios, net negative emissions occur in the 
second half of the 21st Century. However, negative emissions 
are introduced much earlier, and to a greater extent, in those 
scenarios. This is done to compensate for residual emissions 
that are too difficult or too expensive to reduce at the 
level of climate policy ambition that the scenario seeks to 
characterize. Taken together, both climate dioxide removal 
options represent the total or gross negative emissions 
required in a particular scenario (figure 7.2).
From a wider portfolio of mitigation options, integrated 
assessment models select negative emissions technologies 
based on cost-minimization considerations1. Naturally, 
the deployment of negative emissions technologies varies 
1 Specifically, integrated assessment models determine the least-cost pathway 
for the global economy to meet a given climate target (before additional 
benefits are accounted for). They do so on the basis of assumptions about 
technology costs and availability, alongside other macroeconomic factors (for 
example, demand for energy and food).
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Figure 7.2: The role of carbon dioxide removal in climate change mitigation.
Note: This figure shows emission reductions from conventional mitigation technologies combined with carbon dioxide removal. This exemplary scenario is consistent 
with an at least 66 percent chance of keeping warming below 2°C relative to pre-industrial levels. Emission reductions are shown against a business-as-usual scenario 
without any additional climate policies. Global net emissions levels turn to net negative towards the very end of the century, but carbon dioxide removal is already being 
deployed much earlier. Some residual greenhouse gas emissions remain at the end of the century, as they are too difficult to mitigate in the scenario. Note that the 
scenario used is different from the scenarios used in Chapter 3, which leads to small variations in emission levels and timing of negative emissions.
Source: Jérôme Hilaire (Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate).
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greatly from one scenario to the next, due to differences 
in scenario design and the specifications of the particular 
model. Nevertheless, some robust patterns emerge across 
clusters of scenarios:
• Scenarios consistent with the 1.5°C target depend 
on the large-scale availability of negative emissions 
technologies. There are no scenarios available that can 
keep warming below 1.5°C by 2100 without removing 
carbon from the atmosphere via negative emissions 
technologies (Fuss, 2017; Minx et al., 2017).
• In general, the deployment of negative emissions 
technologies in the second half of the century occurs on 
a large scale, and with a very rapid scale-up to 8 GtCO
2
 
per year by 2050 (range 5–15). By 2100 the median 
(2010–2100) removal of carbon dioxide via negative 
emissions technologies is 810 GtCO
2
 (range 440–1,020). 
This corresponds to about 20 years of global emissions at 
current emission rates.
˚ In the 2°C scenarios with immediate climate action, the 
median (2010–2100) deployment of negative emissions 
technologies is considerably lower: 670 GtCO
2
 (range 
320–840). In addition, the scale-up towards mid-century 
is much slower.
• Delay in adequate near-term climate action swiftly 
locks 2°C pathways deeply into negative emissions. 
To limit warming to 2°C, current Nationally 
Determined Contributions lead to pathways that are 
fundamentally dependent on the large-scale availability 
of negative emissions technologies (like 1.5°C pathways 
today, and with similar deployment rates and technology 
upscaling requirements). 
• Compared to emissions pathways that are less efficient 
in energy use, 1.5°C and 2°C emissions pathways that 
feature aggressive energy savings are less dependent on 
negative emissions technologies.
It is worth noting that a few scenarios can meet the 2°C target 
without the deployment of negative emissions technologies. 
If the models select these technologies, it is because they 
represent a cheaper mitigation option overall. This means 
that even in scenarios that are consistent with the 2°C 
target, there is scope to considerably limit the deployment 
of negative emissions technologies, compared to what we 
see in economic optimization scenarios.
7.2. Land-based carbon dioxide              
removal options
Land-based carbon dioxide removal involves technologies, 
practices and approaches that harness the carbon removal 
potential of land-based ecosystems, including forests, 
wetlands, agricultural land and soils. As these systems 
have been managed by humans for many years, there is 
a wealth of knowledge that can be readily applied today 
with confidence. In addition, these approaches present 
opportunities to meet other global sustainability goals, 
such as improved water quality, ecosystem restoration, 
biodiversity preservation, food and nutrition security, job 
creation and improved crop yields.
For these land-based options to contribute to carbon removal 
at the scale of gigatonnes, new management approaches 
that impact large land areas and ecosystems will be required 
in some cases. In others, traditional, sustainable practices 
such as agroforestry may need to be applied2.
Many substantial uncertainties exist regarding effective 
carbon dioxide removal rates, the volumes stored, the 
duration of effective sequestration under a changing climate 
and the implications for ecosystem services provided 
by the land in question. In this regard, carbon dioxide 
removal in these systems may prove very different to other 
current efforts. Ultimately, each option has its strengths, 
uncertainties and constraints.
7.2.1 Afforestation and reforestation
Afforestation refers to planting trees on land not afforested in 
recent history (usually 50 years or longer), while reforestation 
refers to the replanting of trees on more recently deforested 
land (Hamilton et al., 2010). Agroforestry practices entail the 
integration of trees into agricultural systems, in combination 
with crops, livestock or both. Afforestation, and reforestation, 
and agroforestry projects form part of several voluntary and 
mandatory carbon-offset trading schemes worldwide (Diaz 
et al., 2011; Miles and Sonwa, 2015). 
Globally, the carbon dioxide removal potential for 
afforestation and reforestation options is quite significant—
it has been estimated at between 4 and 12 GtCO
2
 per year 
(Smith et al., 2016), with other recent estimates even higher, 
at up to 28 GtCO
2
 per year (Griscom et al., 2017). Preparation 
and deployment can be done at a relatively modest cost3, 
with the potential for co-benefits. The existence of various 
projects today, and the experience of forest managers 
worldwide, provide a high level of technical readiness for 
afforestation and reforestation options4. As such, afforestation 
and reforestation are considered established carbon dioxide 
removal options and projects could feasibly be launched soon.
Ultimately, achieving large carbon removal rates and volumes 
would require very large tracts of land (Houghton et al., 
2015; Kriedenweis et al. 2016) and potentially huge volumes 
of water (Trabucco et al., 2008), although vegetation density 
is positively correlated with the strength of precipitation 
sheds and has a moderating effect on the volatility of water 
availability—in this regard, distant effects might be different 
and as such, more research is required. Competition for 
land and water used for food production is a development 
concern, but could be minimized through agroforestry5 or 
careful selection of appropriate land areas for afforestation 
and reforestation. There are significant uncertainties around 
2 While agroforestry is widely present in the tropics, there are many 
agroforestry systems in temperate and even boreal regions. For example, 
according to Aertsens et al. (2013), 90 percent of Europe’s mitigation 
potential in the agriculture sector stems from agroforestry.
3 For example, Nielsen et al. (2014) report that, within the United States of 
America, up to 730 MtCO
2
 per year might be sequestered at a carbon price 
below US$50 per tonne of carbon.
4 Political and planning readiness varies between countries.
5 Such competition is avoided in agroforestry systems, which allow integrated 
management of agricultural landscapes for food production and the delivery 
of ecosystem services (Zomer et al., 2016; Kimaro et al., 2011; Williams-
Guillén et al., 2008).
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the impacts on non-carbon dioxide greenhouse gases 
(Benanti et al., 2014), albedo (Kirschbaum et al., 2011; 
Zhao and Jackson, 2014), evapotranspiration, emissions of 
volatile organic compounds and other issues6. Obstacles may 
also arise with regard to monitoring, sustaining sequestered 
carbon in the long term due to sink saturation, changing 
practices among forest managers and farmers, and creating 
market and policy contingencies. Despite these uncertainties 
and obstacles, experience with managing forests stands in 
our favour for adopting these options, which, as previously 
mentioned, also have the potential to contribute to other 
global sustainability goals.
7.2.2 Other ‘natural’, land-based solutions
Other natural, land-based carbon dioxide removal solutions 
rely on the restoration or construction of high carbon density, 
anaerobic ecosystems, including “inland organic soils 
and wetlands on mineral soils, coastal wetlands including 
mangrove forests, tidal marshes and seagrass meadows, 
and constructed wetlands for wastewater treatment” 
(IPCC, 2014). Hereinafter, these solutions are referred to 
as wetlands. It is increasingly critical to not only preserve 
existing wetlands, but also to restore and construct these 
ecosystems for use as carbon dioxide removal solutions.
Peatlands and coastal wetlands store up to 44 to 71 percent 
of the world’s terrestrial biological carbon pool (Zedler and 
Kercher, 2005). While the carbon stocks in peatlands and 
coastal wetlands are now vulnerable to reversal (Parish et 
al., 2008), these ecosystems also have significant carbon 
sequestration capacity (Page and Hooijer, 2016). 
Compared to afforestation and reforestation options, much 
less is known about wetlands. Roughly one third of global 
wetland ecosystems had been lost by 2009 (Hu et al., 2017), 
suggesting there are a number of locations where work could 
begin. Long-term sequestration rates in wetlands range from 
0.1 to 5 tonnes of carbon per hectare and per year, a rate 
that significantly improves when emissions avoided from 
(previously degraded) restored wetlands are counted (Parish 
et al., 2008; Mitsch et al., 2012; Smith et al., 2008). However, 
estimating global rates and volumes is challenging. Carbon 
dioxide abatement costs for wetland restoration range from 
US$10 to US$100 per tonne of carbon dioxide (Worrall et 
al., 2009), suggesting potential low-cost options for projects.
Little is known about the total land and water requirements 
needed to achieve substantial and sustainable levels of 
carbon dioxide removal through wetlands. However, non-
carbon dioxide greenhouse gases represent a substantial 
risk. While wetlands store significant amounts of carbon in 
above- and below-ground biomass, and in soil, they have 
also historically been a significant source of methane, with 
estimates ranging from 20 to 25 percent of global methane 
emissions (Mitsch et al., 2012). As such, restoring some 
wetlands could induce a short-term net warming effect 
(Mitsch et al., 2012) due to increased emissions of methane 
6 These uncertainties could be reduced or better characterized through a 
dedicated science programme aimed at understanding the issues across 
ecosystems, latitudes and climate zones.
and nitrous oxide7. In addition, while some sites may be 
suitable for early remediation, in other instances, sites of 
former wetlands have been converted to ports, industrial 
sites and other high-value capital assets, which limits 
the extent to which they can be used for carbon dioxide 
removal. Griscom et al. (2017) estimate that avoided coastal 
wetland impacts, avoided peat impacts and peat restoration 
could deliver 0.3, 0.7 and 0.8 GtCO
2
 per year, respectively, by 
2030. As with forest management, wetlands and peatlands 
have been managed by humans for many years, which 
provides an opportunity to capitalize on existing knowledge 
and on the readiness to implement measures (Griscom et 
al., 2017). There is also the added potential to contribute 
to other global sustainability goals such as improved water 
quality, ecosystem restoration, biodiversity preservation and 
job creation.
7.2.3 Soil carbon sequestration
Soil carbon sequestration occurs when a change in land 
management practices increases the carbon content of soil, 
thus resulting in a net removal of carbon dioxide from the 
atmosphere. Since the level of carbon in the soil is a balance 
of carbon inputs (for example, from litter, residues, roots 
or manure) and carbon losses (mostly through respiration, 
which is increased by soil disturbance), practices that either 
increase inputs or reduce losses can promote soil carbon 
sequestration. Lal (2011, 2013) and Smith et al. (2008, 2014) 
cite a large number of land management practices that can 
promote soil carbon sequestration, some of which can also 
promote carbon sequestration in above-ground biomass.
Soil carbon sequestration uses agricultural and land 
management practices that are generally well known by 
farmers and land managers, and for the most part, does not 
require additional machinery or infrastructure. It therefore 
represents a readily available option to be implemented. 
Rates for soil carbon sequestration vary considerably, 
depending on land management approaches, soil type 
and climate region (Smith, 2012; Lal, 2013). When scaled 
globally, the technical potential for soil carbon sequestration 
is estimated at 4.8 GtCO
2
e per year (Smith, 2016)8. Assuming 
unit costs between US$20 and US$100 per tonne of carbon, 
the global carbon emissions mitigation potential of soil 
carbon sequestration ranges between 1.5 and 2.6 GtCO
2
e 
per year (Smith et al., 2008; Smith, 2016). It is worth noting 
that for some systems, such as croplands and grazing lands, 
soil carbon sequestration costs range from minus US$45 to 
plus US$10 per tonne of carbon (Smith, 2016), suggesting 
there are revenues and cost savings to be made from some of 
these practices9. Smith (2016) estimated that carbon dioxide 
removal through soil carbon sequestration at a rate of 
7 Dedicated and sustained research is needed to resolve or reduce 
these uncertainties.
8 Other estimates range between 0.4 GtCO
2
e per year (Powlson et al., 2014) 
and 11.4 GtCO
2
e per year (Lal, 2011; Lal, 2013; Minasny et al., 2017).
9 Most of the annual estimates are based on sequestration values calculated 
over 20 years. Given that sinks saturate, annualized sequestration 
estimates should be multiplied by 20 to derive the total cumulative 
sequestration potential.
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2.6 GtCO
2
e per year would save US$7.7 billion, comprising 
US$16.9 billion of savings and US$9.2 billion of costs.
Although the apparent energy costs for soil carbon 
sequestration appear low, and in many cases, soil carbon 
sequestering practices would benefit soil ecosystems and 
agribusinesses, implementing these practices involves a 
significant range of potential land requirements (Smith et al., 
2010). While emissions from methane may be limited, soil 
carbon sequestration may result in emissions of nitrous oxide 
(Smith, 2016). As for wetlands, dedicated and continued 
research on these uncertainties and challenges could help 
reduce risks and improve performance.
Barriers to implementation include lack of knowledge 
among farmers, lack of policy incentives, monitoring and 
verification of practices and costs and crucially, reversibility 
of stored carbon. Dedicated pilot projects and programmes 
could help to identify the measures required to overcome 
these barriers, with an emphasis on learning-by-doing and 
resolving key uncertainties through data acquisition and 
development of practices. Since soils have been managed for 
millenniums, there is a high level of knowledge and readiness, 
with the potential to contribute to other global sustainability 
goals such as improved water quality, ecosystem restoration, 
biodiversity preservation, job creation and increased yields 
and food security.
7.2.4 Biochar
Biochar is produced through pyrolysis of biomass into a 
stable, long-lived product, such as charcoal. Biochar is 
resistant to decomposition (Lehmann et al., 2015) and can 
stabilize organic matter added to soil (Weng et al., 2017). 
It can form long-term carbon pools in the soil and provide 
a range of soil fertility and soil quality co-benefits, such 
as improved water and nutrient retention, increased soil 
porosity and higher crop yields.
While biochar can be applied at high rates (Genesio et al., 
2012; Zhang et al., 2010), the net benefits of biochar are likely 
to be higher if applied in low volumes in the most responsive 
soils10. The carbon dioxide removal potential through 
biochar is high: it has been estimated at between 1.8 and 
3.3 GtCO
2
e per year (Woolf et al., 2010). However, the 
efficacy of biochar for carbon dioxide removal is disputed11. 
Costs range between US$18 and US$166 per tonne of 
carbon dioxide-equivalent per year (Woolf et al., 2010), 
although economic benefits and revenues could offset part 
of this cost. 
Although biochar is an established technology, it is not 
yet widely applied, in part due to costs and the (limited) 
availability of infrastructure. Additional infrastructure 
(namely pyrolysis facilities) would be required for large-scale 
implementation. Indeed, the quantity of biomass available 
for biochar production is a key factor limiting the global 
10 Notably after enhancement through co-composting or nutrient addition 
(Joseph et al., 2013).
11 Interestingly, biochar can reduce non-carbon dioxide greenhouse gases, 
notably nitrous oxide (Cayuela et al., 2015).
potential for carbon dioxide removal through biochar. Energy 
and water are also required to produce the crop feedstocks, 
although producing biochar can also produce power and 
fuels12. While the land use for carbon dioxide removal 
through biochar appears relatively modest (between 26 and 
95 million hectares), estimates are dependent on land and 
crop quality. Not least, carbon dioxide-reduction benefits 
may be mitigated by albedo reduction (Bozzi et al., 2015). 
Although the risks of reversibility and difficulty of monitoring 
are lower than for soil carbon sequestration, barriers such 
as limited knowledge of practice or policy support remain.
7.3 Combined land/technology-based option: 
bioenergy with carbon dioxide capture  
and storage
Bioenergy with carbon dioxide capture and storage removes 
carbon dioxide from the atmosphere through the cultivation 
of biomass (bioenergy), and stores carbon dioxide from 
energy generation in deep, geological formations (carbon 
dioxide capture and storage), providing net carbon removal. 
So far, this is the carbon dioxide removal technology that has 
featured most prominently in the mitigation scenarios by 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Fuss et al., 
2016; Fuss, 2017).
Many integrated assessment models estimate the availability 
of sustainable bioenergy at 100 exajoules per year (Creutzig 
et al., 2015; Slade et al., 2014)13; fewer models accommodate 
estimates above 300 exajoules per year.
With regard to carbon dioxide capture and storage, estimates 
for geological storage capacity are well above 5,000 GtCO
2
. 
However, the estimated capacities are not viable in all 
locations (Scott et al., 2015; De Coninck and Benson, 2014; 
Lassiter and Misra, 2016; Global CCS Institute, 2016).
The combined potentials of bioenergy and carbon dioxide 
capture and storage in 2050 are estimated at between 2 and 
18 GtCO
2
 per year (Kemper, 2015; USNAS 2015a; McLaren, 
2012). To achieve this scale, the demands on land use are 
significant: a level of carbon dioxide removal consistent with 
average 2°C emissions pathways would require between 
0.38 and 0.7 billion hectares of crops purpose-grown for 
bioenergy with carbon dioxide capture and storage (Smith 
et al., 2016)14. Under more conservative assumptions, the 
demands on land use would be even higher (Monfreda et 
al., 2008).
Use of agricultural and forest residue as a feedstock for 
bioenergy does not require competition for land, although 
its extraction can adversely impact soil carbon stocks 
(Smith et al., 2016). The potential competition for land 
from widespread use of bioenergy with carbon capture and 
12 Net energy balances remain controversial and dependent on process, 
feedstock and products.
13 Roughly, this represents 15 percent of global primary energy 
consumption today.
14 For comparison, global agriculture today, including both farming and grazing, 
requires roughly 5 billion hectares of land.
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storage  remains a major issue for large-scale bioenergy with 
carbon capture and storage deployment and policymaking.
In a scenario consistent with the 2°C target, infrastructure 
investment costs associated with bioenergy with carbon 
dioxide capture and storage in 2050 are estimated at 
US$138 billion per year for power and US$123 billion 
per year for fuels (Smith et al., 2016). Nonetheless, there 
are significant variations in unit costs for bioenergy and 
with carbon dioxide capture and storage, depending on 
assumptions about feedstock, technology, supply chains 
and logistics15. 
For a level of bioenergy with carbon capture and storage 
deployment consistent with a 2°C target, 170 exajoules per 
year of energy would be generated from bioenergy with 
carbon capture and storage by 2100 (Smith et al., 2016).
Bioenergy with carbon dioxide capture and storage could 
have a large impact on water use, requiring about 720 km3 
per year or roughly 3 percent of the fresh water currently 
appropriated for human use (Smith et al., 2016). Non-carbon 
dioxide greenhouse gas impacts are value-chain specific and 
uncertain, as are global albedo effects (Bright et al., 2015; 
Jones et al., 2015). Taken together, these considerations 
suggest that (i) over the next 10 to 20 years, carbon reduction 
using combined land- and technology-based options will be 
challenging; and (ii) there are risks associated with large-
scale implementation of these options.
Three main barriers stand out with regard to large-scale 
implementation of bioenergy with carbon dioxide capture 
and storage. Firstly, carbon dioxide capture and storage 
and bioenergy enjoy little public acceptance (Benson et al., 
2012; Upham and Roberts, 2011; Wallquist et al., 2012; de 
Best-Waldhober et al., 2009). Secondly, whether there are 
substantial, or even any carbon reductions when accounting 
for displaced activities is unclear (Havlík et al., 2011; Frank 
et al., 2013; Searchinger et al., 2009; Plevin et al., 2010, 
Creutzig et al., 2015; Popp et al., 2012). Thirdly, the lack of 
economic incentives and the regulatory barriers related to 
underground storage hamper large-scale implementation 
(De Coninck and Benson, 2014)16.
McLaren (2012) reports a technological readiness level of 4 
to 6 for bioenergy with carbon dioxide capture and storage 
from combustion and co-firing, and a technological readiness 
level of 5 to 6 for bioenergy with carbon dioxide capture 
and storage from ethanol fermentation (technological 
readiness level 6 corresponds to “prototype demonstration 
in the ‘relevant’ real-world environment” and technological 
readiness level 4 to the stage of “component validation”). 
Although individually, both bioenergy and carbon dioxide 
capture and storage are relatively mature technologies, in 
combination they have seen very little demonstration and 
15 Estimates of cost per tonne of carbon dioxide range from US$60–250 (Kemper, 
2015), to US$70–250 (McLaren, 2012), to as little as US$15–45 for bioenergy 
and carbon dioxide capture and storage from ethanol fermentation.
16 Current low carbon prices deter investments in bioenergy with carbon dioxide 
capture and storage. The withdrawal of public support for these technologies 
(as was the same effect.
deployment, especially at a large scale. Whether bioenergy 
with carbon dioxide capture and storage can thus be scaled 
up in the manner required to achieve ambitious climate 
change targets remains questionable, given the lag in actual 
carbon dioxide capture and storage deployment, compared 
to the requirements associated with emissions pathways 
that are compatible with the 2°C target (Peters et al., 2017; 
Peters and Geden, 2017).
7.4 Technology-based carbon dioxide   
removal options
Man-made technologies to remove carbon dioxide from the 
air have been in use for many years, mostly in submarine, 
aerospace and medical applications. Consideration of them 
as global-scale carbon removal agents is recent (USNAS, 
2015a). They offer specific benefits in that they use very 
little land or water, they do not emit non-carbon dioxide 
greenhouse gases and they have very high levels of certainty 
regarding the flux and long-term fate of the carbon dioxide 
removed. Some approaches also produce materials that can 
be used commercially, for example, cements and aggregates.
However, many approaches are expensive. Most have not 
been deployed at scale and have a low level of technical 
readiness. Investment in developing these options 
will likely yield breakthroughs in material science and 
manufacturing, and could spur new industries and a circular 
carbon economy (McDonough, 2016; Center for Carbon 
Removal, 2017), as was true for lithium-ion batteries 
25 years ago (The Economist, 2017). Nonetheless, among the 
23 countries committed to undertaking large-scale research 
and development programmes in this and related areas, 
only the United Kingdom has financed technology-based 
carbon dioxide removal programmes, and at a modest level 
of £8.6 million (approximately US$11.3 million) per year 
(NERC, 2017).
Each option has strengths, uncertainties and constraints. The 
low level of readiness facing many technologies is perhaps 
the most pressing issue.
7.4.1. Direct air capture
Direct air capture is the practice of separating carbon dioxide 
from ambient air, typically through chemical or physical 
separation (Lackner et al., 1999; Sanz-Peres et al., 2016). Early 
approaches to this process have been applied in aerospace 
and submarine settings, to provide environmental controls 
(Keith et al., 2006). To achieve carbon removal and negative 
emissions, direct air capture would have to be combined 
with carbon-dioxide capture and storage or carbon dioxide 
conversion to long-lived materials (see below)17. 
To yield negative emissions, direct air capture combined 
with carbon dioxide capture and storage must be powered 
predominantly by zero-carbon energy sources (wind, solar, 
17 Several companies have fielded direct air capture units (Marshall, 2017; 
Lassiter and Misra, 2016). Most of these produce fresh water as a by-product 
(American Physics Society, 2011). Niche applications could include the food 
and beverage industry, semiconductor manufacturing and remote sites for 
enhanced oil recovery (Lassiter and Misra, 2016).
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geothermal, hydro and nuclear). Although this approach has 
a technical potential above 20 GtCO
2
 per year, actual global 
deployment is likely to result in reductions of between 2 and 
5 GtCO
2
 per year (USNAS, 2015a). 
Cost remains the largest barrier to deployment. Since direct 
air capture involves separating carbon dioxide from air, and 
the partial pressure of carbon dioxide in air is low, costs 
can be between US$200 and US$600 per tonne (American 
Physics Society, 2011)18. Like bioenergy with carbon 
dioxide capture and storage, direct air capture combined 
with carbon dioxide capture and storage would require 
functional scale deployment of carbon dioxide capture and 
storage, which represents both a potential limit and cause 
for renewed commitments to the technology (Center for 
Carbon Removal, 2017).
It is worth noting that it is possible to directly separate 
dissolved carbon dioxide from ocean water and from air. 
This could provide an additional benefit as a local or global 
countermeasure to ocean acidification. However, research 
on dissolved ocean carbon dioxide is very recent and at very 
low technical readiness levels (Willauer et al., 2014)19.
7.4.2. Accelerated weathering of minerals
It has long been known that natural weathering of most 
rocks (silicates, carbonates and oxides) binds carbon dioxide 
from the atmosphere (Chamberlain, 1899; Raymo, 1991). 
Accelerated weathering has been proposed as a means 
of either drawing carbon dioxide from the air, binding it 
permanently, or both (Lackner et al., 1995; Chiang and Pan, 
2017). Much of this research proposes using rocks that are 
very rich in iron, calcium and magnesium (ultramafic rocks) 
as the primary feedstock, and reacting these in situ or ex situ 
with carbon dioxide to form carbonate rocks and minerals, 
locking away atmospheric carbon dioxide in the process 
(Kelemen and Matter, 2008).
While the technical potential of accelerated weathering 
is, in theory, unlimited (IPCC, 2005), the effective technical 
potential is not. This is due to the kinetics of most carbon 
dioxide mineral reactions, which are slow and limit the viable 
rates for carbon dioxide removal. Not least, the technical 
potential can be limited by the rate at which the ground 
material can be applied to land (Smith et al., 2016, Taylor 
et al., 2016). Global estimates of potential for accelerated 
weathering of minerals are in the range of 0.7 and 3.7 GtCO
2
 
per year (Lenton, 2014; Smith et al., 2016).
While kinetics can be improved by grinding, drilling and 
deep, in situ injection, adding heat or other energy sources, 
or adding chemicals (such as strong acids), these approaches 
dramatically increase costs and can increase the carbon 
intensity of the overall process20. These estimates are poorly 
18 Specialized companies claim much lower prices today (a maximum of US$500 
per tonne) and cost reductions of about 50 percent in the next 10 years.
19 Nonetheless, the United States Senate recently asked the National Academies 
to undertake an assessment on the matter (Whitehouse, 2017).
20 Costs would range between US$20 and US$1,000 per tonne of carbon dioxide 
(USNAS, 2015a).
represented in the literature, thus necessitating additional 
research in this area.
Since carbon dioxide is bound indefinitely in chemical form, 
there is both high confidence in carbon dioxide retention 
for many years, and robustness in accounting and validation 
of carbon storage and removal. For ex situ approaches, 
revenues from product sales, including agricultural 
inputs or aggregate and cement for construction offer 
an additional benefit (Monkman and MacDonald, 2015; 
CO
2
Sciences, 2016)21.
7.4.3. Ocean alkalinity enhancement
The addition of alkaline materials to sea water enhances 
the amount of carbon stored in the ocean. It draws carbon 
dioxide from the atmosphere by shifting the equilibrium 
between atmospheric carbon dioxide and dissolved 
inorganic carbon in the ocean, which also serves to counter 
ocean acidification. While ocean alkalinity enhancement 
has received very little attention, compared to other carbon 
dioxide removal options, it has the potential “to sequester 
hundreds of billions to trillions of tonnes of [carbon]” 
(Renforth and Henderson, 2017).
Ocean alkalinity can be enhanced in a number of ways:
• Weathering of silicate and carbonate minerals on land, 
resulting in the introduction of calcium and magnesium 
ions into ocean waters (Hartmann et al., 2013; 
Rau et al., 2007).
• Introducing calcium ions into ocean water by adding 
calcium oxide or calcium hydroxide to sea water, a 
procedure often referred to as ocean liming (Kheshgi, 
1995; Renforth and Kruger, 2013).
• Electrolysis of sea water, often referred to as 
electrochemical splitting, to increase aqueous sodium 
hydroxide (House et al., 2007) or to accelerate the 
dissolution of calcium carbonate (Rau et al., 2004).
Few techno-economic assessments of these approaches 
exist. Preliminary estimates range from US$10 to US$600 
per tonne of carbon dioxide for weathering of silicate and 
carbonate minerals, US$72 to US$159 per tonne of carbon 
dioxide for ocean liming and US$14 to US$190 per tonne of 
carbon dioxide for electrochemical splitting (Renforth and 
Henderson, 2017).
The availability of suitable minerals close to oceans would 
limit deployment. Notwithstanding, environmental concerns 
and governance considerations may prove to be the primary 
barrier to implementation. Regarding the former, the 
consequences of increased alkalinity on marine ecosystems 
are poorly understood (Henderson et al., 2008)22.
Regarding the latter, the addition of alkaline materials to 
the ocean would fall within the remit of the International 
21 Early niche applications are likely at diamond, base-metal and asbestos 
mines with tailings of carbon dioxide-reactive rocks that have already been 
processed for primary mineral extraction.
22 Note that the addition of alkaline materials would counteract 
ocean acidification.
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Maritime Organization, through the London Protocol to 
the “Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by 
Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter” (also known as the 
“London Convention”)23. 
7.4.4. Conversion of carbon dioxide to                  
long-lived products
The concept of using carbon dioxide to produce chemicals 
and materials was already being developed in the context of 
chemical research in the 1970s, long before climate change 
and the possibilities for removing CO
2
 from the atmosphere 
entered the public debate (Aresta, 2010; Bruhn et al., 2016). 
Most of these technologies have not been developed with 
long-term storage of carbon dioxide in mind. In addition, 
most materials based on captured carbon dioxide (for 
example, polyurethane foams or fuels such as ethanol) only 
have limited lifetimes in the context of the timescales that 
are relevant to climate change (Aresta, 2013; CLCF, 2011). An 
exception to this is carbonates, which are used to produce 
cement-like construction materials in which long-term 
(decades to centuries) sequestration of carbon dioxide can 
be achieved (von der Assen, Jung et al., 2013; Bruhn, 2016), 
as noted above.
Recently, there has been new research and commercial 
activity focused on converting carbon dioxide directly to 
other long-lived materials, including polymers, carbon fibre 
composites, graphene, carbon black and even diamond (ICEF, 
2017). Although these companies and research efforts are 
in their infancy, they have attracted substantial commercial 
interest. Due to the early stages of development, it is 
difficult to estimate the upscaling potential of the various 
approaches. A recent estimate puts the annual market for 
these materials between 1 and 7 GtCO
2
 per year, although 
this is contingent on policy- and market-support actions 
(CO
2
Sciences, 2016).
7.5. Governance issues for carbon           
dioxide removal
Realizing the potential of carbon dioxide removal would 
require large-scale investment in research (to reduce 
key uncertainties), and development and deployment 
incentives (to reduce costs). Governments can play a key 
role in providing the funding and incentives needed to 
achieve these investments (Lomax et al., 2015; Peters and 
Geden, 2017).
Firstly, government policy can work to protect communities 
from any potential, negative side-effects (environmental, 
economic, social, political and ethical) associated with large-
scale deployment of carbon dioxide removal solutions (Buck, 
2016). Secondly, governments can set consistent standards 
for transparency, notably with regard to the measurement 
and verification of carbon stored from a given carbon 
dioxide removal solution (Zakkour et al., 2014). Thirdly, 
they can require that standards accept products arising 
23 The London Convention is examining ocean alkalinity enhancement.
from carbon dioxide-reduction approaches24. And finally, 
they would have to develop international agreements with 
regard to the transboundary effects of these technologies 
(Schäfer et al., 2015).
There is currently limited discussion on carbon dioxide 
removal issues in most subnational and international climate 
policy forums. Policymakers might consider giving attention 
to the importance of carbon dioxide removal, the risks 
and challenges faced by leading carbon dioxide removal 
solutions and the policy options for addressing these risks 
and challenges (Williamson, 2016). This is because, to 
achieve the objectives of the Paris Agreement, mobilizing 
a rapid reduction of greenhouse gas emissions will be 
essential. Carbon dioxide removal can play an important role 
in meeting these objectives. However, to do so, enabling 
actions on carbon dioxide removal will be required, including 
more extensive policy discussions and focus on specific 
barriers to deployment (Peters and Geden, 2017).
Many key uncertainties can be explored using a learning-by-
doing approach, notably by undertaking research and small-
scale deployment activities (Lomax et al., 2015). All of the 
approaches described in this chapter have initiated or can 
initiate small- and large-scale pilot projects, from which data 
on cost, performance and improvement opportunities can 
be drawn (IEA, 2017). Some efforts, such as afforestation 
or reforestation projects, have begun under the jurisdiction 
of United Nations programmes that could be expanded or 
rapidly scaled up. Scenarios that show net emissions turning 
negative in the second half of the 21st Century can give 
the false impression that there is no urgency. However, to 
achieve those scenarios will require significant amounts of 
gross negative emissions by 2030 at the latest (Rogelj et al., 
2015; Anderson and Peters, 2016), and advancing techniques 
to maturity usually takes decades.
7.6 Conclusions and recommendations
Carbon dioxide removal remains an important set of 
undertakings following the Paris Agreement, to supplement 
immediate and aggressive mitigation action. In order to 
achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement, to keep the global 
mean temperature increase well below 2°C (or even below 
1.5°C), carbon dioxide removal is likely a necessary step.
Although there is much ongoing work worldwide on this 
topic, the field of carbon removal remains very young 
(particularly for technology-based solutions), with relatively 
little scholarship on the direct topic of carbon dioxide 
removal. In some cases, efforts aimed at strengthening 
approaches to carbon dioxide removal can build on deep 
understanding and experience from other industries, for 
example, agribusinesses or heavy industry. Nonetheless, 
specific questions concerning current and future costs of 
carbon dioxide removal options, the longevity of carbon 
retention, the environmental consequences of scale-level 
24 For example, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards 
do not currently accept synthetic fuels made from carbon dioxide derived 
from direct air capture.
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deployment of carbon dioxide removal and other key 
questions remain largely unexplored. Critically, only one 
country in the world (the United Kingdom) has a government 
programme aimed explicitly at supporting carbon dioxide 
removal (NERC, 2017).
In light of the above, there are four key recommendations 
for consideration:
• Governments around the world might carefully assess 
the potential role of carbon dioxide removal in achieving 
the goals of the Paris Agreement. They would benefit 
from understanding these technologies and the potential 
ancillary benefits they may provide to commerce and 
trade, such as improved crop yields.
• Governments and other stakeholders could launch joint 
research and development programmes on the many 
pathways for carbon dioxide removal. Such programmes 
would be appropriate, given that some carbon 
dioxide removal options are only at the early stages of 
development, and in light of the role they could play in 
curbing climate change. Both core scientific undertakings 
(for example, a decade-long science programme on 
the carbon cycle in soil) and technology development 
efforts (focused, for example, on novel materials and 
processes for direct air capture) could be included, 
possibly structured around pilot programmes and early-
demonstration activities, where progress can be made 
quickly and early-action opportunities can be identified 
and investigated.
• Carbon dioxide removal presents specific challenges for 
life-cycle accounting, which will directly affect accounting 
standards, industrial standards, industrial and financial 
practice, and regulation. Emissions trading in particular 
would be complicated by carbon-negative approaches. 
Overt and dedicated analysis and efforts would be 
required to develop, refine and incorporate carbon 
dioxide removal approaches into these commercial and 
governmental endeavours.
• Some approaches raise questions around global 
governance in the near term (for example, ocean 
alkalinity enhancement vis-a-vis the London Convention). 
In addition, wide deployment of carbon dioxide removal 
raises fundamental questions about how to appropriately 
stabilize atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations and 
how to manage interests globally and among nations. 
Dedicated working groups, perhaps modelled on the 
Climate and Clean Air Coalition and their work on short-
lived climate pollutants, could be formed and begin 
discussing these issues.
• Since the land-based systems relevant for carbon dioxide 
removal have been managed by humans for many years, 
there is a wealth of knowledge that can be readily applied 
today with confidence. Furthermore, these approaches 
present opportunities to meet other global sustainability 
goals, such as improved water quality, ecosystem 
restoration, biodiversity preservation, food and nutrition 
security, job creation and improved crop yields.
67The Emissions Gap Report 2017
68 The Emissions Gap Report 2017 – References
References
Chapter 1
UNEP (2016). ‘The Emissions Gap Report 2016’, United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Nairobi. Available at: http://www.
google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0ahUKEwiAncDtsfPWAhViQZoKHZt9CrAQFggwMAE&url=http
%3A%2F%2Fwedocs.unep.org%2Fbitstream%2Fhandle%2F20.500.11822%2F10016%2Femission_gap_report_2016.pdf&usg=A
OvVaw3gBleyjAH07zqiIjLQw9N2 [Accessed 15 October 2017].
UNEP (2015). ‘The Emissions Gap Report 2015’, United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Nairobi. Available at: http:// 
uneplive.unep.org/media/docs/theme/13/EGR_2015_Technical_Report_final_version.pdf [Accessed 15 October 2017].
UNFCCC (2017). ‘Initial feedback by Fiji and Morocco on the approach to the Facilitative Dialogue 2018 based on their consultations 
with Parties’ United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Bonn Available at: http://unfccc.int/files/na/
application/pdf/preliminary_ideas.pdf [Accessed 20 October 2017].
UNFCCC (2015). ‘The Paris Agreement’, The Conference of the Parties. Available at: https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/
eng/l09r01.pdf [Accessed 15 October 2017].  
Chapter 2
Australian Government (2016) Australia’s emissions projections 2016. http://www.environment.gov.au/system/files/resources/ 
9437fe27-64f4-4d16-b3f1-4e03c2f7b0d7/files/aust-emissions-projections-2016.pdf: Department of the Environment and 
Energy, Australia.
Bappenas (2015) Sekretariat RAN-GRK. Available at: http://apki.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Presentasi-INDC-BAPPENAS- 
di-KLHK.pptx.
BP (2017) Statistical review of World Energy 2016, British Petroleum, http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/
statistical-review-of-world-energy.html.
Climate Action Tracker (2017a) Action by China and India slows emissions growth, President Trump’s policies likely to cause US 
emissions to flatten. Policy Brief Climate Analytics, Ecofys and NewClimate institute, Available at: http://climateactiontracker.
org/assets/publications/briefing_papers/CAT_2017-05-15_Briefing_India-China-USA.pdf  [Accessed 7 August 2017].
Climate Action Tracker (2017b) Country assessment: Brazil (updated 17 May, 2017). Climate Action Tracker (Climate Analytics, 
Ecofys, NewClimate Institute). http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/brazil.html (Accessed 27 August, 2017).
Climate Action Tracker (2017c) Country assessment: China (updated 17 May, 2017). Climate Action Tracker (Climate Analytics, 
Ecofys, NewClimate Institute). http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/china.html (Accessed 27 August, 2017).
Climate Action Tracker (2017d) Country assessment: India (updated 17 May, 2017). Climate Action Tracker (Climate Analytics, Eco-
fys, NewClimate Institute). http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/india.html (Accessed 27 August, 2017).
Climate Action Tracker (2017e) Country assessment: Japan (updated 9 May, 2017). Climate Action Tracker (Climate Analytics, Eco-
fys, NewClimate Institute). http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/japan.html (accessed on 27 August, 2017).
Climate Action Tracker (2017f) Country assessment: South Africa (updated 6 July, 2017). Climate Action Tracker (Climate Analytics, 
Ecofys, NewClimate Institute).  http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/southafrica.html (accessed on 27 August, 2017).
Climate Action Tracker (2017g) http://climateactiontracker.org/.
Climate Advisers (2017) Trumpbacktracker. https://www.climateadvisers.com/trumpbacktracker/.
Climate Transparency (2017) Brown to Green: The G20 transition to a low-carbon economy. Climate Transparency, c/o Humboldt-
Viadrina Governance Platform, Berlin, Germany, www.climate-transparency.org.
Climateinteractive (2017) What Slashing Climate Rules Means For the U.S. Pledge to Paris, Available at: https://www.climateinterac-
tive.org/media-coverage/what-slashing-climate-rules-means-for-the-u-s-pledge-to-paris/ 
Den Elzen, M., Admiraal, A., Roelfsema, M., Van Soest, H., Hof, A. F. & Forsell, N. (2016a) Contribution of the G20 economies to the 
global impact of the Paris agreement climate proposals. Climatic Change, 137, 655-665.
Den Elzen, M. G. J., Fekete, H., Höhne, N., Admiraal, A., Forsell, N., Hof, A. F., Olivier, J. G. J., Roelfsema, M. & Van Soest, H. (2016b) 
Greenhouse gas emissions from current and enhanced policies of China until 2030: Can emissions peak before 2030? Energy 
Policy, 89, 224-236.
69The Emissions Gap Report 2017 – References
Department Of Environmental Affairs Republic Of South Africa (2011a) South Africa’s Second National Communication under the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Available at: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/zafnc02.pdf 
[Accessed 14 October 2016].
Department Of Environmental Affairs Republic Of South Africa (2011b) Explanatory note: Defining South Africa’s Peak, Plateau 
and Decline Greenhouse Gas Emission Trajectory. Available at: http://www.climateaction.org.za/cop17-cmp7/sa-government-
position-on-climate-change [Accessed 24 October, 2017]
EEA (2014) Trends and projections in Europe 2014. European Environment Agency, EEA Report No 6/2016, http://www.eea.europa.
eu/publications/trends-and-projections-in-europe-2014.
EEA (2016a) Total greenhouse gas emissions trends and projections — European Environment Agency [Online]. Available: http://
www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/greenhouse-gas-emission-trends-6/assessment [Accessed 27 January 2017].
EEA (2016b) Trends and projections in Europe 2016 - Tracking progress towards Europe’s climate and energy targets. European 
Environment Agency, EEA Report No 29/2016, https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/trends-and-projections-in-europe.
Environment And Climate Change Canada (2017) Canadian Environmental Sustainability Indicators: Progress Towards Canada’s 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction Target. https://www.ec.gc.ca/indicateurs-indicators/CCED3397-174A-4F0E-8258-
91DCFE295B34/ProgressTowardsCanadaGHGEmissionsTarget_EN.pdf.
FAO (2017) FAOSTAT Production of live animals, crops, consumption of nitrogen fertilisers, burning – savannah. Available at: “http://
www.fao.org/faostat/en/” \l “data” [Accessed 24 October 2017] Figueres, C., Schellnhuber, H. J., Whiteman, G., Rockström, J., 
Hobley, A. & Rahmstorf, S. 2017. Three years to safeguard our climate. Nature, 546, 593-595, doi:10.1038/546593a.
Government of Canada (2016) Canada’s Second Biennial Report on Climate Change, Environment and Climate Change Cana-
da, https://www.ec.gc.ca/ges-ghg/02D095CB-BAB0-40D6-B7F0-828145249AF5/3001%20UNFCCC%202nd%20Biennial%20
Report_e_v7_lowRes.pdf.
Government of Japan. (2016) Japan’s Second Biennial Report Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Available at: http://unfccc.int/files/national_reports/biennial_reports_and_iar/submitted_biennial_reports/application/pdf/ 
japan_br2_revised.pdf [Online]. [Accessed].
Government of Russia. (2014) First Biennial Report of the Russian Federation [Online]. UNFCCC, Bonn, available at: http://unfccc.
int/files/national_reports/biennial_reports_and_iar/submitted_biennial_reports/application/pdf/1br_rus_unoffical_trans- 
lation_eng.pdf [Accessed 12 December 2014].
Government of Russia. (2015) Second Biennial Report of the Russian Federation [Online]. UNFCCC, Bonn, available at: http://unfccc.
int/resource/docs/2016/trr/rus.pdf.  [Accessed 2015].
Government of Brazil (2010) DECREE No. 7390, 9 December 2010. http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2007-2010/2010/ 
Decreto/D7390.htm 
Government of Mexico (2012a) Mexico. México quinta comunicación nacional ante la Convención Marco de las Naciones Unidas 
sobre el Cambio Climático.: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/mexnc5s.pdf.
Government of Mexico (2012b) Programas para mitigar el cambio climático, Available at: http://www2.inecc.gob.mx/publicacio-
nes/libros/685/programas2.pdf [Accessed 10 November 2015].
Grassi, G., House, J., Dentener, F., Federici, S., Den Elzen, M. & Penman, J. (2017) The key role of forests in meeting climate targets 
requires science for credible mitigation. Nature Clim. Change, 7, 220-226.
Green, F. and Stern, N. (2017) China’s changing economy: implications for its carbon dioxide emissions. Climate Policy, 17, 423-442.
Hafstead, M. (2017) On Trump, Paris, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions. Retrieved August 7, 2017, from Resources for the Future: 
http://www.rff.org/blog/2017/trump-paris-and-greenhouse-gas-emissions.
IEA (2015) World Energy Outlook 2016, Paris, France, International Energy Agency.
IEA (2017) IEA finds CO
2
 emissions flat for third straight year even as global economy grew in 2016, Paris, France, International 
Energy Agency, https://www.iea.org/newsroom/news/2017/march/iea-finds-co
2
-emissions-flat-for-third-straight-year-even- 
as-global-economy-grew.html.
Jackson, R. B., Canadell, J. G., Le Quere, C., Andrew, R. M., Korsbakken, J. I., Peters, G. P. & Nakicenovic, N. (2016) Reaching peak 
emissions. Nature Clim. Change, 6, 7-10.
Janssens-Maenhout, G., Crippa, M., Guizzardi, D., Muntean, M., Schaaf, E., Dentener, F., Bergamaschi, P., Pagliari, V., Olivier, J. G. J., 
Peters, J. A. H. W., Van Aardenne, J. A., Monni, S., Doering, U. & Petrescu, A. M. R. (2017) EDGAR v4.3.2 Global Atlas of the three 
major Greenhouse Gas Emissions for the period 1970-2012. Earth Syst. Sci. Data Discuss., 2017, 1-55 (in review).
Kuramochi, T., Höhne, N., Hagemann, M., Sterl, S., El-Laboudy, T., Wouters, K., Deng, Y., Blok, K., Hare, B., Schaeffer, M., Cantzler, J., 
Rocha, M., Deryng, D., Rogelj, J., Sindt, J. & Yanguas Parra, P. (2016a) The ten most important short-term steps to limit warming 
to 1.5°C. Climate Analytics, Ecofys and the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK).
Kuramochi, T., Höhne, N., Sterl, S., Gonzales-Zuñiga, S., Hans, F., Hagemann, M., Hernandez Legaria, E., Den Elzen, M. G. J., Roelf-
sema, M., Van Soest, H., Forsell, N. & Turkovska, O. (2016b) Greenhouse gas mitigation scenarios for major emitting countries: 
Analysis of current and planned climate policies, and mitigation pledges. Cologne, Germany: NewClimate Institute, PBL, IIASA, 
http://www.pbl.nl/en/publications/greenhouse-gas-mitigation-scenarios-for-major-emitting-countries.
Ministry of The Environment and Sustainable Development Argentina. (2015) Tercera Comunicación Nacional del Gobierno de la 
República Argentina a las Partes de la Convención Marco de las Naciones Unidas sobre Cambio Climático [Online]. Secretaría de 
Ambiente y Desarrollo Sustentable de la Nación. Available: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/argnc3s.pdf [Accessed 4 August 
2016].
Mitra, A., Chitkara, P., Ross, K., Singh, M., Sawhney, S., Keswani, S. & Batra, P. (2017) Pathways for Meeting India’s Climate Goals. 
Washington DC, USA: World Resource Institute.
NCCS (2013) National Climate Change Strategy. 10-20-40 Vision. Mexico: Federal Government of Mexico.
Olivier, J. G. J., Peters, J. A. H. W. & Schure, K. M. (2017) Trends in global emissions of CO
2
 and other greenhouse gases: 2017 Report. 
PBL report no. 2674, PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, Bilthoven, the Netherlands, http://www.pbl.nl/en/
news/newsitems/2017/greenhouse-gas-emission-levels-continued-to-rise-in-2016.
PBL (2017) PBL Climate Pledge NDC tool, www.pbl.nl/indc. PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency.
70 The Emissions Gap Report 2017 – References
Peters, G. P., Andrew, R. M., Canadell, J. G., Fuss, S., Jackson, R. B., Korsbakken, J. I., Le Quere, C. & Nakicenovic, N. (2017) Key indica-
tors to track current progress and future ambition of the Paris Agreement. Nature Clim. Change, 7, 118-122.
Planning Commission Government of India (2011) Low Carbon Strategies for Inclusive Growth: An Interim Report. Interim Report 
of the Expert Group on Low Carbon Strategies for Inclusive Growth, New Delhi, India, http://moef.nic.in/downloads/public-
information/Interim%20Report%20of%20the%20Expert%20Group.pdf.
Planning Commission Government of India (2014) The Final Report of the Expert Group on Low Carbon Strategies for Inclusive 
Growth. Interim Report of the Expert Group on Low Carbon Strategies for Inclusive Growth, New Delhi, India, http://planning-
commission.nic.in/reports/genrep/rep_carbon2005.pdf.
Republic of Korea. (2016) Submission by the Republic of Korea: Intended Nationally Determined Contribution [Online]. UNFCCC. 
Available: http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/PublishedDocuments/Republic%20of%20Korea%20First/INDC%20Submis-
sion%20by%20the%20Republic%20of%20Korea%20on%20June%2030.pdf [Accessed 28 July 2017].
Republic of Turkey Ministry of Environment and Urbanization (2016) Sixth National Communication of Turkey. Ankara, Turkey.
Reputex (2016) Framing Australia’s 2030 energy & climate policy mix. The contribution of safeguard sectors to Australia’s 2030 
emissions reduction target. http://www.reputex.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/0916_RepuTex-White-Paper_Framing- 
Australias-energy-policy-mix-to-2030.pdf: MARKET UPDATE | September 2016 
Rhodium Group (2017) Taking Stock 2017: Adjusting Expectations for US GHG Emissions. Available at: http://rhg.com/reports/ 
taking-stock-2017-adjusting-expectations-for-us-ghg-emissions.
Rockström, J., Gaffney, O., Rogelj, J., Meinshausen, M., Nakicenovic, N. & Schellnhuber, H. J. (2017) A roadmap for rapid decarbon-
ization. Science, 355, 1269.
Sha, F., JI, Z. & Linwei, L. (2015) An Analysis of China’s INDC. Beijing, China: China National Center for Climate Change Strategy and 
International Cooperation.
Sha, F., JI, Z. & Linwei, L. (2017) An Analysis of China’s INDC (Updated analysis 2017) (MILES report). Beijing, China: China National 
Center for Climate Change Strategy and International Cooperation.
South Africa. Department of Environmental Affairs (2011) Explanatory note: Defining South Africa’s Peak, Plateau and Decline 
Greenhouse Gas Emission Trajectory. Government of Republic of South Africa.: http://www.climateaction.org.za/cop17-cmp7/sa- 
government-position-on-climate-change.
The Law National Information Center. (2016) Presidental Decree 27180 of 24 May, 2016 (enforced 1 June, 2016); partial amendment 
of the Enforcement Decree of the Framework Act on Low Carbon, Green Growth. The Law National Information Center, Korea 
[Online]. Ministry of Government Legislation. Available: htp://www.law.go.kr/lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=183314&efYd=20160601#AJAX 
[Accessed 16 October 2016].
U.S. Department of State (2016) 2016 second biennial report of the United States of America, under the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change. US Department of State, Washington, DC, https://unfccc.int/files/national_reports/biennial_ 
reports_and_iar/submitted_biennial_reports/application/pdf/2016_second_biennial_report_of_the_united_states_.pdf.
UNEP (2016) The Emissions Gap Report 2016: A UNEP Synthesis Report [Online]. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 
Nairobi. Available: http://www.unep.org/emissionsgapreport2016/ [Accessed 20 October 2017].
UNEP (2015) The Emissions Gap Report 2015: A UNEP Synthesis Report [Online]. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 
Nairobi. Available: http://www.unep.org/emissionsgapreport2015/ [Accessed].
UNFCCC (2011) Compilation of information on nationally appropriate mitigation actions to be implemented by Parties not included 
in Annex I to the Convention. FCCC/AWGLCA/2011/INF.1, http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/awglca14/eng/inf01.pdf 
WRI (2016) CAIT Indonesia Climate Data Explorer - PINDAI [Online]. Available: http://cait.wri.org/indonesia?lng=en [Accessed 31 
October 2016].
WRI CAIT (2017) Climate Analysis Indicators Tool: WRI’s Climate Data Explorer. Washington DC, USA: World Resource Institute.
Chapter 3
Aldy, J. E., Pizer, W. A. & Akimoto, K. (2016) Comparing emissions mitigation efforts across countries. Climate Policy, 1-15.
Andonova, L. B., Hale, T. N. & Roger, C. B. (2017) National Policy and Transnational Governance of Climate Change: Substitutes or 
Complements? International Studies Quarterly, 61, 253-268.
Australian Government (2016) Australia’s emissions projections 2016. http://www.environment.gov.au/system/files/
resources/9437fe27-64f4-4d16-b3f1-4e03c2f7b0d7/files/aust-emissions-projections-2016.pdf: Department of the Environment 
and Energy, Australia.
CAT (2017) Climate Action Tracker. Available at: http://climateactiontracker.org/ [Accessed 7 August 2017].
CDP and We Mean Business (2016) The Business End of Climate Change. Available at: https://newclimateinstitute.files.wordpress.
com/2016/06/business-end-of-climate-change.pdf.
CEC (2017) Power Generation Industry Information, CEC (China Electricity Council), Beijing [Online]. [Accessed 08/10/2017].
Central Electricity Authority (2016) Draft National Electricity Plan, Central Elctricity Authority (CEA), Ministry of Power, Government 
of India,, http://www.cea.nic.in/reports/committee/nep/nep_dec.pdf 
Chai, Q., Fu, S., XU, H., Li, W. & Zhong, Y. (2017) The gap report of global climate change mitigation, finance, and governance after 
the United States declared its withdrawal from the Paris Agreement. Chinese Journal of Population Resources and Environment, 
1-13.
Chan, S., Falkner, R., Goldberg, M. & Van Asselt, H. (2016) Effective and geographically balanced? An output-based assessment of 
non-state climate actions. Climate Policy, 1-12.
Cheong Wa Dae (2017) Opening remarks by the President Moon Jae-In at the 2nd Annual Meeting of the AIIB Board of Governors, 
16 June, 2017, Jeju, the Republic of Korea. Cheong Wa Dae (the President’s Office of the Republic of Korea). http://men.presi-
dent.go.kr/activity/speeches.php?srh%5Bview_mode%5D=detail&srh%5Bseq%5D=429&srh%5Bdetail_no%5D=4 (accessed 18 
July, 2017).
71The Emissions Gap Report 2017 – References
China Statistic Year Book (2017) China Statistic Year Book 2017, China Statistic Publishing House, Beijing, available at: http://www.
stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2016/indexeh.htm.
Clarke, L., Jiang, K., Akimoto, K., Babiker, M., Blanford, G., Fisher-Vanden, K., Hourcade, J.-C., Krey, V., Kriegler, E., Löschel, A., Mccol-
lum, D., Paltsev, S., Rose, S., Shukla, P. R., Tavoni, M., Zwaan, B. V. D. & Vuuren, D. V. (2014) Assessing Transformation Pathways. 
In: Edenhofer, O., Pichs-Madruga, R., Sokona, Y., Farahani, E., Kadner, S., Seyboth, K., Adler, A., Baum, I., Brunner, S., Eickemeier, 
P., Kriemann, B., Savolainen, J., Schlömer, S., Stechow, C. V., Zwickel, T. & Minx, J. C. (eds.) Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of 
Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change. Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
Climate Action Tracker (2017a) Action by China and India slows emissions growth, President Trump’s policies likely to cause US emis-
sions to flatten. Policy Brief Climate Analytics, Ecofys and NewClimate institute, Available at: http://climateactiontracker.org/
assets/publications/briefing_papers/CAT_2017-05-15_Briefing_India-China-USA.pdf  [Accessed 7 August 2017].
Climate Action Tracker (2017b) Country assessment: Argentina  (updated  17 May, 2017). Climate Action Tracker (Climate Analytics, 
Ecofys, NewClimate Institute). http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/argentina.html(Accessed 27 August, 2017).
Climate Action Tracker (2017c) Country assessment: Mexico (updated  6 July, 2017). Climate Action Tracker (Climate Analytics, 
Ecofys, NewClimate Institute). http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/mexico.html  [Accessed 30 August, 2017].
Climate Action Tracker (2017d) Country assessment: Russian Federation (updated 11 May, 2017). Climate Action Tracker (Climate 
Analytics, Ecofys, NewClimate Institute). http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/russianfederation.html (accessed on 27 
August, 2017).
Climate Action Tracker (2017e) Country assessment: Saudi Arabia  (updated  10 May, 2017). Climate Action Tracker (Climate Ana-
lytics, Ecofys, NewClimate Institute). http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/saudiarabia.html  (Accessed 27 August, 2017).
Climate Action Tracker (2017f) Country assessment: South Africa (updated 6 July, 2017). Climate Action Tracker (Climate Analytics, 
Ecofys, NewClimate Institute). http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/southafrica.html (accessed on 27 August, 2017).
Climate Action Tracker (2017g) Country assessment: Turkey (updated 17 May, 2017). Climate Action Tracker (Climate Analytics, 
Ecofys, NewClimate Institute). http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/turkey.html (Accessed 27 August, 2017).
Climate Action Tracker (2017h) http://climateactiontracker.org/.
Climate Advisers (2017) Trumpbacktracker. https://www.climateadvisers.com/trumpbacktracker/.
Climate Transparency (2017) Brown to Green: The G20 transition to a low-carbon economy. Climate Transparency, c/o Humboldt-
Viadrina Governance Platform, Berlin, Germany, www.climate-transparency.org.
Climate Interactive (2017) Climate Scoreboard. US: Climate Interactive.
Climateinteractive (2017) What Slashing Climate Rules Means For the U.S. Pledge to Paris, Available at: https://www.climateinterac-
tive.org/media-coverage/what-slashing-climate-rules-means-for-the-u-s-pledge-to-paris/ 
Compact Of Mayors (2015) Climate Leadership at the Local Level: Global Impact of the Compact of Mayors. Available at: https://
data.bloomberglp.com/mayors/sites/14/2016/01/BR_AggregationReport_Final_SinglePages-FINAL-2016.pdf.
Damassa, T., Fransen, T., Haya, B., Ge, M., Pjeczka, K. & Ross, K. (2015) Interpreting INDCs: Assessing transparency of post-2020 
greenhouse gas emissions targets for 8 top-emitting economies. Working Paper. Washington, DC: World Resources Institute. 
Available online at http://www.wri.org/publication/interpreting-indcs.
Den Elzen, M., Admiraal, A., Roelfsema, M., Van Soest, H., Hof, A. F. & Forsell, N. (2016a) Contribution of the G20 economies to the 
global impact of the Paris agreement climate proposals. Climatic Change, 137, 655-665.
Den Elzen, M. G. J., Fekete, H., Höhne, N., Admiraal, A., Forsell, N., Hof, A. F., Olivier, J. G. J., Roelfsema, M. & Van Soest, H. (2016b) 
Greenhouse gas emissions from current and enhanced policies of China until 2030: Can emissions peak before 2030? Energy 
Policy, 89, 224-236.
EEA (2016) Trends and projections in Europe (2016 - Tracking progress towards Europe’s climate and energy targets. European Envi-
ronment Agency, EEA Report No 29/2016, https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/trends-and-projections-in-europe.
Environment And Climate Change Canada (2017) Canadian Environmental Sustainability Indicators: Progress Towards Canada’s 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction Target. https://www.ec.gc.ca/indicateurs-indicators/CCED3397-174A-4F0E-8258-
91DCFE295B34/ProgressTowardsCanadaGHGEmissionsTarget_EN.pdf.
Forsell, N., Turkovska, O., Gusti, M., Obersteiner, M., Elzen, M. D. & Havlik, P. (2016) Assessing the INDCs’ land use, land use change, 
and forest emission projections. Carbon Balance and Management, 11, 26.
Fricko, O., Havlik, P., Rogelj, J., Klimont, Z., Gusti, M., Johnson, N., Kolp, P., Strubegger, M., Valin, H., Amann, M., Ermolieva, T., Forsell, 
N., Herrero, M., Heyes, C., Kindermann, G., Krey, V., Mccollum, D. L., Obersteiner, M., Pachauri, S., Rao, S., Schmid, E., Schoepp, 
W. & Riahi, K. (2017) The marker quantification of the Shared Socioeconomic Pathway 2: A middle-of-the-road scenario for the 
21st century. Global Environmental Change, 42, 251-267.
Fuglestvedt, J. S., Shine, K. P., Berntsen, T., Cook, J., Lee, D. S., Stenke, A., Skeie, R. B., Velders, G. J. M. & Waitz, I. A. (2010) Transport 
impacts on atmosphere and climate: Metrics. Atmospheric Environment, 44, 4648-4677.
Government of Argentina (2016) Primera Revisión de su Contribución Determinada a Nivel Nacional, http://www4.unfccc.int/
ndcregistry/PublishedDocuments/Argentina%20First/17112016%20NDC%20Revisada%202016.pdf.
Government of Russia. (2014) First Biennial Report of the Russian Federation [Online]. UNFCCC, Bonn, available at: http://un-
fccc.int/files/national_reports/biennial_reports_and_iar/submitted_biennial_reports/application/pdf/1br_rus_unoffical_trans-
lation_eng.pdf [Accessed 12 December 2014].
Graichen, J., Healy, S., Siemons, A., Höhne, N., Kuramochi, T., Gonzales Zuñiga, S., Sterl, S., Kersting, J. & Wachsmuth, J. (2017) 
International Climate Initiatives – A way forward to close the emissions gap? Initiatives’ potential and role under the Paris Agree-
ment. Berlin: Öko-Institut. Retrieved from https://www.umweltbundesamt.de/sites/default/files/medien/376/publikationen/
climate_change_22_2017.pdf.
Graichen, J., Healy, S., Siemons, A., Höhne, N., Kuramochi, T., Gonzales Zuñiga, S. & Wachsmuth, J. (2016) Climate initiatives, na-
tional contributions, and the Paris Agreement. Berlin: Öko-Institut. Retrieved from http://www.oeko.de/oekodoc/2554/2016-
079-de.pdf.
Grassi, G., House, J., Dentener, F., Federici, S., Den Elzen, M. & Penman, J. (2017) The key role of forests in meeting climate targets 
requires science for credible mitigation. Nature Clim. Change, 7, 220-226.
72 The Emissions Gap Report 2017 – References
Green, F. and Stern, N. (2017) China’s changing economy: implications for its carbon dioxide emissions. Climate Policy, 17, 423-442.
Gütschow, J., Jeffery, L., Gieseke, R. & Gebel, R. (2017) The PRIMAP-hist national historical emissions time series (1850-2014). V. 1.1. 
GFZ Data Services. http://doi.org/10.5880/PIK.2017.001.
Hafstead, M. (2017) On Trump, Paris, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions. Retrieved August 7, 2017, from Resources for the Future: 
http://www.rff.org/blog/2017/trump-paris-and-greenhouse-gas-emissions.
Höglund-Isaksson, L., Purohit, P., Amann, M., Bertok, I., Rafaj, P., Schöpp, W. & Borken-Kleefeld, J. (2017) Cost estimates of the Kigali 
Amendment to phase-down hydrofluorocarbons. Environmental Science and Policy, 75, 138-147.
Höhne, N., Fekete, H., Den Elzen, M. G. J., Hof, A. F. & Kuramochi, T. (2017) Assessing the ambition of post-2020 climate targets: a 
comprehensive framework. Climate Policy, 1-16.
IEA (2016) World Energy Outlook 2016, Paris, France, International Energy Agency.
IPCC (2014a) Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. In: CORE WRITING TEAM, PACHAURI, R. K. & MEYER, L. A. (eds.). Geneva, Swit-
zerland: IPCC.
IPCC (2014b) Summary for Policymakers. In: Edenhofer, O., Pichs-Madruga, R., Sokona, Y., Farahani, E., Kadner, S., Seyboth, K., Adler, 
A., Baum, I., Brunner, S., Eickemeier, P., Kriemann, B., Savolainen, J., Schlömer, S., Stechow, C. V., Zwickel, T. & Minx, J. C. (eds.) 
Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge, United Kingdom, and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
Jiang, K.-J., Tamura, K. & Hanaoka, T. (2017) Can we go beyond INDCs: Analysis of a future mitigation possibility in China, Japan, EU 
and the U.S. Advances in Climate Change Research, 8, 117-122.
Kitous, A., Keramidas, K., Vandyck, T. & Saveyn, B. (2016) GECO
2
016. Global Energy and Climate Outlook. Road to Paris. download 
at: http://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/geco: Joint Research Centre.
Kitous, A., Keramidas, K., Vandyck, T., Saveyn, B., Van Dingenen, R., Spadaro, J. & Holland, M. (2017) Global Energy and Climate 
Outlook 2017: How climate policies improve air quality. EUR 28798 EN, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 
2017, ISBN 978-92-79-73864-7, doi:10.2760/474356, JRC107944: Joint Research Centre.
Kuramochi, T., Höhne, N., Sterl, S., Gonzales-Zuñiga, S., Hans, F., Hagemann, M., Hernandez Legaria, E., Den Elzen, M. G. J., Roelf-
sema, M., Van Soest, H., Forsell, N. & Turkovska, O. (2016) Greenhouse gas mitigation scenarios for major emitting countries: 
Analysis of current and planned climate policies, and mitigation pledges. Cologne, Germany: NewClimate Institute, PBL, IIASA, 
http://www.pbl.nl/en/publications/greenhouse-gas-mitigation-scenarios-for-major-emitting-countries.
Kuramochi, T., Höhne, N., Sterl, S., Lütkehermöller, K. & Seghers, J.-C. (2017) States, cities and businesses leading the way: a first look 
at decentralized climate commitments in the US. NewClimate Institute, the Climate group.
Le Quéré, C., Moriarty, R., Andrew, R. M., Canadell, J. G., Sitch, S., Korsbakken, J. I., Friedlingstein, P., Peters, G. P., Andres, R. J., 
Boden, T. A., Houghton, R. A., House, J. I., Keeling, R. F., Tans, P., Arneth, A., Bakker, D. C. E., Barbero, L., Bopp, L., Chang, J., 
Chevallier, F., Chini, L. P., Ciais, P., Fader, M., Feely, R. A., Gkritzalis, T., Harris, I., Hauck, J., Ilyina, T., Jain, A. K., Kato, E., Kitidis, V., 
Klein Goldewijk, K., Koven, C., Landschützer, P., Lauvset, S. K., Lefèvre, N., Lenton, A., Lima, I. D., Metzl, N., Millero, F., Munro, D. 
R., Murata, A., Nabel, J. E. M. S., Nakaoka, S., Nojiri, Y., O’brien, K., Olsen, A., Ono, T., Pérez, F. F., Pfeil, B., Pierrot, D., Poulter, B., 
Rehder, G., Rödenbeck, C., Saito, S., Schuster, U., Schwinger, J., Séférian, R., Steinhoff, T., Stocker, B. D., Sutton, A. J., Takahashi, 
T., Tilbrook, B., Van Der Laan-Luijkx, I. T., Van Der Werf, G. R., Van Heuven, S., Vandemark, D., Viovy, N., Wiltshire, A., Zaehle, S. & 
Zeng, N. (2015) Global Carbon Budget 2015. Earth Syst. Sci. Data, 7, 349-396.
Lee, D. S., Fahey, D. W., Forster, P. M., Newton, P. J., Wit, R. C. N., Lim, L. L., Owen, B. & Sausen, R. (2009.) Aviation and global climate 
change in the 21st century. Atmospheric Environment, 43, 3520-3537.
Lee, D. S., Pitari, G., Grewe, V., Gierens, K., Penner, J. E., Petzold, A., Prather, M. J., Schumann, U., Bais, A., Berntsen, T., Iachetti, D., 
Lim, L. L. & Sausen, R. (2010) Transport impacts on atmosphere and climate: Aviation. Atmospheric Environment, 44, 4678-4734.
Luderer, G., Kriegler, E., Delsa, L., Edelenbosch, O., Emmerling, J., Krey, V., Mccollum, D., Pachauri, S., Riahi, K., Saveyn, B., Tavoni, 
M., Vrontisi, Z., Van Vuuren, D., Arent, D., Arvesen, A., Fujimori, S., Iyer, G., Keppo, I., Kermeli, K., Mima, S., Ó , Broin, E., Pietzcker, 
R., Sano, F., Scholz, Y., Van Ruijven, B. & Wilson, C. (2016) Deep Decarbonisation Towards 1.5°C - 2°C Stabilisation - Policy findings 
from the ADVANCE project (first edition). ADVANCE, http://www.fp7-advance.eu/content/advance-key-findings.
Luderer, G., Pietzcker, R. C., Bertram, C., Kriegler, E., Meinshausen, M. & Edenhofer, O. (2013) Economic mitigation challenges: how 
further delay closes the door for achieving climate targets. Environmental Research Letters, 8, 034033.
Michaelowa, K. and Michaelowa, A. (2017) Transnational Climate Governance Initiatives: Designed for Effective Climate Change 
Mitigation? International Interactions, 43, 129-155.
Millar, R. J., Fuglestvedt, J. S., Friedlingstein, P., Rogelj, J., Grubb, M. J., Matthews, H. D., Skeie, R. B., Forster, P. M., Frame, D. J. & 
Allen, M. R. (2017) Emission budgets and pathways consistent with limiting warming to 1.5°C. Nature Geosci, 10, 741-747.
Ministry of Science And Technology Of Brazil (2016) Third National Communication of Brazil to the United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change.
Mitra, A., Chitkara, P., Ross, K., Singh, M., Sawhney, S., Keswani, S. & Batra, P. (2017) Pathways for Meeting India’s Climate Goals. 
Washington DC, USA: World Resource Institute.
Motie-Moe-Molit (2017) Joint press release by Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy (MOTIE), Ministry of Environment (MOE), and 
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport (MOLIT) on the occasion of joint report to the President.
Nordhaus, W. D. (2017) Revisiting the social cost of carbon. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 114, 1518-1523.
PBL (2017) PBL Climate Pledge NDC tool, www.pbl.nl/indc. PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency.
REN21 (2017) Renewables 2017: Global Status Report, available at: http://www.ren21.net/gsr-2017/ [Online]. Available: http://
www.ren21.net/gsr-2017/ [Accessed 08/10/2017].
Reputex (2016) Framing Australia’s 2030 energy and climate policy mix. The contribution of safeguard sectors to Australia’s 2030 
emissions reduction target. http://www.reputex.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/0916_RepuTex-White-Paper_Framing-Aus-
tralias-energy-policy-mix-to-2030.pdf: MARKET UPDATE | September 2016 
Rhodium GROUP (2017a) Taking Stock 2017: Adjusting Expectations for US GHG Emissions. Available at: http://rhg.com/reports/
taking-stock-2017-adjusting-expectations-for-us-ghg-emissions.
73The Emissions Gap Report 2017 – References
Rhodium GROUP (2017b) Trump’s Regulatory Rollback Begins, Available at: http://rhg.com/notes/trumps-regulatory-rollback-be-
gins.
Riahi, K., Van Vuuren, D. P., Kriegler, E., Edmonds, J., O’neill, B. C., Fujimori, S., Bauer, N., Calvin, K., Dellink, R., Fricko, O., Lutz, 
W., POPP, A., Cuaresma, J. C., KC, S., Leimbach, M., Jiang, L., Kram, T., Rao, S., Emmerling, J., Ebi, K., Hasegawa, T., Havlik, P., 
Humpenöder, F., Da Silva, L. A., Smith, S., Stehfest, E., Bosetti, V., Eom, J., Gernaat, D., Masui, T., Rogelj, J., Strefler, J., Drouet, L., 
Krey, V., Luderer, G., Harmsen, M., Takahashi, K., Baumstark, L., Doelman, J. C., Kainuma, M., Klimont, Z., Marangoni, G., Lotze-
Campen, H., Obersteiner, M., Tabeau, A. & Tavoni, M. (2017) The Shared Socioeconomic Pathways and their energy, land use, and 
greenhouse gas emissions implications: An overview. Global Environmental Change, 42, 153-168.
Rogelj, J., Den Elzen, M., Höhne, N., Fransen, T., Fekete, H., Winkler, H., Schaeffer, R., SHA, F., RIAHI, K. & MEINSHAUSEN, M. (2016) 
Paris Agreement climate proposals need a boost to keep warming well below 2°C. Nature, 534, 631-639.
Rogelj, J., Fricko, O., Meinshausen, M., Krey, V., J, Z. & Riahi, K. (2017a) Understanding the origin of Paris Agreement emission un-
certainties Nature Communications 8,15748 doi: 10.1038/ncomms15748.
Rogelj, J., Hare, W., Chen, C. & Meinshausen, M. (2011) Discrepancies in historical emissions point to a wider 2020 gap between 2°C 
benchmarks and aggregated national mitigation pledges. Environmental Research Letters.
Rogelj, J., Luderer, G., Pietzcker, R. C., Kriegler, E., Schaeffer, M., Krey, V. & Riahi, K. (2015) Energy system transformations for limiting 
end-of-century warming to below 1.5°C. Nature Climate Change, 5, 519-527.
Rogelj, J., Mccollum, D. L., O’neill, B. C. & Riahi, K. (2013a) 2020 emissions levels required to limit warming to below 2°C. Nature 
Clim. Change, 3, 405-412.
Rogelj, J., Mccollum, D. L., Reisinger, A., Meinshausen, M. & Riahi, K. (2013b) Probabilistic cost estimates for climate change mitiga-
tion. Nature, 493, 79-83.
Rogelj, J., Popp, A., Calvin, K. V., Luderer, G., Emmerling, J., Gernaat, D., Fujimori, S., Strefler, J., Hasegawa, T., Marangoni, G., Krey, 
V., Kriegler, E., Riahi, K., Van Vuuren, D. P., Doelman, J., Drouet, L., Edmonds, J., Fricko, O., Harmsen, M., Havlík, P., Humpenöder, 
F., Stehfest, E. & Tavoni, M. (2017b) Transition pathways towards limiting climate change below 1.5°C. Nature Climate Change 
(under review), http://unfccc.int/files/adaptation/application/pdf/2.9_iiasa_rogelj.pdf.
Schneider, L., Day, T., LA Hoz, S. & Warnecke, C. (2017) Discussion Paper: CDM Supply Potential up to 2020. NewClimate Institute, 
the Climate group.
SEEG (2017) The System Study Greenhouse Gas Emissions Estimates (SEEG). [Online]. Available: http://seeg.eco.br/en/ [Accessed 
21 July 2017].
Sha, F., Ji, Z. and Linwei, L. (2015) An Analysis of China’s INDC. Beijing, China: China National Center for Climate Change Strategy and 
International Cooperation.
Sha, F., Ji, Z. and Linwei, L. (2017) An Analysis of China’s INDC (Updated analysis 2017) (MILES report). Beijing, China: China National 
Center for Climate Change Strategy and International Cooperation.
State CounciL (2013) Air Pollution Prevention Action Plan [Online]. Accessed: 26 October 2017
The Climate Group (2016) Compact of States and Regions - Disclosure report: How leading states, provinces and regions are re-
sponding to the Paris Agreement 2016 Edition. Available at: https://www.theclimategroup.org/sites/default/files/compact-of-
states-and-regions-disclosure-report-2015.pdf.
The Representative of The United States of America to the United Nations (2017) Reference: C.N.464.2017.TREATIES-XXVII.7.d (De-
positary Notification). United Nations, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2017/CN.464.2017-Eng.pdf 
UNEP (2012) The Emissions Gap Report 2012: A UNEP Synthesis Report.  United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Nairobi. 
Available: http://www.unep.org/emissionsgapreport2012/ [accessed 23 September 2017]
UNEP (2015) The Emissions Gap Report 2015: A UNEP Synthesis Report [Online]. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 
Nairobi. Available: http://www.unep.org/emissionsgapreport2015/ [Accessed 23 September 2017].
UNEP (2016) The Emissions Gap Report 2016: A UNEP Synthesis Report [Online]. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 
Nairobi. Available: http://www.unep.org/emissionsgapreport2016/ [Accessed 23 September 2017].
UNFCCC (2015) Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/indc/Submission%20
Pages/submissions.aspx.
Van Vuuren, D. P., Stehfest, E., Gernaat, D., Doelman, J., Van Den Berg, M., Harmsen, M., DE Boer, H. S., Bouwman, L., Daioglou, V., 
Edelenbosch, O., Girod, B., Kram, T., Lassaletta, L., Lucas, P., Van Meijl, H., Müller, C., Van Ruijven, B., Van Der Sluis, S. & Tabeau, 
A. (2017) Energy, land-use and greenhouse gas emissions trajectories under a green growth paradigm. Global Environmental 
Change, 42, 237-250.
Vandyck, T., Keramidas, K., Saveyn, B., Kitous, A. & Vrontisi, Z. (2016) A global stocktake of the Paris pledges: Implications for energy 
systems and economy. Global Environmental Change, 41, 46-63.
Vrontisi, Z., Luderer, G., Saveyn, B., Bertram, C., De Boer, H. S., Drouet, L., Fragkiadakis, K., Fricko, O., Fujimori, S., Guivarch, C., 
Keramidas, K., Kitous, A., Krey, V., Kriegler, E., Broin, E., Paroussos, L., Riahi, K., Tavoni, M. & Van Vuuren, D. P. (2016) Report 
containing an economic analysis of a set of sectoral impacts, Deliverable No. 6.4, ADVANCE, Advanced Model Development 
and Validation for Improved Analysis of Costs and Impacts of Mitigation Policies, http://www.fp7-advance.eu/sites/default/files/
documents/WP6/D6.4_deliverable_20170619.pdf.
Vrontisi, Z., Luderer, G., Saveyn, B., Bertram, C., De Boer, H. S., Drouet, L., Fragkiadakis, K., Fricko, O., Fujimori, S., Guivarch, C., 
Keramidas, K., Kitous, A., Krey, V., Kriegler, E., Broin, E., Paroussos, L., Riahi, K., Tavoni, M. & Van Vuuren, D. P. (2017) A multi-mod-
el assessment of the effectiveness of Paris pledges towards a 1.5-2°C stabilization, Global Environmental Change (submitted).
Weyant, J. (2017) Some Contributions of Integrated Assessment Models of Global Climate Change. Review of Environmental Eco-
nomics and Policy, 11, 115-137.
Chapter 4
Afanador, A., Begemann, E., Bourgault, C., Krabbe, O. and Wouters, K. (2015) The potential of scaling up proven low-carbon solu-
tions. Available at: https://media.sitra.fi/2017/02/28142516/Ecofys_2015_potential_of_scaling_up-low_carbon_solutions.pdf 
[Accessed 24 October 2017].
74 The Emissions Gap Report 2017 – References
Akbar, S., Kleiman, G., Menon, S. and Segafredo, L. (2014) Climate-smart development : adding up the benefits of actions that help 
build prosperity, end poverty and combat climate change : Main report Washington, DC : World Bank Group. Available at: http://
documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/794281468155721244/Main-report [Accessed 24 October 2017]
Alvik, S., Eide, M., Endresen, Ø., Hoffman, P., and Longva, T. (2010) Pathways to Low Carbon Shipping-Abatement Potential Towards 
2030. DNV De Norske Veritas.
Arasto, A., K. Onarheim, E., Tsupari, and Kärki, J. (2014) ‘Bio-CCS: feasibility comparison of large scale carbon-negative solutions’. 
Energy Procedia 63, 6756-6769.
Blok, K., and Gardiner, A. (2015) Climate commitments of subnational actors and business – a quantitative assessment of their 
emission reduction impact. Available at: http://www.unep.org/ourplanet/september-2015/unep-publications/climate-commit-
ments-subnational-actors-and-business-quantitative [Accessed 24 October 2017]
Bloomberg New Energy Finance. (2017) Electric Vehicle Outlook 2017. Available at: https://data.bloomberglp.com/bnef/
sites/14/2017/07/BNEF_EVO_2017_ExecutiveSummary.pdf [Accessed 24 October 2017]
Bonn, A., Reed, M., Evans, C., Joosten, H., Bain, C., Farmer, J., Emmer, I., Birnie, D.. (2014) Investing in nature: Developing ecosystem 
service markets for peatland restoration. Ecosystem Services, 9: 54-65.
Breyer, C., Bogdanov, D., Gulagi, A., Aghahosseini, A., Barbosa, L.S.N.S., Koskinen, O., Barasa, M., Caldera, U., Afanasyeva, S., Child, 
M., Farfan, J. and Vainikka, P. (2017) On the role of solar photovoltaics in global energy transition scenarios. Progress in photo-
voltaics: research and applications. 25(8): 727-745.
Bouman, E., Lindstad, E., Rialland, A., Stromann, A. (2017) State-of-the-art technologies, measures, and potential for reducing GHG 
emissions from shipping – A review. Transportation Research Part D: Transport and Environment. 52: 408 – 421. 
BLE (2016) Evaluations und Erfahrungsbericht für das Jahr 2015, Biomassestrom-Nachhaltigkeitsverordnung and Biokraftstoff-
Nachhaltigkeitsverordnung. Bonn Germany: Bundesanstalt für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung. 
C40 (2014) Advancing climate ambition: cities as partners in global climate action. Available at http://c40-production-images.
s3.amazonaws.com/researches/images/25_Advancing_Climate_Ambition.original.pdf?1412878084 [Accessed 24 October 
2017]
Chen, X., Luo, Y., Zhou, Y., and Lu, M. (2016) Carbon Sequestration Potential in Stands under the Grain for Green Program in South-
west China. PLoS ONE, 11(3): 1-17.
Clarke, L., Jiang, K., Akimoto, K., Babiker, M., Blanford, G., Fisher-Vanden, K., Hourcade, J.-C., Krey, V., Kriegler, E., Löschel, A., Mc-
Collum, D., Paltsev, S., Rose, S., Shukla, P.R., Tavoni, M., Van der Zwaan, B., Van Vuuren, D. (2014) Assessing Transformation Path-
ways. In: Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report 
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambrigde and New York: Cambridge University Press.
CLASP (2011) Opportunities for success and CO2 savings from appliance energy efficiency harmonisation. Available at http://clasp.
ngo/Resources/Resources/PublicationLibrary/2011/Opportunities-for-appliance-EE-harmonization#file [Accessed 24 October 
2017]
Climate Action Tracker (2016) 10 Steps: the ten most important short-term steps to limit warming to 1.5°C. Available at http://cli-
mateactiontracker.org/assets/publications/publications/CAT_10_Steps_for_1o5.pdf [Accessed 24 October 2017]
Creutzig, F., Agoston, P., Goldschmidt, J., Luderer, G., Nemet, G., and Pietzcker, R. (2017) The underestimated potential of solar 
energy to mitigate climate change. Nature Energy (2) doi:10.1038/nenergy.2017.140
Deng, Y., Blok, K., and Leun, K. (2012) Transition to a fully sustainable global energy system. Energy Strategy Reviews, 1(2): 1-13.
Dimassi, B., Mary, B., Wylleman, R., Labreuche, J., Couture, D., Piraux, F., and Cohan, J. (2014) Long-term effect of contrasted tillage 
and crop management on soil carbon dynamics during 41 years. Agriculture, Ecosystems and Environment, 136-146.
Ecofys (2017) A role for rapeseed biodiesel in greening EU transport. Utrecht: Ecofys (forthcoming).
Eide, M., Longva, T., Hoffmann, P., Endresen, Ø., and Dalsøren , S. (2011) Future cost scenarios for reduction of ship CO
2
 emissions. 
Maritime Policy and Management, 11-37.
Faber, J., Wang., H., Nelissen, D., Russell, B., and Amand, D. (2011) Marginal abatement costs and cost effectiveness of energy-
efficiency measures. Institute of Marine Engineering, Science and Technology.
Fischedick. (2014) Industry. New York: Cambridge University Press.
GBPN (2013) What is a deep renovation definition? Available at http://www.gbpn.org/sites/default/files/08.DR_TechRep.low_.pdf 
[Accessed 24 October 2017]
GCEM (2015) Raising Ambition to Reduce International Aviation and Maritime Emissions. Contributing paper for Seizing the Global 
Opportunity: Partnerships for Better Growth and a Better Climate. New Climate Economy, London and Washington, DC. Available 
at: http://newclimateeconomy.report/misc/working-papers. [Accessed 24 October 2017]
GCEM (2015) New Climate Economy Technical Note: Abatement Reduction Potential. Available at: http://newclimateeconomy.
report/workingpapers/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2016/04/NCE-technical-note-emission-reduction-potential_final.pdf [Ac-
cessed 24 October 2017]
GWEC (2016) Global Wind Report 2016. Available at http://gwec.net/publications/global-wind-report-2/global-wind-report-2016/ 
[Accessed 24 October 2017]
Hawken, P. (2017) Drawdown: The Most Comprehensive Plan Ever Proposed to Reverse Global Warming. New York: Penguin Ran-
dom House LLC.
Herzog, H., Smekens K., Dadhich, P., Dooley, J., Fujii, Y., Hohmeyer, O., and Riahi K. (2005) Costs and Economic Potential, in: IPCC 
Special Report on Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage. Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
Hoffmann, P., Eide, M., and Endresen, Ø. (2012) Effect of proposed CO
2
 emission reduction scenarios on capital expenditure. Mari-
time Policy and Management, 443-460.
ICAO (2013) Environmental Report 2013. Available at http://cfapp.icao.int/Environmental-Report-2013/files/assets/basic-html/in-
dex.html#1 [Accessed 24 October 2017].
ICCT (2012) Global Transportation Energy and Climate Roadmap. Availabel at: http://www.theicct.org/publications/global-trans-
portation-energy-and-climate-roadmap [Accessed 24 October 2017].
75The Emissions Gap Report 2017 – References
ICCT (2017) Technology uptake, costs, and benefits under a next-phase passenger car efficiency program in Brazil. Available at: 
http://www.theicct.org/publications/technology-uptake-costs-and-benefits-under-next-phase-passenger-car-efficiency-pro-
gram [Accessed 24 October 2017].
IEA (2016) World Energy Outlook 2016. Paris: International Energy Agency.
IEA (2017) Enery Technology Perspectives 2017. Paris: International Energy Agency.
IPCC. (2001) Climate Change 2001: Synthesis Report. A Contribution of Working Groups I, II, and III to the Third Assessment Report 
of the Integovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambrigde and New York: Cambridge University Press.
IPCC (2007) Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Geneva: IPCC.
IPCC (2014) Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Geneva: IPCC.
IRENA (2016) Roadmap for a Renewable Energy Future. Bonn: IRENA Innovation and Technology Centre.
IRENA (2017) ‘Renewable Energy Auctions: Analysing 2016’. IRENA, Abu Dhabi. Available at http://www.irena.org/DocumentDown-
loads/Publications/IRENA_REAuctions_summary_2017.pdf 
Johnson, N., Parker, N., and J.Ogden. (2014) How negative can biofuels with CCS take us and at what cost? . Energy Procedia 63: 
6770 – 6791.
Joosten, H., Tapio-Biström, M.-L., and Tol, S. (2012) Peatlands - guidance for climate change mitigation through conservation, reha-
bilitation and sustainable use. Available at: http://www.fao.org/3/a-an762e.pdf [Accessed 24 October 2017].
Kim, K., and Zsuffa, L. (1994) Reforestation of South Korea: The history and analysis of a unique case in forest tree improvement and 
forestry. The Forestry Chronicle, 58-64.
Klimont, Z., and Höglund-Isaksson, L. (2017) Personal communication. IIASA.
Lazard (2016) Levelized Cost of Energy Analysis 10.0. Available at: https://www.lazard.com/media/438038/levelized-cost-of-energy-
v100.pdf [Accessed 24 October 2017].
Lundqvist, J. (2009) Losses and waste in the global crisis. Rev. Environ. Sci. Biotechnnol., 121-123
Mac Dowell N, and Fajardy, M. (2017) Inefficient power generation as an optimal route to negative emissions via BECCS? Environ-
mental Research Letters 12 (4): 1-11.
McGlashan, N., Workman, M., Caldecott, B., and Shah, N. (2012) Negative Emissions Technologies. Grantham Institute for Climate 
Change Briefing paper No 8.
Messinger, J. and DeWitt, S. (2015) Bonn Challenge on track to meet land restoration goal by 2020. Available at: http://www.wri.
org/blog/2015/03/bonn-challenge-track-meet-land-restoration-goal-2020-0 [Accessed 24 October 2017]
Molenbroek, E., Smith, M., Surmeli, N., Schimschär, S., Waide, P., Tait, J., and McAllister, C. (2015) Savings and benefits of global 
regulations for energy efficient products. Brussels, Belgium: European Commission.
Nelleman, C., MacDevette, M., Manders, T., Eickhout, B., Svihus, B., and Prins, A. (2009) The environmental Food Crisis – The Envi-
ronment’s Role in Averting Future Food Crises. A UNEP Rapid Response Assessment. Arendal, Norway: United Nations Environ-
mental Programme, GRID.
Nelson, G., Rosegrant, M., Palazzo, A., Gray, I., Ingersoll, C., Robertson, R., Tokzog S., Zhu T., Sulser T.B., Ringer, C., Mgansi, S. and You, 
L. (2010) Food Security, Farming, and Climate Change to 2050: Scenarios, Results, Policy Options. Washington, DC: International 
Food Policy Research Institute.
Papaefthymiou, G., Grave, K., and Dragoon, K. (2014) Flexibility options in electricity systems. Available at: https://www.ecofys.com/
files/files/ecofys-eci-2014-flexibility-options-in-electricity-systems.pdf [Accessed 24 October 2017]
Purohit, P., and Höglund-Isaksson, L. (2017) Global emissions of fluorinated greenhouse gases 2005–2050 with abatement poten-
tials and costs. Atmos. Chem. Phys., 17, 2795–2816. doi:10.5194/acp-17-2795-2017
REN21 (2017) Global Status Report. Available at http://www.ren21.net/status-of-renewables/global-status-report/ [Accessed 24 
October 2017]Renforth, P., Washbourne, C.-L., Taylder, J., and Manning, D.A.C. (2012) Silicate Production and Availability for 
Mineral Carbonation. Environmental Science and Technology, 45 (6), 2035–2041Saygin, D., E. Worrell, M.K. Patel, D.J. Gielen. 
(2011) Benchmarking the energy use of energy-intensive industries in industrialized and in developing countries. Energy (36): 
6661 – 6673.
SITRA (2015) Green to Scale. Available at https://media.sitra.fi/2017/02/28142523/Selvityksia105.pdf [Accessed 24 October 2017].
Smith (2016) Soil carbon sequestration and biochar as negative emission technologies. Global Change Biology, 1315-1324.
Smith, P., Martino, D., Cai, Z., Gwary, D., Janzen, H., Pushpam, K., McCarl, B., Ogle, S., O’Mara, F., Rice, C., Scholes, B., Sirotenko, O. 
(2008) Greenhouse gas mitigation in agriculture. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B, 789-813.
Smith, P. Smith, P., Martino, D., Cai, Z., Gwary, D., Janzen, H., Pushpam, K., McCarl, B., Ogle, S., O’Mara, Frank, Rice, Charles, Scholes, 
Bob, Sirotenko, Oleg, (2007) Agriculture. In Climate Change 2007: Mitigation. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth 
Assessment Report of the, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Smith, P., M. Bustamante, H.Ahammad, H. Clark, H. Dong, E. Elsiddig, H. Haberl, R. Harper, J. House,, M. Jafari, O. Masera, C. Mbow, 
N. Ravindranath, C. Rice, C. Robledo, A. Romanovskaya, F. Sperling, F. Tubiello. (2014) Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use 
(AFOLU) In: Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report 
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
Stehfest, E., Van den Berg, M., Woltjer, G., and Westhoek, G. (2013) Options to reduce the environmental effects of livestock produc-
tion – Comparison of two economic models. Agricultural Systems, 38-53.
Teske, S., Sawyer, S., Schäter, O., Pregger, T., Simon, S., and Naegler, T. (2015) Energy [R]evolution a Sustainable World Energy Out-
look 2015. Hamburg: Greenpeace International.
UNEP (2011) Bridging the Emission Gap. Nairobi: United Nations Environment Programme. Available at: https://www.ecofys.com/
files/files/unep_bridging%20the%20emissions%20gap.pdf [Accessed 24 October 2017]
UNEP (2012) The Emissions Gap Report 2012. Nairobi: United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). http://apps.unep.org/re-
direct.php?file=/publications/pmtdocuments/-The%20emissions%20gap%20report%202012_%20a%20UNEP%20synthesis%20
reportemissionGapReport2012.pdf  [Accessed 24 October 2017] 
76 The Emissions Gap Report 2017 – References
UNEP (2013) The Emissions Gap Report 2013. Nairobi: United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). Available at: http://www.
unep.org/sites/default/files/EGR2013/EmissionsGapReport_2013_high-res.pdf [Acessed 24 October 2017]
UNEP (2014) The Emissions Gap Report 2014. Nairobi: United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). Available at: http://wed-
ocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/9345/-The%20Emissions%20Gap%20Report%202014%3a%20a%20UNEP%20
synthesis%20report-November%202014EGR_2014_Lowres.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y [Accessed 24 October 2017]
UNEP (2014) Green paper Policy Options to Accelerate the Global Transition to Advanced Lighting. Nairobi: United Nations Environ-
ment Programme (UNEP). 
UNEP (2016) Emission Gap Report 2016. Nairobi: United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).  Available at: https://www.
google.dk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwignN39p4vXAhXpDZoKHdh9BgUQ
FggwMAE&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwedocs.unep.org%2Fbitstream%2Fhandle%2F20.500.11822%2F10016%2Femission_gap_re-
port_2016.pdf&usg=AOvVaw3gBleyjAH07zqiIjLQw9N2 [Accessed 24 October 2017. 
UNEP (2017) Accelerating the global adoption of energy-efficient lighting. Available at: http://www.enlighten-initiative.org/Por-
tals/0/documents/global-forum/Green_Paper_FINAL%20reduced.pft [Accessed 24 October 2017]
USEPA (2012) Global Anthropogenic Non-CO2 Greenhouse Gas Emissions: 1990 - 2030. United States: Environmental Protection 
Agency.
USEPA (2013) Global Mitigation of Non-CO2 Greenhouse Gases: 2010-2030. United States: Environmental Protection Agency.
Verdone, M., Olsen, N., Wylie, P., Saint Laurent, C., and Maginnis, M. (2015) Making the case for forest landscape restoration. White 
paper, initial working draft for future discussion. Post-Bonn Challenge 2.0 Ministerial Event, 20-21 March 2015. IUCN.
Wagner, N. (2017) Personal communication from Mr. N. Wagner, IRENA, September 2017. 
Wichtmann, W., Schröder, C., and Joosten, H. (2016) Paludiculture – productive use of wet peatlands. Climate protection − biodiver-
sity − regional economic benefits. Stuttgart: Schweizerbart Science Publishers.
Woolf, D., Amonette, J., Alayne Street-Perrott, F., Lehmann, J., and Joseph, S. (2010) Sustainable biochar to mitigate global climate 
change. Nature Communications, 1-56.
Worell, E., and Carreon, J. (2017) Energy demand for materials in an international context. Utrecht: The Royal Society.
World Bank (2016) The Cost of Fire: An Economic Analysis of Indonesia’s 2015 Fire Crisis. Jakarta: World Bank.
Chapter 5
ADB (2017). ‘Poverty in India.’ Basic Statistics. Asian Development Bank. Available at: https://www.adb.org/countries/india/
poverty[Accessed 19 October 2017]
Annaluru, R., and Garg, A. (2017). Managing the Power Grid Ramping Challenges Critical to Success of India’s Renewable Energy 
Targets. Working paper No 2017-08-01. Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad. Available at: https://web.iima.ac.in/as-
sets/snippets/workingpaperpdf/14473831782017-08-01.pdf [Accessed October 19 2017 ]
Arent, D., Arndt, C., Miller, M., Zinaman, O., and Tarp, F. (2017). ‘The Political Economy of Clean Energy Transitions.’ Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
Audoly, R., Vogt-Schilb, A. and Guivarch, C. (2014). ‘Pathways toward Zero-Carbon Electricity Required for Climate Stabilization.’ 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 7075.
Australian Government. (2017). ‘Australian Mineral Commodities: Coal.’ Department of Industry, Innovation and Science. Available 
at:https://www.industry.gov.au/resource/Mining/AustralianMineralCommodities/Pages/Coal.aspx [Accessed 19 October 2017]
Bach, S., Kohlhaas, M., Meyer, B., Praetorius, B. and Welsch, H. (2002). ‘The Effects of Environmental Fiscal Reform in Germany: 
A Simulation Study.’ Energy Policy 30 (9): pp. 803–811. 
Baker, L., and Burton, J. in press. ‘The Politics of Procurement and the Low Carbon Transition in South Africa.’ In: Elgar, E. Handbook 
of the International Political Economy of Energy and Natural Resources.
Sharma, B. K. and Das Kundu, N. (2016). China’s One Belt One Road: Initiative, Challenges and Prospects. Vij Books India Pvt Ltd. 
Available at:https://books.google.dk/books?isbn=9385563602 [Accessed 19 October 2017]
Bauer, N., Mouratiadou, I., Luderer, G., Baumstark, L., Brecha, R. J., Edenhofer, O., and Kriegler, E. (2016). ‘Global Fossil Energy 
Markets and Climate Change Mitigation–an Analysis with REMIND.’ Climatic Change 136 (1): pp. 69–82.
Bazilian, M., and Onyeji, I. (2012). ‘Fossil Fuel Subsidy Removal and Inadequate Public Power Supply: Implications for Businesses.’ 
Energy Policy 45: pp. 1–5. 
Bertram, C., Johnson, N., Luderer, G., Riahi, K., Isaac, M. and Eom, J. (2015). ‘Carbon Lock-in through Capital Stock Inertia Associated 
with Weak near-Term Climate Policies.’ Technological Forecasting and Social Change 90, Part A (January): pp. 62–72. Bertram, 
C., Luderer, G., Pietzcker, R. C., Schmid, E., Kriegler, E., and Edenhofer, O. (2015). ‘Complementing Carbon Prices with Technology 
Policies to Keep Climate Targets within Reach.’ Nature Climate Change 5 (3): pp. 235–39. 
BNEF (2017). ‘New Energy Outlook.’ Bloomberg New Energy Finance. https://about.bnef.com/new-energy-outlook/
Bouzarovski, S. and Tirado Herrero, S. (2017). ‘Geographies of Injustice: The Socio-Spatial Determinants of Energy Poverty in Po-
land, the Czech Republic and Hungary.’ Post-Communist Economies 29 (1): pp. 27–50. 
Branger, F. and Quirion, P. (2014). ‘Climate Policy and the ‘Carbon Haven’ Effect.’ Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change 5 
(1): pp. 53–71. doi:10.1002/wcc.245.
Brenner, M., Riddle, M. and Boyce, J.K. (2007). ‘A Chinese Sky Trust?: Distributional Impacts of Carbon Charges and Revenue 
Recycling in China.’ Energy Policy 35 (3): pp. 1771–1784. 
Breyer, C., Bogdanov, D., Gulagi, A., Aghahosseini, A., Barbosa, L. S.N.S., Koskinen, O., Maulidi Barasa, M. (2017). ‘On the Role of 
Solar Photovoltaics in Global Energy Transition Scenarios.’ Progress in Photovoltaics: Research and Applications 25: pp. 727–745. 
doi:10.1002/pip.2885.
Burton, J., Caetano, T., Hughes, A., Merven, B., Ahjum, F. and McCall, B. (2016). ‘The Impact of Stranding Power Sector Assets in 
South Africa: Using a Linked Model to Understand Economy-Wide Implications.’ Cape Town: Energy Research Centre, University 
of Cape Town.
77The Emissions Gap Report 2017 – References
Burtraw, D., Sweeney, R. and Walls, M. (2009). ‘The Incidence of U.S. Climate Policy: Alternative Uses of Revenues from a Cap-and-
Trade Auction.’ National Tax Journal 62 (3): pp. 497–518.
Caldecott, B. (2017). ‘Introduction to Special Issue: Stranded Assets and the Environment.’ Journal of Sustainable Finance & Invest-
ment 7 (1): pp. 1–13. 
Caldecott, B., Sartor, O. and Spencer, T. (2017). ‘Lessons from Previous Coal Transitions: High-Level Summary for Decision-Makers.’ 
London: IDDRI & Climate Strategies. http://www.iddri.org/Publications/Rapports-and-briefing-papers/COAL_SynthesisReport_
v04.pdf
Callan, T., Lyons, S., Scott, S., Tol, R. S. J. and Verde, S. (2009). ‘The Distributional Implications of a Carbon Tax in Ireland.’ Energy 
Policy 37 (2): pp. 407–412. 
Cameron, L., and van der Zwaan, B. (2015). ‘Employment Factors for Wind and Solar Energy Technologies: A Literature Review.’ 
Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 45 (May): pp. 160–172. 
Carbon Tracker Initiative. (2015). ‘The $2 Trillion Stranded Assets Danger Zone: How Fossil Fuel Firms Risk Destroying Investor 
Returns.’ London. https://www.carbontracker.org/reports/stranded-assets-danger-zone/
CEC. (2017). ‘Briefing on the Power Sector’s Status during January - June 2017.’ China Electricity Council. http://www.cec.org.cn/
guihuayutongji/gongxufenxi/dianliyunxingjiankuang/2017-07-19/171012.html
Central Electricity Authority Government of India. (2016). ‘Draft National Electricity Plan (Volume 1) Generation.’ http://www.cea.
nic.in/reports/committee/nep/nep_dec.pdf
Chen, H. (2017). ‘Why Are G20 Governments Financing Coal Over Renewables?’ National Resources Defense Council (NRDC) Expert 
Blog. July 17. https://www.nrdc.org/experts/han-chen/why-are-g20-governments-financing-coal-over-renewables
Chong, C., Ma, L., Li, Z., Ni, W and Song, S. (2015). ‘Logarithmic Mean Divisia Index (LMDI) Decomposition of Coal Consumption in 
China Based on the Energy Allocation Diagram of Coal Flows.’ Energy 85 (June): pp. 366–378.
Citi GPS. (2015). ‘Energy 2030: Financing a Greener Future. Financing Green Energy in a Low Fossil Fuel Price World and Managing 
Stranded Asset Risk.’ Citi Global Perspectives & Solutions. https://ir.citi.com/BOkALUJBhr6ezsrQxov5ZpfX3D8UkGSU7cyUzHOPU
zfK%2FaozVshGqUWCOwuxH0eFBsfY5BSB8aM%3D
Clarke, L., Jiang, K., Akimoto, K., Babiker, M., Blanford, G., Fisher-Vanden, K. and van Vuuren, D. P. (2014). Assessing Transformation 
Pathways. In: Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment 
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge, New York. Cambridge University Press.
Coady, D., Parry, I., Sears, L. and Shang, B. (2016). ‘How Large Are Global Fossil Fuel Subsidies?’ World Development. 
Coady, D., Parry, I. and Shang, B. (2017). ‘Energy Price Reform: A Guide for Policymakers.’ CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6342.
Collier, P., and Venables, A. J. (2014). ‘Closing Coal: Economic and Moral Incentives.’ Oxford Review of Economic Policy 30 (3): 
pp. 492–512.
Coons, C. (2015). ‘Master Limited Partnership Parity Act Section-by-Section.’ http://www.mlpassociation.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2015/09/MLP_Section-by-Section-114th_-Congress.pdf
Cramton, P, MacKay, D. J. C., Ockenfels, A. and Stoft, S. eds. (2017). Global Carbon Pricing: The Path to Climate Cooperation. 
Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
Creutzig, F., Agoston, P., Goldschmidt, J. C., Luderer, G., Nemet, G. and Pietzcker, R. C. (2017). ‘The Underestimated Potential of Solar 
Energy to Mitigate Climate Change.’ Nature Energy 2 (9): 
CSIR. (2016). ‘Least-Cost Electricity Mix for South Africa by 2040: Scenarios for South Africa’s Future Electricity Mix.’ Pretoria: South 
Africa: Council of Scientific & Industrial Research (CSIR) Energy Centre.
Danish Energy Agency. (2017). ‘Annual and Monthly Statistics.’ https://ens.dk/en/our-services/statistics-data-key-figures-and- 
energy-maps/annual-and-monthly-statistics
Davis, S. J., Caldeira, K. and Matthews, H. D. 2010. ‘Future CO
2
 Emissions and Climate Change from Existing Energy Infrastructure.’ 
Science 329 (5997): pp. 1330–1333. 
Davis, S. J., and Socolow R.H. (2014). ‘Commitment Accounting of CO
2
 Emissions.’ Environmental Research Letters 9 (8). 
DoE. 2017a. ‘Siting and Regulating Carbon Capture, Utilization and Storage Infrastructure.’ Workshop Report. Washington, DC: U.S. 
Dept. of Energy.
DoE. 2017b. ‘Staff Report to the Secretary on Electricity Markets and Reliability.’ Washington DC: U.S. Dept. of Energy. https://en-
ergy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/08/f36/Staff%20Report%20on%20Electricity%20Markets%20and%20Reliability_0.pdf
Dolphin, G., Pollitt, M. and Newbery, D. (2016). ‘Political Economy of Carbon Pricing Policies: Insights from a Panel of Countries.’ 
In Energy: Expectations and Uncertainty, 39th IAEE International Conference, Jun 19-22, (2016). International Association for 
Energy Economics.
Edenhofer, O., Steckel, J. C., Jakob, M. and Bertram, C. (2017). ‘Reports of Coal’s Terminal Decline May Be Exaggerated.’ MCC 
Working Paper.
Enerdata. (2015). ‘Indonesia Releases Its 35 GW Power Capacity Addition Plan.’ http://www.enerdata.net/enerdatauk/press-and-
publication/energy-news-001/indonesia-releases-its-35-gw-power-capacity-addition-plan_32605.html
Eskom. (2017). ‘Integrated Report 2017.’ http://www.eskom.co.za/IR2017/Documents/Eskom_integrated_report_2017.pdf
Fay, M., Hallegatte, S., Vogt-Schilb, A., Rozenberg, J., Narloch, U. and Kerr, T. (2015). Decarbonizing Development: Three Steps to a 
Zero-Carbon Future. Washington DC, USA: World Bank Publications.
Fothergill, S. (2017). ‘Coal Transition in the United Kingdom.’ An Historical Case Study for the Project ‘Coal Transitions: Research 
and Dialogue on the Future of Coal.’ IDDRI and Climate Strategies. www.iddri.org/Publications/Rapports-and-briefing-papers/
COAL_UK_v04.pdf
Galgóczi, B. (2014). ‘The Long and Winding Road from Black to Green: Decades of Structural Change in the Ruhr Region.’ Interna-
tional Journal of Labour Research 6 (2): pp. 217–240.
Garg, A., Mohan, P., Kankal, B., Shukla, S. and Vishwanathan, S. (2017). High-Impact Opportunities for Energy Efficiency in India. 
Copenhagen: Copenhagen Centre on Energy Efficiency, UNEP DTU. ISBN: 978-87-93458-14-7
Garg, A., and Shukla, P. R. (2009). ‘Coal and Energy Security for India: Role of Carbon Dioxide (CO
2
) Capture and Storage (CCS).’ 
Energy Journal 34 (8): pp. 1032–1041.
78 The Emissions Gap Report 2017 – References
Gerdes, J. (2016). Quitting Carbon: How Denmark Is Leading the Clean Energy Transition and Winning the Race to the Low-Carbon 
Future.
GoI. (2017). India’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution: Working Towards Climate Justice. New Delhi: Government of 
India. http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/India/1/INDIA%20INDC%20TO%20UNFCCC.pdf
Gonzalez, F. (2012). ‘Distributional Effects of Carbon Taxes: The Case of Mexico.’ Energy Economics 34 (6): pp. 2102–2115. 
doi:10.1016/j.eneco.2012.03.007.
Goulder, L. H., and Schein, A. R. (2013). ‘Carbon Taxes versus Cap and Trade: A Critical Review.’ Climate Change Economics 4 (3): 
1350010. doi:10.1142/S2010007813500103.
Government of Alberta. (2015). ‘Phasing Out Coal Pollution – Alberta Climate Leadership Plan.’ Edmonton. http://www.alberta.ca/
climate-coal-electricity.cfm
Graichen, P., Kleiner, M. M. and Buck, M. (2016). ‘Energy Transition in the Power Sector in Europe: State of Affairs in 2015: Review 
of the Developments and Outlook for 2016.’ Agora Energiewende.
Arze del Granado, F.J., Coady, D., Gillingham, R. (2012). ‘The Unequal Benefits of Fuel Subsidies: A Review of Evidence for Develop-
ing Countries.’ World Development 40 (11): pp. 2234–2248.
Great Plains Institute. (2016). ‘Putting the Puzzle Together: State and Federal Policy Drivers for Growing America’s Carbon Capture & 
CO
2
-EOR Industry.’ Great Plains Institute. http://www.betterenergy.org/sites/default/files/PolicyDriversCO
2
_EOR%20V1.1_0.pdf
Green, F., and Stern, N. (2017). ‘China’s Changing Economy: Implications for Its Carbon Dioxide Emissions.’ Climate Policy 17 (4): 
pp. 423–442. 
Guivarch, C., and Hood, C. 2011. ‘Early Retirement of Coal-Fired Generation in the Transition to Low-Carbon Electricity Systems.’ In: 
Climate & Electricity Annual 2011 Data and Analyses. Paris: International Energy Agency.
Hallegatte, S., Bangalore, M., Bonzanigo, L., Fay, M., Kane, T., Narloch, U., Rozenberg, J., Treguer, D. and Vogt-Schilb, A. (2016). Shock 
Waves: Managing the Impacts of Climate Change on Poverty. Washington DC: World Bank Publications.
Hao, Y., Liu, Y., Weng, J., and Gao, Y. (2016). ‘Does the Environmental Kuznets Curve for Coal Consumption in China Exist? New 
Evidence from Spatial Econometric Analysis.’ Energy 114 (November): pp. 1214–1223. 
Hart, M, Bassett, L. and Johnson, B. (2017). ‘Everything You Think You Know About Coal in China Is Wrong.’ Issue Brief. Energy and 
Environment. Center for American Progress. https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/reports/2017/05/15/432141/
everything-think-know-coal-china-wrong/
Healy, N., and Barry, J. (2017). ‘Politicizing Energy Justice and Energy System Transitions: Fossil Fuel Divestment and a ‘Just Transi-
tion.’’ Energy Policy 108 (September): pp. 451–459. 
Heede, R. (2014). ‘Tracing Anthropogenic Carbon Dioxide and Methane Emissions to Fossil Fuel and Cement Producers, 1854–
2010.’ Climatic Change 122 (1–2): pp. 229–241. 
Heede, R., and Oreskes, N. (2016). ‘Potential Emissions of CO
2
 and Methane from Proved Reserves of Fossil Fuels: An Alternative 
Analysis.’ Global Environmental Change 36: pp. 12–20. 
Hirth, L., and Steckel, J.C. (2016). ‘The Role of Capital Costs in Decarbonizing the Electricity Sector.’ Environmental Research Letters 
11. doi:doi:10.1088/1748-9326/11/11/114010.
Hirth, L., Ueckerdt, F. and Edenhofer, O. (2015). ‘Integration Costs Revisited – An Economic Framework for Wind and Solar Variabil-
ity.’ Renewable Energy 74 (February): pp. 925–939. 
Hirth, L., Ueckerdt, F. and Edenhofer, O. (2016). ‘Why Wind Is Not Coal: On the Economics of Electricity Generation.’ The Energy 
Journal 37 (3). 
Houser, T., Bordoff, J. and Marsters, P. (2017). ‘Can Coal Make a Comeback?’ New York, NY: Columbia University. Center on Global 
Energy Policy. https://www.eenews.net/assets/2017/04/27/document_gw_06.pdf
IEA. (2016). World Energy Outlook (2016). International Energy Agency. Paris: IEA. http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/energy/world- 
energy-outlook-2016_weo-2016-en
IEA. (2017). Tracking Progress: Renewable Power. Paris: IEA. https://www.iea.org/etp/tracking2017/renewablepower
IEA/OECD. (2016). Coal Information (2016). Paris, France: International Energy Agency, OECD Publishing. http://www.oecd-ilibrary.
org/energy/coal-information-2016_coal-2016-en
IEA-RETD. (2016). ‘RE-TRANSITION – Transitioning to Policy Frameworks for Cost-Competitive Renewables.’ Utrecht: IEA Technology 
Collaboration Programme for Renewable Energy Technology Deployment (IEA-RETD).
International Labour Organization. (2015). Guidelines for a Just Transition towards Environmentally Sustainable Economies and 
Societies for All. Geneva: International Labour Organization. http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_ent/
documents/publication/wcms_432859.pdf
IPCC. (2014). Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment  Report 
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Edited by Edenhofer, Ottmar, Ramón Pichs-Madruga, Youba Sokona, Ellie 
Farahani, Susanne Kadner, Anna Adler, and Kristin Seyboth. Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge 
University Press.
IqtiyaniIlham, N., Hasanuzzaman, M. and Hosenuzzaman, M. (2017). ‘European Smart Grid Prospects, Policies, and Challenges.’ 
Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 67: pp. 776–790. 
IRENA. 2017a. ‘Geothermal Power. Technology Brief.’ Abu Dhabi: International Renewable Energy Agency. http://www.irena.org/
DocumentDownloads/Publications/IRENA_Geothermal_Power_2017.pdf
IRENA. 2017b. ‘Stranded Assets and Renewables: How the Energy Transition Affects the Value of Energy Reserves, Buildings and 
Capital Stock.’ Abu Dhabi: International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA). http://www.irena.org/DocumentDownloads/Publi-
cations/IRENA_REmap_Stranded_assets_and_renewables_2017.pdf
Iyer, G. C., Clarke, L. E., Edmonds, J.E., Flannery, B. P., Hultman, N.E., McJeon, H. C. and Victor, D. G. (2015). ‘Improved Representa-
tion of Investment Decisions in Assessments of CO
2
 Mitigation.’ Nature Climate Change 5 (5): pp. 436–440.
Jakob, M., Chen, C., Fuss, S., Marxen, A. and Edenhofer, O. (2015). ‘Development Incentives for Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform.’ Nature 
Climate Change 5 (8): pp. 709–712. 
79The Emissions Gap Report 2017 – References
Jakob, M., Chen, C., Fuss, S., Marxen, A., Rao, N. D. and Edenhofer, O. (2016). ‘Carbon Pricing Revenues Could Close Infrastructure 
Access Gaps.’ World Development 84 (August): pp. 254–265. 
Jakob, M., and Steckel, J.C. (2016). ‘Implications of Climate Change Mitigation for Sustainable Development.’ Environmental 
Research Letters 11 (10): 104010. 
Johnson, N., Krey, V., McCollum, D. L., Rao, S., Riahi, K. and Rogelj, J. (2015). ‘Stranded on a Low-Carbon Planet: Implications of 
Climate Policy for the Phase-out of Coal-Based Power Plants.’ Technological Forecasting and Social Change 90, Part A (January): 
pp. 89–102. 
Jonek Kowalska, I. (2015). ‘Challenges for Long-Term Industry Restructuring in the Upper Silesian Coal Basin: What Has Polish Coal 
Mining Achieved and Failed from a Twenty-Year Perspective?’ Resources Policy 44 (June): pp. 135–149. 
Jordaan, S. M., Romo-Rabago, E., McLeary, R., Reidy, L., Nazari, J., and Herremans, I.M. (2017). ‘The Role of Energy Technology 
Innovation in Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions: A Case Study of Canada.’ Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 78 
(October): pp. 1397–1409. doi:10.1016/j.rser.2017.05.162.
Jotzo, F., Jordan, T. and Fabian, N. (2012). ‘Policy Uncertainty about Australia’s Carbon Price: Expert Survey Results and Implications 
for Investment.’ Australian Economic Review 45 (4): pp. 395–409.
Kalkuhl, M., and Brecha, R.J. (2013). ‘The Carbon Rent Economics of Climate Policy.’ Energy Economics 39: pp. 89–99.
Kern, F., and Rogge, K. S. (2016). ‘The Pace of Governed Energy Transitions: Agency, International Dynamics and the Global Paris 
Agreement Accelerating Decarbonisation Processes?’ Energy Research & Social Science 22 (December): pp. 13–17. 
Khosla, R., Dukkipati, S., Dubash, N.K., Sreenivas, A. and Cohen, B. (2015). ‘Towards Methodologies for Multiple Objective-Based 
Energy and Climate Policy.’ Economic & Political Weekly 50 (49): pp. 49–59.
Kim, S. E., Urpelainen, J. and Yang, J. (2016). ‘Electric Utilities and American Climate Policy: Lobbying by Expected Winners and 
Losers.’ Journal of Public Policy 36 (2): pp. 251–275.
Kolstad, C. D., Urama, K., Broome, J., Bruvoll, A., Cariño-Olvera, M., Fullerton, D., Gollier, C. (2014). ‘Social, Economic and Ethical 
Concepts and Methods.’ In: Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change, pp. 173–248. Cambridge, United Kingdom and 
New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. http://lup.lub.lu.se/record/5104578.
Kriegler, E., Weyant, J.P., Blanford, G. J., Krey, V., Clarke, L., Edmonds, J., Fawcett, A. (2014). ‘The Role of Technology for Achieving 
Climate Policy Objectives: Overview of the EMF 27 Study on Global Technology and Climate Policy Strategies.’ Climatic Change 
123 (3–4): pp. 353–367.
Lazarus, M., Erickson, P. and Tempest, K. (2015). ‘Supply-Side Climate Policy: The Road Less Taken.’ Stockholm Environment Institute, 
Working Paper, No. SEI-WP-2015-13 (October).
Liang, Q. and Wei, Y. (2012). ‘Distributional Impacts of Taxing Carbon in China: Results from the CEEPA Model.’ Applied Energy 92 
(April): pp. 545–551. 
Lindebjerg, E. S., Peng, W., and Yeboah, S. (2015). ‘Do Policies for Phasing out Fossil Fuel Subsidies Deliver What They Promise? 
Social Gains and Repercussions in Iran, Indonesia and Ghana.’  United Nations Research Institute for Social Development 
(UNRISD) Working Paper.
Löffler, K., Hainsch, K., Burandt, T., Oei, P., Kemfert, C. and von Hirschhausen, C. (2017). ‘Designing a Global Energy System Based 
on 100% Renewables for 2050 - GENeSYS-MOD: An Application of the Open-Source Energy Modelling System (OSeMOSYS).’ DIW 
Discussion Paper, DIW Discussion Paper 1678.
Louie, E. P., and Pearce, J.M. (2016). ‘Retraining Investment for U.S. Transition from Coal to Solar Photovoltaic Employment.’ Energy 
Economics 57 (June): pp. 295–302. 
Luderer, G., Pietzcker, R. C., Carrara, Bertram, C., Kriegler, E., Meinshausen, M. and Edenhofer, O. (2013). ‘Economic Mitigation 
Challenges: How Further Delay Closes the Door for Achieving Climate Targets.’ Environmental Research Letters 8 (3): 34033. 
Luderer, G., Pietzcker, R. C., Carrara, S., Sytze de Boer, H., Fujimori, S., Johnson, N., Mima, S. and Arent, D. (2017). ‘Assessment of 
Wind and Solar Power in Global Low-Carbon Energy Scenarios: An Introduction.’ Energy Economics 64 (May): pp. 542–551. 
Marcinkiewicz, K., and Tosun, J. (2015). ‘Contesting Climate Change: Mapping the Political Debate in Poland.’ East European Politics 
31 (2): pp. 187–207. doi:10.1080/21599165.2015.1022648.
Matthes, F. C. (2017). ‘Energy Transition in Germany: A Case Study on a Policy-Driven Structural Change of the Energy System.’ 
Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review 14 (1): pp. 141–169. 
Matthes, F. C., Fabra, N., Newbery, D., Colombier, M., Mathieu, M. and Rüdinger, A. (2015). ‘The Energy Transition in Europe: Initial 
Lessons from Germany, the UK and France.’ Centre on Regulation in Europe (CERRE).
McGlade, C., and Ekins, P. (2015). ‘The Geographical Distribution of Fossil Fuels Unused When Limiting Global Warming to 2°C.’ 
Nature 517 (7533): pp. 187–190. doi:10.1038/nature14016.
Meadowcroft, J., Stephens, J., Wilson, E. and Rowlands, I. (2017). ‘Social Dimensions of Smart Grid: Regional Analysis in Canada 
and the United States. Introduction to Special Issue of Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews.’ Renewable and Sustainable 
Energy Reviews In press. 
Meinshausen, M., Meinshausen, N., Hare, W., Raper, S. C. B., Frieler, K., Knutti, R., Frame, D. J. and Allen, M. R. (2009). ‘Greenhouse- 
Gas Emission Targets for Limiting Global Warming to 2°C.’ Nature 458 (7242): pp. 1158–1162. doi:10.1038/nature08017.
MEMR. (2016). ‘Statistik Ketenagalistrikan (Electricity Statistics) 2015.’ Jakarta: Directorate General Electricity Ministry of Energy 
and Mineral Resources of Indonesia.
MEMR. (2017). ‘Electric ity Supply Business Plan (Rencana Umum Penyediaan Tenaga Listrik) 2017 – 2026.’ Jakarta: Director-
ate General Electricity Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources of Indonesia.
Mendelevitch, R., Richter, P. and Jotzo, F. (2015). ‘Market Power Rents and Climate Change Mitigation: A Rationale for Coal Export 
Taxes?’ Conference Paper.
Metcalf, G. E. (1999). ‘A Distributional Analysis of Green Tax Reforms.’ National Tax Journal 52 (4): pp. 655–682.
Miller, C. A., Richter, J. and O’Leary, J. (2015). ‘Socio-Energy Systems Design: A Policy Framework for Energy Transitions.’ Energy 
Research & Social Science 6 (March): pp. 29–40. 
Ministry of Power Government of India. n.d. LOK SABHA STARRED QUESTION NO.164 ANSWERED ON 28.07.2016.
80 The Emissions Gap Report 2017 – References
Mondal, D. (2017). ‘Electricity May Get Costlier as States Demand Higher Royalty on Coal: India Ratings.’ ET Energy World. 
January 18. http://energy.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/coal/electricity-may-get-costlier-as-states-demand-higher-
royalty-on-coal-india-ratings/56649160
Morgan, E. (2017). ‘Electricity Prices Could Double with New Coal-Fired Stations, Energy Experts Say.’ ABC. http://www.abc.net.
au/news/2017-02-02/coal-power-stations-could-double-the-cost-of-electricity/8234240
NDRC. (2016). ‘First Biennial Update Report on Climate Change of China.’ China’s official submission to the UNFCCC. National 
Development and Reform Commission. http://unfccc.int/files/national_reports/non-annex_i_parties/biennial_update_re-
ports/application/pdf/pr_china-_bur-chinese+en.pdf
Nemet, G. F., Jakob, M., Steckel, J. C. and Edenhofer, O. (2017). ‘Addressing Policy Credibility Problems for Low-Carbon Investment.’ 
Global Environmental Change 42 (January): pp. 47–57. doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2016.12.004.
Nordhaus, W. D. (1991). ‘A Sketch of the Economics of the Greenhouse Effect.’ The American Economic Review 81 (2): pp. 146–150.
OCI. (2016). ‘The Sky’s Limit. Why the Paris Climate Goals Require a Managed Decline of Fossil Fuel Production.’ Oil Change Inter-
national. http://priceofoil.org/content/uploads/2016/09/OCI_the_skys_limit_2016_FINAL_2.pdf
OECD. (2017). Investing in Climate, Investing in Growth. OECD Publishing, Paris. http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/invest-
ing-in-climate-investing-in-growth_9789264273528-en
Oei, P., and Mendelevitch, R. (2016). ‘European Scenarios of CO
2
 Infrastructure Investment until 2050.’ The Energy Journal 37: pp. 
171-194. 
Olivier, J. G. J., Greet Janssens-Maenhout, Marilena Muntean, and Jeroen Peters. (2016). ‘Trends in Global CO
2
 Emissions: 2016 
Report.’ PBL publication number: 2315. JRC Science for Policy Report: 103428. The Hague: PBL Netherlands Environmental As-
sessment Agency. European Commission, Joint Research Centre.
Ondraczek, J., Komendantova, N. and Patt, A. (2015). ‘WACC the Dog: The Effect of Financing Costs on the Levelized Cost of Solar 
PV Power.’ Renewable Energy 75: pp. 888–898. 
Oosterhuis, F., and ten Brink, P. eds. (2014). Paying the Polluter: Environmentally Harmful Subsidies and Their Reform. Cheltenham, 
UK ; Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Park, A., and Lappas, P. (2017). ‘Evaluating Demand Charge Reduction for Commercial-Scale Solar PV Coupled with Battery Stor-
age.’ Renewable Energy 108 (August): pp. 523–532.
Parry, I. W. H., and Williams III, R.C. (2010). ‘What Are the Costs of Meeting Distributional Objectives for Climate Policy?’ The B.E. 
Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy 10 (2): pp. 1935–1682.
Pearce, D. (1991). ‘The Role of Carbon Taxes in Adjusting to Global Warming.’ The Economic Journal 101 (407): pp. 938–948. 
Perrier, Q., and Quirion, P. (2016). ‘La transition énergétique est-elle favorable aux branches à fort contenu en emploi ? Une 
approche input-output pour la France.’ Working Paper 2016.09. French Association of Environmental and Resource Economists 
(FAERE) http://faere.fr/pub/WorkingPapers/Perrier_Quirion_FAERE_WP2016.09.pdf
Pfeiffer, A., Millar, M., Hepburn, C. and Beinhocker, E. (2016). ‘The ‘2°C Capital Stock’ for Electricity Generation: Committed 
Cumulative Carbon Emissions from the Electricity Generation Sector and the Transition to a Green Economy.’ Applied Energy 
179 (October): pp. 1395–1408. 
Pigou, A. C. (1920). The Economics of Welfare. Macmillan & Co., London.
Portman, R. (2017). ‘Portman, Bennet Introduce Bill to Help Finance Carbon Capture and Storage Projects.’ Press release. 
https://www.portman.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2017/4/portman-bennet-introduce-bill-to-help-finance-carbon-capture-
and-storage-projects
Porto, G.G. (2012). ‘The Cost of Adjustment to Green Growth Policies: Lessons from Trade Adjustment Costs.’ World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper No. 6237. http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2165675
PWC Indonesia and ICMA. (2016). ‘Supplying and Financing Coal-fired Power Plants in 35 GW Programme.’ http://www.apbi-icma. 
org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/03-03-2016-APBI-PwC-Report-on-Supplying-and-Financing-the-35-GW-program-FINAL- 
FINAL-rev-8-32016.pdf
Ragwitz, M., Schade, W., Breitschopf, B., Walz,R., Helfrich, N., Rathmann, M., Resch, G., Panzer, C., Faber, T. and Haas, R. (2009). 
‘EmployRES. The Impact of Renewable Energy Policy on Economic Growth and Employment in the European Union. Final 
Report, Contract No.’ TREN.
Rausch, S., Metcalf, G. E. and Reilly, J.M. 2011. ‘Distributional Impacts of Carbon Pricing: A General Equilibrium Approach with 
Micro-Data for Households.’ Energy Economics, Supplemental Issue: Fourth Atlantic Workshop in Energy and Environmental 
Economics, 33, Supplement 1 (December): S20–33. 
Reddy, B. S. (2016). ‘India’s Energy System Transition—Survival of the Greenest.’ Renewable Energy 92: pp. 293–302.
Ren, P., Liu, C. and Zhang, L. (2017). ‘China’s Involvement in Coal-Fired Power Projects along the Belt and Road.’ Global Environmen-
tal Institute. http://www.geichina.org/_upload/file/report/China’s_Involvement_in_Coal-fired_Power_Projects_OBOR_EN.pdf 
Renn, O., and Marshall, J.P. (2016). ‘Coal, Nuclear and Renewable Energy Policies in Germany: From the 1950s to the ‘Ener-
giewende.’’ Energy Policy 99 (December): pp. 224–232.
Rentschler, J. (2015). Incidence and Impact: A Disaggregated Poverty Analysis of Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform. OIES working Paper: 
SP 36. Oxford: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies.
Rentschler, J and Bazilian, M. (2016). ‘Reforming Fossil Fuel Subsidies: Drivers, Barriers and the State of Progress.’ Climate Policy, 
17 (7): pp. 891–914. 
Riahi, K., Kriegler, E., Johnson, N., Bertram, C., den Elzen, M., Eom, J., Schaeffer, M. (2015). ‘Locked into Copenhagen Pledges – 
Implications of Short-Term Emission Targets for the Cost and Feasibility of Long-Term Climate Goals.’ Technological Forecasting 
and Social Change 90, Part A (January): pp. 8–23. 
Rifkin, J. 2011. The Third Industrial Revolution: How Lateral Power Is Transforming Energy, the Economy, and the World. St. Mar-
tin’s Press. http://www.ebooks.com/731631/the-third-industrial-revolution/rifkin-jeremy/
Robles, M., Rubio, M. G., and Stampini, M.S. (2015). ‘Have Cash Transfers Succeeded in Reaching the Poor in Latin America and the 
Caribbean?’ Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). http://publications.iadb.org/handle/11319/7223
81The Emissions Gap Report 2017 – References
Rogelj, J., Luderer, G., Pietzcker, R. C., Kriegler, E., Schaeffer, M., Krey, V., and Riahi, K. (2015). ‘Energy System Transformations for 
Limiting End-of-Century Warming to below 1.5°C.’ Nature Climate Change 5 (6): pp. 519–527. doi:10.1038/nclimate2572.
Rogelj, J., McCollum, D. L., O’Neill, B.C. and Riahi, K. (2013). ‘2020 Emissions Levels Required to Limit Warming to below 2? C.’ Na-
ture Climate Change 3 (4): pp. 405–412.
Rozenberg, J., Vogt-Schilb, A. and Hallegatte, S. (2017). ‘Instrument Choice and Stranded Assets in the Transition to Clean Capital.’ 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).
Sachs, J., Guerin, E., Mas, C., Schmidt-Traub, G., Tubiana, L., Waisman, H., Colombier, M. (2014). ‘Pathways to Deep Decarbonizati-
on: 2014 Report.’ INIS-FR--15-0191. France: SDSN/IDDRI.
Sdralevich, C.A., Sab, R., Zouhar, Y. and Albertin, G. (2014). Subsidy Reform in the Middle East and North Africa: Recent Progress and 
Challenges Ahead. International Monetary Fund.
Shearer, C., Ghio, N., Myllyvirta, L., Yu, A. and Nace, T. (2017). ‘Boom and Bust 2017 - Tracking the Global Coal Plant Pipeline.’ Coals-
warm / Sierra Club / Greenpeace.
Singh, R. K. (2016). ‘India Seeks to Shut 12% of Power Capacity in Anti-Pollution Move.’ Live Mint, May 8.http://www.livemint.com/
Industry/QkD9eo3lrSVj1sxV3ubB9K/India-seeks-to-shut-12-of-power-capacity-in-antipollution.html
Sovacool, B. (2017). ‘Reviewing, Reforming, and Rethinking Global Energy Subsidies: Towards a Political Economy Research Agenda.’ 
Ecological Economics 135 (February): 150–163. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2016.12.009.
Sovacool, B. K., Heffron R. J., McCauley, D. and Goldthau. A. (2016). ‘Energy Decisions Reframed as Justice and Ethical Concerns.’ 
Nature Energy 1: 16024.
Steckel, J. C., Edenhofer, O and Jakob, M. (2015). ‘Drivers for the Renaissance of Coal.’ Proceedings of the National Academy of Sci-
ences 112 (29): E3775–81. doi:10.1073/pnas.1422722112.
Steckel, J. C., Jakob, M., Flachsland, C., Kornek, U., Lessmann, K., and Edenhofer, O. (2017). ‘From Climate Finance toward Sustain-
able Development Finance.’ Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change 8 (1).
Sterner, T., ed. (2012). Fuel Taxes and the Poor: The Distributional Effects of Gasoline Taxation and Their Implications for Climate 
Policy. New York: RFF Press.
Stiglitz, J. and Stern, N. (2017). Report of the High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices. Washington: World Bank Group: Carbon 
Pricing Leadership Coalition.
Suwala, W. 2010. ‘Lessons Learned from the Restructuring of Poland’s Coal-Mining Industry.’ Global Subsidies Initiative (GSI), Inter-
national Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD).
Swartz, J. (2016). ‘China’s National Emissions Trading System: Implications for Carbon Markets and Trade.’ Issue Paper No. 6. Inter-
national Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD).
Symons, E., Proops, J. and Gay, P. (1994). ‘Carbon Taxes, Consumer Demand and Carbon Dioxide Emissions: A Simulation Analysis 
for the UK.’ Fiscal Studies 15 (2): pp. 19–43. 
Szpor, A. (2017). ‘Coal Transition in Poland.’ IDDRI and Climate Strategies. www.iddri.org/Publications/Rapports-and-briefing-pa-
pers/COAL_PL_v04.pdf
Szulecki, K., Fischer, S., Gullberg, A.T. and Sartor, O. (2016). ‘Shaping the ‘Energy Union’: between National Positions and Gover-
nance Innovation in EU Energy and Climate Policy.’ Climate Policy 16 (5): pp. 548–567. 
Torvanger, A., Narbel, P., Pillay, K. and Clapp, C. (2016). ‘Instruments to Incentivize Private Climate Finance for Developing Coun-
tries.’ CICERO Report.
Trebilcock, C. 1981. The Industrialization of the Continental Powers, 1780–1914. Longman London.
Trebilcock, M. J. (2014). Dealing with Losers: The Political Economy of Policy Transitions. Oxford University Press, USA.
United Nations. (2015). ‘Adoption of the Paris Agreement.’ Framework Convention on Climate Change. http://unfccc.int/resource/
docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf
US Senate. (2017). ‘S.1535 – FUTURE Act.’ Washington, DC. https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/1535/text
Vogt-Schilb, A. and Hallegatte, S. (2017). ‘Climate Policies and Nationally Determined Contributions: Reconciling the Needed Ambi-
tion with the Political Economy.’ WIREs Energy Environment 6 (6). doi:10.1002/wene.256.
Wei, M., Patadia, S. and Kammen, D. M. (2010). ‘Putting Renewables and Energy Efficiency to Work: How Many Jobs Can the Clean 
Energy Industry Generate in the U.S.?’ Energy Policy 38 (2): pp. 919–931. 
West, J. J., Smith, S. J., Silva, R. A., Naik, V., Zhang, Y., Adelman, Z., Fry, M. M., Anenberg, S., Horowitz, L.W. and Lamarque, J. (2013). 
‘Co-Benefits of Mitigating Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions for Future Air Quality and Human Health.’ Nature Climate Change 3 
(10): pp. 885–889. doi:10.1038/nclimate2009.
White House. (2015). ‘The Budget of the U.S. Government Fiscal Year2015.’ Washington, DC.
White House . (2016). “The Budget of the U.S. Government Fiscal Year 2016.” Washington, DC.
Widera, M., Kasztelewicz, Z. and Ptak, M. (2016). ‘Lignite Mining and Electricity Generation in Poland: The Current State and Future 
Prospects.’ Energy Policy 92: pp. 151–157.
Williams, J. H., DeBenedictis, A., Ghanadan, R., Mahone, A., Moore, J., Morrow III, W.R., Price, S. and. Torn, M.S. (2012). ‘The Tech-
nology Path to Deep Greenhouse Gas Emissions Cuts by 2050: The Pivotal Role of Electricity.’ Science 335 (6064): pp. 53–59.
World Bank. (2015). The State of Social Safety Nets (2015). Washington DC: The World Bank. http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/
book/10.1596/978-1-4648-0543-1
World Bank, and Ecofys. (2016). ‘Carbon Pricing Watch 2016: An Advance Brief from the State and Trends of Carbon Pric-
ing 2016 Report, to Be Released Late 2016.’ Washington, DC: World Bank Group. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/
en/2016/05/26379305/carbon-pricing-watch-2016-advance-brief-state-trends-carbon-pricing-2016-report-released-late-2016
Wynn, G. (2016). ‘The Dutch Coal Mistake: How Three Brand-New Power Plants in the Netherlands Are Already at Risk of Becom-
ing Stranded Assets.’ Cleveland: Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA) http://ieefa.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2016/11/The-Dutch-Coal-Mistake_November-2016.pdf
Zhang, C. (2017). ‘China Takes Another Step to Reduce Coal-Fired Power.’ ChinaDialogue, March 20. https://www.chinadialogue.
net/article/show/single/en/9678-China-takes-another-step-to-reduce-coal-fired-power
82 The Emissions Gap Report 2017 – References
Zhou, Y., Li, H., Wang, K. and Bi, J. (2016). ‘China’s Energy-Water Nexus: Spillover Effects of Energy and Water Policy.’ Global Environ-
mental Change 40 (September): pp. 92–100. 
Chapter 6
Aggarwal, R.K. and Chandel, S.S. (2004) ‘Review of Improved Cookstoves Programme in Western Himalayan State of India’. Biomass 
and Bioenergy, 27(2):131–144. Available at: https://www.cabdirect.org/cabdirect/abstract/20043106078 [Accessed 18 October 
2017]. doi:10.1016/j.biombioe.2004.01.001
Allen, M.R., Fuglestvedt, J.S., Shine, K.P., Reisinger, A., Pierrehumbert, R.T. and Forster, P.M. (2016) ‘New use of global warming po-
tentials to compare cumulative and short-lived climate pollutants’. Nature Climate Change, 6:773–776. Available at: http://www.
sequoiaforestkeeper.org/pdfs/attachments/Allen_et_al_on_SLCP_GWP_2016.pdf [Accessed 18 October 2017].
Amann, M., Klimont, Z. and Wagner, F. (2013) ‘Regional and Global Emissions of Air Pollutants: Recent Trends and Future Scenari-
os’. Annual Review of Environment and Resources, 38:31–55. Available at: http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/10315/ [Accessed 18 October 
2017]- 
Bond, T.C., Doherty, S.J., Fahey, D.W., Forster, P.M., Berntsen, T., DeAngelo, B.J., Flanner, M.G., Ghan, S., Kärcher, B., Koch, D., Kinne, 
S., Kondo, Y., Quinn, P.K., Sarofim, M.C., Schultz, M.G., Schulz, M., Venkataraman, C., Zhang, H., Zhang, S., Bellouin, N., Guttikun-
da, S.K., Hopke, P.K., Jacobson, M.Z., Kaiser, J.W., Klimont, Z., Lohmann, U., Schwarz, J.P., Shindell, D., Storelvmo, T., Warren, S.G. 
and Zender, C.S. (2013) ‘Bounding the role of black carbon in the climate system: A scientific assessment’. Journal of Geophysi-
cal Research: Atmospheres, 118(11):5380–5552. Available at: https://experts.illinois.edu/en/publications/bounding-the-role-of-
black-carbon-in-the-climate-system-a-scienti [Accessed 18 October 2017].
Brander, M., Sood, A., Wylie, C., Haughton, A. and Lovell, J. (2011) ‘Technical Paper - Electricity-specific Emission Factors for Grid 
Electricity’. Ecometrica. Available at: https://ecometrica.com/assets/Electricity-specific-emission-factors-for-grid-electricity.pdf 
[Accessed 18 October 2017].
CAI-Asia (2011) Factsheet No. 17- Roadmap for Cleaner Fuels and Vehicles in Asia. Manila: Clean Air Initiative for Asian Cities Cen-
ter. Available at: http://cleanairasia.org/wp-content/uploads/portal/files/documents/16_Roadmap_to_Cleaner_Fuels_and_Ve-
hicles_in_Asia_0.pdf [Accessed 18 October 2017].
Cardenas, B., Maiz, P., Márquez, R.O., Munguia, J.L., Angeles, F., Baum, E. and Molina, L.T. (2012) Determining Emissions of Black 
carbon, greenhouse gases and other pollutants from artisanal brick production in Mexico. Clean Air Task Force and MCE2.
Chambliss, S., Miller, J., Facanho, C., Minjares, R., Blumberg, K., 2013. The impact of stringent fuel and vehicle standards on prema-
ture mortality and emisisons. International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT), Washington D.C., USA.
Cherian, A. (2015) Energy and Global Climate Change: Bridging the Sustainable Development Divide. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons 
Ltd. 
Christian, T.J., Yokelson, R.J., Cárdenas, B., Molina, L.T., Engling, G. and Hsu, S.-C. (2010) ‘Trace gas and particle emissions from 
domestic and industrial biofuel use and garbage burning in central Mexico’. Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics, 10(2):565–584. 
Available at: https://www.atmos-chem-phys.net/10/565/2010/acp-10-565-2010.html [Accessed 18 October 2017].
Coan, J. (2012) Vehicle emissions standards are a regulatory success story. Fuelfix. Available at: http://fuelfix.com/blog/2012/05/18/
vehicle-emissions-standards-a-regulatory-success-story/ [Accessed 18 October 2017].
Conrad, B.M. and Johnson, M.R. (2017) ‘Field Measurements of Black Carbon Yields from Gas Flaring’. Environmental Science and 
Technology, 51(3):1893–1900. Available at:  http://pubs.acs.org/doi/abs/10.1021/acs.est.6b03690 [Accessed 18 October 2017].
Crippa, M., Janssens-Maenhout, G., Dentener, F., Guizzardi, D., Sindelarova, K., Muntean, M., Van Dingenen, R. and Granier, C. 
(2016) ‘Forty years of improvements in European air quality: regional policy-industry interactions with global impacts’. Atmo-
spheric Chemistry and Physics, 16:3825–3841. Available at: https://www.atmos-chem-phys.net/16/3825/2016/ [Accessed 18 
October 2017].
DieselNet (2015). Summary of worldwide engine emission standards. Emission Standards.
EC-JRC/PBL (2013) EDGAR version 4.2FT2010—Emission Database for Global Atmospheric Research.
Etminan, M., Myhre, G., Highwood, E. and Shine, K.P. (2016) ‘Radiative forcing of carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide: A 
significant revision of the methane radiative forcing’. Geophysical Research Letters, 43:614–623. Available at: http://centaur.
reading.ac.uk/68557/1/grl_etminan.pdf [Accessed 18 October 2017].
Evans, M., Kholod, N., Malyshev, V., Tretyakova, S., Gusev, E., Yu, S. and Barinov, A. (2015) ‘Black carbon emissions from Russian 
diesel sources: case study of Murmansk’. Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics, 15:8349–8359. Available at: https://www.atmos-
chem-phys.net/15/8349/2015/ [Accessed 18 October 2017].
FAO (2013) Mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions in livestock production –a review of technical options for non-CO2 emissions. 
Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations. Available at: http://www.fao.org/docrep/018/i3288e/
i3288e.pdf [Accessed 18 October 2017].
GACC (2015). Five Years of Imapct 2010-2015. Our Story. Our Progress. Our Aspiration. Washington: Global Alliance for Clean Cook-
stoves (GACC). Available at: http://cleancookstoves.org/resources/reports/fiveyears.html [Accessed 18 October 2017].
Gasser, T., Peters, G.P., Fuglestvedt, J.S., Collins, W.J., Shindell, D.T. and Ciais, P. (2017) ‘Accounting for the climate-carbon feedback in 
emission metrics’. Earth System Dynamics, 8:235–253. Available at: https://www.earth-syst-dynam.net/8/235/2017/esd-2016-
55.pdf [Accessed 18 October 2017].
Geoffroy, O., Saint-Martin, D., Bellon, G., Voldoire, A., Olivié, D.J.L. and Tytéca, S. (2013) ‘Transient Climate Response in a Two-Layer 
Energy-Balance Model. Part II: Representation of the Efficacy of Deep-Ocean Heat Uptake and Validation for CMIP5 AOGCMs’. 
Journal of Climate, 23:1859–1876. Available at: http://journals.ametsoc.org/doi/ref/10.1175/JCLI-D-12-00196.1 [Accessed 18 
October 2017].
GOI (2014) Auto Fuel Vision and Policy 2025. Report of the Expert Committee. Government of India (GOI). Available at: http://www.
petroleum.nic.in/sites/default/files/autopol.pdf [Accessed 18 October 2017].
Griggs, D., M. Stafford Smith, J. Rockström, M. C. Öhman, O. Gaffney, G. Glaser and P. Shyamsundar (2014) ‘An integrated framework 
for sustainable development goals’. Ecology and Society, 19(4):49. Available at: https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol19/iss4/
art49/ [Accessed 18 October 2017].
83The Emissions Gap Report 2017 – References
Haines, A., et al. (under review) ‘Short-lived climate pollutant mitigation and the sustainable development goals’. Nature Climate 
Change.
Hoesly, R.M., Smith, S.J., Feng, L., Klimont, Z., Janssens-Maenhout, G., Pitkanen, T., Seibert, J.J., Vu, L., Andres, R.J., Bolt, R.M., Bond, 
T.C., Dawidowski, L., Kholod, N., Kurokawa, J.-I., Li, M., Liu, L., Lu, Z., Moura, M.C.P., O’Rourke, P.R. and Zhang, Q. (2017). ‘Histori-
cal (1750–2014) anthropogenic emissions of reactive gases and aerosols from the Community Emission Data System (CEDS)’. 
Geoscientific Model Development Discussions, 1–41. Available at: https://www.geosci-model-dev-discuss.net/gmd-2017-43/ 
[Accessed 18 October 2017].
Höglund-Isaksson, L. (2017) ‘Bottom-up simulations of methane and ethane emissions from global oil and gas systems 1980 to 
2012’. Environmental Research Letters, 12(2). Available at: http://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/aa583e [Ac-
cessed 18 October 2017].
Höglund-Isaksson, L. (2012) ‘Global anthropogenic methane emissions 2005–2030: technical mitigation potentials and costs’. At-
mospheric Chemistry and Physics, 12(19):9079–9096. Available at: https://www.atmos-chem-phys.net/12/9079/2012/acp-12-
9079-2012.html [Accessed 18 October 2017].
Höglund-Isaksson, L., Purohit, P., Amann, M., Bertok, I., Rafaj, P., Schöpp, W. and Borken-Kleefeld, J. (2017) ‘Cost estimates of the 
Kigali Amendment to phase-down hydrofluorocarbons’. Environmental Science & Policy, 75:138–147.
Hu, A., Xu, Y., Tebaldi, C., Washington, W.M. and Ramanathan, V. (2013) ‘Mitigation of short-lived climate pollutants slows sea-
level rise’. Nature Climate Change, 3:730–734. Available at: http://www.nature.com/nclimate/journal/v3/n8/full/nclimate1869.
html?foxtrotcallback=true [Accessed 18 October 2017]. 
Huang, K., Fu, J.S., Prikhodko, V.Y., Storey, J.M., Romanov, A., Hodson, E.L., Cresko, J., Morozova, I., Ignatieva, Y. and Cabaniss, J. 
(2015) ‘Russian anthropogenic black carbon: Emission reconstruction and Arctic black carbon simulation’. Journal of Geophysical 
Research: Atmospheres, 120(11):306–11. 
IEA (2016) World Energy Outlook Special Report: Energy and Air Pollution. Paris: International Energy Agency (IEA). Available at: 
https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/WorldEnergyOutlookSpecialReport2016EnergyandAirPollution.
pdf [Accessed 18 October 2017].
IEA (2012) Energy Technology Perspectives 2012 - Pathways to a Clean Energy System. Paris: International Energy Agency (IEA). 
Available at: https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/ETP2012_free.pdf [Accessed 18 October 2017].
INDC-Mexico (2015). Intended Nationally Determined Contribution, Mexico. Government of Mexico.
Jacobson, A., Lam, N.L., Bond, T.C. and Hultman, N. (2013) Black Carbon and Kerosene Lighting: An Opportunity for Rapid Action 
on Climate Change and Clean Energy for Development. Washington, D.C.: The Bookings Institution. Available at: https://www.
brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/04_climate_change_clean_energy_development_hultman.pdf [Accessed 18 Oc-
tober 2017]. 
Karekezi, S., K. Lata, and S. T. Coelho (2006) ‘Traditional biomass energy: improving its use and moving to modern energy use’.  Re-
newable Energy, 1:231-261.Kholod, N., Evans, M. and Kuklinski, T. (2016) ‘Russia’s black carbon emissions: focus on diesel sourc-
es’. Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics, 16(17):11267–11281. Available at: https://www.atmos-chem-phys.net/16/11267/2016/ 
[Accessed 18 October 2017].
Klimont, Z., Kupiainen, K., Heyes, C., Purohit, P., Cofala, J., Rafaj, P., Borken-Kleefeld, J. and Schöpp, W. (2017) ‘Global anthropogenic 
emissions of particulate matter including black carbon’. Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics, 17(14):8681–8723. Available at: 
https://www.atmos-chem-phys.net/17/8681/2017/ [Accessed 18 October 2017].
Kodjak, D. (2015) Policies to reduce fuel consumption, air pollution, and carbon emissions from vehicles in G20 nations. Washington, 
D.C.: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT). Available at: http://www.theicct.org/publications/policies-reduce-
fuel-consumption-air-pollution-and-carbon-emissions-vehicles-g20 [Accessed 18 October 2017]. 
Kondo, Y., Oshima, N., Kajino, M., Mikami, R., Moteki, N., Takegawa, N., Verma, R.L., Kajii, Y., Kato, S. and Takami, A. (2011) ‘Emis-
sions of black carbon in East Asia estimated from observations at a remote site in the East China Sea’. Journal of Geophysical 
Research: Atmospheres, 116(D16). Available at: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1029/2011JD015637/abstract. [Accessed 
18 October 2017].
Kurokawa, J., Ohara, T., Morikawa, T., Hanayama, S., Janssens-Maenhout, G., Fukui, T., Kawashima, K. and Akimoto, H. (2013) 
‘Emissions of air pollutants and greenhouse gases over Asian regions during 2000–2008: Regional Emission inventory in ASia 
(REAS) version 2’. Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics, 13(21):11019–11058. Available at: https://www.atmos-chem-phys.
net/13/11019/2013/acp-13-11019-2013.html [Accessed 18 October 2017].
Lam, N.L., Chen, Y., Weyant, C., Venkataraman, C., Sadavarte, P., Johnson, M.A., Smith, K.R., Brem, B.T., Arineitwe, J., Ellis, J.E. and 
Bond, T.C. (2012) ‘Household Light Makes Global Heat: High Black Carbon Emissions From Kerosene Wick Lamps’. Environmental 
Science & Technology, 46(24):13531–13538. Available at: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23163320 [Accessed 18 Octo-
ber 2017].
Lamarque, J.-F., Bond, T.C., Eyring, V., Granier, C., Heil, A., Klimont, Z., Lee, D., Liousse, C., Mieville, A., Owen, B., Schultz, M.G., Shin-
dell, D.T., Smith, S.J., Stehfest, E., Van Aardenne, J.A., Cooper, O.R., Kainuma, M., Mahowald, N., McConnell, J.R., Naik, V., Riahi, 
K. and Van Vuuren, D.P.V. (2010) ‘Historical (1850-2000) gridded anthropogenic and biomass burning emissions of reactive gases 
and aerosols: Methodology and application’. Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics, 10:7017–7039. 
Lu, Z., Zhang, Q. and Streets, D.G. (2011) ‘Sulfur dioxide and primary carbonaceous aerosol emissions in China and India, 1996–
2010’. Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics, 11(18):9839–9864. Available at: https://www.atmos-chem-phys.net/11/9839/2011/
acp-11-9839-2011.html [Accessed 18 October 2017].
Maithel, S., Lalchandani, D., Malhotra, G., Bhanware, P., Uma, R., Ragavan, S., Athalye, V., Bindiya, K., Reddy, S., Bond, T.C., Weyant, 
C., Baum, E., Kim Thoa, V.T., Thu Phuong, N. and Kim Thanh, T. (2012) Brick Kilns Performance Assessment; A Roadmap for Cleaner 
Brick Production in India. Shakti Sustainable Energy Foundation and Climate Works Foundation.
Malley, C.S., Henze, D.K., Kuylenstierna, J.C.I., Vallack, H.W., Davila, Y., Anenberg, S.C., Turner, M.C. and Ashmore, M.R. (2017) ‘Up-
dated global estimates of respiratory mortality in adults ≥30 years of age attributable to long-term ozone exposure’. Environmen-
tal Health Perspectives, 125(8). Available at: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28858826 [Accessed 18 October 2017].
MoRTH (2016) Government decides to directly shift from BS-IV to BS-VI emission norms. New Delhi:  Ministry of Road Transport & 
Highways (MoRTH), Government of India.
84 The Emissions Gap Report 2017 – References
Myhre, G., Shindell, D., Bréon, F.M., Collins, W., Fuglestvedt, J., Huang, J., Koch, D., Lamarque, J.F., Lee, D., Mendoza, B., Nakajima, 
T., Robock, A., Stephens, G., Takemura, T. and Zhang, H. (2013) Anthropogenic and Natural Radiative Forcing, in: Climate Change 
2013: The Physical Science Basis. New York: Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom. Available at: https://www.ipcc.ch/
pdf/assessment-report/ar5/wg1/WG1AR5_Chapter08_FINAL.pdf [Accessed 18 October 2017].
Pine, K., Edwards, R., Masera, O., Schilmann, A., Marrón-Mares, A. and Riojas-Rodríguez, H., (2011) ‘Adoption and use of improved 
biomass stoves in Rural Mexico’. Energy for Sustainable Development, 15(2):176–183. Available at: https://asu.pure.elsevier.
com/en/publications/adoption-and-use-of-improved-biomass-stoves-in-rural-mexico [Accessed 18 October 2017].
Purohit, P. and Höglund-Isaksson, L. (2017) ‘Global emissions of fluorinated greenhouse gases 2005–2050 with abatement po-
tentials and costs’. Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics, 17(4):2795–2816. Available at: https://www.atmos-chem-phys.
net/17/2795/2017/ [Accessed 18 October 2017].
Rao, S., Klimont, Z., Smith, S.J., Van Dingenen, R., Dentener, F., Bouwman, L., Riahi, K., Amann, M., Bodirsky, B.L., van Vuuren, D.P., 
Aleluia Reis, L., Calvin, K., Drouet, L., Fricko, O., Fujimori, S., Gernaat, D., Havlik, P., Harmsen, M., Hasegawa, T., Heyes, C., Hilaire, 
J., Luderer, G., Masui, T., Stehfest, E., Strefler, J., van der Sluis, S. and Tavoni, M. (2017) ‘Future air pollution in the Shared Socio-
economic Pathways’. Global Environmental Change, 42:346–358. 
Riahi, K., van Vuuren, D.P., Kriegler, E., Edmonds, J., O’Neill, B.C., Fujimori, S., Bauer, N., Calvin, K., Dellink, R., Fricko, O., Lutz, 
W., Popp, A., Cuaresma, J.C., KC, S., Leimbach, M., Jiang, L., Kram, T., Rao, S., Emmerling, J., Ebi, K., Hasegawa, T., Havlik, P., 
Humpenöder, F., Da Silva, L.A., Smith, S., Stehfest, E., Bosetti, V., Eom, J., Gernaat, D., Masui, T., Rogelj, J., Strefler, J., Drouet, 
L., Krey, V., Luderer, G., Harmsen, M., Takahashi, K., Baumstark, L., Doelman, J.C., Kainuma, M., Klimont, Z., Marangoni, G., 
Lotze-Campen, H., Obersteiner, M., Tabeau, A., Tavoni, M., 2017. The Shared Socioeconomic Pathways and their energy, land 
use, and greenhouse gas emissions implications: An overview. Global Environmental Change 42, 153–168. doi:10.1016/j.gloen-
vcha.2016.05.009
Rogelj, J., Schaeffer, M., Meinshausen, M., Shindell, D.T., Hare, W., Klimont, Z., Velders, G.J.M., Amann, M. and Schellnhuber, H.J. 
(2014) ‘Disentangling the effects of CO
2
 and short-lived climate forcer mitigation’. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sci-
ences, 111:16325–16330. Available at: http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/10817/ [Accessed 18 October 2017].
Ruiz-Mercado, I., Masera, O., Zamora, H. and Smith, K.R. (2011) ‘Adoption and sustained use of improved cookstoves’. Energy 
Policy, 39:7557–7566. Available at: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.394.2048&rep=rep1&type=pdf 
[Accessed 18 October 2017].
Sabel, C.F. and Victor, D.G. (2015) ‘Governing global problems under uncertainty: making bottom-up climate policy work’. Climatic 
Change, 136:1-13. Available at: https://ai2-s2-pdfs.s3.amazonaws.com/1e77/b22f9eafa83e6f060517ff890461ceee0a7d.pdf 
[Accessed 18 October 2017].
Saikawa, E. (2013) ‘Policy Diffusion of Automobile Emission Standards: Is there a Race to the Top?’ World Politics, 65: 1–33. Avail-
able at: https://globalchange.mit.edu/publication/15932 [Accessed 18 October 2017].
Schmale, J., Shindell, D., von Schneidemesser, E., Chabay, I. and Lawrence, M.G. (2014) ‘Air pollution: Clean up our skies’. Nature, 
515:335–337. Available at: http://publications.iass-potsdam.de/pubman/faces/viewItemFullPage.jsp?itemId=escidoc%3A7189
05%3A4&view=EXPORT [Accessed 18 October 2017].
Shah, N., Wei, M., Letschert, V. and Phadke, A. (2015) Benefits of Leapfrogging to Superefficiency and Low-Global Warming Poten-
tial Refrigerants in Room Air Conditioning. Berkeley: Ernest Orlando Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory.
Shen, G., Wei, S., Wang, Wen, Zhang, Y., Ming, Y., Wang, B., Wang, R., Li, W., Shen, H., Huang, Y., Yang, Y., Wang, Wei, Wang, Xilong, 
Wang, Xuejun and Tao, S. (2012) ‘Emission factors, size distributions, and emission inventories of carbonaceous particulate mat-
ter from residential wood combustion in rural China’. Environmental Science & Technology, 46:4207–4214. 
Shindell, D., Borgford-Parnell, N., Brauer, M., Haines, A., Kuylenstierna, J.C.I., Leonard, S.A., Ramanathan, V., Ravishankara, A., 
Amann, M. and Srivastava, L. (2017a) ‘A climate policy pathway for near- and long-term benefits’. Science, 356:493–494. Avail-
able at: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28473553 [Accessed 18 October 2017].
Shindell, D., Fuglestvedt, J.S. and Collins, W.J. (2017b) ‘The social cost of methane: Theory and applications’. Faraday Discussions, 
200:429-451. Available at: http://pubs.rsc.org/en/content/articlelanding/2017/fd/c7fd00009j#!divAbstract [Accessed 18 Octo-
ber 2017].
Shindell, D., Kuylenstierna, J.C.I., Vignati, E., Van Dingenen, R., Amann, M., Klimont, Z., Anenberg, S.C., Muller, N., Janssens-
Maenhout, G., Raes, F., Schwartz, J., Faluvegi, G., Pozzoli, L., Kupiainen, K., Höglund-Isaksson, L., Emberson, L., Streets, D., Ra-
manathan, V., Hicks, K., Oanh, N.T.K., Milly, G., Williams, M., Demkine, V. and Fowler, D. (2012) ‘Simultaneously mitigating near-
term climate change and improving human health and food security’. Science, 335:183-189. Available at: https://www.ncbi.nlm.
nih.gov/pubmed/22246768 [Accessed 18 October 2017].
Sinton, J.E., Smith, K.R., Peabody, J.W., Yaping, L., Xiliang, Z., Edwards, R. and Quan, G. (2004) ‘An assessment of programs to pro-
mote improved household stoves in China’. Energy for Sustainable Development, 8:33-52. 
Smith, S.J. and Mizrahi, A. (2013) ‘Near-term climate mitigation by short-lived forcers’. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sci-
ences, 110(35):14202–14206. Available at: http://www.pnas.org/content/110/35/14202.abstract [Accessed 18 October 2017].
Stehfest, E., Bouwman, L., Vuuren, D.P., Elzen, M.G.J., Eickhout, B. and Kabat, P. (2009) ‘Climate benefits of changing diet’. Cli-
matic Change, 95(1-2):83–102. Available at: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-008-9534-6 [Accessed 18 October 
2017].
Stockwell, C. E., Christian, T. J., Goetz, J. D., Jayarathne, T., Bhave, P. V., Praveen, P. S., Adhikari, S., Maharjan, R., DeCarlo, P. F., Stone, 
E. A., Saikawa, E., Blake, D. R., Simpson, I. J., Yokelson, R. J., and Panday, A. K.: Nepal Ambient Monitoring and Source Testing 
Experiment (NAMaSTE): emissions of trace gases and light-absorbing carbon from wood and dung cooking fires, garbage and 
crop residue burning, brick kilns, and other sources, Atmos. Chem. Phys., 16, 11043-11081, https://doi.org/10.5194/acp-16-
11043-2016, 2016.
Stohl, A., Aamaas, B., Amann, M., Baker, L.H., Bellouin, N., Berntsen, T.K., Boucher, O., Cherian, R., Collins, W., Daskalakis, N., Dusin-
ska, M., Eckhardt, S., Fuglestvedt, J.S., Harju, M., Heyes, C., Hodnebrog, Ø., Hao, J., Im, U., Kanakidou, M., Klimont, Z., Kupiainen, 
K., Law, K.S., Lund, M.T., Maas, R., MacIntosh, C.R., Myhre, G., Myriokefalitakis, S., Olivié, D., Quaas, J., Quennehen, B., Raut, J.-C., 
Rumbold, S.T., Samset, B.H., Schulz, M., Seland, Ø., Shine, K.P., Skeie, R.B., Wang, S., Yttri, K.E. and Zhu, T. (2015) ‘Evaluating the 
climate and air quality impacts of  short-lived pollutants’. Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics, 15(18):10529-10566. Available at: 
https://www.atmos-chem-phys.net/15/10529/2015/acp-15-10529-2015.html [Accessed 18 October 2017]. 
85The Emissions Gap Report 2017 – References
Stohl, A., Klimont, Z., Eckhardt, S., Kupiainen, K., Shevchenko, V.P., Kopeikin, V.M. and Novigatsky, A.N. (2013) ‘Black carbon in 
the Arctic: the underestimated role of gas flaring and residential combustion emissions’. Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics, 
13(17):8833-8855. Available at: https://www.atmos-chem-phys.net/13/8833/2013/acp-13-8833-2013.html [Accessed 18 Octo-
ber 2017].
Thomas, E., Wickramasinghe, K., Mendis, S., Roberts, N. and Foster, C. (2015) ‘Improved stove interventions to reduce household air 
pollution in low and middle income countries: a descriptive systematic review’. BMC Public Health, 15:650. Available at: https://
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26169364 [Accessed 18 October 2017]. 
UNEP/WMO (2011) Integrated Assessment of Black Carbon and Tropospheric Ozone. Nairobi: United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme (UNEP) and World Meterorological Organization (WMO). Available at: https://wedocs.unep.org/rest/bitstreams/12809/
retrieve [Accessed 18 October 2017].
US EPA (2017) History of Reducing Air Pollution from Transportation in the United States (U.S.). Washington, DC: United States En-
vironmental Protection Agency (USEPA). Available at: https://www.epa.gov/air-pollution-transportation/accomplishments-and-
success-air-pollution-transportation [Accessed 18 October 2017].
US EPA (2013) Global Mitigation of Non-CO2 Greenhouse Gases: 2010-2030. Washington, DC: United States Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (USEPA). Available at: https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyNET.exe/P100GYHT.TXT?ZyActionD=ZyDocument&Client=EPA&
Index=2011+Thru+2015&Docs=&Query=&Time=&EndTime=&SearchMethod=1&TocRestrict=n&Toc=&TocEntry=&QField=&QF
ieldYear=&QFieldMonth=&QFieldDay=&IntQFieldOp=0&ExtQFieldOp=0&XmlQuery=&File=D%3A%5Czyfiles%5CIndex%20Data
%5C11thru15%5CTxt%5C00000008%5CP100GYHT.txt&User=ANONYMOUS&Password=anonymous&SortMethod=h%7C-&Maxi
mumDocuments=1&FuzzyDegree=0&ImageQuality=r75g8/r75g8/x150y150g16/i425&Display=hpfr&DefSeekPage=x&SearchBa
ck=ZyActionL&Back=ZyActionS&BackDesc=Results%20page&MaximumPages=1&ZyEntry=1&SeekPage=x&ZyPURL [Accessed 18 
October 2017].
US EPA (2012) Global Anthropogenic Non-CO2 Greenhouse Gas Emissions: 1990 – 2030. Washington, DC: United States Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA). Available at: https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-08/documents/epa_global_
nonco2_projections_dec2012.pdf [Accessed 18 October 2017].
US EPA (2002) Building owners save money, save the Earth: replace your CFC air conditioning chiller. Washington, DC: United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Available at: https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyNET.exe/00000LZT.TXT?ZyActionD=ZyDocum
ent&Client=EPA&Index=2000+Thru+2005&Docs=&Query=&Time=&EndTime=&SearchMethod=1&TocRestrict=n&Toc=&TocEnt
ry=&QField=&QFieldYear=&QFieldMonth=&QFieldDay=&IntQFieldOp=0&ExtQFieldOp=0&XmlQuery=&File=D%3A%5Czyfiles%
5CIndex%20Data%5C00thru05%5CTxt%5C00000004%5C00000LZT.txt&User=ANONYMOUS&Password=anonymous&SortMeth
od=h%7C-&MaximumDocuments=1&FuzzyDegree=0&ImageQuality=r75g8/r75g8/x150y150g16/i425&Display=hpfr&DefSeekP
age=x&SearchBack=ZyActionL&Back=ZyActionS&BackDesc=Results%20page&MaximumPages=1&ZyEntry=1&SeekPage=x&ZyP
URL  [Accessed 18 October 2017].
Velders, G.J.M., Fahey, D.W., Daniel, J.S., Andersen, S.O. and McFarland, M. (2015) ‘Future atmospheric abundances and climate 
forcings from scenarios of global and regional hydrofluorocarbon (HFCs) emissions’. Atmospheric Environment, 123:200-209. 
Available at: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S135223101530488X [Accessed 18 October 2017].
Velders, G.J.M., Solomon, S. and Daniel, J.S. (2014) ‘Growth of climate change commitments from HFC banks and emissions’. Atmo-
spheric Chemistry and Physics, 14(9):4563-4572. Available at:  https://www.atmos-chem-phys.net/14/4563/2014/ [Accessed 18 
October 2017].
Venkataraman, C., Sagar, A.D., Habib, G. and Smith, K.R. (2010) ‘The Indian National Initiative for Advanced Biomass Cookstoves: 
The benefits of clean combustion’. Energy for Sustainable Development, 14:63-72. Available at: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/
viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.648.7301&rep=rep1&type=pdf [Accessed 18 October 2017].
Victor, D.G., Zaelke, D., Ramanathan, V., 2015. Soot and short-lived pollutants provide political opportunity. Nature Clim. Change 5, 
796–798. doi:10.1038/nclimate2703
Wang, R., Tao, S., Shen, H., Huang, Y., Chen, H., Balkanski, Y., Boucher, O., Ciais, P., Shen, G., Li, W., Zhang, Y., Chen, Y., Lin, N., Su, S., 
Li, B., Liu, J. and Liu, W. (2014) ‘Trend in global black carbon emissions from 1960 to 2007’. Environmental Science & Technology, 
48:6780-6787. Available at: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24825392 [Accessed 18 October 2017].
Weyant, C., Athalye, V., Ragavan, S., Rajarathnam, U., Lalchandani, D., Maithel, S., Baum, E. and Bond, T.C. (2014) ‘Emissions from 
South Asian Brick Production’. Environmental Science & Technology, 48:6477-6483. Available at: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pubmed/24735080 [Accessed 18 October 2017].
Weyant, C.L., Shepson, P.B., Subramanian, R., Cambaliza, M.O.L., Heimburger, A., McCabe, D., Baum, E., Stirm, B.H. and Bond, T.C. 
(2016) ‘Black Carbon Emissions from Associated Natural Gas Flaring’. Environmental Science & Technology, 50:2075-2081. Avail-
able at: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26764563 [Accessed 18 October 2017].
WHO (2016) Burning Opportunity: Clean Household Energy for Health, Sustainable Development, and Wellbeing of Women and Children. 
Geneva: World Health Organization (WHO). Available at: http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/204717/1/9789241565233_
eng.pdf [Accessed 18 October 18 2017].
Wickramasinghe, A. (2011). ‘Energy access and transition to cleaner cooking fuels and technologies in Sri Lanka: Issues and policy 
limitations’. Energy Policy, 39:7567-7574. Available at: http://agris.fao.org/agris-search/search.do?recordID=US201600071626 
[Accessed 18 October 2017].
Wiedinmyer, C., Yokelson, R.J. and Gullett, B.K. (2014) ‘Global Emissions of Trace Gases, Particulate Matter, and Hazardous Air Pol-
lutants from Open Burning of Domestic Waste’. Environmental Science & Technology, 48:9523-9530. Available at: http://pubs.
acs.org/doi/abs/10.1021/es502250z [Accessed 18 October 2017].
Winiger, P., Andersson, A., Eckhardt, S., Stohl, A., Semiletov, I.P., Dudarev, O.V., Charkin, A., Shakhova, N., Klimont, Z., Heyes, C. and 
Gustafsson, Ö. (2017) ‘Siberian Arctic black carbon sources constrained by model and observation’. Proceeding of the National 
Academy of Sciences, 114:E1054–E1061. Available at: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28137854 [Accessed 18 October 
2017].
Xu, Y. and Ramanathan, V. (2017) ‘Well below 2°C: Mitigation strategies for avoiding dangerous to catastrophic climate changes’. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 114: 10315-10323. Available at: http://www.pnas.org/content/114/39/10315.
abstract [Accessed 18 October 2017].
86 The Emissions Gap Report 2017 – References
Xu, Y., Zaelke, D., Velders, G.J.M. and Ramanathan, V. (2013) ‘The role of HFCs in mitigating 21st century climate change’. Atmo-
spheric Chemistry and Physics, 13:6083-6089. Available at: https://www.atmos-chem-phys.net/13/6083/2013/ [Accessed 18 
October 2017]. 
Zeiger, B., Gschrey, B. and Schwarz, W. (2014) Alternatives to HCFCs/HFCs in developing countries with a focus on high ambient 
temperatures. Frankfurt/Main: Öko-Recherche.
Chapter 7
Aertsens, J., De Nocker, L., & Gobin, A. (2013). Valuing the carbon sequestration potential for European agriculture. Land Use Policy, 
31, 584-594.
American Physics Society Panel on Public Affairs (2011) Direct Air Capture of CO
2
 Using Chemicals, 87 p. https://www.aps.org/
policy/reports/assessments/upload/dac2011.pdf
Anderson K., Peters G, 2016, The trouble with negative emissions, Science, 354/6309, pp 182-183, DOI: 10.1126/science.aah4567
Aresta (2010): Carbon dioxide as chemical feedstock, Wiley, Weinheim.
Aresta (2013): M. Aresta, A. Dibenedetto & A. Angelini: The changing paradigm in CO
2
 utilization, Journal of CO2 Utilization, 3, 65-73.
Basso, A.S., Miguez, F.E., Laird, D.A., et al. (2013). Assessing potential of biochar for increasing water-holding capacity of sandy soils. 
GCB Bioenergy, 5(2), pp.132-143.
Benanti, G., Saunders, M., Tobin, B., & Osborne, B. (2014). Contrasting impacts of afforestation on nitrous oxide and methane emis-
sions. Agricultural and forest meteorology, 198, 82-93.
Benson, S. M., and Coauthors, 2012: Chapter 13 - Carbon Capture and Storage. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and 
New York, NY, USA and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria, 993–1068 www.globalener-
gyassessment.org.
Berthrong, S. T., Jobbagy, E. G., & Jackson, R. B. (2009). A global meta-analysis of soil exchangeable cations, pH, carbon, and nitrogen 
with afforestation. Ecological Applications, 19(8), 2228-2241.
Bozzi, E., Genesio L., Toscano P, Pieri M, Miglietta F, 2015 Mimicking biochar-albedo feedbackin complex Mediterranean landscapes, 
Envir. Res. Letters 10/084014
Bright, R. M., K. Zhao, R. B. Jackson, and F. Cherubini, 2015: Quantifying surface albedo and other direct biogeophysical climate 
forcings of forestry activities. Glob. Chang. Biol., 21, 3246–3266, doi:10.1111/gcb.12951.
Bruhn et al. (2016): T. Bruhn, H. Naims, B. Olfe-Kräutlein: Separating the debate on CO
2
 utilisation from carbon capture and storage’, 
Environmental Science & Policy, 60, 38-43.
Buck, H. J., 2016, Rapid scale-up of negative emissions technologies: social barriers and social implications, Clim. Change, (2016) 
139: 155. Doi:10.1007/s10584-016-1770-6
Cayuela, M.L., Jeffery, S, and Van Zwieten L, (2015). The molar H:Corg ratio of biochar is a key factor in mitigating N2O emissions 
from soil. Agriculture Ecosystems and Environment 202, 135-138.
Center for Carbon Removal, 2015, Direct Air Capture explained in 10 questions, http://www.centerforcarbonremoval.org/blog-
posts/2015/9/20/direct-air-capture-explained-in-10-questions
Center for Carbon Removal, 2017, Carbon removal polices: opportunity for federal action, 39p. http://www.centerforcarbonre-
moval.org/s/Carbon-Removal-Policy-Opportunities-for-Action.pdf
Chamberlain TC, 1899, “An Attempt to Frame a Working Hypothesis of the Cause of Glacial Periods on an Atmospheric Basis”. Jour-
nal of Geology. 7: 575, 667, 751
Chiang PC., Pan SY.,2017, CO
2
 Mineralization and Utilization via Accelerated Carbonation. In: Carbon Dioxide Mineralization and 
Utilization. Springer, Singapore https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-3268-4_3
Clarke, L., K. Jiang, K. Akimoto, M. Babiker, G. Blanford, K. Fisher-Vanden, J.-C. Hourcade, V. Krey, E. Kriegler, A. Löschel, D. McCollum, 
S. Paltsev, S. Rose, P. R. Shukla, M. Tavoni, B. van der Zwaan, and D. P. van Vuuren. 2014. Assessing Transformation Pathways. In 
Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Edenhofer, O., R. Pichs-Madruga, Y. Sokona, E. Farahani, S. Kadner, K. Seyboth, A. 
Adler, I. Baum, S. Brunner, P. Eickemeier, B. Kriemann, J. Savolainen, S. Schlömer, C. von Stechow, T. Zwickel and J.C. Minx (eds.)]. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA.
CLCF (2011): The Centre for Low Carbon Futures, Carbon Capture and Utilisation in the green economy: Using CO
2
 to manufacture 
fuel, chemicals and materials. http://www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/policy_library/data/01612/_res/id=sa_File1/CCU.pdf
CO
2
Sciences, 2016, Global Roadmap for Implementing CO
2
 Utilization, Innovation for Cool Earth Forum, 61p, https://assets.con-
tentful.com/xg0gv1arhdr3/27vQZEvrxaQiQEAsGyoSQu/44ee0b72ceb9231ec53ed180cb759614/CO
2
U_ICEF_Roadmap_FI-
NAL_2016_12_07.pdf 
Coninck, H. De, and S. M. Benson, 2014: Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage: Issues and Prospects. Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour., 39, 
243–70, doi:10.1146/annurev-environ-032112-095222.
Creutzig, F., Ravindranath, N. H., Berndes, G., Bolwig, S., Bright, R., Cherubini, F., … Masera, O. (2015). Bioenergy and climate change 
mitigation: an assessment. GCB Bioenergy, 7(5), 916–944. https://doi.org/10.1111/gcbb.12205
de Best-Waldhober, M., D. Daamen, and A. Faaij, 2009: Informed and uninformed public opinions on CO
2
 capture and storage tech-
nologies in the Netherlands. Int. J. Greenh. Gas Control, 3, 322–332, doi:10.1016/j.ijggc.2008.09.001.
De Coninck, H., Benson, S. (2014). Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage: Issues and Prospects. Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 2014. 
39:243–70.
Diaz, D., Hamilton, K., Johnson, E., 2011. State of the Forest Carbon Markets 2011: From Canopy to Currency. Ecosystem Market-
place Report. Forest Trends, Washington, DC.
Field, C. B., & Mach, K. J. (2017). Rightsizing carbon dioxide removal. Science, 356(6339), 706-707.
Frank, S., H. Böttcher, P. Havlík, H. Valin, A. Mosnier, M. Obersteiner, E. Schmid, and B. Elbersen, 2013: How effective are the sus-
tainability criteria accompanying the European Union 2020 biofuel targets? GCB Bioenergy, 5, 306–314, doi:10.1111/j.1757-
1707.2012.01188.x. http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1757-1707.2012.01188.x (Accessed July 6, 2017).
87The Emissions Gap Report 2017 – References
Fuss, S. 2017. The 1.5C target, political implications, and the role of BECCS. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Climate ScienceClimate 
Science, DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190228620.013.585
Fuss, S., and Coauthors, 2016: Research priorities for negative emissions. Environ. Res. Lett., 11, 115007, doi:10.1088/1748-
9326/11/11/115007.
Fuss, S., J. G. Canadell, G. P. Peters, M. Tavoni, R. M. Andrew, P. Ciais, R. B. Jackson, C. D. Jones, F. Kraxner, N. Nakicenovic, C. Le Que-
re, M. R. Raupach, A. Sharifi, P. Smith, and Y. Yamagata. 2014. Betting on negative emissions. Nature Clim. Change 4(10): 850-853.
Genesio, L., Miglietta, F., Lugato, E., Baronti, S., Pieri, M., Vaccari, FP. (2012) Surface albedo following biochar application in durum 
wheat. Environmental Research Letters (2012): 1-8. IOP Science. http://iopscience.iop.org/1748-9326/7/1/014025.
Global CCS Institute, 2016, The Global Status of CCS, 2016: Summary Report, Australia, https://hub.globalccsinstitute.com/sites/
default/files/publications/201158/global-status-ccs-2016-summary--report.pdf
Griscom, B.W., Adams, J., Ellis, P., Houghton, R.A., Lomax, G., Miteva, D.A., Schlesinger, W.H., Shoch, D., Siikamäki, J., Woodbury, P., 
Zganjar, C., Blackman, A., Campari, J., Conant, R.T., Delgado, C., Elias, P., Hamsik, M., Kiesecker, J., Landis, E., Polasky, S., Potapov, 
P., Putz, F.E., Sanderman, J., Silvius, M., Smith, P., Wollenberg, E. & Fargione, J. 2017. Natural pathways to climate mitigation. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA (in press).
Hamilton, K., Chokkalingam, U., Bendana, M., 2010. State of the Forest Carbon Markets 2009: Taking Root and Branching Out. Eco-
system Marketplace Report. Forest Trends, Washington, DC.
Hartmann J., West A.J., Renforth P, Kohler P, DeLaRocha C.L., Wolf-Gladrow D.A., Durr H.H., Scheffran J, 2013, Enhanced chemical 
weathering as a geoengineering strategy to reduce atmospheric carbon dioxide, supply nutrients, and mitigate ocean acidifica-
tion, Reviews in Geophysics 51(2) pp 113-149, DOI: 10.1002/rog.20004
Havlík, P., and Coauthors, 2011: Global land-use implications of first and second generation biofuel targets. Energy Policy, 39, 
5690–5702, doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2010.03.030.
Henderson G., Rickaby R., Bouman H., 2008, Decreasing atmospheric CO
2
 by increasing ocean alklainity, https://www.earth.ox.ac.
uk/~gideonh/reports/Cquestrate_report.pdf 
Houghton, R. A., Byers, B., & Nassikas, A. A. (2015). A role for tropical forests in stabilizing atmospheric CO
2
. Nature Climate Change, 
5(12), 1022-1023.
House KZ, House CH, Schrag DP, Aziz MJ (2007) Electrochemical acceleration of chemical weathering as an energetically feasible 
approach to mitigating anthropo- genic climate change. Environ Sci Technol 41(24):8464–8470 
Hu, S., Niu, Z., Chen, Y., Li, L., Zhang, H. (2017). Global wetlands: potential distribution, wetland loss, and status. Science of the Total 
Environment 586: 319-327. 
ICEF, 2017, Carbon Dioxide Utilization (CO
2
U): ICEF Roadmap 1.0,
International Energy Agency, 2017, Energy Technology Perspectives 2017. Catalysing Energy Technology Transformations, Paris 
(ISBN 978-92-64-27050-3)
IPCC 2014, 2013 Supplement to the 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories: Wetlands, Hiraishi, T., Krug, T., 
Tanabe, K., Srivastava, N., Baasansuren, J., Fukuda, M. and Troxler, T.G. (eds). Published: IPCC, Switzerland.
IPCC, 2005 - Bert Metz, Ogunlade Davidson, Heleen de Coninck, Manuela Loos and Leo Meyer (Eds.). Cambridge University Press, 
UK. pp 431. https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/special-reports/srccs/srccs_wholereport.pdf 
IPCC. 2014. Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Geneva, Switzerland: IPCC.
Jones, A. D., K. V. Calvin, W. D. Collins, and J. Edmonds, 2015: Accounting for radiative forcing from albedo change in future global 
land-use scenarios. Clim. Change, 131, 691–703, doi:10.1007/s10584-015-1411-5.
Joseph, S., Graber, E.R., Chia, C., Munroe, P., Donne, S., Thomas, T., Nielsen, S., Marjo, C., Rutlidge, H., Pan, G.X. and Li, L., 2013. 
Shifting paradigms: development of high-efficiency biochar fertilizers based on nano-structures and soluble components. Carbon 
Management, 4(3), pp.323-343.)
Keith, D.W. 2017. Toward a Responsible Solar Geoengineering Research Program. Issues in Science and Technology 33(3), 71-77.
Keith, D.W., Ha-Duong M., Stolaroff J.K., 2006, Climate Strategy with CO
2
 Capture from the Air, Climate Change, v.74 17-45, DOI: 
10.1007/s10584-005-9026-x
Kelemen PB, Matter J, 2008, In situ carbonation of peridotite for CO
2
 storage. PNAS 105(45)  pp 17295–17300
Kemper, J., 2015: Biomass and carbon dioxide capture and storage: A review. Int. J. Greenh. Gas Control, 40, 401–430, doi:10.1016/j.
ijggc.2015.06.012.
Kheshgi, H. S. 1995. Sequestering atmospheric carbon dioxide by increasing ocean alkalinity. Energy, 20(9), 915-922.
Kimaro, A.A., Isaac, M.E. & Chamshama, S.A.O. (2011) Carbon pools in tree biomass and soils under rotational woodlot systems 
in Eastern Tanzania. In: ”Carbon Sequestration Potential of Agroforestry Systems”, ed. Kumar, B.M. & Nair, P.K.R., Springer, Dor-
drecht, NL. pp. 129-143.
Kirschbaum, M. U. F., Whitehead, D., Dean, S. M., Beets, P. N., Shepherd, J. D., & Ausseil, A. G. (2011). Implications of albedo changes 
following afforestation on the benefits of forests as carbon sinks. Biogeosciences, 8(12), 3687.
Lackner K.S., Ziock H., Grimes P., 1999, Carbon Dioxide Extraction from Air: Is It an Option? In Proceedings of the 24th Annual Tech-
nical Conference on Coal Utilization & Fuel Systems, Clearwater, FL.; pp  885– 896
Lackner KS, Wendt CH, Butt DP, Joyce EL, Sharp DH (1995) Carbon dioxide disposal in carbonate minerals, Energy 11(20) pp. 1153-
1170
Lal, R (2011) Sequestering carbon in soils of agro-ecosystems. Food Policy 36, Supplement 1, pp. S33-S39
Lal, R. (2013) Intensive Agriculture and the Soil Carbon Pool. Journal of Crop Improvement, 27(6), pp.735-751
Lassiter III J.B., Misra S., 2016, Carbon Engineering, Harvard Business School case study, 9-814-040.
Lehmann J., Czimczik, C., Laird, D., Sohi, S. (2015) Stability of biochar in soil. In: Biochar for Environmental Management: Science, 
Technology and Implementation (eds. Lehmann, J., Joseph, S.), pp. 235-282, Taylor and Francis, London, UK.
Lehmann, J. and Joseph, S. (2009) Biochar for Environmental Management: Science and Technology. Earthscan Books Ltd., London, 
UK.
88 The Emissions Gap Report 2017 – References
Lenton, T. M. (2014) The Global Potential for Carbon Dioxide Removal. In Geoengineering of the Climate System (eds Harrison, R. M. 
and Hester, R. E.), Royal Society of Chemistry, 2014, pp. 52-79.
Li, D., Niu, S., and Luo, Y. (2012). Global patterns of the dynamics of soil carbon and nitrogen stocks following afforestation: a meta-
analysis. New Phytologist, 195(1), 172-181.
Lomax, G., M. Workman, T. Lenton, N. Shah, 2015, Reframing the policy approach to greenhouse gas removal technologies, Energy 
Policy, 78 (2015) 125–136, doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2014.10.002
Marshall C., 2017, “In Switzerland, a giant new machine is sucking carbon directly from the air”, E&E News, June 1 (reprinted in 
Science: doi:10.1126/science.aan6915)
McDonough W., 2016, Carbon is not the Enemy, Nature 539, pp 349-351
McLaren, D., 2012: A comparative global assessment of potential negative emissions technologies. Spec. Issue Negat. Emiss. Tech-
nol., 90, 489–500, doi:10.1016/j.psep.2012.10.005.
Miles L. and Sonwa D.J. et al. 2015 UNEP Emissions Gap Report, Chapter 6: Mitigation potential from forest-related activities and 
incentives for enhanced ac on in developing countries 
Minasny,B. et al. (2017) Soil carbon 4 per mille. Geoderma 292 (2017)59–86
Minx, J.C.; Lamb, W.; Callaghan, M.; Bornmann, L.; Fuss, S. 2017. Fast growing research on negative emissions. Envir. Res. Letters 
12/035007
Mitsch, William J., et al. (2012). Wetlands, carbon, and climate change. Landscape Ecology 28.4: 583-597. 
Monfreda, C., N. Ramankutty, and J. A. Foley, 2008: Farming the planet: 2. Geographic distribution of crop areas, yields, physiologi-
cal types, and net primary production in the year 2000. Global Biogeochem. Cycles, 22, doi:10.1029/2007GB002947.
Monkman S., MacDonald M., 2015, Case studies for CO
2
 utilization in concrete, Spec. Publication 303, American Concrete Institute, 
pp. 33-44
Naims (2016): H. Naims, Economics of carbon dioxide capture and utilization - A supply and demand perspective. Environmental 
Science and Pollution Research, 1-16.
NERC, 2017, Greenhouse Gas Removal from the Atmosphere, Program Overview, http://www.nerc.ac.uk/research/funded/pro-
grammes/ggr/#xcollapse2 
Nielsen, Anne Sofie Elburg; Plantinga, Andrew J.; Alig, Ralph J. 2014. New cost estimates for carbon sequestration through affores-
tation in the United States. Gen. Tech. Rep. PNW-GTR-888. Portland, OR: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Pacific 
Northwest Research Station. 35 p.
Page S.E., Hooijer A. 2016 In the line of fire: the peatlands of Southeast Asia. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 371: 20150176. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1098/rstb.2015.0176
Parish, F., Sirin, A., Charman, D.J., Joosten, H., Minayeva, T., Silvius, M., Stringer, L. (2008). Assessment on Peatlands, Biodiversity 
and Climate Change: Main Report. Global Environment Centre, Kuala Lumpur and Wetlands International, Wageningen.
Peters, G. P., R. M. Andrew, J. G. Canadell, S. Fuss, R. B. Jackson, J. I. I. Korsbakken, C. Le Quéré, and N. Nakicenovic, 2017: Key 
indicators to track current progress and future ambition of the Paris Agreement. Nat. Clim. Chang., 7, 118–122, doi:10.1038/
nclimate3202.
Peters, G.P., O. Geden, 2017: Catalysing a political shift from low to negative carbon. Nat. Clim. Chang., 7, 619–621, doi:10.1038/
nclimate3369.
Plevin, R. J., M. O’Hare, A. D. Jones, M. S. Torn, and H. K. Gibbs, 2010: Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Biofuels’ Indirect Land Use 
Change Are Uncertain but May Be Much Greater than Previously Estimated. Environ. Sci. Technol., 44, 8015–8021, doi:10.1021/
es101946t. http://pubs.acs.org.globalproxy.cvt.dk/doi/full/10.1021/es101946t. 
Popp, A., Krause, M., Dietrich, J. P., Lotze-Campen, H., Leimbach, M., Beringer, T., & Bauer, N. (2012). Additional CO
2
 emissions from 
land use change — Forest conservation as a precondition for sustainable production of second generation bioenergy. Ecological 
Economics, 74, 64–70. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2011.11.004 
Powlson, DS, Stirling, CM, Jat, ML, Gerard, BG, Palm, CA, Sanchez, PA, Cassman, KG (2014) Limited potential of no-till agriculture for 
climate change mitigation. Nature Climate Change 4, 678–683 (2014) doi:10.1038/nclimate2292
Rau G., Knauss K.G., Lander W.H., Caldeira K., 2004, CO
2
 mitigation via accelerated limestone weathering,  Am. Chem. Soc., Div. Fuel 
Chem. 2004, 49 (1), 376
Rau GH, Knauss KG, Langer WH, Caldeira K, 2007, Reducing energy-related CO
2
 emissions using accelerated weathering of lime-
stone, Energy 32, pp. 1471-1477, DOI: 10.1016/j.energy.2006.10.011
Raymo, M.E., 1991, Geochemical evidence supporting T.C. Chamberlain’s theory of glaciation, Geology 19(4) 344-347 https://doi.
org/10.1130/0091-7613(1991)019<0344:GESTCC>2.3.CO;2
Renforth P, Kruger T, 2013, Coupling mineral carbonation and ocean liming, Energy Fuels 27(8), pp. 4199-4207 DOI: 10.1021/
ef302030w
Renforth P., Henderson G., 2017, Assessing ocean alkalinity for carbon sequestration, Reviews in Geophysics 55, 
10.1002/2016RG000533
Rogelj, J., G. Luderer, R. C. Pietzcker, E. Kriegler, M. Schaeffer, V. Krey, and K. Riahi. 2015. Energy system transformations for limiting 
end-of-century warming to below 1.5 [deg]C. Nature Clim. Change 5(6): 519-527.
Rogelj, J., M. den Elzen, N. Höhne, T. Fransen, H. Fekete, H. Winkler, R. Schaeffer, F. Sha, K. Riahi, and M. Meinshausen. 2016. Paris 
Agreement climate proposals need a boost to keep warming well below 2°C. Nature 534(7609): 631-639.
Royal Society 2009. Geoengineering the climate Science, governance and uncertainty. Royal Society Policy document 10/09 Issued: 
September 2009 RS1636. ISBN: 978-0-85403-773-5.
Sanz-Perez E.S., Murdock C.R., Didas S.A., Jones C.W., 2016, Direct Air Capture of CO
2
 from Ambient Air, Chem. Rev., v. 116 (19), pp 
11840-11876
89The Emissions Gap Report 2017 – References
Schäfer, S.; Lawrence, M.; Stelzer, H.; Born, W.; Low, S.; Aaheim, A.; Adriázola, P.; Betz, G.; Boucher, O.; Carius, A.; Devine-Right, P.; 
Gullberg, A. T.; Haszeldine, S.; Haywood, J.; Houghton, K.; Ibarrola, R.; Irvine, P.; Kristjansson, J.-E.; Lenton, T.; Link, J. S. A.; Maas, 
A.; Meyer, L.; Muri, H.; Oschlies, A.; Proelß, A.; Rayner, T.; Rickels, W.; Ruthner, L.; Scheffran, J.; Schmidt, H.; Schulz, M.; Scott, 
V.; Shackley, S.; Tänzler, D.; Watson, M.; Vaughan, N., 2015, The European Transdisciplinary Assessment of Climate Engineering 
(EuTRACE):Removing Greenhouse Gases from the Atmosphere and Reflecting Sunlight away from Earth. http://www.iass-pots-
dam.de/sites/default/files/files/eutrace_report_digital_second_edition_0.pdf
Scott, V., R. S. Haszeldine, S. F. B. Tett, and A. Oschlies, 2015: Fossil fuels in a trillion tonne world. Nat. Clim. Chang., 5, 419–423.
Searchinger, T. D., and Coauthors, 2009: Fixing a Critical Climate Accounting Error. Science (80-. )., 326, 527–528, doi:10.1126/sci-
ence.1178797.
Slade, R., A. Bauen, and R. Gross, 2014: Global bioenergy resources. Nat. Clim. Chang., 4, 99–105.
Smith, P. (2012) Soils and climate change. Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 4, 539–544. 
Smith P., Bustamante, M., Ahammad, H., Clark, H., Dong, H., Elsiddig, E.A., Haberl, H., Harper, R., House, J., Jafari, M., Masera, 
O., Mbow, C., Ravindranath, N.H., Rice, C.W., Robledo Abad, C. Romanovskaya, A., Sperling, F. & Tubiello, F. (2014) Agriculture, 
Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU). In: “Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group 
III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change” pp. 811-922 (ed. Edenhofer, O., R. Pichs-
Madruga, Y. Sokona, E. Farahani, S. Kadner, K. Seyboth, A. Adler, I. Baum, S. Brunner, P. Eickemeier, B. Kriemann, J. Savolainen, S. 
Schlömer, C. von Stechow, T. Zwickel & J. Minx). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA. 
Smith, P. (2016) Soil carbon sequestration and biochar as negative emission technologies. Global Change Biology 22, 1315–1324.
Smith, P., and Coauthors, 2016: Biophysical and economic limits to negative CO
2
 emissions. Nat. Clim. Chang., 6, 42–50, doi:10.1038/
nclimate2870.
Smith, P., Gregory, P., van Vuuren, D. et al. (2010) Competition for land. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, B. 365, 
2941-2957.
Smith, P., Martino, D., Cai, Z., Gwary, D., Janzen, H., Kumar, P., McCarl, B., Ogle, S., O’Mara, F., Rice, C., Scholes, B., Sirotenko, O., 
Howden, M., McAllister, T., Pan, G., Romanenkov, V., Schneider, U., Towprayoon, S., Wattenbach, M., Smith, J. (2008). Green-
house gas mitigation in agriculture. Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society, Series B 363(1492), 789–813.
Taylor, L.L., Quirk, J., Thorley, R.M.S. et al., 2016. Nature Climate Change, 6, 402-406.
The Economist, 2017, Electrifying Everything, Economist Magazine, Aug. 12th
Trabucco, A., Zomer, R. J., Bossio, D. A., van Straaten, O., & Verchot, L. V. (2008). Climate change mitigation through afforestation/re-
forestation: a global analysis of hydrologic impacts with four case studies. Agriculture, ecosystems & environment, 126(1), 81-97.
Upham, P., and T. Roberts, 2011: Public perceptions of CCS: Emergent themes in pan-European focus groups and implications for 
communications. Int. J. Greenh. Gas Control, 5, 1359–1367, doi:10.1016/j.ijggc.2011.06.005.
USNAS 2015a. Climate Intervention: Carbon Dioxide Removal and Reliable Sequestration. US National Academy of Sciences, Wash-
ington D.C.
USNAS 2015b. Climate Intervention: Reflecting Sunlight to Cool Earth. US National Academy of Sciences, Washington D.C.
van Vuuren, D. P., S. Deetman, J. van Vliet, M. van den Berg, B. J. van Ruijven, and B. Koelbl. 2013. The role of negative CO
2
 emissions 
for reaching 2°C—insights from integrated assessment modelling. Climatic Change 118(1): 15-27.
von der Assen, N., Jung, J. & Bardow, A. (2013) Life-cycle assessment of carbon dioxide capture and utilization: avoiding the pitfalls. 
Energy Environ. Sci., 6, 2721-2734.
Wallquist, L., S. L. O. Seigo, V. H. M. Visschers, and M. Siegrist, 2012: Public acceptance of CCS system elements: A conjoint measure-
ment. Int. J. Greenh. Gas Control, 6, 77–83, doi:10.1016/j.ijggc.2011.11.008.
Weng, Z.H., Van Zwieten, L., Singh, B.P., Tavakkoli, E., Joseph, S., Macdonald, L.M., Rose, T.J., Rose, M.T., Kimber, S.W., Morris, S. and 
Cozzolino, D., (2017). Biochar built soil carbon over a decade by stabilizing rhizodeposits. Nature Climate Change 7, 371-376.
Willauer H., DiMascio F., Hardy D.R., Williams F.W., 2014, Feasibility of CO
2
 Extraction from Seawater and Simultaneous Hydrogen 
Gas Generation Using a Novel and Robust Electrolytic Cation Exchange Module Based on Continuous Electrodeionization Tech-
nology, Industrial & Chem. Res. 53, 12192−12200, dx.doi.org/10.1021/ie502128x.
Williams-Guillén, K., Perfecto, I & Vandermeer, J. (2008) Bats Limit Insects in a Neotropical Agroforestry System. Science, 320, 70.
Williamson P., 2016, Scrutinize CO
2
 removal methods. Nature, 530: 153–155.
Woolf, D., Amonette, JE., Street-Perrott. A., Lehmann, J., Joseph, S. (2010) Sustainable biochar to mitigate global climate change. 
Nature Communications 1, Article 56, doi:10.1038/ncomms1053 (2010).
Worrall, F., Evans, M.G., Bonn, A., Reed, M.S., Chapman, D., Holden, J. (2009). Can carbon offsetting pay for upland ecological res-
toration? The Science of the Total Environment 408(1), 26–36.
Zakkour, P., J. Kemper, T. Dixon, 2014: Incentivising and accounting for negative emission technologies, Energy Procedia, 63 (2014) 
6824 – 6833, doi: 10.1016/j.egypro.2014.11.716.
Zedler, Joy B., and Suzanne Kercher. (2005). Wetland resources: status, trends, ecosystem services, and restorability. Annu. Rev. 
Environ. Resour. 30: 39-74.
Zhang, A., Cui, LQ., Pan, G., Li, LQ., Hussain, Q., Zhang, XH., Zheng, JW., Crowley, D. (2010) Effect of biochar amendment on yield 
and methane and nitrous oxide emissions from a rice paddy from Tai Lake Plain, China. Agriculture, Ecosystems & Environment 
139, 469-475.
Zhao, K., & Jackson, R. B. (2014). Biophysical forcings of land-use changes from potential forestry activities in North America. Eco-
logical Monographs, 84(2), 329-353.
Zomer, R.J., Neufeldt, H., Xu, J.C., Ahrends, A., Bossio, D., Trabucco, A., van Noordwijk, M. & Wang, M.C. (2016) Global Tree Cover 
and Biomass Carbon on Agricultural Land: The contribution of agroforestry to global and national carbon budgets. Scientific 
Reports 2016, 6: 29987. doi: 10.1038/srep29987.


ISBN: 978-92-807-3617-5
Job Number: DEW/2061/NA 
United Nations Avenue, Gigiri
P O Box 30552, 00100 Nairobi, Kenya
Tel +254 20 7621234 | publications@unenvironment.org
www.unenvironment.org
 
